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  i 
Abstract 
 
This thesis aims to further our understanding of the role that intuition plays in human 
reasoning when making probability judgements. It attempts to: a) gain a better understanding 
of the cognitive processes underlying these judgements, b) determine how individual 
differences impacts the logicality of these judgements, and c) test original and theoretically-
driven ways to increase logical intuitions in probability judgements. Classically, it is assumed 
that people make biased judgements because they rely on an intuitive thinking system 
(System 1) and apply the representativeness heuristic to make conjunctive probability 
judgements. In contrast, logical judgements are assumed to arise from the use of deliberation 
(System 2) to overrule the prepotent heuristic response and replace it with a logical one. 
Recent research; however, has challenged this claim and instead proposes that our intuitions 
do not always lead us astray. In fact, they can reflect a sensitivity to logic that is implicit, and 
potentially happens automatically and outside of awareness.  
This thesis takes this notion one step further and asks whether it is the slower, more 
deliberative, thinking system which may be vulnerable to prior beliefs and biases. A series of 
five experiments examined the relative impact of heuristic and logical considerations on 
probability judgements. The results indicated that people are readily able to detect the conflict 
underlying intuitive and deliberative assessments, and that people effortlessly engage in 
deliberative processing, which suggests they are not simply cognitive misers who fail to 
reason in line with the principles of logic because they either lack the cognitive ability or the 
motivation to do so. The results also supported the idea that people can intuit logical 
judgements (i.e., judgements in accordance with the laws of probability) when they rely on 
System 1 thinking; however, when they deliberate or use System 2 thinking, that is when the 
heuristic biases their judgements.  
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Chapter 1: General Introduction 
 
Judgement and decision making is a field that explores how people make decisions 
and judgements under uncertainty. It is a multidisciplinary area that bring together scientists 
and researchers from an array of disciplines including psychology, statistics, economics, 
philosophy, law and medicine to name just a few. Although the terms ‘reasoning’, 
‘judgement’ and ‘decision making’ are usually used interchangeably, there are small 
differences that set them apart from each other. When people reason, they draw implications 
from their beliefs. This process resembles what philosophy describes as deduction: when 
someone seeks to derive new assertions from assertions already in place. For example, ‘If I 
believe X, what other claims follow from this?’ Reasoning allows us to use our knowledge in 
new ways. When people make judgements, they draw conclusions from their experiences. In 
other words, they draw new information from their prior experiences. Judgement and 
reasoning allow people to expand their knowledge in important ways. For example, when 
they draw new conclusions from their experiences, or when they deduce a novel claim from 
their other beliefs. When people make decisions, they choose from among options. This type 
of thinking is more closely linked to their actions and is informed by their judgements. The 
contents of thought and the processes of thought are linked in important ways, and the flow 
of their thoughts depends on what they are trying to accomplish in their thinking. The act of 
making a judgement involves reaching beyond the evidence gathered to draw a conclusion. 
Hence, the nature of making a judgement involves exploration and uncertainty because it 
requires reaching beyond what is already known; as well as risk because they might be 
mistaken in their judgement. 
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People’s decision-making can be less than optimal at times and is prone to biases such 
as framing (i.e., the way a decision is phrased, or the way options are described can influence 
decisions by changing the point of reference). Judgements are also prone to biases and it is 
commonly assumed that these biases occur due to the use of heuristics. Two biases (i.e., the 
conjunction fallacy and base rate neglect) as well as the representativeness heuristic will be 
covered in more detail later in this chapter (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974, 1982, 1983).  
Probability 
This thesis focusses on social judgments under uncertainty, specifically probability 
judgements, and probability is a concept that we use to deal with uncertainty. “The 
probability of an event is a measure of how likely it is to occur” (O’Hagan et al., 2006, p. 2). 
A probability of 0 means that the event will certainly not occur, while a probability of 1 
means that it is certain to occur. Values increasing from 0 to 1 describe increasing chances 
that the event will occur, while the central value 0.5, represents an event that is as likely to 
occur as it is not to occur. For example, the toss of a coin. There is an equal chance of 
throwing a ‘Heads’ as there is to throw a ‘Tails’, thus if H is the probability of getting 
‘Heads’, then the equation can be expressed as such: P(H) = 0.5. Similarly, when rolling a die 
there are six equally likely results, thus if S is the probability of rolling a six, then P(S) = !". 
The theoretical study of probability is a branch of mathematics that deals with laws and 
theorems about how probabilities behave and combine. However, when dealing with 
judgements under uncertainty it becomes a bit trickier as we cannot simply assign a numeric 
probability to an event such as we can with a coin toss or the roll of a die. Uncertainty is an 
unavoidable aspect of human existence and many important choices must be based on beliefs 
about the likelihood of such uncertain events occurring (Kahneman & Tversky, 1983). A few 
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examples include: where to invest one’s money, the result of an election, the outcome of a 
medical procedure, or the guilt of a defendant.  
Rules of probability. There are many rules of probability all used to calculate the 
chance of an event happening. The rule of mutual exclusivity states that two events cannot 
both be true if they are mutually exclusive. For example, a) “Hillary Clinton will win the US 
presidency in 2016” and b) “Donald Trump will win the US presidency in 2016” are two 
statements each with a probability between 0 and 1; however, they both cannot be true 
because they are mutually exclusive. The rule of exhaustiveness is similar in that one of the 
probabilities must be true; however, when taken together they exhaust the possibilities. For 
example, a) “Einstein was born before 1900”, b) “Einstein was born after 1900”, and c) 
“Einstein was not born before or after 1900”. Not only are these statements mutually 
exhaustive, one of them must be true; and together they exhaust the possibilities. The 
probability of negations enables one to calculate the probability of a negation from the 
probability of the statement negated. For example, suppose we know the probability of 
throwing a four on a die is 1 in 6, so P(F) = !". Then the negation rule enables us to calculate 
the probability that a four will not turn up on the next throw: P(~F) = #". Obviously not every 
pair of statements is mutually exclusive, and in many cases two events can both be true. 
Thus, the general disjunction rule is used to calculate these probabilities. For example, the 
likelihood of drawing a King and drawing a Club from a deck of cards is not mutually 
exclusive because of the King of Clubs. So, one needs to subtract the probability of drawing 
that card: P(K&C) = P(K) + P(C) – P(KC) = $#% + !&#% - !#% = !"#% = $!&. The conditional rule of 
probability enables one to calculate the probability that an event is true conditional on another 
event being true: P(A/B) = '()*)'(*) . The rule of independence states that two events are 
independent if neither affect the probability of the other: P(A/B) = P(A) and P(A/B) = P(B). 
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For example, “Hillary Clinton will be the next US President” is independent of “the first card 
I choose (from a full deck) will be an Ace”. When we are dealing with independent 
propositions, we can derive a simpler rule for conjunctions, the restricted conjunction rule: 
P(A&B) = P(A) x P(B). The final, but most applicable rule of probability for this thesis is the 
conjunction probability rule, as this rule forms the foundation on which this program of 
research was built. 
Conjunction probability rule. Probability is a measurement of the likelihood that an 
event will occur. When making a judgement of probability, people are required to reach 
beyond what they already know, which adds an element of uncertainty and risk. The laws of 
probability are derived from extensional considerations. The extension rule is one of the 
simplest yet fundamental qualitative laws of probability. It states that if the extension of A 
includes the extension of B (i.e., A ⊃ B) then P(A) ≥ 𝑃(B). This is because the set of 
possibilities associated with the conjunction A&B is included in the set of possibilities 
associated with B. This sentiment is also expressed in the conjunction rule 𝑃(A&B) ≤ 𝑃(A) 
and 𝑃(A&B) ≤ 𝑃(𝐵), which states that a conjunction can never be more likely to occur than 
one of its constituents (see Figure 1. 1). Even as the probability of B increases to cover A, it 
can still not be greater than A. At best, B can only be equal to A. 
 
Figure 1. 1. The conjunction rule of probability as represented by Venn diagrams 
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Heuristics and Biases 
“Judgments are all based on data of limited validity, which are processed according to 
heuristic rules” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, p.1124). Research on probability heuristics 
began in earnest in the 1970’s and has been growing in popularity ever since. Two 
researchers, namely Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahnemam, have been especially prominent 
in this field. They established a cognitive understanding for common human errors in 
judgement and decision making that arise from heuristics and biases (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1973; Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky, 1982; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1982, 1983). Together they developed Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979), a behavioural economic theory that describes how people make choices between 
alternatives involving risk, where the probabilities of outcomes are known. They postulate 
that people base their decisions on the would-be losses and gains instead of the final outcome 
and use certain heuristics when making their evaluations. This theory was developed further 
in 1992 to overcome violations of stochastic dominance, which is when one gamble, or 
prospect, is ranked as superior to another by a large group of decision makers; making it a 
more accurate predictor of human judgement and decision making (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1992). In 2002 Kahneman was acknowledged for his valuable contribution to our 
understanding of how human beings’ reason under uncertainty, by being awarded the Nobel 
Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for Prospect Theory in 20021.  
                                                             
 
 
1Amos Tversky was deceased by this time. 
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The term ‘heuristic’; however, has been around much longer than the 1970’s. This 
word emerged in the early nineteenth century from the Greek word heuriskein which means 
“find” (Online Etymology Dictionary, 2019). Originally heuristic meant enabling a person to 
discover or learn something for him or herself. This experienced-based technique for drawing 
conclusions and making decisions has become a seminal area in psychological research over 
the past half a century with many different judgement and decision heuristics emerging in the 
literature. The definitions of these heuristics, combined with the studies on them, suggest that 
people often rely on cognitive shortcuts when making judgements. The classic understanding 
of heuristics is that they save on effort but can also come at the cost of accuracy (Gigerenzer 
& Gaissmaier, 2011). In other words, heuristics offer a trade-off between cognitive efficiency 
and accuracy. When people need to make a difficult decision or judgement, they use a 
guideline that is simple and easy to access. Heuristics are cognitive shortcuts that people 
employ when a task or decision becomes too difficult. They are strategies or rules of thumb 
that reduce complex problems into simpler judgemental ones (Shiloh, Salton, & Sharabi, 
2002). People normally do not have adequate formal models for computing the probabilities 
of uncertain events, thus intuitive judgement is often the only practical method for assessing 
uncertainty (Kahneman & Tversky, 1983). People tend to use heuristics when dealing with 
uncertainty; by relying on schemas to make guesses they are likely to arrive at the correct 
solution. “When faced with the difficult task of judging probability or frequency, people 
employ a limited number of heuristics which reduce these judgements to simpler ones” 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, p. 207). Heuristics are quick and efficient in terms of time 
invested in making a decision. Usually they are well adapted to handle a wide range of 
problems (Kahneman & Frederick, 2005); however, if applied too broadly these same 
heuristics can bias judgements and decisions. They aid people to estimate the probability, or 
likelihood, of an event occurring but they do not guarantee accuracy (Evans, 2010). In other 
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words, heuristics assist people to make judgements faster, but at the expense of occasional 
mistakes. The key word here is occasional; people make erroneous judgements sometimes, 
however continue to use heuristics in risky or uncertain situations because for the majority of 
the time the heuristics serve the task well. In fact, people either fail to realise the limitations 
of the heuristic, or they fail to realise they are using a heuristic in the first place because 
heuristics operate very quickly and automatically. If as Devine and Monteith (1999) describe, 
heuristic processes occur without intention, effort or awareness, and without interfering with 
other concurrent cognitive processes then it is possible that people are unaware of using them 
when solving problems. 
Some researchers believe that heuristics are based on previous experience and 
knowledge and are considered to be serious sources of error due to their overuse or 
inappropriate application (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). A prominent feature of judgement 
and decision-making research is the emphasis placed on errors – violations of rational norms 
– also known as biases. The normative theory of human judgement and choice plays a critical 
role in judgement under uncertainty because it provides a rational model to which 
participants’ behaviour can be compared. In other words, these logical norms inform the null 
hypotheses of research studies. Although errors in judgement and choice are often interesting 
in themselves, this is not the reason why psychologists pay such close attention to them. It is 
through studying the biases that researchers are able to identify which heuristics were used to 
make certain judgements and decisions. “A bias is a systematic tendency to consider 
irrelevant factors and ignore relevant ones when solving a problem” (Moutier & Houdé, 
2003, p. 186). A commonly adopted strategy for research in this field is to identify a factor 
that should generally not affect judgement or decision, and then design an experiment in 
which it does (Kahneman, 1991). Inducing and studying biases allows psychologists to 
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determine what normal judgement and decision performance is, and it also accomplishes the 
methodological objective of rejecting a credible null hypothesis. 
The Representativeness Heuristic. Determinants of representativeness are similarity 
and randomness. A sample is defined as representative if it is similar in essential properties to 
its parent population and reflects the salient features of the process by which it is generated. 
For example, how representative of a bird is a robin compared with a penguin? “A will be 
judged more probable than B whenever A appears more representative than B” (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1972, p. 26). “In the same manner, a person seems representative of a social group 
if his or her personality resembles the stereotypical member of that group” (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1983, p. 296). Thus, the ordering of events by their subjective probabilities 
coincides with their ordering by representativeness. A randomly selected sample should 
appear to be random in order for people to judge it as representative. Often people interpret 
coincidences as having more meaning than what they actually do, because they do not look 
random enough to be explained by chance. Take for instance a normal coin with one head (H) 
and one tail (T), if you were to toss it six times which of these two outcomes would you 
believe was more likely: T H H T H T or H H H T T T? Most people would guess that T H H 
T H T would be the most likely outcome of the two possibilities because it appears to be the 
most random, and a coin toss should have a random outcome (Teigen, 2004). However, both 
sequences are equally as likely to occur because the flip of a coin has a 50% chance of 
landing heads up or tails up. Representativeness is when a sample is considered more 
representative if it is similar in important characteristics to the population, or prototype, from 
which it was selected. People tend to ignore important information such as sample size and 
base rate in favour of representativeness, and also confuse independent and dependent events. 
For example, previous coin tosses cannot affect future ones, and thus previous tosses should 
not be taken into consideration when guessing probabilities of future tosses. 
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Representativeness is not always akin to similarity.  Sometimes it can reflect a 
correlational and causal relationship amongst people’s beliefs (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972). 
For example, a particular act such as stealing is representative of a particular person because 
we afford that person a specific disposition to commit the act, not because the act resembles 
the person. Representativeness also tends to covary with frequency. Common or frequent 
events are usually more representative than unusual or rare events. The representative 
summer day is warm and sunny, or the representative height of an adult female is 5 feet 4 
inches. However, there are instances where a highly specific outcome can be representative 
but infrequent. For example, it might be representative for a female university student “to 
weigh between 124 and 125 pounds”, but there are more “women who weigh more than 135 
pounds” than “women who weigh between 124 and 125 pounds” (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1983, p. 296). Thus “124-125 pounds” was judged as representative but less frequent than 
“above 135 pounds”. An attribute can be representative of a class if it is very diagnostic. For 
example, it is more representative for a Hollywood actress to have been “divorced more than 
four times”, than to “vote Democratic”. Multiple divorces amongst Hollywood actresses 
feeds into a stereotype that divorce rates are higher amongst Hollywood actresses than among 
other women. An unrepresentative illustration of a category can be representative of a 
superordinate category. For example, rice is an unrepresentative vegetable, but it is 
representative of food. “Representativeness is nonextensional: It is not determined by 
frequency, and it is not bound by class inclusion. Consequently, the test of the conjunction 
rule in probability judgments offers the sharpest contrast between the extensional logic of 
probability theory and the psychological principles of representativeness” (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1983, p. 296). 
The belief that random looking outcomes are more likely than orderly outcomes is 
known as the representativeness heuristic. People often use this heuristic when they judge a 
  10 
sample to be more likely if it is similar to the population from which it was drawn 
(Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Kahneman & Tversky, 1972). Although useful in many 
situations, the representativeness heuristic is extremely persuasive and can encourage errors 
when making more complex decisions. The representativeness heuristic is an example of a 
heuristic that often results in misconceptions of chance. It occurs when people form 
generalisations from highly limited information (Shiloh, Salton, & Sharabi, 2002). More 
specifically, when people consider a sample more representative if it is similar in important 
characteristics to the population – or prototype – from which it was selected. The stereotype 
or prototype of the population from which the sample is selected is often so compelling that 
people ignore important statistical information that otherwise should be have been 
considered. For example, sample size and base rate are two kinds of useful statistical 
information that are often overlooked in representativeness judgements. 
Sample size and representativeness. Kahneman and Tversky proposed that that 
people assign probabilities to events so that “the more representative events are assigned 
higher probabilities, and equally representative events are assigned equal probabilities” 
(1972, p. 437). When making representativeness judgements people often fail to pay attention 
to the sample size due to the persuasiveness of the representation. A large sample is 
statistically more likely to reflect the true proportions in a population, while a small sample is 
more likely to reflect the extreme deviations from the population (Teigen, 2004). Consider 
the following example (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972; the correct answers are asterisked): 
A certain town is served by two hospitals. In the larger hospital about 45 babies are 
born each day, and in the smaller hospital about 15 babies are born each day. As you 
know, about 50% of all babies born are boys. The exact percentage of baby boys, 
however, varies from day to day. Sometimes it may be higher than 50%, sometimes 
lower. 
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For a period of one year, each hospital recorded days on which (more/less) than 60% 
of the babies born were boys. Which hospital do you think recorded more such days? 
 (More than 60%) (Less than 60%) 
The larger hospital (12) (9)* 
The smaller hospital (10)* (11) 
About the same (i.e., within 
5% of each other) 
(28) (25) 
 
The researchers hypothesised that if people had any insight into the role of sample 
size, they should find it easy to select the correct answer. However, if they judge equally 
representative outcomes as equally likely, they should show no preference for the correct 
answer. When they tested this theory, they found that the latter was clearly the case. People 
opted for the “same” answer showing no preference for the correct answer. “The notion that 
sampling variance decreases in proportion to sample size is apparently not part of man’s 
repertoire of intuitions” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972, p. 444). People make these sampling 
biases often in everyday life, for example people are willing to take seriously a result 
expressed as a percentage without concern for the number of observations, which may be 
ridiculously small. Alternatively, people often remain sceptical in the face of solid 
information from a large sample. The researchers conclude that people can be taught the rule 
of sampling; however, work by Tversky and Kahneman (1971) shows a strong tendency to  
underestimate the impact of sample size, even when the subjects have knowledge of the 
correct rule and extensive statistical training.  
Base rate and representativeness. Just as people neglect the sample size, so do they 
ignore the base rate when making representativeness judgements. Again, this is due to the 
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persuasiveness of the heuristic. The base rate is the amount of times an item occurs in the 
population, and people tend to rely on representativeness when they are asked to judge 
category membership (Teigen, 2004). Kahneman and Tversky (1973) devised a study that 
tested the “hypothesis that intuitive predictions are dominated by representativeness and are 
relatively insensitive to prior probabilities” (p.241). Subjects were presented with the 
following cover story: 
A panel of psychologists have interviewed and administered personality tests to 30 
engineers and 70 lawyers, all successful in their respective fields. On the basis of this 
information, thumbnail descriptions of the 30 engineers and 70 lawyers have been 
written. You will find on your forms five descriptions, chosen at random from the 100 
available descriptions. For each description, please indicate your probability that the 
person described is an engineer, on a scale from 0 to 100. 
The same task has been performed by a panel of experts, who were highly accurate in 
assigning probabilities to the various descriptions. You will be paid a bonus to the 
extent that your estimates come close to those of the expert panel. 
There were two conditions; the low engineer group (e.g., 30 engineers and 70 
lawyers) and the high engineer group (e.g., 70 engineers and 30 lawyers). All subjects were 
presented with five descriptions, one of which read: 
Jack is a 45-year-old man. He is married and has four children. He is generally 
conservative, careful, and ambitious. He shows no interest in political and social 
issues and spends most of his free time on his many hobbies which include home 
carpentry, sailing, and mathematical puzzles. 
The probability that Jack is one of the 30 engineers in the sample of 100 is _____%. 
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Following the five descriptions, the subjects were shown the null description: 
Suppose now that you are given no information whatsoever about an individual 
chosen at random from the sample.  
The probability that this man is one of the 30 engineers in the sample of 100 is ___%. 
The researchers found that the average value was 50% for the low-engineer group, 
and 55% for the high-engineer group, and although the effect of prior probability was slight it 
was significant (p < .01). However, the researchers also discovered that the only condition 
that provided the correct response (e.g., 70% for high-engineer group and 30% for low-
engineer group) was the null description. All five other conditions gave incorrect responses. 
Thus, the researchers concluded that explicit manipulation of the prior distribution had 
minimal effect on subjective probability. Participants applied their knowledge of the prior 
only when they were given no specific evidence, and prior probabilities were largely ignored 
when individuating information was made available. Indeed, even giving the participants 
worthless information resulted in errors. The example read: 
Dick is a 30-year-old man. He is married with no children. A man of high ability and 
high motivation, he promises to be quite successful in his field. He is well liked by his 
colleagues. 
This description was constructed to be completely uninformative with regards to 
Dick’s profession and participants responded with 50% for both the low- and high-engineer 
groups. When no specific evidence is given, in other words, by removing the context, it 
seems that prior probabilities are properly utilised. However, by including evidence, even 
worthless evidence, those prior probabilities are ignored. These findings highlight that people 
focus almost exclusively on representativeness when judging category membership, and by 
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doing so commit the base-rate fallacy. In other words, the important statistical information 
found in the base rate in underestimated, while representativeness is overemphasised; 
resulting in a failure to identify that one category is more common than the other.  
In 2007, Barbey and Sloman published a review article on the phenomenon of base-
rate neglect. They attempted to explain human rationality, and how people make judgements 
under conditions of uncertainty by unpacking the perspectives found in the literature and 
evaluating how well they explained existing data and their conceptual coherence. Their 
empirical review supported five main conclusions, all of which suggested that people do not 
have an inductive reasoning mechanism designed to process natural frequencies, instead they 
rely on cues to the set structure of the problem for accurate reasoning. In fact, partitioning the 
data into nested sets facilitated Bayesian reasoning regardless of whether natural frequencies 
or single-event probabilities were used. The authors found solid evidence supporting the 
nested set hypothesis. In other words “the mind embodies a domain general capacity to 
perform elementary set operations and these operations can be induced by cues to the set 
structure of the problem to facilitate reasoning in any context where people tend to rely on 
associative rather than extensional, rule-based processes” (Barbey & Sloman, 2007, p. 252). 
Errors were reduced when the question was presented in such a way that it made the 
participants use the sample of category instances to give an answer, or when the sample of 
category instances were represented in a nested set structure, which organised the data into a 
manner needed to solve the Bayesian computation. 
The Conjunction Fallacy 
Following the early work of Kahneman and Tversky in the 70’s and 80’s, a vast 
amount of empirical data has emerged all casting doubt on the extent to which human 
reasoning is logical (see Evans & Over, 1997; Kahneman, 2011). An example of this is how 
poorly people perform on intuitive probability judgement tasks (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, 
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1983). A realization from all of these studies is that “adult subjects are able to correctly carry 
out certain probabilistic reasoning tasks—which is a testimony to their logical inductive 
abilities—while still exhibiting massive reasoning biases in other contexts” (Moutier & 
Houdé, 2003, p.186). The conjunction fallacy is one of the classical intuitive probability 
judgement biases that affects inductive reasoning. Inductive reasoning is when specific 
observations lead to a general or probable conclusion, compared to deductive reasoning 
which is when general rules lead to a true and specific conclusion. An example of inductive 
logic is, “The coin I pulled from the bag is a penny”. Even though all the premises are true in 
this statement, inductive reasoning allows for the conclusion to be false. Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974, 1983) were the first to demonstrate the conjunction fallacy using both 
frequency and probability judgements. 
The conjunction fallacy is perhaps the most notorious of dual-process reasoning 
errors. When a person neglects to apply the laws of conjunction probability and rates a 
conjunction of events occurring as more likely than either of the constituent events occurring 
singularly, then they have committed a conjunction fallacy. In other words, they assume that 
multiple specific conditions are more probable than a single general one. Often seduced by 
compelling heuristics the reasoner commits this bias despite it being statistically impossible. 
Take these two scenarios for instance, 1) a car accident occurring on a perfectly straight 
highway, and 2) a car accident occurring on a perfectly straight highway with a grease spot. 
The second statement may be judged to be more likely to occur given the grease spot as this 
gives rise to the stereotype of a slippery road. However, the second statement is merely an 
extension of the first. In both scenarios the car accident occurred on a perfectly straight 
highway. Another example would be the probability of having three daughters and one son 
may appear higher, intuitively, than the probability of having only three daughters (Fiedler, 
1988). Tversky and Kahneman attribute the conjunction fallacy to the representativeness 
  16 
heuristic (1983). They believe that people derive their probability estimates by application of 
this heuristic, and therein lies the problem because this then leads to biases.  The conjunction 
of two events combines one representative (likely) event with another unrepresentative 
(unlikely) event, and this conjunction is usually perceived as more representative (likely) than 
the unrepresentative event on its own. These judgements via representativeness give rise to 
erroneous probability judgements, in other words, the conjunction is judged more probable 
than its unrepresentative (unlikely) component. “If probability estimates were based on 
representativeness, it would seem reasonable to assume that the more representative the 
larger component, the more representative the conjunction will be judged to be and the 
greater will be the extent of the conjunction fallacy” (Fisk, 2002, p. 432). In 1977, Tversky 
proposed a model where similarity is a continuous function of both similar and dissimilar 
events. Tversky and Kahneman (1983) have suggested that this model might provide the 
basis for judgements under representativeness, such that the perceived representativeness of 
the conjunction depends on the perceived representativeness of both the unlikely 
(unrepresentative) component and the likely (representative) component. Hence, the more 
likely (representative) the larger component is perceived to be, the more likely 
(representative) the conjunction will be judged to be.  
In a pioneering series of studies, Tversky and Kahneman (1983) demonstrated that, 
when evaluating the likelihood of the conjunction of two events, most people made these 
systematic errors. Among the best known examples of this type of logical violation is the 
‘Linda problem’. 
The Linda Problem. The representativeness heuristic involves using a stereotype or 
prototype when making a judgement instead of logic, and this can lead to errors in 
judgement. To test this idea Tversky and Kahneman (1983) developed a task affectionately 
known today as the “Linda problem”.  Their earliest studies on the conjunction rule began in 
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1974 and used occupation and political affiliation as target attributes to be predicted singly or 
in conjunction from brief personality sketches. In 1983 they replicated and extended this 
work using the following personality sketches of two fictitious people, Linda and Bill (see 
Figure 1. 2), followed by a list of occupations and hobbies associated with each of them. The 
task involved reading a personality sketch of Linda and Bill followed by a list of eight 
statements. These statements were comprised of hobbies and occupations, some more closely 
associated to the prototype of Linda and Bill than others. Participants were required to read 
the personality description and then to rank the eight statements in order of the degree to 
which they resembled a typical member of that class. They gave a ranking of “1” for the most 
likely option and a ranking of “8” for the least likely option. The description of Bill was 
constructed to be representative of an accountant (A) and unrepresentative of a person who 
plays jazz for a hobby (J), while the description of Linda was representative of an active 
feminist (F) and unrepresentative of a bank teller (T).  
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Read the following paragraph:  Read the following paragraph: 
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken and 
very bright. She majored in philosophy. As 
a student, she was deeply concerned with 
issues of discrimination and social justice, 
and she also participated in anti-nuclear 
demonstrations.  
 
Bill is 34 years old. He is intelligent, but 
unimaginative, compulsive, and generally 
lifeless. In school, he was strong in 
mathematics but weak in social studies and 
humanities. 
Now rank the following options in terms of 
the probability of their describing Linda. 
Give a ranking of 1 to the most likely option 
and a ranking of 8 to the least likely option: 
 
Now rank the following options in terms of 
the probability of their describing Bill. Give 
a ranking of 1 to the most likely option and 
a ranking of 8 to the least likely option: 
 
___Linda is a teacher in elementary school. ___Bill is a physician who plays poker for a 
hobby.  
___Linda works in a bookstore and takes 
yoga classes. 
___Bill is an architect.   
 
___Linda is active in the feminist 
movement. (F) 
___Bill is an accountant. (A)  
 
___Linda is a psychiatric social worker. 
 
___Bill plays jazz for a hobby. (J) 
 
___Linda is a member of the League of 
Women Voters. 
___Bill surfs for a hobby.   
 
___Linda is a bank teller. (T) 
 
___Bill is a reporter.   
___Linda is an insurance salesperson. 
 
___Bill is an accountant who plays jazz for 
a hobby. (A&J)  
___Linda is a bank teller and is active in the 
feminist movement. (F&T) 
___Bill climbs mountains for a hobby. 
 
Figure 1. 2. Demonstration of the Linda and Bill problems designed to investigate the 
influence of the representativeness heuristic on conjunction probability judgements (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1983) 
 
Would you agree that Linda is more likely to be a bank teller than she is to be a bank 
teller and active in the feminist movement? Most people would not agree with this statement 
because Linda more closely resembles a feminist than a bank teller (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1983). Linda is described as a stereotypical feminist, thus our instinct would be to label her as 
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one even if this meant choosing a conjunction of two attributes (bank teller and feminist) as 
more likely than one attribute (bank teller). However, it is logically impossible for two 
attributes to be more likely than one. The conjunction fallacy occurs because people naturally 
form a heuristic impression of a believable answer using their initial intuitive judgement. In 
the Linda problem, this is a portrayal of a feminist because Linda has many traits and hobbies 
representative of a woman actively involved in the feminist movement. Indeed, the results 
showed that the majority of participants correctly ranked the representative single event as 
more likely than both the unrepresentative single event and the conjunctive events. However, 
more surprisingly to the authors was the fact that the participants incorrectly ranked the 
conjunctive events as more likely than the unrepresentative single event, and in doing so 
committed the conjunction fallacy (87% responded A > A&J > J for Bill; 85% responded F > 
T&F > T for Linda). According to the conjunction rule, the conclusion T&F > T is 
mathematically impossible. The conjunction law of probabilities states that the probability of 
the conjunction of two events can never be larger than the probability of either of its 
constituent events; P(T&F) ≤	P(T) or P(F). In the Linda problem, the conjunction of the two 
events (bank teller and feminist) cannot occur more often than either event by itself (i.e., 
being either a bank teller, or an active feminist). When performing conjunction probability 
tasks most people mistakenly believe that the co-occurrence of two events (Linda is a bank 
teller AND a feminist) are more likely than the occurrence of one of those events (Linda is a 
bank teller), and in doing so they commit the conjunction fallacy. “This is called the 
conjunction fallacy because the class of bank tellers includes the class of bank tellers who are 
feminists; therefore, being a bank teller who is a feminist cannot be more probable than being 
a bank teller” (Reyna, 1991, p. 318). If representativeness depends on both common and 
distinctive features (Tversky, 1977), it would be heightened by the addition of shared 
features. In this example, the addition of active feminist to the occupation of bank teller 
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improved the match between Linda’s personality sketch and her current activities (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1983). Tversky and Kahneman (1983) believe that erroneous conjunction 
judgements of probabilities are the result of the representativeness heuristic. Instead of 
deliberating and using logic to find the solution, people simply rely on the heuristic to make a 
fast, intuitive decision that leads to the representative – and often incorrect – answer. These 
findings have contributed to the widespread belief that traditional logical or probabilistic 
considerations play little role in our reasoning (Gigerenzer, 1996). In an attempt to further 
understand why people were so heavily influenced by the representativeness heuristic when 
making probability judgements under uncertainty, Tversky and Kahneman (1983) elaborated 
upon this research by introducing three new conditions to the Linda problem: the indirect, 
direct-subtle, and direct-transparent versions. All three versions used the same personality 
descriptions as in the original study (i.e., Linda and Bill); the differences are in the statements 
presented afterwards.  
The indirect version required one group of participants to judge the probability of the 
conjunction (T&F), whereas another group judged its constituents (T, F). There was no 
requirement to compare the conjunction with the constituents, thus testing whether 
probability judgments conformed to the conjunction rule. The direct-subtle version required 
all participants to compare the conjunction to its less representative constituent (T, T&F). The 
inclusion relation of the two events was not emphasized, thus testing whether people would 
take advantage of an opportunity to compare the critical events. The direct-transparent 
version required participants to evaluate the probabilities of the conjunction and its 
constituents (T&F, T, F). The inclusion relation between these statements was explicitly 
highlighted, which tested whether people would conform to the rules of logic of probability 
when they were led to compare the critical events. These three variants were tested on three 
groups of participants: statistically naïve (no statistical knowledge or background), informed 
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(familiar with basic probability theory), and sophisticated (doctoral students who had taken 
advanced statistics and probability courses). To the researchers’ surprise, all three groups 
ranked the conjunction higher than its less likely constituents, there were no consistent 
differences found between the rankings of the direct and indirect versions of the test, the 
overall rate of violations of the conjunction rule was 88% for direct tests, and there was no 
effect of statistical sophistication in either the direct or indirect tests. The researchers had 
expected that participants would make less conjunction errors in the direct tests compared to 
the indirect tests, and had also expected that even naive participants would be able to apply 
the conjunction rule. This was clearly not the case as in both direct and indirect versions of 
the test all the participants, including the statistically sophisticated ones, committed the 
conjunction fallacy.  
These surprising results motivated the researchers to embark on a “series of 
increasingly desperate manipulations designed to induce subjects to obey the conjunction 
rule” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983, p. 299). First, they presented the personality description 
of Linda to a group of undergraduate participants and asked them to check which of these two 
alternatives was more probable “Linda is a bank teller (T)” or “Linda is a bank teller and is 
active in the feminist movement (T&F)”. Overall, 85% of respondents indicated that T&F 
was more probable than T, in a “flagrant violation of the conjunction rule” (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1983, p. 299). The authors then decided to investigate whether there was a 
misinterpretation of the wording in the task. If participants believed the wording to be too 
trivial, they might not have taken the statement literally. In other words, “Linda is a bank 
teller” might have been interpreted as “Linda is a bank teller and is not a feminist”. If this 
were in fact the case, then ranking T&F higher than T would not have been a conjunction 
error. They tested this idea by asking a group of participants to judge the probability of T and 
of T&F on a 9-point scale ranging from 1 (extremely unlikely) to 9 (extremely likely). By 
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rating the probabilities this way – when one of the events includes the other – there was no 
reason for respondents to interpret T as T&notF. The results obtained were the same as before 
with 82% of participants ranking T&F as more likely than T. To examine whether people are 
able to identify the validity of the conjunction rule, even though they are unable to apply it 
spontaneously, Tversky and Kahneman presented the Linda description to a further group of 
participants and asked them to state which of two arguments they found most convincing. 
Argument 1: “Linda is more likely to be a bank teller than she is to be a feminist bank teller, 
because every feminist bank teller is a bank teller, but some women bank tellers are not 
feminists, and Linda could be one of them (T)”, or argument 2: “Linda is more likely to be a 
feminist bank teller than she is likely to be a bank teller, because she resembles an active 
feminist more than she resembles a bank teller (T&F)”. Although the results showed an 
improvement, the majority of participants (65%) still committed the conjunction fallacy 
despite a deliberate attempt at inducing a reflective mood. Finally, the authors attempted to 
highlight the inclusive nature of the event T by conveying it as a disjunction. The conjunction 
rule can also be expressed as a disjunction rule: P(A or B) ≥ P(B). Once again, the Linda 
description was presented to a group of participants who then had to rate the probability 
statements on a 9-point scale ranging from 1 (extremely unlikely) to 9 (extremely likely); 
however, the statement T was replaced by “Linda is a bank teller whether or not she is active 
in the feminist movement (T*)”. This adaptation was designed to highlight the inclusive 
nature of T&F in T. Overall, 57% of participants violated the conjunction rule because they 
failed to draw extensional inferences from the phrase “whether or not”. The authors then 
asked participants to rank T, T*, and T&F on a 9-point scale and found that people believed 
T < T* < T&F to be true. They surmised that because Linda is representative of an active 
feminist, the mere mention of the word “feminist” causes T* to be rated as more likely than 
T, despite them being extensionally equivalent. And a definite commitment to “feminist” 
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makes the probability of T&F even higher.  
The high rates of conjunction fallacies perplexed the authors and they continued 
searching for reasons for this and ways to improve this phenomenon. They managed to 
achieve lower rates of the conjunction fallacy by asking participants to bet on T or on T&F in 
the transparent version of the task. Subjects were given Linda’s description followed by the 
following instructions: “If you could win $10 by betting on an event, which of the following 
would you choose to bet on? (Check one)”. Conjunction fallacies were committed by “only” 
56% of individuals, which is still high but substantially lower than the typical value circa 
80%. The lowest rates of conjunction fallacies achieved was by testing a group of statistically 
savvy students. Previous samples had used statistically naïve undergraduates, which 
prompted the authors to recruit graduate students who had undertaken several statistics 
courses. They completed the rating-scale version of the direct test of the conjunction rule for 
the Linda problem. For the first time ever, they found that only 36% committed the 
conjunction fallacy. This finding is still rather high for the a group of intelligent and 
statistically sophisticated respondents, however it seemed that statistical sophistication 
produced a majority who conformed to the conjunction rule (in a transparent test).  
The findings discussed above caused Tversky and Kahneman (1983) to question 
whether the conjunction fallacy holds for other areas of judgement, and whether or not 
expertise in the relevant subject matter protected against the conjunction fallacy? They found 
that the phenomenon of committing the conjunction fallacy was extremely robust and this 
applied across domains such as medicine, gambling, political forecasting, and law. The 
authors tested over 3000 participants and found widespread violations of the extension rule 
by naïve and sophisticated participants in both the indirect and direct versions of the problem.  
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Other Conjunction Fallacy Tasks. The natural assessments of representativeness 
and availability do not conform to the extensional logic of probability theory. In other words, 
a conjunction judgement can be seen as more representative than one of its constituents, and 
in instances of recalling categories, a specific category can be easier to retrieve than a more 
inclusive category (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). The Linda problem formed the foundation 
for many conjunction probability judgement tasks to follow. The most popular adaptations 
have been designed using the same format of providing the participant with a descriptive 
sketch of a fictitious person and then asking the participant to rank a number of statements in 
order of likelihood from most to least, or to estimate their likelihood of occurring using a 
Likert scale. In addition to probabilities, another example of the conjunction fallacy can be 
found in judgements of frequency, such as the seven-letter word test. Tversky and Kahneman 
devised the seven-letter word task in 1983, where they gave participants 60 seconds to list 
seven-letter words of a specified form and found that their student participant sample 
produced more words of the form _ _ _ _ i n g than the form _ _ _ _ _ n _, despite the latter 
class including the former. The researchers found that the average number of words produced 
in the two conditions were 6.4 and 2.9, respectively. “In this test of availability, the increased 
efficacy of memory search suffices to offset the reduced extension of the target class” 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1983, p.295). Similar results were obtained for the comparison of 
words in this form _ _ _ _ _ l y, compared to this form _ _ _ _ _ l _, with median estimates of 
8.8 and 4.4, respectively. 
A similar example of the seven-letter word task can be seen in Kahneman and 
Tversky (1996). They displayed the seven-letter word task, which required participants to 
estimate the number of seven-letter words conforming to the following form: _ _ _ _ _ n _ in 
a piece of text approximately 2000 words, or 4 pages long. Following this, the same 
participants estimated the number of seven-letter words conforming to a new form:  
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_ _ _ _ i n g in a piece of text 4 pages long. Due to the availability heuristic, it is easier to 
think of words ending in “i n g” than “_ n _” (despite them being the same), thus participants 
will overestimate the frequency of the former, and in doing so will commit a conjunction 
fallacy. Kahneman and Tversky (1996) reported that individuals estimated words ending in 
“ing” nearly three times higher than those ending in “n” in the next-to-last position. The 
researcher’s interpretation of these findings was that people are capable of making correct 
probability judgements; however, due to significant judgmental heuristics they fall prey to 
systematic judgmental biases.  
The Linda and seven-letter words tasks are both inductive, conjunction fallacy tasks 
but differ in presentation and wording. The Linda problem deals with probability judgements 
while the seven-letter word task deals with frequency judgements. However, they both 
provoke similar judgemental heuristics (i.e., representativeness and availability) that lead to 
committing the conjunction fallacy. Both tasks rely on the same underlying logic and require 
people to apply the inclusion rule and the conjunction probability rule in order to solve them 
correctly, or logically. According to Moutier and Houdé (2003), to provide a correct answer 
an individual would be required to 1) inhibit the misleading scheme (i.e., the judgemental 
heuristic) and 2) activate the relevant scheme (i.e., inclusion rule and conjunction probability 
rule).  
What we know of the Conjunction Fallacy. The conjunction fallacy can be found in 
a multitude of settings which is why it is so important for researchers to gain a better 
understanding of why and how we make these errors in reasoning. Conjunction fallacies have 
been observed in the case of probabilistic reasoning in legal decision making. For example, 
Wojciechowski and Pothos (2018) found that people without a legal background were 
committing the conjunction fallacy by rating the probability that a suspect committed two 
crimes higher than the probability that they committed one of the constituent crimes. 
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Interestingly, these findings did not convey to judges and attorneys with a legal background. 
In the context of profiling victims of homicide, Dearden (2018) found that people 
overestimated the likelihood that certain situational or demographic characteristics would 
occur together, thus committing the conjunction fallacy. For example, “the overwhelming 
number of victims, 183, were Black as were the suspects, 66. More than half the victims were 
between the ages 18 and 29, and 181 were male. Handguns continued to be the choice of 
murder weapon, in 149 killings” (Hermann, 2012). Participants were swayed by the profiles 
or stereotypes of the victims causing them to consider these demographics together, instead 
of separately. Each of these statistics is independent. Being Black has no relationship to being 
male. However, consistent with the conjunction fallacy, many participants overestimated the 
likelihood that these demographics occurred together, and some to a “mathematically 
impossible degree” (Dearden, 2018, p. 187). 
In 2003, Medin, Coley, Storms, and Hayes demonstrated a parallel conjunction 
fallacy in category-based induction. This effect was demonstrated for both property 
reinforcement arguments and causal arguments. Causal arguments are causally related, such 
as: “Grain has property M4. Therefore, mice have property M4.” While property 
reinforcement arguments share categories, for example: “Andean people have property X12. 
Therefore, Himalayan people have property X12.” Their results showed that across a number 
of sets of arguments the mean ratings of inductive strength (on a 9-point scale) for two-
conclusion category arguments (e.g., “Therefore, mice and owls have property M4” and 
“Therefore, Himalayan people and Alpine people have property X12”) were greater than 
single-conclusion category arguments. This is normatively contradictory, as the probability of 
a conjunction cannot be greater than the probability of its constituents; thus, causing a 
conjunction fallacy. The differences between causal and categorical materials elude to the 
fact that the conjunction fallacy might be based on different kinds of knowledge about the 
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relationships among categories. This idea led Feeney, Shafto and Dunning (2007) to 
investigate further. They replicated Medin et al.’s (2003) finding of a conjunction fallacy in 
category-based induction. Also using both causal and categorical (i.e., what Medin et al. 
referred to as property) arguments to test the conjunction fallacy, but this time they took 
cognitive ability into account. Their results showed that people are more susceptible to the 
causal version of the fallacy than the category-reinforcement version. They also found that 
high ability participants were less susceptible to the conjunction fallacy in the category 
reinforcement condition; however, in contrast, there was no relationship between ability and 
susceptibility in the causal condition. The researchers stressed the importance of including 
both how individual differences in cognitive ability and different types of prior knowledge 
affect reasoning, when forming a complete theory of reasoning. Stanovich and West (2008) 
explored the effects of cognitive ability on thinking biases. They found contradictory results 
showing that both highly intelligent and less intelligent people (as measured by SAT scores) 
committed the conjunction fallacy. However, more surprisingly, they discovered that the 
interaction between fallacies and cognitive ability was in the opposite direction. Indeed, the 
group with higher SAT scores was more susceptible to the conjunction fallacy. 
Brotherton and French (2014) investigated whether a relationship existed between the 
belief in, and endorsement of, conspiracy theories and the conjunction fallacy. It is thought 
that anomalistic beliefs are accounted for (at least in part) by the representativeness heuristic: 
the automatic assumption that ‘like causes (or is caused by) like’ (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1972, Teigen, 2004). It makes sense that a bias in judgement that overestimates the likelihood 
of co-occurring events (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972) would correlate with paranormal 
beliefs, as paranormal believers have a “biased conception of randomness” (Brotherton & 
French, 2014, p. 246) and base their judgements on certain coincidences (i.e., subjective 
representativeness) rather than on objective probabilistic. Across a series of two experiments, 
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the authors found that both paranormal believers and conspiracy believers made more 
conjunction errors than nonbelievers. The stronger people endorsed conspiracy theories the 
more conjunction errors they committed. The effects were not limited to conspiratorial items, 
which suggests that individual differences in susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy are 
domain-general. Surprisingly, participants in these studies committed conjunction fallacies 
33.3% and 48% of the time, which is still high but nowhere near as high as other studies in 
the field (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman, 1983, found 85%). It is unclear from these results 
whether susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy causes or conversely is caused by 
endorsement of conspiracy theories. Although the authors acknowledge that it might be a 
reciprocal relationship, they do mention that susceptibility to commit the conjunction fallacy 
is domain-general, which suggests that some people are inherently more susceptible to the 
conjunction fallacy than others.  
In 2009, Crisp and Feeney conducted research in an attempt to bridge a gap in our 
understanding of causal conjunction fallacies. A causal conjunction is when the conjunction 
includes a possible cause and an outcome, and a fallacy is committed because the strength of 
the casual link biases the probability judgement. Consider these two statements for example 
taken from Sides, Osherson, Bonini and Viale (2002), “Smoking will decrease by 15%” (A) 
and “The government will increase tax by 1$ per pack and smoking will decrease by 15%” 
(B). By mentioning the increase in tax and thus the increase in price of cigarettes, they have 
strengthened the causal relationship between the two conditions. Hence making it more 
appealing to choose the conjunction statement. Crisp and Feeney (2009) predicted that the 
greater the strength of the casual connection between constituent events would directly affect 
the magnitude of the causal conjunction fallacy and tested this by using weak, strong, and 
unrelated causal events. Findings from the first experiment showed that rates of violations 
were higher for strongly-related than for weakly-related conjunctions, which in turn produced 
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higher fallacy rates than unrelated conjunctions. The second experiment included a cognitive 
load condition (i.e., to suppress deliberative thinking) as a means to better understand the 
thinking systems used when making causal conjunction judgements. The results showed that 
the dot memory task increased flawed responding for strongly related events but had no effect 
on the fallacy rate for weakly related events. In other words, strongly related conjunctions cue 
a stronger heuristic output than weak conjunctions, but when under cognitive load people 
lack the mental resources to inhibit the compelling heuristic response. Thus, causal 
knowledge has a crucial influence on probabilistic reasoning as varying causal strength also 
influences the strength of the cued heuristic response.  
Methods of improving Conjunction Violations. Bakhti (2018) found that using 
priming methods affected the performance on conjunction judgements. Participants were 
allocated into one of three groups: religious priming, reflective priming and neutral. Priming 
was presented through the scrambled sentence task. Religious priming involved unscrambling 
sentences made from religious words (e.g., pray for the poor), reflective priming was 
unscrambling analytical words (e.g., I think all day) and the neutral condition included 
unscrambling neutral words (e.g., he finished it yesterday). The results showed that people 
who received religious priming committed more conjunction fallacies than those who 
received reflective priming.  However, there was no difference found between religious and 
neutral priming, therefore indicating that reflective priming reduced conjunction fallacies; 
while religious priming had no effect.  
A recent Brazillian study showed that the conjunction fallacy was a robust 
phenomenon that could, however, be minimized by converting all the probability alternatives 
into conjunctions. Usually the list of alternatives shown to participants include a number of 
single event and one conjunction that contains two of the listed single events. Campos, 
Lincoln, Neves, Correia and Soares (2013) conducted a series of three experiments that 
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firstly, emphasized the resilience of the conjunction fallacy and secondly, showed what 
measures could be taken to minimize the effect on human judgement. In the first two studies, 
the authors demonstrated the robustness of the conjunction fallacy phenomenon by achieving 
levels of conjunction fallacies at 76% and 86% respectively. The third and final study 
attempted to minimize the effect of the conjunction fallacy by presenting the information 
differently. The authors discovered that by presenting all the statement alternatives as 
conjunctions, they were able to reduce the percentage of errors in judgement from an average 
of 80.4% down to only 17.2%.  
Charness, Karni and Levin (2010) were not convinced that previous research on the 
conjunction fallacy was relevant to real-life economic behaviour, where people are able to 
discuss their options before deciding and often these decisions involve monetary incentives. 
Thus, they designed an experiment aimed to replicate the results of Tversky and Kahneman 
(1983) using the transparent test as their main experiment. Participants either made unassisted 
(e.g., individual) or assisted judgements (e.g., they were allowed to consult with either one or 
two other participants before giving their answer). And they were either offered small 
monetary incentives, or no incentives at all. The results revealed far lower rates of 
conjunction fallacies (e.g., 58%) compared to Tversky and Kahneman (e.g., 85%), and when 
incentives were introduced that rate dropped to 33%. Additionally, when communication 
between participants was allowed violation rates fell significantly, and this effect was most 
noticeable in groups of three, compared to groups of two, or even one person. These findings 
suggest that the rate of conjunction fallacies is in fact much lower than reported in Tversky 
and Kahneman (1983), and this error rate declines dramatically when subjects are given the 
opportunity to consult with others prior to making a judgement. Unsurprisingly, financial 
incentives for providing the correct answer were effective. In light of this evidence, the 
authors surmise that the “conjunction fallacy is a phenomenon of no serious concern for 
  31 
economics” (p. 555) as people rarely make decisions in isolation. They consult with others 
and also recognize that their choices have consequences. However, contradictory to these 
findings, Bonini, Tentori and Osherson (2004) found that most people do not spontaneously 
integrate the logic of conjunction into their assessments of chance. They designed 
experiments using a betting paradigm that discouraged misreading p as p-and-not-q and 
encouraged genuine conjunctive reading of p-and-q. Participants were instructed to divide 7 
euros among 3 statements with the understanding that the assigned amount could be won if 
the statement comes true. Due to the fact that the conjunction p-and-q implies p, the value of 
a bet on p-and-q cannot exceed the value of a bet on p at the same stakes; however, frequent 
violations were observed. The authors rule out the possibility of miscommunication as an 
explanation, and instead attribute the fallacies to a failure to reconcile probability with logic. 
Moutier and Houdé (2003) suggested that systematic judgemental biases, such as the 
conjunction fallacy, are due to inhibition failure and not statistical sophistication. To test this 
theory, they designed two types of training before completing the seven-letter word task. 
First, a strictly logical procedure in which participants were trained to use the conjunction 
rule, and second, both a logical and executive-emotional procedure in which participants 
were alerted to the bias through warnings such as “we’re falling into a trap!” and “so the goal 
here is (1) not to fall into the trap” (p. 192). The words “not to fall into the trap” evoked both 
an emotional response and also a tendency to avoid the biased answer. Results showed a 
significant effect of inhibition training; however, strictly logical training (e.g., without 
executive-emotional warning) had no effect on performance. This confirms that cognitive 
inhibition is key to correcting intuitive judgements. Interestingly, not all participants 
benefitted from the training, which raised the question of what accounts for the inter-
individual variability of receptivity to inhibition training? This question led Cassotti and 
Moutier (2010) to investigate further. They reconfirmed that training based solely on logical 
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explanations is in fact ineffective to overcome System 1 intuitive-heuristic reasoning and 
found that executive-emotional warnings enabled drastic changes in reasoning performance. 
Further, they found that participants who did not respond to the inhibition training mainly had 
less emotion-based learning ability as measured by the Iowa Gambling Task, whereas the 
opposite was true for those who did learn from the training. The authors surmised that in 
order to resist the bias, participants with lower emotional warning sensitivity needed greater 
inhibitory efficiency (e.g., more in-depth inhibition training) than those with higher emotional 
warning sensitivity. Houdé et al. (2000) explored closer, through the use of functional 
imaging (PET), what happens in the mind when the brain has to inhibit an intuitive response 
to activate logical reasoning. They focused on matching-bias tasks where participants 
completed a pretest, followed by inhibition training, and finally a posttest. The authors 
noticed a “striking biased-to-logical shift under matching-bias inhibition training” (p. 5). The 
PET results showed that brain activity shifted from the posterior part of the brain when 
performing the pretest, to the left prefrontal network when completing the posttest. This 
reflects the change in the participants’ reasoning strategy as a specific consequence of the 
executive-inhibition training. This finding shows how the activated brain networks can 
change in the same subjects, carrying out the same task, depending on their ability to inhibit a 
misleading strategy. 
A well renowned method for alleviating the conjunction fallacy is by presenting the 
information in frequencies as opposed to probabilities. Gigerenzer (1994) claimed that the 
conjunction fallacy disappears when formulated in terms of frequencies. In other words, by 
adding the following sentence after the description of Linda: “There are 100 people who fit 
the description above”, the experimenter has managed to change the structure of the task 
from a probability problem to a mathematical or frequentist problem. And in doing so, has 
changed the way people think when solving the problem. “The conceptual distinction 
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between single-event and frequency representations suffices to make this allegedly stable 
cognitive illusion largely disappear” (Gigerenzer, 1994, p. 144) Fiedler (1988) reported that 
the number of conjunction violations in the Linda problem dropped from 91% in the original, 
single-event representation to 22% in the frequency representation. While Reeves and 
Lockhart (1993) found 59% conjunction violations for probability problems and 35% for 
frequency problems. Hertwig and Gigerenzer (1994, cited in Gigerenzer, 1994, p. 144) asked 
participants to rank order single-events (T, T&F, and F) according to their likelihood of 
occurrence, and noticed a conjunction fallacy rate of 88%; however, when asked to estimate 
the frequency of T, T&F and F (e.g., “how many out of 200?”) those violation rates dropped 
to 13% and 16% respectively across two frequency experiments. What is more, this effect is 
stable across different cognitive illusions, including base rate neglect. Gigerenzer (1994) 
concludes that we must pay attention to the kind of information representation that algorithms 
were designed to work upon. To discuss rationality simply in terms of good or bad algorithms 
is incomplete, because when information is represented in terms of frequencies rather than 
single-event probabilities, these apparent stable cognitive fallacies disappear. However, 
Kahneman and Tversky (1996) made an argument against the frequency hypothesis by 
pointing out that biases have been demonstrated with frequency judgements since the 
emergence of the heuristics and biases program. Research conducted by Sloman, Over, 
Slovak and Stibel (2003) compared the natural frequency hypothesis to the “nested-sets” 
hypothesis (i.e., “presenting the options as concrete classes made the inclusion relation 
between the two sets more transparent” p. 305). The authors found that the benefits of 
frequency in reducing the conjunction fallacy were eliminated by making the nested-set 
relationship obscure by spacing the conjunction and its constituent. They make the 
observation that nested-set relations are more general than frequency representations. While 
the nested-set hypothesis increases transparency in the task, thus increasing coherence of 
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probability judgements; this is not the same as inducing a frequency frame. The nested sets 
only need to represent the subset relation between the conjunction and constituent, not the 
actual frequency of each. Interestingly, they also found that the way participants were asked 
to answer the tasks affected the number of conjunction fallacies committed. To be more 
specific, ranking responses produced more conjunction fallacies than rating responses. This 
could be due to the fact that ranking forces a choice between the critical statements. It does 
not offer the option to judge two alternatives as equally probable. Thus, some people may 
have committed the fallacy despite the conviction that the two options were equally likely. 
Ratings, on the other hand, allow people to assign equal probabilities to the two events.  
Hertwig and Gigerenzer (1999) tested the hypothesis that between-subjects designs 
lessen the frequency of conjunction violations. They tested this hypothesis using the seven-
letter word problem both in a within-subjects and between-subjects design. They found that 
the between-subjects groups fell prey to the conjunction fallacy by estimating that more 
words end in ‘ing’ than in ‘_n_’. However, the within-subjects group, who saw both 
alternatives, answered the questions correctly and only 26% committed the conjunction 
fallacy. This finding is not task specific as Birnbaum and Mellers (1983) discovered that the 
base rate fallacy also leads to different conclusions depending on whether a within-subjects 
or between-subjects design is used.  
Alternative explanations for the Conjunction Fallacy. There exists a dispute in the 
literature on whether the conjunction fallacy is the product of people’s misunderstanding of 
the problem, or whether it is a case of genuine reasoning bias. Over the years, researchers 
have offered alternative explanations for the occurrence of the conjunction fallacy. One such 
prevalent explanation is that of linguistic ambiguities. Camerer (1995) explains the high rate 
of violations of the conjunction principle in terms of linguistic conventions: 
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... some apparent biases might occur because the specific words used, or linguistic 
convention subjects assume the experimenter is following, convey more information 
than the experimenter intends. In other words, subjects may read between the lines. 
The potential linguistic problem is this: in the statement “Linda is a feminist bank 
teller,” subjects might think that this statement “Linda is a bank teller” tacitly 
excludes feminists; they might think it actually means “Linda is a bank teller (and not 
feminist).” If subjects interpret the wording this way none of the statements are 
conjunctions of others and no probability rankings are wrong. (p. 598) 
Hertwig, Benz and Krauss (2008) postulate that unintended interpretations of the 
connective and may account for conjunction violations. They state that the word ‘and’ is used 
in the task to invoke the logical connective ∧ whereas when presented experimentally it is 
being interpreted with natural language (e.g., English) as a conjunction and. Unlike the 
former, the latter and relays a wide range of relationships between conjuncts, and depending 
on which meaning of and is adopted “people may arrive at nearly opposite understandings of 
a sentence” (Hertwig, Benz & Krauss, 2008p. 741). There is; however, relevant evidence 
against this version of the misunderstanding hypothesis. Bar-Hillel and Neter (1993) found 
high percentages of the conjunction fallacy in contexts where the word ‘and’ does not appear. 
While Bonini, Tentori and Osherson (2004) used an explicit reminder of the conjunctive 
meaning of ‘and’ to discourage a disjunctive interpretation of ‘and’ (e.g., “both events must 
happen for you to win the money on this bet” p.204). However, most participants continued 
to commit the conjunction fallacy in this context. A control task run by the same authors 
confirmed that around 91% of the participants believed that event A was true on the one 
hand, while event B was true on the other. And among these participants, 70% of them 
committed the conjunction fallacy. As explained in Tentori, Bonini & Osherson (2004), 
exercising the conjunction rule does not require logical equivalence between and and ∧, it 
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only requires that the interpretation of the and statement implies the corresponding ∧ 
statement. For example, consider the statement “he turned on the switch and the motor 
started” (Hertwig, Benz & Krauss, 2008p. 747). Here the use of and expresses a conjunction 
between two events, but also a temporal and causal relationship, which goes beyond the 
meaning of ∧. However, if the reader recognizes that both sentences “he turned on the 
switch” and “the motor started” must occur for the statement to be true, then the meaning 
assigned to and includes the logical operator ∧, and consequently the conjunction rule can be 
“properly invoked as a norm” (Tentori & Crupi, 2012, p. 124). For a full review on the 
misunderstanding of and specifically devoted to the conjunction fallacy, see Moro’s review, 
2009.  
Pogue, Kurumada and Tenenhaus (2015) believe that conjunction fallacies are not 
fallacies at all, and suggest that we should view them instead as participants “behaving 
according to basic assumptions about the rationality of language users” (p. 2). They propose 
that human language does not normally consist of a series of disconnected remarks, thus 
when someone provides certain information (e.g., Linda is a feminist) they must have done so 
with a purpose. The authors agree with Hertwig and Gigerenzer (1999) that the tendency is 
for people to engage in goal-directed acts of communication, even with regards to the simple 
Linda problem, rather than treating the scenario as an abstract logical problem. If this is in 
fact the case, then these ‘reasoning errors’ are in fact grounded behaviours that lead to more 
successful communication. 
The representativeness heuristic can only apply when “a question asks about the 
probability of membership of an instance in a conjunctive category and when knowledge 
about representative members of that category is available” (Costello & Watts, 2017, p. 305). 
However, the conjunction fallacy occurs frequently even when this condition does not hold. 
Work done by Tentori, Bonini and Osherson (2004) disputed the traditional 
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‘representativeness heuristic’ explanation for the conjunction fallacy, and they have shown 
that the conjunction fallacy occurs frequently even when there is no question about 
membership of an instance in a category, thus representativeness cannot explain the 
occurrence of the fallacy in these cases. The authors asked people to bet on the occurrence of 
unique future events or on the conjunction of those events. Eighty percent of their 
participants chose to place monetary bets on the conjunction of events even with the 
disclaimer: “both events must happen for you to win the money placed on this bet” (p. 468). 
The fact that the conjunction fallacy is a robust, consistent and systematic part of 
people’s probability judgements is attested in many studies over at least the past 40 years. In 
some cases, these fallacies occur very frequently (e.g., rates of 80% or higher, Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1983), while in other cases the fallacies are much rarer (e.g., rates of 10% or less, 
Fisk & Pidgeon, 1996). The conjunction fallacy is an undeniable part of human probabilistic 
reasoning; however, it does not occur at the same rate for all conjunctions. The violation of 
the conjunction rule occurs very frequently with the Linda problem, after all that is what it 
was designed to demonstrate, but occurs significantly less frequently for other material. The 
lower the probability of the less probable constituent P(T), and the higher both P(F) and the 
conditional probability P(T&F), the more frequent the conjunction fallacy is (Fisk & Pidgeon, 
1996). Indeed, these authors were able to show a decrease in the conjunction fallacy to rates 
as low as 10% when they manipulated both constituent events to be low in probability. 
Costello and Watts (2017) explain this wide range of observed fallacy rates by a model where 
people reason according to probability theory but are subject to random noise in the reasoning 
process. This model “rejects the idea that people estimate probabilities using heuristics and 
instead assumes that people reason according to probability theory but are subject to random 
noise in the reasoning process; in the model, this random noise causes the systematic biases 
seen in people’s probability estimates” (Costello & Watts, 2017, p. 305). In other words, 
  38 
probability judgements are produced by a fundamentally rational mechanism, which is 
perturbed in various ways through purely random noise or error. 
Dual Process Theories 
Since the Linda experiment, significant scholarly work has been dedicated to the 
problem. The phenomenon itself is robust, with experimental evidence ranging across sectors 
such as betting on sports games (Erceg & Galić, 2014) to investing in complex financial 
products (Rieger, 2012). However, the mechanisms are less understood. Traditionally, dual 
process theories have been used to explain why people fall prey to such reasoning fallacies. 
Dual process theories of reasoning differ somewhat in their details; however, they all posit 
that there are two distinct types of reasoning. The idea of two systems of thought is not new; 
it has been around for as long as academics have written about the nature of human thought. 
However, only in more recent years have cognitive scientists proposed that there are two 
distinct cognitive systems underlying thinking and reasoning with separate evolutionary 
histories (Evans, 2003). The animal-instinctual brain and the human-logical brain. These two 
systems of thought have had many labels: Heuristic and Analytic (Evans, 1984), Implicit and 
Explicit (Evans & Over, 1996), System 1 and System 2 (Stanovich & West, 2000), and more 
recently Type 1 and Type 2 (Evans, 2008). In this thesis I will use the terminology System 1 
and System 2 to describe the types of thought behind human judgement and decision making 
according to dual process theory. 
The defining feature of System 1 processing is its autonomy (Stanovich, West & 
Toplak, 2011). The activation of System 1 is automatic (both processing and activation) and 
fast, it is not reliant on high-level control systems, thus it does not put a heavy load on central 
processing capacity. It is the animal brain (i.e., universal cognition shared between humans 
and animals), acquired through biology, exposure, and personal experience. System 1 
processes are parallel and “automatic in nature: only their final product is posted in 
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consciousness” (Evans, 2003). It tends to solve problems involuntarily and effortlessly by 
using prior knowledge and beliefs (Kahneman, 2011). System 1 processes are intuitive, have 
implicit inferences and use heuristic processing when making judgements or decisions. 
Unlike System 1, System 2 is nonautonomous. It is “believed to have evolved much more 
recently and is thought by most theorists to be uniquely human” (Evans, 2003). It is a 
relatively slow, controlled and conscious processing system that is computationally expensive 
as it draws from cognitive resources. It solves problems using logical reasoning and its 
operations involve “choice and concentration” and are “heavily demanding of people’s 
computational resources” (Kahneman, 2011, p. 21; De Neys, 2006, p. 428). It is rational, 
rule-based, and has explicit inferences. System 2 processes are sequential in nature and 
permits abstract hypothetical thought that cannot be achieved by System 1. One of the most 
critical functions of System 2 processing is to monitor and override System 1 processing 
(Stanovich, West & Toplak, 2011). See Table 1. 1 for an overview of the properties of 
System 1 and System 2 processes. 
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Table 1. 1 
The properties and attributes of dual process theories of reasoning (adapted from Stanovich 
& West, 2000 and Evans & Stanovich, 2013) 
System 1 process (intuitive) System 2 process (reflective) 
Defining features 
Does not require working memory 
Autonomous 
Requires working memory 
Cognitive decoupling; mental simulation 
Properties 
Fast 
High capacity 
Parallel 
Nonconscious 
Holistic 
Biased responses 
Automatic 
Associative 
Experience-based decision making 
Independent of cognitive ability 
Evolved early 
Similar to animal cognition 
Implicit knowledge 
Basic emotions 
Slow 
Capacity limited 
Serial 
Conscious 
Analytic 
Normative responses 
Controlled 
Rule-based 
Consequential decision making 
Correlated with cognitive ability 
Evolved late 
Distinctly human 
Explicit knowledge 
Complex emotions 
Task construal 
Contextualised 
Personalised 
Conversational and socialised 
Abstract 
Depersonalised 
Asocial 
 
Heuristics are defined as automatic processes because they occur without intention, 
effort or awareness, and without interfering with other concurrent cognitive processes; 
whereas, controlled processes are intentional, under the individual’s control, effortful and 
entail conscious awareness (Devine & Monteith, 1999). Generally, it is accepted that System 
1 processing yields fast, frugal and correct conclusions, although sometimes its reliance on 
heuristics and prior beliefs lead to irrational responses. When this happens System 2 is 
needed to suppress this initial incorrect response and replace it with a correct one. This 
inhibitory-control mechanism is a critical prerequisite for deliberate processing and is an idea 
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that has been around for many decades, indeed Thurstone (1927) referred to it in his 
discussion on the nature of intelligence. Often people act as cognitive misers (Fiske & Taylor, 
1991) by engaging in attribute substitution, which is the substitution of a difficult-to-evaluate 
characteristic for an easier one, even if the easier one is less accurate (Kahneman & 
Frederick, 2002). This model of attribute-substitution “focuses on the phenomenon whereby 
people often answer difficult questions by substituting an answer to an easier question 
without necessarily being aware of the substitution” (Böckenholt, 2012, p. 389). This 
generally serves people well in many situations; however, when we are evaluating important 
risks (e.g., for example the risk of certain activities and environments for our children) we do 
not want to substitute careful thought. Instead, we want to employ System 2 processing to 
override and block the attribute substitution of the cognitive miser. Kahneman and Frederick 
(2002) provide an example of how attribute substitution can lead people into irrational 
response patterns. In an experiment, participants assigned a higher probability to “an 
earthquake in California causing a flood in which more than 1000 people will drown” 
compared to “a flood somewhere in the United States in which more than 1000 people will 
drown.” This is because the image of a Californian earthquake is very accessible, and its ease 
of accessibility affects the probability judgement. 
In order to override System 1 processing, System 2 processing must be capable of two 
things: 1) interrupting System 1 processing and suppressing its response tendencies, and 2) 
replacing the erroneous response with a better one (Stanovich, West & Toplak, 2011). But 
where do these better responses come from? Evans (2007, 2010) suggests that they come 
from hypothetical reasoning and cognitive simulation, which are unique aspects of System 2 
processing. Hypothetical reasoning involves creating temporary models of the world and 
testing our actions in that simulated world (Stanovich, West & Toplak, 2011).  
At the heart of dual process theories lies a “corrective” view on sound reasoning and 
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deliberation. In other words, correct responding is assumed to require correction of an 
intuitive System 1 response by slower and more deliberate System 2 processing (Kahneman, 
2011; Kahneman & Frederick, 2005). This corrective view results in a somewhat indisposed 
characterization of System 1. It is seen as a source of error that requires supervision from the 
deliberate System 2. “Bluntly put, System 2 is portrayed as the good guy that cleans up the 
mess left behind by the fast but error prone System 1” (Bago & De Neys, in press, p. 2). To 
clarify, dual process theories do not suggest that intuitions are always incorrect. In fact, they 
are sometimes seen as both appropriate and helpful (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman, 
2011; Sloman, 1996). Also, it is not claimed that deliberation will always lead to the correct 
answer (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman, 2011). However, intuitive responses do have 
the potential to be biased and as a result must be monitored and sometimes corrected by 
System 2 processing. It is this corrective aspect of the model that puts System 1 processing in 
a negative light. However, it has not always been this way. Historically, mathematicians and 
physicists have conceived intuition as guiding intellect. Great minds such as Isaac Newton, 
Henri Poincaré and Albert Einstein placed great trust in their intuition and credited it with 
many of their major breakthroughs. However, this does not discount the value in deliberation. 
After the initial insight of the intuitive idea one must employ deliberate thought to validate 
and develop it further. This view differs to the corrective dual process view as here sound 
reasoning is not conceived as a process that overrides and corrects erroneous intuitions, but 
rather as a process that builds on correct insights (Bago & De Neys, in press). Following a 
series of experiments, the Bago and De Neys (in press) found convincing evidence for logical 
intuitions, or correct intuitive responding in the initial response phase. They also conclude 
that in addition to overriding and correcting an incorrect intuition, deliberation is often also 
used to verify and justify a correct intuitive insight. 
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Why do people commit the conjunction fallacy according to dual process 
theories? Different versions of dual process theories all agree that heuristic assessments 
originate from intuitive processing. They differ, however, in their understanding of the origin 
of logical assessments and people’s ability to detect conflict between heuristic and logical 
assessments. Several propositions have been set out in past research to explain why people 
are prone to committing the conjunction fallacy. Some researchers believe it is due to 
misunderstanding the task (Politzer & Noveck, 1991; Hetwig, Benz, & Krauss, 2008). The 
misunderstanding the task account proposes that people make logical errors because the task 
contains linguistic ambiguities or involves concepts that are not adapted to the human mind. 
For example, a person might interpret the conjunction and as “aswell” instead of “or”. In this 
case, when they state that the conjunction is more likely than the constituent, they are not 
wrong. Hertwig, Benz and Krauss (2008) suggest that when performing the classic Linda 
task, people interpret Pr(T) compared to Pr(F&T) as Pr(T & not-F) compared to Pr(F&T). In 
other words, they judge that Linda is more likely to be a bank teller and NOT a feminist than 
she is to be a bank teller AND a feminist. In this situation, following a vignette that describes 
Linda as a feminist, there can no longer be a fallacy because both alternatives involve 
choosing a conjunction of two events; one of which is representative (e.g., feminist) while the 
other is unrepresentative (e.g., not a feminist). However, evidence provided by Tentori, 
Bonini and Osherson (2004) disputed this account. They showed that even when people were 
asked to evaluate Pr(T), Pr(F&T), as well as Pr(T & not-F) they still erroneously believed 
that Pr(F&T) was more probable than Pr(T). 
The default-interventionist account posits that people make errors because they are 
not able to detect the conflict between heuristic and logical considerations (Evans, 2008; 
Kahneman, 2003, 2011; Stanovich & West, 2000; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). People are 
happy to trust their immediate, intuitive judgement and lack the motivation or cognitive 
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capacity to engage in effortful deliberation. However, those who can or are willing to engage 
in deliberative thinking may apply the conjunction probability law to their judgement, which 
would enable them to make a logical and correct answer to the task (Evans, 2008; Stanovich 
& West, 2000; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Kahneman, 2003, 2011). The parallel-
competitive account proposes that people can detect conflict but are not able to inhibit the fast 
heuristic answer (Sloman, 1996; Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). This is when people 
experience “simultaneous contradictory belief”. In other words, they might suspect that there 
is something wrong with their judgement but will make it anyway because they lack the 
cognitive powers required to inhibit it (Sloman, 1996; Tversky & Kahneman, 1983; Epstein, 
1994; De Neys & Glumicic, 2008).   
The default-interventionist view and parallel-competitive view differ in their accounts 
of information processing; however, they do share the core assumption that human behaviour 
is determined by the interplay of two systems of processing. The default interventionist view 
states that deliberative processing is optional (people are either motivated to solve the 
problem or capable of doing so) and the parallel-competitive view states that deliberative 
processing is systematic (despite knowing the conjunction rule, people choose the 
representative answer because it is the most compelling, they are not able to inhibit the 
persuasive intuitive answer). The default-interventionist view assumes that initially only the 
heuristic system gets activated, while the analytic system monitors the output and might 
override the heuristic system at a later stage if a conflict is detected. Evans described this 
process as being serial in nature (Evans, 2008) and typically quite lax (Kahneman, 2003). The 
parallel-competitive view believes that people make analytic considerations right from the 
beginning of the judgement process and are able to detect possible conflicts through the use 
of heuristically cued beliefs. In other words, both systems are operating flawlessly and in 
parallel. Both these accounts agree that the conjunction fallacy is a fast, automatic, and 
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persuasive answer, but that it can be overcome by employing a slower, more effortful and 
deliberative thinking process. In other words, heuristic considerations arise from the intuitive 
process, and logical considerations from the deliberative process; however, effortless, 
intuitive thinking can sometimes be aligned with logic and probability theory (Saxe, 1988; 
Villejoubert, 2009, De Neys, 2012).  
Fuzzy trace theory assumes that judgements are guided by a range of preferences for 
types of information, and that they default to the simplest gist representation. If this fails to 
yield a decision, then more complex representations are used. Gists represent the essential 
meaning of a situation, and intuitions are believed to arise from gist memory traces (Reyna, 
2012). This theory was adapted from dual process theories; however, it differs in that it 
distinguishes between impulsivity and intuition, which are usually combined in System 1 
according to traditional dual process theories. One defining feature of Fuzzy Trace Theory is 
that it claims that expertise and advanced cognition both rely on intuition, it just depends on 
the type of representation used to process the information: gist or verbatim (Reyna, 2012). 
Gist and verbatim representations are activated in parallel, however people will generally rely 
on the simplest and least precise gist representation necessary when making decisions. Fuzzy 
trace theory posits that people make errors when classes overlap, when a compelling 
conclusion comes to mind, and when individuals fail to inhibit this pre-potent intuitive 
response (Reyna & Brainerd, 2008; Wolfe & Reyna, 2010). This dependence on gist makes 
reasoning vulnerable to processing interference from overlapping classes of events, although 
it also explains expert reasoning such that a person can treat certain different reasoning 
problems in the same way if the problems share an underlying gist (Reyna, Lloyd, & 
Brainerd, 2003). 
The accounts mentioned above differ slightly from one another; however, they all 
assume that logical answers emerge form slow, deliberative, and rule-based processes 
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whereas heuristic answers arise from faster, intuitive and associative processes. Most believe 
that if a reasoner relies on intuitive processes to make a judgement, that judgement will fall 
prey to heuristic biases. However, if a reasoner is able to suppress the prepotent heuristic 
response and employ deliberative reasoning, s/he will most likely arrive at the correct answer. 
Although, when it comes to conjunction probability judgements, the majority of the time 
erroneous judgements are produced as the stereotypical heuristic answer is very persuasive. 
This account has contributed to the widespread belief that traditional logical or probabilistic 
considerations play little role in our reasoning (Gigerenzer, 1996). More recently, the logical-
intuitionist account suggests that our intuition does not always mislead us. It can sometimes 
reflect a sensitivity to the logic of sets which underpins the conjunction rule (Villejoubert, 
2009; De Neys, 2012). In fact, there is evidence supporting the idea that fast, automatic 
processes reflect a sound appreciation of logic and mathematics. A study in Brazil showed 
that children who lived on the streets and sold candy for a living could outperform schooled 
children by using candies and money instead of pen and paper (Saxe, 1988). Despite having 
no formal schooling these candy sellers were able to perform advanced mathematical 
equations automatically. The children’s mathematical skills emerged as they worked their 
trade to achieve the primary goal of economic survival. This suggests that people can acquire 
the laws of logical problem solving by simply existing in and interacting with the world. In 
other words, it is possible that people can have logical intuitions.  
But what of the nature and procedure of learning complex mathematics? Could logical 
intuitions be likened to training effects, or automaticity, in complex mathematical problems? 
A study using an fMRI conducted by Delazer et al., showed that learning complex arithmetic 
induced a modification of cerebral activation patterns (2003, p. 84). Participants were faster 
and more accurate in trained problems compared to untrained problems, plus they showed a 
change in brain activation patterns with increasing expertise. The study also highlighted the 
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demands on working memory in untrained problems, supporting the notion that calculation 
strategies rely more heavily on executive resources than automatized retrieval. 
Developmental research on the acquisition process of arithmetical competence in children has 
shown that “during the first school years, calculation processes change from deliberate and 
sometimes effortful step-by-step procedures to fast and efficient processing” and following 
“years of training, older children show increasing automaticity in retrieval of arithmetic 
facts” (Delazer et al., 2003, p. 77). Taken together, these studies provide support for the idea 
that mathematical reasoning can be automatized. However, these automatizations of 
knowledge may not be the same thing as logical intuitions. Logical intuitions are knowledge 
that is implicit in nature and activated automatically when faced with a reasoning task (De 
Neys, 2014). While a logical intuition is indeed a fast, automatic response, it is not simply 
reiterating explicitly taught information that has become automatic through practice and 
expertise. Exactly how one acquires this knowledge is unclear; however, it might be possible 
that we acquire it by simply existing in our world (e.g., Saxe, 1988). Through interacting with 
our environments and surroundings, we implicitly learn the fundamental laws of logic and 
physics that govern our world. De Neys (2012) postulates that proof of logical intuitions lies 
in the successful nature of conflict detection. The idea being that in order to detect conflict 
between intuitively cued heuristic responses and logical principles, these two types of 
responses need to be activated at a similar level. While Trippas, Handley, Verde and 
Morsanyi (2016) suggest that people have an implicit sensitivity to logical structures, which 
potentially occurs automatically and outside of awareness. 
As the body of literature grows, there is increasing evidence that shows people can 
make fast and logical judgements, and they can intuitively detect the conflict between logical 
and heuristic considerations (De Neys, 2012, 2014, 2019; Villejoubert, 2009). Recent work 
on conflict detection has provided further support for logical intuitions. De Neys (2012) 
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claimed that people have implicit knowledge of logical and probabilistic normative 
principles, which are automatically activated when faced with the classic reasoning problems. 
Thus, our intuition does not always mislead human judgement and decision making. As 
outlined in several studies, heuristics – or intuitive thinking – are helpful and often lead 
people to make a correct judgement (see Saxe, 1988; De Neys, 2012; Villejoubert, 2009). 
However, it is important to note that despite being sensitive to the fact that the heuristic 
answer conflicts with logical norms, the majority of people continue to give the incorrect 
answer when performing reasoning problems.  
Evidence for logical intuitions. In 2009, Villejoubert designed an experiment to 
better understand the cognitive underpinnings of people’s intuitions concerning the 
conjunction rule of probabilities. The study was intended to test the competing predictions of 
the lax-monitoring view (Kahneman, 2003; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002) and the conflict-
monitoring view (De Neys & Glumicic, 2008) of cognitive functioning. It aimed to answer 
the question of whether intuitions were solely driven by heuristic processing (lax-monitoring 
view), or whether they resulted from a combination of heuristic and controlled processing 
(conflict-monitoring view). Using a novel methodology adapted from Evans and Curtis-
Holmes (2005) that disentangled the two systems of thought she was able to assess the impact 
that time pressure (e.g., a deadline) had on the logicality of peoples’ conjunction judgements. 
This methodology incorporated the use of both congruent statements (i.e., no conflict 
between the two systems of thought) and incongruent statements (i.e., conflict between the 
two systems of thought), allowing for the detection of conflict sensitivity. It also disentangled 
the systems of thought allowing the researcher to observe whether the participant was 
answering in accordance with representativeness (i.e., the heuristic stereotype), or logic (i.e., 
the rule of conjunction probability). Based on the theoretical predictions of dual-process 
theories, the author expected to find that people who made their judgements under time 
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pressure would show an increased level of heuristic processing and a reduced level of logical 
responding. The study used a between-subjects design, and in the time pressured condition 
participants were allocated 12 seconds to read the statement and make an answer. The other 
condition had unlimited time. Villejoubert found that participants were more likely to accept 
representative statements (i.e., in line with the stereotype), but they were also significantly 
less likely to accept illogical ones. Moreover, they consistently took longer before accepting a 
statement when intuitive and deliberative considerations were in conflict, even when they 
were pressured to provide an answer in less than 12s. The increase in acceptance time under 
conflicting situations suggested that people engaged effortlessly in deliberative processing 
(i.e., that people instinctively wanted to think hard about their response when they suspected 
two contradictory answers). Indeed, participants appeared to be aware of the conflict and 
were not blindly relying on the heuristic intuitive response to guide their answers (i.e., in 
which case if they were there would have been no difference in time latencies between no-
conflict and conflict trials). Additionally, the fact that logical considerations were still 
effective under time pressure suggested that the conflict between intuitive and deliberative 
considerations was readily detected. In other words, “intuitions regarding the conjunction rule 
of probabilities are not solely influenced by heuristic processing and that people think longest 
when there is a conflict between the heuristic-based response and the logic-based response” 
(Villejoubert, 2009, p. 2985). The author also found that contrary to common two-systems 
assumptions, representative assessments were not fast and automatic, while logical responses 
were not slow and deliberate. Surprisingly, when participants were given unlimited time to 
think about their answers, they were most influenced by the representativeness heuristic, but 
when put under time pressure to respond quickly, participants were in fact providing more 
logical responses in line with the statistical rule of conjunction probability. Villejoubert 
suggests that one possible account of these results could be that intuitive thinking might in 
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fact point to the logical answer first; however, when this answer conflicts with 
representativeness, people then engage in deliberative thinking to resolve the conflict. This 
counterintuitive hypothesis goes against all current accounts of dual process theories (as 
reviewed above except for the logical intuitions account) since they all stipulate that when the 
slow deliberative system is not given enough time to process information, thinking will be 
more heuristic and less logical. In contrast, these findings are in line with the conflict-
monitoring view (De Neys & Glumicic, 2008) and seem to suggest that fast thinking can be 
logical while slower, more effortful thinking can be biased by non-logical heuristics. It is 
important to note here however, that a time limit of 12 seconds is very generous for the 
limited time condition. In the allocated 12 seconds timeframe, it is possible that participants 
could have read the statement and still had enough time remaining to deliberate their answers. 
Future studies should consider severely constricting the timeframe of the limited time 
condition. 
An important and interesting study conducted by Riis and Schwarz (2003) showed 
that increased heuristic processing led to fewer conjunction fallacies, while deliberate 
processing led to higher fallacy rates. The authors conducted two experiments using two 
different conjunction problems. The first was the Linda problem (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1983) and the second was the James problem (adapted from Mellers, Hertwig & Kahneman, 
2001). A similar type of problem to the Linda task with a personality vignette followed by 
ranking two statements: one single event and one conjunction event. Participants either used 
the approach action (e.g., pulling something closer and flexing the arm), the avoid action 
(e.g., pushing something away and extending the arm), or no action, while they completed the 
conjunction problems. The approach action has been shown to enhance heuristic processing, 
while the avoid action has been shown to enhance analytic processing (Friedman & Förster, 
2000). The authors found something quite unexpected; participants who engaged in 
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avoidance motor actions were significantly more likely to commit the conjunction fallacy 
than participants who engaged in approach motor actions. In other words, enhanced analytic 
processing led to higher rates of the conjunction fallacy than enhanced heuristic processing. 
The authors suggest that “detail-oriented processing can lead participants to pay too much 
attention to irrelevant details in a given narrative, which can undermine consistency with 
normative principles of judgement” (p. 247). Another interpretation of these findings could 
be that people have an implicit understanding of the conjunction law and this is obvious when 
they respond intuitively to the problems (i.e., logical intuitions); however, when they 
deliberate their answers, that is when the bias (e.g., the representativeness heuristic) corrupts 
their judgements. Indeed, the authors noted that deliberation was “detrimental to performance 
on problems of the Linda type” (p. 259). 
De Neys had been doing extensive research on conflict sensitivity (De Neys, 
Vartanian, & Goel, 2008; De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; De Neys, 2009; Franssens & De Neys, 
2009; De Neys, Moyens, & Vansteenwegen, 2010; De Neys, Cromheeke, & Osman, 2011), 
and in 2012 he published an article that presented people were able to implicitly detect when 
their heuristic response conflicted with traditional normative considerations. Following on 
from this conflict sensitivity he proposed that logical and probabilistic knowledge is intuitive 
and is activated automatically when people engage in a reasoning task. “The conflict 
detection studies established that despite the well documented failure to give the correct 
answer on the classic problems, people do not simply disregard the traditional normative 
implication of their judgments; rather, they are sensitive to the fact that their heuristic answer 
conflicts with it” (De Neys, 2012, p. 30). The author proposes that the nature of the normative 
information needed to detect conflict is intuitive: it is activated automatically, and it is 
implicit in nature. De Neys highlights the fact that dual process models lack a way to detect 
whether deliberate thinking is required without having to engage in deliberate thinking, and 
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in an attempt to solve this conceptual puzzle he presents the Logical Intuition Model. This 
model proposes that intuitive-heuristic (e.g., responses are based on mere semantic and 
stereotypical associations) and intuitive-logical (e.g., responses are based on the activation of 
traditional logical and probabilistic normative principles) processing are both cued initially, if 
there is conflict detected between these two processing systems, then deliberate processing is 
engaged. If the two intuitive responses are consistent with each other, then that response will 
be chosen and there will be no need for further deliberation. Whereas the employment of 
intuitive-heuristic and intuitive-logical processing is mandatory from the start, the 
employment of deliberation is optional. However, the fact that deliberate processes are called 
upon does not imply that the correct response will be chosen. De Neys claims that “despite 
the erroneous answer, people have implicit knowledge of the logical and probabilistic 
normative principles that are evoked in the classic problems and automatically activate this 
knowledge when faced with the reasoning problem” (2012, p. 36). 
Recent work by Bago and De Neys (in press) has shown convincing evidence that 
logical intuitions, or correct “intuitive” responding in the initial response phase, exist. They 
adopted the two-response paradigm designed by Thompson, Prowse, Turner and Pennycook 
(2011) to gain direct behavioural insight into the timing of intuitive and deliberative response 
generation. This paradigm requires participants to answer a reasoning problem as quickly as 
possible with the first, intuitive response that comes to mind. Following this, they are 
presented with the same problem again, but given as much time as they want to think about 
their final answer. The authors paired this two-response paradigm with items directly 
modelled after the bat-and-ball problem and conducted a series of experiments to test the role 
that intuition plays in the bat-and-ball problem. The bat-and-ball problem is a classic conflict 
detection problem, and one of the three original problems found in Frederick’s (2005) 
Cognitive Reflection Task (see p. 55 for an example). It was designed to entice a potent 
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intuitive response and requires mental capacity in order to inhibit this intuitive response and 
replace it with a deliberative one. In their first experiment, they employed stringent 
procedures to ensure that the first response given was intuitive in nature. These procedures 
included extreme time pressure in the form of a 4 second deadline and overburdening of 
cognitive resources using a secondary load task (in this instance the dot memorization task 
was used, Miyake, Friedman, Rettinger, Shah, & Hegarty, 2001). The authors found that the 
majority of participants fail to solve the bat-and-ball problem. However, in the cases where 
people did manage to give a correct final response following deliberation they had often 
already selected this answer as their first (e.g., 67.2%), intuitive response. This suggests that 
correct responders do not need to correct their intuition as their intuition is often already 
correct. This high non-corrective rate argues against the dual process theories that assume 
System 2 processing plays a corrective role. In fact, these findings suggest that in these cases, 
deliberation acts to verify correct intuitive insights. These results were replicated across a 
series of five experiments. In their final two experiments they explored the participants 
justifications of their answers (in both response phases) by asking the following questions: 
“Could you please try to explain why you selected this answer? Can you briefly justify why 
you believe it is correct? Please type down your justification below.” The combination of 
asking participants to generate their own response and then justify it boosted deliberation, 
which resulted in the lowest recorded corrective rate of all the experiments (e.g., 30%). 
Additionally, the justification responses clearly showed that people can estimate the correct 
answer intuitively, but do not know how they did it. However, after deliberation they 
provided clear justifications. The authors suggest that we need to upgrade our views of both 
Systems of thought. System 1 is able to generate correct logical intuitions, and as such 
System 2 deliberation cannot exist exclusively as a correction process. Instead the authors 
suggest that in these situations System 2 is crucial to produce cognitive transparency, which 
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is important for many reasons, such as developing ideas further and communication. The 
authors stress that this interpretation does not discount System 2 deliberation, as they found 
that in a few instances participants were able to correct their incorrect first response after 
deliberation. Also, for the majority of the time participants were not able to arrive at the 
correct answer in either response phases. “the vast majority of reasoners gives the faulty 
intuitive “10 cents” response both at the initial response stage and after deliberation. Hence, 
not everyone will generate a correct (intuitive) response. For most reasoners, the incorrect 
intuition will dominate” (Bago & De Neys, in press, p.21) 
In a recent study by Trippas, Handley, Verde and Morsanyi (2016) it was shown that 
people have an implicit sensitivity to logic, which occurs potentially automatically and 
outside of awareness. Across three experiments, the authors asked participants to rate 
sentences for how much they liked them, and how physically bright they found the sentences 
to be. Logically valid sentences were judged more likeable and brighter than other sentences. 
Although the sentences made no reference to logical validity, participants liked the 
statements more when they formed part of a logically valid argument, suggesting that people 
are sensitive to logical structure at an intuitive level. Participants also judged logically valid 
statements as being physically brighter than invalid statements. The authors state that 
“reasoning does not seem to be exclusively deliberative but instead possesses some qualities 
typically associated with intuitive, heuristic processes” (p. 1454). 
Conflict detection 
In order for people to detect that their initial response might be biased there has to be 
some type of conflict-detection mechanism that alerts us to this error so that we can employ 
System 2 processing to suppress and override the intuitive response with a deliberate one. 
Conflict detection studies have focused on people’s processing of a variety of classical 
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problems found within the judgement and decision-making literature. Some of these include 
base rate neglect, conjunction fallacy, belief bias syllogisms, and ratio bias tasks. Giving the 
correct answer to these tasks involves simply applying some basic logical or probabilistic 
principles. However, the problems are constructed in such a way that they cue a tempting 
heuristic response, that is in direct conflict with these principles.   
Take the bat-and-ball problem as an example. Similar to the Linda problem, the bat-
and-ball problem is designed to elicit a salient intuitive, but biased response. The classic 
version of the problem is as follows: 
A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much 
does the ball cost? 
The majority of people answer this problem incorrectly by assuming that the answer 
is ‘10 cents’. If the ball costs $0.10, then the bat should cost $1.10 (because as specified in 
the problem, the bat costs $1.00 more than the ball), which brings the total amount to $1.20. 
The correct answer is that the ball costs $0.05, and the bat $1.05, which accumulates in a total 
amount of $1.10. Tremoliere and De Neys (2014) suggest that people use attribute 
substitution when attempting to solve this problem, which results in the incorrect answer. 
People substitute the ‘more than’ relational statement with an easier absolute statement, thus 
the statement no longer reads ‘The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball’, but instead is read as 
‘The bat costs $1.00’. 
The conflict detection problems are trying to establish whether reasoners are aware 
that their biased response is questionable, thus they are designed in a way to contrast people’s 
processing of the traditional problem (e.g., contains conflict) with a newly constructed 
control/congruent version (e.g., does not contain conflict; see Figure 1. 3 for an example of 
both conflict and congruent versions of the Linda problem). By removing the conflict from 
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the task, one enables the cued heuristic response to align with the response cued by logical or 
probabilistic principles. This makes it very easy to respond as both heuristic and logical 
considerations point towards the same answer. Conflict detection studies examine whether 
people process the conflict and no conflict versions differently. The idea behind this being 
that if people are simply cognitive misers and are not sensitive to the conflict underlying 
these considerations, then the two versions of the task (e.g., conflict present vs. conflict 
absent) should be processed in the same way.  
 
A. Control “No conflict” version B. Classic “Conflict” version 
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken and 
very bright. She majored in philosophy. As 
a student, she was deeply concerned with 
issues of discrimination and social justice, 
and she also participated in anti-nuclear 
demonstrations.  
 
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken and 
very bright. She majored in philosophy. As 
a student, she was deeply concerned with 
issues of discrimination and social justice, 
and she also participated in anti-nuclear 
demonstrations.  
 
Which one of the following statements is 
most likely? 
 
a. Linda is active in the feminist 
movement. 
b. Linda is a bank teller and is active in 
the feminist movement. 
Which one of the following statements is 
most likely? 
 
a. Linda is a bank teller. 
 
b. Linda is a bank teller and is active in 
the feminist movement. 
 
Figure 1. 3. Illustration of a control “no conflict” and classic “conflict” version of the Linda 
problem. Note. The left panel (A) shows the newly constructed control version of the task, in 
which the cued heuristic response is consistent with the logical response. The right panel (B) 
shows the classic version of the task, in which the cued heuristic response is at odds with the 
correct logical response (i.e., the response considered correct according to standard logic or 
probability theory principles) 
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Tremoliere and De Neys (2014) recently investigated the question ‘when are 
heuristics beneficial’ in a study that used an adapted version of the bat-and-ball problem. 
They presented two experiments as support for their hypothesis that prior beliefs (i.e., 
intuitions) provide support for solving the bat-and-ball problem. By manipulating the objects 
and the values of these objects they were able to present congruent or incongruent versions of 
the problem to their participants. An example of an incongruent problem was as follows: “A 
Ferrari and a Ford together cost $190,000. The Ferrari costs $100,000 more than the Ford. 
How much does the Ford cost?” Consistent with the structure of the original problem, the 
cued heuristic response for the value of the Ford is ‘$90,000’; however, this amount is 
unbelievable for such an ordinary car. The authors predicted that the conflict between the 
value of the car and people’s prior knowledge would decrease the appeal of the substituted 
response, and thereby help people to reason better. Their results supported their predictions, 
showing that participants performed significantly better on solving the incongruent compared 
to the congruent problem (which read: “A Ferrari and a Ford together cost $190,000. The 
Ford costs $100,000 more than the Ferrari. How much does the Ferrari cost?”) In the 
congruent version, prior belief of a Ferrari being expensive would fit the cued response; 
however, there was a limitation in this study because prior knowledge would make it 
unbelievable to accept that a Ford could cost $100,000 more than a Ferrari. Thus, the authors 
attempted to consolidate this limitation with a second experiment that substituted the Ford 
with a Rolls-Royce. They were able to replicate their results from the first experiment 
showing that participants performed better on the incongruent (unbelievable, intuitively cued 
response conflicted with background knowledge) version than the congruent (believable, 
intuitively cued response matched with background knowledge) version of the task. 
However, this effect was small resulting in only a 10% accuracy boost. They attempt to 
explain their findings in two ways. The first is that people are readily able to detect conflict. 
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They typically follow their intuition when the response is congruent with their beliefs but will 
switch to a more deliberate thinking style when the response conflicts with their beliefs. The 
second explanation originates from the fluency framework, which suggests that fluency 
decreases when prior beliefs conflict with the intuitive response, resulting in more effortful 
thinking. 
Feelings of rightness/wrongness. Consider again the classic Linda problem in Figure 
1. 3. The vast majority of people pick the heuristic response the first time they encounter 
these tasks. However, this does not mean they were fully convinced that their answer was 
correct. The persuasive heuristic response might have prevailed; however, did respondents 
feel there was something wrong with their answer? Did they “feel that there was something 
tricky about the problem” (De Neys, 2012). The point of these feelings of rightness, or 
conflict detection, is to enable a “switch” from System 1 to System 2 thinking, to allow 
ourselves to override the intuitive response and replace it with a deliberate one. Koriat (1993) 
labelled the idea of switching between systems of thought as the “feeling of rightness” 
(FOR). The idea being that our intuitive System 1 judgements are always accompanied by an 
affective FOR response. This response is supposed to arise from the fluency with which the 
initial answer is produced. In other words, fluent answers give rise to a strong FOR, while 
dysfluent answers result in negative affect and lower FOR. A low FOR triggers the need to 
employ System 2 thinking. 
The fundamental question that conflict detection studies have been trying to answer 
is: are people sensitive to the intrinsic conflict between the cued heuristic response and the 
basic logical or probabilistic principles that are evoked in these types of problems, regardless 
of the eventual response they produce? Recent work on conflict sensitivity, even during 
biased reasoning, suggests that people are able to sense when something is not quite right 
with their response, which in turn causes them to question their response (e.g., Bonner & 
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Newell, 2010; De Neys, Cromheeke, & Osman, 2011; De Neys, Moyens, & Vansteenwegen, 
2010). The following studies all showed that people are sensitive to conflict and might be 
aware of a particular alternative answer. For example, giving an unwarranted heuristic 
response to a task resulted in autonomic arousal in skin conductance (e.g., De Neys et al., 
2010), longer response times (e.g., Bonner & Newell, 2010; Villejoubert, 2009; De Neys & 
Glumicic, 2008; Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2012), and increased attention and 
inspection of logically critical problem parts (Ball, Philips, Wade, & Qualyle, 2006). 
Additionally, the following studies show a more general lack of confidence, with participants 
expressing less subjective confidence after solving the classic conflict version of a problem 
compared to the congruent version (e.g., De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; De Neys et al., 2011; 
De Neys, Comheeke, & Osman, 2011; De Neys & Feremans, 2013). Taken together, these 
results suggest that both biased and unbiased reasoners are readily able to detect conflict and 
can sense that their heuristic response is questionable. Failure to provide an unbiased answer 
is not due to a lack of conflict detection, as both biased and unbiased reasoners showed 
evidence of conflict sensitivity. 
The origins of conflict detection. Recently in the body of literature surrounding 
conflict detection a debate has arisen regarding how cognizant conflict detection actually is. 
To be more specific, empirical studies present substantial support for the presence of conflict 
detection. They conclude that even biased reasoners are able to detect that their incorrect 
response is questionable (Bago et al., 2019; Villejoubert, 2009; De Neys & Glumicic, 2008). 
When people give a heuristic response that conflicts with the laws of logic, they are able to 
pick up on this at some level, and this is where the problem lies. Researchers are aware of its 
existence; however, the precise nature of conflict detection is unknown. A burning question 
remains: where does this doubt come from? Bago and colleagues (2019) suggest two 
possibilities. The first is that “people have a highly specific error or conflict signal” (p. 215). 
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Take the bat-and-ball problem as an example. With regards to conflict detection, people 
might have computed both the “10 cents” and the “5 cents” responses, thus they experience a 
conflict between the correct and incorrect response. Biased reasoners would choose the 
heuristic response of “10 cents”; however, they would also be aware that the alternative 
answer is “5 cents”. The second suggestion is that “the conflict signal might be non-specific” 
(p. 215). In other words, people might detect that the heuristic answer of “10 cents” is 
incorrect, but they would have no further clue as to what the correct response is.  
A few recent studies have attempted to illuminate where conflict detection comes 
from. Travers and colleagues (2016) used a mouse-tracking methodology to try and pin point 
where the conflict was coming from. They used an adapted version of the extended CRT and 
designed both conflict and no-conflict trials. A choice of four different responses were 
presented in the corners of the screen. Conflict trials contained both the heuristic response 
and the logical response, plus two addition foil responses. No-conflict trials contained the 
logico-heuristic response plus three foil answers. The researchers found that while correct 
responders showed attraction towards the incorrect “10 cents” option, incorrect responders 
showed no attraction towards the correct “5 cents” option. These findings either mean that 
contrary to other conflict detection studies, biased responders do not display error sensitivity. 
Alternatively, it might indicate that biased responders conflict detection is non-specific in 
nature. To be more specific, reasoners might detect that the “10 cents” response is erroneous; 
however, do not know that the “5 cents” response is correct, hence, showing no particular 
attraction towards it.  
Bago and colleagues (2019) attempt to further clarify this issue in their study by 
introducing a second guess paradigm. First, they asked participants to answer an adaptation 
of the classic bat-and-ball problem. Following this, they asked them to make a second guess, 
which they could choose from a list of options (e.g., “1 cent”, “5 cents”, or “15 cents”). They 
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purposefully left the intuitively induced response off the list of second guess options as a 
means to reflect the specificity of their conflict detection. The researchers found over a series 
of three experiments, that the “average biased reasoner has a medium-specific error signal” 
(p. 225). What this means is that biased participants were not aware of the correct response 
and gave second guess answers lower than but as close to the heuristic answer “10 cents” as 
possible. Although they did not know the correct response, they were aware that it should at 
least be smaller than the salient heuristic answer they succumbed to. However, it should be 
mentioned that this evidence is weak and does not allow for the possibility of participants 
guessing. The task was a forced answer task from three different choices, two of which were 
lower, or smaller than, than the heuristic answer. Thus, giving participants a 2 out of 3 chance 
(i.e., 66%) of guessing a lower number than the salient heuristic answer. 
Implicit vs. explicit detection. People are readily able to detect the conflict 
underlying logical and heuristic considerations (De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; Villejoubert, 
2009; Franssens & De Neys, 2009), but to what extent are these realizations conscious? De 
Neys and Glumicic (2008) found that explicit verbalization did not show any evidence of 
actively experienced conflict; however, analysis of processing levels from a recall test 
showed that they were experiencing this conflict implicitly (i.e., conflict detection was 
accompanied by deeper processing of the base rate information, which resulted in higher 
recall). In other words, “people are not verbalizing the conflict they are detecting” (p. 1274). 
However, it is important to note that lack of verbalization does not simply imply that the 
detection process is unconscious. The role of verbalization as a key prerequisite for 
conscious, explicit processing is debatable. Moors and de Houwer (2006) caution against 
using dichotomous implicit-explicit labels, and instead favour a more gradual approach. With 
this in mind, De Neys and Glumicic (2008) suggest that “the conflict experience might be 
less explicit than traditionally assumed but any stronger claims should be avoided” (p. 1275). 
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Conflict detection and dual process theories. Thanks to the advancement and 
accessibility of technology inspiring new methodologies, conflict detection research is 
thriving, and people are learning a lot more about dual process theories than ever before. For 
example, the fact that conflict monitoring is successful even when the biased response is 
given suggests that the dominance of the heuristic response is not due to a lax monitoring 
process (Bago et al., 2019; Travers, Rolison, & Feeney, 2016; Villejoubert, 2009; De Neys & 
Glumicic, 2008). This implies that people are not simply cognitive misers, instead we have 
acquired the relevant normative principles needed to detect the conflict underlying heuristic 
and logical considerations, and we are able to retrieve them. If people were not taking 
analytic considerations into account, then they would simply not detect that there is conflict, 
which does not happen. Instead, the dominance of heuristic responses should be accredited to 
an inhibition failure.  
It is apparent from the literature that the nature of the relation between the two 
systems is unclear (Evans, 2007, 2009). Is it a serial or a parallel relationship? The parallel 
activation account (e.g., Epstein, 1994; Sloman, 1996) states that both systems are activated 
from the start and they simultaneously compute a solution. Hence, if their answers differ they 
are alerted to the conflict between intuitive and logical considerations. The serial view differs 
in that a reasoner initially relies on only the intuitive system. The deliberate system is only 
employed when the intuitively cued response conflicts with the output of the deliberate 
system. There is; however, a fundamental flaw in the conception of the serial view. How is 
the reasoner able to detect a conflict between the output of the intuitive and deliberate system 
if the deliberate system is not engaged yet? The simultaneous activation of the two systems in 
the parallel view overcomes this problem; however, it also faces a problem as the deliberate 
system is “blindly” engaged from the beginning (De Neys, 2012). Thus, essentially throwing 
away any benefit of having an intuitive system. When the two systems of thought do not 
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conflict with each other, it is perfectly acceptable to rely on the intuitive route. Engaging in 
demanding deliberations in this case is redundant and would be a waste of cognitive 
resources (De Neys & Glumicic, 2008). De Neys (2012, 2013) has postulated that in order to 
detect conflict between intuitively cued heuristic intuitions and logical principles, the logical 
principles need to be activated at some level. Conflict detection has an effortless nature 
(Franssens & De Neys, 2009), thus it seems to be a System 1 process. However, system 1 is 
widely accepted as being intuitive. So, how are people able to detect the conflict between 
heuristic and logical considerations when only System 1 (i.e., intuition) is activated initially? 
Activating logical considerations from the beginning would be a waste of precious cognitive 
resources, thus any realistic dual process model needs a way to detect whether System 2 
thinking is required without having to engage in System 2 thinking (Evans, 2009; Thompson, 
Turner, & Pennycook, 2011).  
De Neys (2011), suggests that the cuing of an intuitive logical response is the answer 
to this conceptual puzzle. If the intuitive System 1 cues both a heuristic and logical response, 
then any potential conflict can be detected without prior engagement of System 2. This 
involves a parallel activation, not of the two systems as in the parallel-competitive account, 
but rather a parallel activation of two different types of intuitive responses: a heuristic-
intuitive response based on semantic and stereotypical associations, and a logical-intuitive 
response based on the activation of traditional logical and probabilistic norms (De Neys, 
2012). In the case where no conflict exists (i.e., congruency between the two intuitive 
responses) people will simply select the cued response without further deliberation. However, 
any detected conflict would result in the need to engage the deliberative system. Importantly, 
this does not necessarily mean that the correct logical answer will be chosen, but this account 
does provide us with a clear switch rule to understand how conflict might be detected without 
permanently activating the deliberate system. De Neys (2012) does clarify that the logical 
  64 
intuition account differs from the basic automatization account, because all reasoners have 
access to these logical intuitions, not just experts (e.g., a professional statistician might be 
able to solve logical reasoning problems in an entirely intuitive manner after years of 
extensive training). Additionally, De Neys clarifies that the intuitively cued response might 
still be chosen despite detecting the conflict because “the heuristic response might be more 
strongly activated, salient, or appealing than the logical response” (2012, p. 35). There is no 
guarantee that the two intuitive responses have the same strength or status. If conflict is 
detected and deliberation is henceforth activated, then the final selection of the logical 
response will still require a demanding inhibition of the heuristic response. 
The present research 
Dual process models do not necessitate that correct responding requires System 2 
processes. Indeed, the correct response can come from System 1 processing when there is no 
conflict between the two systems of thought, but also when the task is elementary enough. 
For example, “Modus Ponens is arguably automatic, and, as long as the conditional major 
premise is encoded in working memory, it can be triggered unconsciously by a minor premise 
that is below the threshold of detection” (Reverberi, Pischedda, Burigo, & Cherubini, 2012, 
p.252). Modus Ponens is an intuitively straightforward rule of inference. It can be 
summarised as “A implies B and A is asserted to be true, therefore B must be true. In this 
case, the processing needed to arrive at the correct conclusion is so basic that it has been 
automatized and assimilated as a System 1 response. If there is no erroneous response coming 
from System 1, then there is obviously no need for System 2 to correct it. Modus Tollens is a 
related rule of inference to Modus Ponens. Summarised as “A implies B, but B is not true, 
therefore A is also not true”. For example, “If the watch-dog detects an intruder, the watch-
dog will bark. The watch-dog did not bark. Therefore, no intruder was detected by the watch-
dog”. Following this general idea, some might suggest that correct intuitive responses are 
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attributed to the easiness, or non-representative nature, of the task (Pennycook, Fugelsang, & 
Koehler, 2012; Travers, Rolison, & Feeney, 2016). However, I believe that the prototypical 
Linda problem, and various adaptions thereof, is demanding enough to warrant deliberation. 
Particularly when there is a high contrast between the stereotypes or prototypes used in the 
task. For example, if Pr(T) is highly unrepresentative of a chosen category, but Pr(F) is 
highly representative of that category. When testing for correct “intuitive” responding, it is 
important to ensure that rigid measures are put in place to ensure that the first response is 
intuitive in nature. If simply instructed to respond intuitively, but not forced to, participants 
might fail to respect the instructions resulting in a correct first response due to System 2 
processing. For example, in a study conducted by Villejoubert (2009), participants in the time 
restricted condition were instructed to respond within 12 seconds. This time limit was 
prescribed as it was less than half the average time taken under unlimited time in a pilot 
study; however, reviewers have suggested this is too long a period of time to warrant intuitive 
responses. Clearly one needs to make sure, through the use of stringent measures, that only 
System 1 is engaged in the initial response phase. It is widely accepted that System 2 
processing is time and resource demanding (Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman & Frederick, 
2005). “Under conditions of time pressure and memory load people are less able to recruit 
effortful analytical mechanisms in order to correct the prepotent heuristic response, 
supporting the contention that the incorrect response is based on a less thorough analysis and 
is delivered without much effort” (Crisp & Feeney, 2009, p.2323). Thus, in the present series 
of experiments, I attempt to force the intuitive response through discarding System 2 as much 
as possible by depriving participants of time and cognitive resources. By having participants 
reason under conditions that minimise deliberation in the first response, I attempt to identify 
the presumed intuitive response that precedes deliberation.   
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Can we intuit probabilities? De Neys (2012) as well as Handley and Trippas (2015) 
offer their explanations for believing that reasoning, an accepted System 2 process, may in 
fact be partly intuitive. They showed that when people make biased or erroneous judgements 
(i.e., they fail to make normatively correct judgements in line with logical considerations), 
they often reveal a sensitivity to the normatively correct knowledge through implicit 
measures; including response latencies, response confidence ratings and gaze durations. 
However, when people are in fact able to make normatively correct judgements, they often 
neglect to mention critical aspects of the normative solution in their verbal protocols (e.g., 
referring to the base rate information when solving a base rate task). These findings suggest 
that procedures relevant to reasoning might in fact be activated implicitly and outside of 
awareness – a characteristic of intuition rather than deliberation. Trippas, Handley, Verde, 
and Morsanyi (2016) also provided evidence that suggests people have an implicit sensitivity 
to logical norms. Participants were not asked to reason, instead they were asked to rate how 
much they liked a sentence, or how physically bright they found a sentence. Results showed 
that people rated sentences with inherent logical structure as more likeable and brighter than 
sentences that were logically invalid. The authors surmised that although reasoning is 
undeniably a System 2 process and resource-intensive, it also “possesses some qualities 
typically associated with intuitive, heuristic processes” (p. 1454).  
De Neys (2012) supports this idea with his “logical intuitions” model, whereby people 
appear to be intuitively sensitive to the conflict between heuristic and deliberate 
considerations. For example, stereotypes and formal probabilistic norms. This model states 
that people have an intuitive sensitivity to all formal norms; however, they are often unable to 
articulate this conflict. The analytic-heuristic conflict is always detected, but this does not 
always result in correct responses being made due to inhibition failure. A few reasons for this 
may be that people lack the motivation or cognitive resources to complete the demanding 
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inhibition process, or that there is no follow up of deliberate System 2 thinking (i.e., 
justification of the initial logical intuition) after conflict detection (De Neys & Bonnefon, 
2013). Despite much evidence supporting the idea that people are able to detect the conflict 
between their deliberate and heuristic considerations (Stupple & Ball, 2008; De Neys, 
Moyens & Vansteenwegen, 2010; De Neys, 2012; Villejoubert, 2009; De Neys, Vartanian, & 
Goel, 2008; Franssens & De Neys, 2009; De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; Mevel et al., 2014), as 
well as the fact that people might have logical intuitions (Saxe, 1988; De Neys, 2012; 
Villejoubert, 2009), there remains a large gap in our knowledge as to whether people are 
genuinely answering in accordance with their logical intuitions when they make these 
judgements, or using a different strategy. One cannot disregard the potential explanation for 
these “logical” responses as resulting from logical reasoning (i.e., System 2 deliberation), 
from a rejection of the heuristic answer and simply choosing the alternative option (e.g., in a 
forced answer task containing two possible answers), or from participants simply giving up 
and guessing.  
Can we deliberate intuitions? Recently, there has been some evidence provided for the 
notion of effortful heuristics, or heuristic reflections. Handley, Newstead, and Trippas (2011) 
used a novel methodology by asking participants to judge both the validity as well as the 
believability of an argument. They found that belief judgements (i.e., intuitive judgements) 
took longer to make and were also more subject to error than logically valid judgements. The 
authors concluded that the logical consideration (e.g., the validity) was available early, but 
needed to be inhibited in order to explicitly assess the believability of the argument. A 
possible interpretation of these findings is that “the logical inference is available 
automatically and by default and intervention is required to successfully give a belief 
judgement” (Howarth, Handley & Walsh, 2018, p. 5). In a subsequent study conducted by 
Howarth, Handley and Walsh (2016) using the same novel methodology as Handley et al. 
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(2011) plus a secondary task that burdened working memory resources, the results mentioned 
above were replicated. Belief-based judgements produced lower rates of accuracy overall 
(e.g., compared to validity judgements) and were more greatly influenced by conflict being 
present. The secondary task (i.e., random number generation) reduced accuracy across all 
judgements, however had its greatest impact on logic-based judgements. The authors 
interpreted these findings as resembling conflict between two System 2 processes. Indeed, 
they proposed that logical responses are available at an early System 1 level, however require 
System 2 processing (e.g., deliberation) to explicitly extract the underlying structure of an 
argument required for answering in line with logical considerations. However, belief-based 
responses are available later and depend on the inhibition of a competing intuitive-logical 
response. The authors propose that this evidence is better suited to a parallel processing 
model compared to a default interventionist model. A few years later, the same authors 
conducted another series of two experiments to investigate the effortful nature of belief-based 
(i.e., heuristic) judgements (Howarth, Handley & Walsh, 2018). They increased the inhibitory 
demands of the task by adding a third instructional condition (e.g., the Stroop Test in E1 and 
a memory updating task in E2) and found that this in turn increased the difficulty of 
withholding a logical response, therefore reducing accuracy on the belief judgement. Logic 
judgements appeared to impact on belief judgements more when inhibitory demands were 
increased by the inclusion of a colour naming condition. This led the authors to surmise that 
people use a parallel processing model to make judgement and decisions. They believe that 
simple logical considerations are available early and require inhibiting to produce a belief-
based (i.e., intuitive or heuristic) response. Thus, there are two routes to providing a logical 
response: an intuitive route and a deliberative route. The first is a System 1 process 
completing first and creating an intuitive cue based on the logical structure of the argument, 
possibly accompanied by a feeling of rightness (Thompson, Prowse, Turner & Pennycook, 
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2011). The second is a System 2 process activated when given specific instruction to reason 
logically, which runs parallel to the route required for an intuitive/heuristic response and 
explains the impact of a secondary task on logic judgements. With simple logical arguments, 
as used by Howarth et al. (2018), an intuitive logical response is available early and must be 
inhibited in order to explicitly generate a response based on belief, or intuition. Their findings 
showed that withholding an available logical response requires effort and increasing 
cognitive demands significantly reduced people’s ability to do so. However, on more 
challenging tasks a belief-based, or intuitive, response may come first, thus impacting logic-
based reasoning. 
The current research is focussed around the question of whether people are able to 
intuitively solve conjunction probability judgements. From simply existing in the world, we 
learn different lessons and rules. For example, Saxe (1988) found that street children who 
sold candy for a living were able to outperform school children on advanced mathematical 
equations, simply because they had learned to do so from existing in their environment. 
These children had received no formal schooling. Could this also be the case for people with 
the statistical law of conjunction probability? Indeed, the logical intuitions model (De Neys, 
2012) suggests that people have an understanding of the formal laws underlying most classic 
reasoning and decision-making tasks (e.g., base-rate neglect, conjunction fallacy, ratio-bias, 
belief-bias, etc). In 2009, Villejoubert ran an experiment that resulted in some surprising data. 
The results showed that people took longer to make a judgement when heuristic and logical 
considerations were in conflict, even when they were put under time pressure. This suggests 
that people do readily detect the conflict between heuristic and logical assessments. 
Additionally, time pressure appeared to increase the rate of logical judgements under conflict. 
One possible interpretation of these results would be that intuitive thinking might in fact point 
to the logical answer first (i.e., logical intuition); however, if deliberation is employed the 
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heuristic bias then corrupts our thinking (i.e., heuristic reflection). This idea goes against all 
traditional accounts of dual process theories, since they all stipulate that when the slow 
deliberative system is not given enough time to process information, thinking will be more 
heuristic and less logical. In contrast, Villejoubert’s (2009) findings suggest that quick 
thinking can be logical while effortful thinking can be biased by non-logical heuristics. 
Hypotheses. The present research proposes to build on Villejoubert’s (2009) findings, 
and methodology, to explore more systematically the circumstances under which accurate 
logical considerations might be fast and intuitive in judgements of conjunction probability. 
This research has two objectives: (1) To determine how individual differences impact on the 
logicality of individuals’ probability judgements, and (2) to test original and theoretically-
driven ways to improve individuals’ probability judgements. 
The first objective will be addressed by testing two hypotheses: (1a) Individuals who 
tend to engage more naturally in effortful thinking are also more prone to produce illogical 
probability judgements if they have time to deliberate because their deliberation is biased by 
non-logical heuristics, and (1b) in situations of conflict between representativeness and 
logicality, individuals who provide logical answers will show different patterns of eye-
movement disruption than individuals who provide heuristic answers.  
The second objective will be addressed by testing two additional hypotheses: (2a) 
Decreasing individuals’ capacity for effortful thinking will also have a positive impact on 
probability judgments because it will impede the inhibition of the rapid, logical response by 
conscious effortful deliberation, and (2b) the presence of conflict and severe time pressure 
will result in individuals’ displaying more logical base-rate responses than when there is no 
conflict or no time pressure, because deliberation is biased by non-logical heuristics. This 
final experiment seeks to replicate the findings from Hypothesis 1a but using a repeated 
  71 
measure design and investigate whether the results are transferable across different 
probability tasks. 
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Chapter 2: Methodology 
 
In the classic conjunction fallacy experiments (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1983), 
most participants commit the conjunction fallacy when they rate an atypical single event 
(e.g., “Linda is a bank teller” (T)) as more likely than a conjunction of the atypical single 
event and a representative one (e.g., “Linda is a Feminist and a bank teller (F&T)). Yet, they 
also correctly believe that a representative single event (e.g., “Linda is a Feminist” (F)) is 
more likely to occur than the above-mentioned conjunction. Researchers have assumed that 
participants who ranked (F) as more probable than both (T) and (F&T) answered logically 
because they chose the single event over the conjunction. However, it is impossible to 
disentangle logic from intuition using this design. The rating of (F) as more likely than (F&T) 
could stem from either logical considerations (since a single event is more likely than the 
conjunction of two events) or intuitive considerations (since (F) is also more congruent with 
the stereotype stemming from the associated personality description than (F&T)). 
Researchers may be correct in assuming that this answer arose from logical considerations; 
however, there is no way to be sure of this. It is therefore important to identify whether these 
correct and logical answers are determined only by heuristic processing, or whether the 
participants are sensitive to the logic that underpins the conjunction rule. 
The Comparison Conjunction Probability Judgement (CCPJ) Task 
Following Villejoubert (2009; see also Curtis-Holmes & Evans, 2005), the 
experiments described in this thesis use a research methodology aiming to disentangle the 
influence of intuitive and representativeness considerations underpinning conjunction 
fallacies. This innovative experimental procedure allows the examination of the relative 
impact of heuristic and logical considerations on conjunction judgements. Instead of asking 
participants to make separate evaluations of the probability of a conjunction and the 
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probability of a single event, this procedure asks them to judge whether statements comparing 
both types of probabilities are true or false (see Figure 2. 1). These statements vary in terms 
of their logicality (logical vs. illogical) and their compatibility with the representativeness 
heuristic (representative vs. unrepresentative). The four possible statement types are 
illustrated in Table 2. 1.  
 
A. Classic Conjunction Fallacy Task B. Comparative Conjunction Probability 
Judgement Task 
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken and 
very bright. She majored in philosophy. As 
a student, she was deeply concerned with 
issues of discrimination and social justice, 
and she also participated in anti-nuclear 
demonstrations.  
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken and 
very bright. She majored in philosophy. As 
a student, she was deeply concerned with 
issues of discrimination and social justice, 
and she also participated in anti-nuclear 
demonstrations.  
Which one of the following statements is 
most likely? 
 
a. Linda is an active feminist. 
 
b. Linda is a bank teller and is an active 
feminist. 
Is the following statement correct? 
 
 
Linda is more likely to be an active feminist 
than she is to be a bank teller and an active 
feminist. 
 
TRUE or FALSE 
 
Figure 2. 1. Illustration of the classic conjunction fallacy task compared to the Comparison 
Conjunction Probability Judgement (CCPJ) task. Note. The left panel (A) shows the classic 
version of the Linda problem where participants rank order probabilities. The right panel (B) 
shows the CCPJ task where participants accept a statement containing both types of 
probabilities as true or reject it as false 
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Table 2. 1 
Illustration of the four types of statements used to study the conjunction fallacy in CCPJ 
tasks. 
 Conflict statements 
R/I Lynn is more likely to be a cashier and a feminist than she is to be a cashier. 
U/L Lynn is more likely to be a cashier than she is to be a cashier and a feminist. 
 No conflict statements 
R&L Lynn is more likely to be a feminist than she is to be a cashier and a feminist. 
U&I Lynn is more likely to be a cashier and a feminist than she is to be a feminist. 
Note. R/I: Representative but Logical; U/L: Unrepresentative but Logical; R&L: 
Representative and Logical; U&I: Unrepresentative and Illogical. 
 
The CCPJ task makes it possible to manipulate whether or not a conflict is present in 
the probability statement. By presenting a series of no-conflict and conflict statements to 
participants with varying cover contents, it is possible to compute an index of their sensitivity 
to logic considerations. With no-conflict statements, both representativeness and logic points 
towards the same answer. For example, if a participant accepts a representative and logical 
(R&L) statement as true, they are answering in accordance with both representativeness and 
logic considerations. The same can be said for rejecting an unrepresentative and illogical 
(U&I) statement as false. Thus, the R&L statements should be easy to accept as true, while 
the U&I statements should be easy to reject as false. The conflict statements (i.e., containing 
conflict); however, should be more difficult to answer if people detect the conflict because 
representativeness and logic considerations point towards opposite answers. For example, if a 
participant accepts a representative but illogical (R/I) statement as true, they have 
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transparently chosen the heuristic answer over the logical one. However, if they accept an 
unrepresentative but logical (U/L) statement as true then they chose the logical answer over 
the heuristic one. These conflict statements allow to test whether people are sensitive to the 
conflict between logic and representativeness. The CCPJ task allowed me to observe the 
effects of conflict on people’s conjunction probability judgements, including their judgement 
latencies and eye movements. 
The original CCPJ task (Villejoubert, 2009) was comprised of 12 scenarios. Two of 
these were the original Linda and Bill descriptions (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). In addition, 
ten new descriptions were modelled after these original texts. The statements fell into the 
same four categories as the current CCPJ task: R&L, R/I, U/L, and U&I. Thus, there were 
three scenarios for each category of statement. The task was originally designed and 
administered in French, therefore it was translated into English for this program of research. 
Additional improvements were made by adding four extra scenarios to the task bringing the 
total number of scenarios to 16. This made it possible to design the study (and analyse it) 
across four blocks of four scenarios each. An example of a scenario is as follows: “Jesse is 28 
years old. She enjoys meeting new people and traveling to unusual countries.  She has 
excellent team building skills and is very athletic. In her spare time she likes to go hiking and 
play paintball.” The scenario is then accompanied by a statement such as: “Jesse is more 
likely to be a soldier than a beauty salon owner and a soldier” (R&L statement; see Appendix 
1 for the full CCPJ task).  
Each trial presented a short person description followed by one of the four types of 
probability statements. Each description was designed so that the person presented appeared 
both as a highly representative member of a stereotypical category and highly 
unrepresentative of an atypical category, without openly mentioning that this individual 
belonged to either category. These descriptions were then tested in a pilot study where 20 
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students were asked to rate how shocked they felt when they saw two events listed together. 
For example, they were asked to rate on a scale from 0 (not at all shocked) – 9 (extremely 
shocked) how shocked they were to learn that Neil was both a “builder and a dance 
instructor”, or that Sarah was a “foreman and fortune teller”. The thumbnail descriptions that 
were rated highest on the “surprise factor” were included in the final CCPJ task. The final 
version of the task contained 16 trials. See Appendix 1 for the full CCPJ task used in this 
thesis. Each scenario was found in only one condition (i.e., the type of statement was not 
rotated through scenario). Participants saw each of the sixteen scenarios only once; however, 
the type of statement seen after each scenario differed across participants due to the design 
and randomisation of the CCPJ task, In other words, the Linda scenario was followed by the 
random selection of either an R&L, R/I, U/L or U&I statement. Plus, the order in which the 
scenarios were completed was randomised across participants. 
Half of the 16 statements presented were logical (e.g., R&L and U/L) and the 
remaining half were illogical (e.g., the R/I and U&I, see Table 2. 1). Within each set of 8 
statements, half were compatible with predictions based on representativeness (R&L and R/I 
statements) whereas the other half were incompatible with those predictions (U/L and U&I 
statements). Representativeness was determined by the short description presented before the 
statement and was manipulated by crafting each description so that the individual presented 
appeared both as a highly representative member of a given category and highly 
unrepresentative of an “odd” category, without openly mentioning that this individual 
belonged to either category. “R” statements always described the individual as more likely to 
belong to the stereotypical category whereas “U” statements always described the target as 
more likely to belong to the odd category. These “R” and “U” statements were then combined 
with the law of conjunction probability to be either logical (R&L, U&L) or illogical (R/I, 
U/I). In line with this law of probability, participants who judged the single clause as more 
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likely to occur than the conjunction clause made a logical judgement, while those who judged 
the conjunction clause as more likely made an illogical judgement. The statement 
manipulation between representativeness and logicality afforded an insight into the cognitive 
underpinnings of people’s probability judgements as the given answer pointed to the thinking 
style that was employed while making the judgement: either intuition or logic.  
Each type of statement was presented four times in a random order. For all of the 
experiments, except the eye-tracking experiment, the CCPJ task was programmed using E-
Prime and participants completed it from a desktop computer. For each CCPJ trial, all 
participants were first presented with a thumbnail description of a fictitious person and once 
they had finished reading it, they were instructed to press the spacebar in order to move onto 
the next part. This resulted in a probability statement appearing below the description. 
Participants read the statement and then responded “True” or “False” indicating whether or 
not they agreed with the statement. The programme recorded the time taken to read the 
description, the time taken to read the statement and make a judgement, the total test time 
from start to finish, as well as the responses given. The eye-tracking experiment was similar 
but had a few small differences. It was programmed in Matlab, and both the description and 
the statement were presented simultaneously for each trial. The software recorded all the 
variables mentioned above, as well as the number of refixations into the areas of interest 
(AoI), the refixation dwell times, the first run dwell times, and the total dwell times. The AoIs 
comprised of the description and the statement, and then the statement was divided up into 
several areas: “more likely”, “single clause”, “than” and “conjunction clause”. For an 
example, see Figure 2. 2. 
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*Lynn is 31 years old. She is single, outspoken, and very bright. She has a Degree in 
philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and 
social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations*. 
 
Lynn is *more likely* to be *a feminist* *than* she is to be 
*a cashier and a feminist*. 
 
TRUE  FALSE 
 
Figure 2. 2. An example of a CCPJ trial as presented to participants in the eye-tracking study 
(Experiment 2). Note. AoIs are represented inside of asterisks; this is an example of an R&L 
statement. 
No two CCPJ tasks in this program of research were identical. They all differed 
slightly according to the manipulations being applied (e.g., time pressure, ego-depletion, or 
cognitive load); thus, more specific details about the procedures used in each experiment will 
be provided in the following chapters.  
Ethical Approval 
For all five of the experiments conducted across this research project, ethical 
application was made to the Kingston University Faculty Research Ethics Committee.  
Experiment 1: “The Impact of Preferred Thinking Styles and Time Pressure on the 
Conjunction Fallacy”, was approved and granted permission to proceed on 25 April 2012. 
Experiment 2: “Eye-tracking Evidence for Logical Intuitions in Conjunction Probability 
Judgements”, was approved on 18 January 2013. Finally, experiment 3: “The Influence of 
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Ego Depletion and Impulsivity on the Conjunction Fallacy”, experiment 4: “The Influence of 
Spatial Storage Load and Cognitive Reflection on the Conjunction Fallacy”, and experiment 
5: “The Effects of Time Pressure and Cognitive Reflection on Base Rate Neglect” were 
approved on 26 March 2014.  
The procedures needed to conform to ethical scrutiny ensured no harm came to 
anyone who chose to participate in the studies. This included ensuring all participants were 
fully informed before consenting to participant in the study. Their participation remained 
anonymous and they could withdraw from the study at any point. Following the completion 
of the study, all participants were debriefed and reimbursed for their time and efforts. The 
participants were also offered the option of withdrawing their data from analysis at a later 
stage and were provided with a cut-off date for this. The studies were not of a stressful 
nature, nor were they likely to trigger a negative experience. All the signed consent forms and 
collected data were stored safely on Kingston University campus. 
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Chapter 3: Analysing Response Times and Eye Movements to Further Understand the 
Conjunction Fallacy 
 
People typically use heuristic (i.e., intuitive) thinking to make many of their day-to-
day judgments and decisions. For example, judging the quality of a product based on its 
price, or judging a job candidate based on his or her level of assertiveness. In fact, most of the 
“educated guesses” we make are founded on heuristics. It would be very impractical to write 
exhaustive lists or use decision trees every time we needed to make a judgment. Heuristic 
thinking is often assumed to involve fast decision strategies that save time and effort 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1973, Kahneman & Frederick, 2005, Evans, 2008). It is considered to 
be an efficient and reliable process in most instances. Such instances would include when 
heuristic responses are congruent with logical principles. However, there are instances when 
heuristic responses clash with laws of logic and violate axioms of probability, and in these 
instances heuristic thought leads to erroneous, so-called “biased” judgments. In the situation 
of conjunction probability judgements, making these errors is termed committing conjunction 
fallacies (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). 
People often deviate from what are considered to be normative responses in 
judgement and decision-making tasks. A current debate in the literature asks the question: are 
people aware when their heuristic response conflicts with logical considerations? Default-
interventionist models assume that heuristic processes are always activated first and that 
deliberate processes are activated only if necessary to intervene, correct or support heuristic 
reasoning (Evans, 2007; Glöckner & Witteman, 2010). Erroneous judgments result from the 
failure to detect the conflict between heuristic and logical considerations; which explains why 
heuristic responses are readily endorsed without scrutiny from the deliberative system 
(Kahneman & Frederick, 2002, Kahneman, 2011). Parallel-competitive models argue that 
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people are able to detect the conflict but fail to inhibit the enticing heuristic response and 
replace it with a more deliberate logical response (Thompson, Turner, & Pennycock, 2011, 
Evans & Stanovich, 2013, Reyna & Brainerd, 2008, Sloman, 1996). Both of these models 
assume that logical answers emerge from slow, deliberative, and rule-based processes 
whereas heuristic answers arise from faster, intuitive, and associative processes. It is widely 
assumed that the “fast thinkers” who rely on heuristic thinking by default, are also prone to 
making biased judgments and committing fallacies (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983, Kahneman, 
2011, Evans, 2003); however, few studies have empirically put this claim to the test. For 
example, in the original conjunction fallacy task (i.e., the Linda problem by Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1983), it is not possible to assess whether people’s judgments are solely informed 
by heuristic considerations or whether they are also sensitive to logic considerations even if 
their final answer is congruent with a heuristic assessment.  
The Conjunction Fallacy. The conjunction rule of probability states that the 
likelihood of two events occurring simultaneously (i.e., a conjunction) is always less probable 
than either one of the constituent events occurring alone. Conjunctions have an extensional 
nature, which means that the probabilities associated with the conjunction of two events 
occurring simultaneously (e.g., F&B) are included in the probability that event F, or event B, 
will occur individually (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). The conjunction fallacy is observed 
when a participant assigns a higher likelihood to the conjunction of two events (i.e., F&B > 
B) than to one of the constituent events alone. The best-known demonstration of the 
conjunction fallacy presented a description of a woman named Linda to participants. Linda 
was described as being “31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in 
philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social 
justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983, p. 
297). Eighty-five percent of participants believed it was more likely that Linda was a “bank 
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teller and a feminist” than that she was simply a “bank teller”. This violates the conjunction 
rule of probability because Linda’s being a bank teller includes the possibility that she is also 
a feminist, so the conjunction cannot be more likely. See Figure 1. 2, pg.18 for the original 
rendition of the Linda and Bill tasks. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1983) attributed the conjunction fallacy to the use of the 
representativeness heuristic when making conjunction judgements. Representativeness is an 
evaluation of the degree to which something corresponds with a stereotype or prototype 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). The representativeness heuristic is a cognitive tool that uses 
past knowledge to estimate probabilities (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). Although this 
heuristic is fast, and at certain times efficient at making quick, snap or gut instinct 
judgements, when used to make conjunction probability judgements it leads to errors and 
biased judgments. Participants seemingly assess how similar Linda is to the stereotypes of 
bank tellers and feminists.  
Does intuition always mislead people’s judgements? While there is a consensus 
supporting the assumption that erroneous judgements originate from rapid considerations and 
logical judgements arise from slower, deliberative considerations; there is very little 
empirical evidence to support this theoretical claim. An accepted assumption from most dual 
process accounts of the conjunction fallacy is that heuristic considerations (i.e., derived from 
representative considerations) arise from intuitive processes, while logical considerations 
(i.e., derived from statistical rules of probability) arise from deliberative processes. 
Controversially, the recent emergence of the logical intuitions account states that logical 
considerations might in fact stem from intuitive processes (De Neys, 2012), while others 
believe that slower deliberative reasoning can be aligned with reflective heuristics 
(Villejoubert, 2009; Howarth, Handley & Walsh, 2016). Thus, without empirical evidence it 
is difficult to define which system of reasoning drives intuition and which drives logic.  
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Recent research by Evans, Dillon and Rand (2015) has found that extreme social 
decisions were fast, but not intuitive. The authors caution other researchers in experimental 
psychology and economics not to interpret slow reaction times as evidence of reflective 
thinking. In support of this, a recent alternative theoretical position calls for distinguishing 
heuristic-biased thinking from intuitive processes. Heuristic thinking may lead to biased 
judgements, but it is unclear of whether this is happens while deliberating or reflecting. 
Contrary to the traditional two-systems approach, there is empirical evidence suggesting that 
intuitive processes are not necessarily biased. Indeed, people can be fast and logical and they 
can intuitively and implicitly detect the conflict between logical and heuristic considerations 
(Evans, Dillon & Rand, 2015; De Neys, 2012; Villejoubert, 2009). 
The idea that people can have logical intuitions is supported by recent work on 
conflict detection in reasoning, which explores whether or not people detect that they are 
biased when making a judgement. Traditionally the default interventionist account has 
accepted that fast, automatic and intuitive processes stem from System 1 processing, which is 
susceptible to heuristic biases and result from the failure to detect the conflict between 
deliberative and intuitive considerations. While conflict detection is assumed to only be 
available to deeper, slower, more effortful deliberative cognitive processing (e.g., see 
Kahneman, 2011). Parallel competitive accounts; however, state that people are very good at 
detecting conflict between the two systems of reasoning, but they make errors due to the 
failure to inhibit the convincing heuristic answer (Sloman, 1996).  
The following studies used a variety of measures, including response latencies (e.g., 
Bonner & Newell, 2010; Villejoubert, 2009), self-report confidence ratings showing how 
confident they were in their judgements (De Neys, Cromheeke & Osman, 2011) and eye 
tracking (Ball, Phillips, Wade & Quayle, 2006), to examine if people were sensitive to 
violations of statistical laws of logic or, in other words, whether they were able to detect the 
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conflict between the heuristic and logical considerations. Typically, conjunction fallacy tasks 
presented to the participants contained both congruent (i.e., no conflict) and incongruent (i.e., 
containing conflict) statements. Take the Linda problem for example; a congruent statement 
would present the most probable option as the one that is both representative of the 
stereotype, and also in line with the law of probability. For example, participants can be 
asked to “rank which is more likely to occur: Pr(F) or Pr(F&B)”. Ranking is relatively 
straightforward due to there being no conflict between the logical (one event is more likely 
than a conjunction of events, so Pr(F) > Pr(F&B)) and the heuristic answer (Linda looks like a 
feminist, so Pr(F) > Pr(F&B)). However, things get more complicated when the task is to 
“rank which is more likely to occur: Pr(B) or Pr(F&B)”. This proves more difficult to solve 
because there is conflict between the logical and heuristic considerations. From a logical 
point of view, one event is more probable than a conjunction so Pr(B) should be ranked as 
more probable than Pr(F&B) but Linda’s portrait does not resemble that of a bank teller, so 
Pr(F&B) may seem more probable than Pr(B). The results from the conflict detection studies 
showed that people typically needed more time to solve the conflict compared to the control 
versions of the reasoning problems. They also rated their confidence levels as lower than the 
control versions, suggesting that they were sensitive to the fact that their answers were 
inconsistent with the logical rules (De Neys, Cromheeke & Osman, 2011). It is interesting to 
note, that in some instances this conflict detection caused further deliberation resulting in 
more logical answers; however, this was not consistent across all studies and in some 
instances conflict detection did not transpire in people making correct judgements. The 
research suggests that all reasoners (both biased and unbiased) are able to detect conflict 
between intuitive and deliberate assessments; thus, failure to provide an unbiased answer is 
not due to a lack of conflict detection (De Neys, 2015). Previous research has shown that 
people perform better on incongruent trials (i.e., when conflict is present) than congruent 
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ones (i.e., when conflict is absent) because the detection of two possible answers activates a 
deeper processing of the problem (Tremoliere & De Neys, 2014). The effect that conflict has 
on the logicality of probability judgements will be addressed further across this program of 
research. 
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Experiment 1: The Impact of Preferred Thinking Styles and Time Pressure on the 
Conjunction Fallacy 
 
The logical-intuitionist account suggests that people’s intuition does not always 
mislead them. It can sometimes reflect sensitivity to the logic of sets that underpins the 
conjunction rule. This account assumes that initial, fast judgements are logical but are 
subsequently overridden by slower, deliberative heuristic thinking. In other words, it is the 
logical answer that comes first, and not the heuristic answer as previously believed. There is 
evidence to show that people can make fast and logical judgements, and they can intuitively 
detect the conflict between logical and heuristic considerations (Saxe, 1988; De Neys, 2014; 
Villejoubert, 2009). Villejoubert (2009) provided initial evidence for this idea; however, the 
study was never replicated. There were also a few limitations to the study, such as the data 
was collected online, thus time pressure was not controlled. The current study was intended 
to replicate the findings of Villejoubert (2009), shed light on the debate surrounding logical 
intuitions and address the following point of contention: whether people can have logical 
intuitions in conjunction probability problems or whether they are simply applying the 
representativeness heuristic blindly.  
The Present Experiment. An experiment was designed to test the hypothesis that 
individuals who engage more naturally in effortful, deliberate thinking are also more prone to 
produce illogical probability judgements if they have time to deliberate, because it is the 
slower, more deliberative form of thinking that may be more vulnerable to prior beliefs and 
non-logical heuristics. A methodology adapted from Villejoubert (2009) was employed to 
investigate whether people are “cognitive misers” who fail to reason in line with the tenets of 
logic because they either lack the cognitive ability or the motivation to do so. This study 
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combined the new adapted Comparison Conjunction Probability Judgement (CCPJ) task with 
the Rational Experiential Inventory (REI-40; Pacini & Epstein, 1999), a 40-item scale 
designed to measure people’s propensity to think rationally or experientially. 
Rational-Experiential thinking styles and Dual-Processes. The REI is designed to 
measure two independent processing modes by combining two scales: the Need for Cognition 
Scale (NFC; Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) with the Faith in Intuition Scale (FI; Epstein, et al., 
1996). The NFC is the tendency for an individual to engage in and enjoy thinking (Cacioppo 
& Petty, 1982), while the FI scale reflects how much trust a person has in his or her own 
intuition (Alos-Fereer & Hugelschafer, 2012). In other words, it is an interplay between the 
two thinking styles: System 1 and System 2. It has been found that high scores on the FI scale 
is positively correlated with committing the conjunction fallacy (Toyosawa & Karasawa, 
2004). Alos-Fereer and Hugelschafer (2012) also found that intuitive decision makers relied 
more heavily on the representativeness heuristic; however, they cautioned that FI “should not 
be equated with heuristic processing, since intuitive people seem to be susceptible to 
particular heuristic cues and not to others” (p. 187). By contrast; however, the logical 
intuitionist account would predict that faith in intuition may instead result in more logical 
answers in the particular context of the conjunction fallacy where the probability relationship 
between single and conjunctive events may be implicitly learnt from experience. With this in 
mind, and in line with the assumption that intuitive thinking can display the tenets of logic 
(i.e., the logical answer comes first), this experiment aimed to examine whether individuals 
who relied more heavily on experiential thinking would also show more logicality when 
making conjunction judgements, especially when conflict was present in the statement. 
Time Pressure and Judgement and Decision Making. Time pressure was employed 
as the task manipulation as a means to obstruct deliberative thinking in half of the 
participants. The other half were in the control condition and were not subjected to any time 
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limitations. It has been traditionally accepted that time pressure impairs participants’ ability 
to reason about the details of the situation and thus promotes intuitive thinking (Capraro & 
Cococcioni, 2016; Sloman, 1996; Kahneman, 2011; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Stanovich & 
West, 1998). Classically, time pressure is believed to increase the likelihood that people use 
readily available strategies, such as heuristics and System 1 thinking. “The logic being that a 
key feature of intuitive processes is that they can be executed more quickly than deliberative 
processes” (Krajbich et al., 2015, p. 2). Without the luxury of having time available, 
individuals will rely more heavily on preexisting strategies (i.e., heuristics). But what if these 
preexisting strategies have been learnt implicitly by simply existing in the world around us? 
Could it be possible that we have acquired knowledge of statistical laws by simply interacting 
with our surroundings? Take Saxe’s (1988) research as an example, he found that Brazilian 
street children who were uneducated and never attended school, were able to perform 
complex mathematical equations when selling their candies on the streets. Indeed, they 
outperformed children of the same age who attended school and were taught mathematics. 
These children had implicitly acquired knowledge of algebra through a necessity to survive. 
In accordance with the assumption that the heuristic answer comes first and can be logical, 
while the deliberative answer is susceptible to biases, this experiment aimed to test whether 
participants who were put under extreme time pressure would be less likely to favour the 
heuristic answer; while given time to deliberate they would succumb to the representativeness 
heuristic to inform their answers. 
Method 
Participants. A power analysis indicated that a total sample size of 70 students would be 
sufficient to detect effects of a medium size effect (d = .5), as reported in Villejoubert (2009), 
with 1 – b = .80 and a = .05. The final sample comprised of 101 students (nunlimited = 50; 
nlimited = 51), ranging in age from 18-56 years (M = 24.16, SD = 8.07). Eighty were females 
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(79.2%) and 21 males (20.8%). Most of the students were undergraduates (n = 68, 67.3%) 
and the remaining 32 students were postgraduates (31.7%). Almost all of participants in the 
sample were enrolled on Psychology modules (n = 86, 85.1%), however 14 students (13.9%) 
were enrolled on other courses. Fifty-eight of the students were native English speakers 
(57.4%), while the remainder of the sample spoke English as a second language (n = 42, 
41.6%). 
Apparatus and materials. Participants were required to complete a series of 16 
Comparative Conjunction Probability Judgement (CCPJ) tasks. Each task presented a short 
person description followed by one of four types of probability statements (see Figure 3. 1 for 
a screenshot of a trial presented to the participants in the unlimited time condition). Half of 
the 16 statements presented were logical (e.g., the Representative & Logical and 
Unrepresentative but Logical statements) and the remaining half were illogical (e.g., the 
Representative but Illogical and Unrepresentative & Illogical statements). Within each set of 
8 statements, half were compatible with predictions based on representativeness (R&L and 
R/I statements) whereas the other half were incompatible with those predictions (U/L and 
U&I statements; see Table 3. 1 for an illustration of the four types of statements used to study 
the conjunction fallacy). Representativeness was determined by the short description 
presented before the statement and was manipulated by crafting each description so that the 
individual presented appeared both as a highly representative member of a given category 
and highly unrepresentative of an “odd” category, without openly mentioning that this 
individual belonged to either category. R statements always described the individual as more 
likely to belong to the stereotypical category whereas U statements always described the 
target as more likely to belong to the odd category. R and U statements were also defined so 
that they could nevertheless be logical (R&L, U&L) or illogical (R/I, U/I). In line with the 
conjunction law of probability, participants who judged the single clause as more likely to 
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occur than the conjunction clause made a logical judgement, while those who judged the 
conjunction clause as more likely made an illogical judgement. The statement manipulation 
between representativeness and logicality afforded an insight into the cognitive 
underpinnings of people’s probability judgements as the given answer pointed to the thinking 
style that was employed while making the judgement: either intuition or logic. See appendix 
A for the 16 descriptions and their accompanying statements. 
 
Table 3. 1 
Illustration of the four types of statements used to study the conjunction fallacy in CCPJ tasks 
Key Statement 
 Conflict statements 
R/I Lynn is more likely to be a cashier and a feminist than she is to be a cashier. 
U/L Lynn is more likely to be a cashier than she is to be a cashier and a feminist. 
 No conflict statements 
R&L Lynn is more likely to be a feminist than she is to be a cashier and a feminist. 
U&I Lynn is more likely to be a cashier and a feminist than she is to be a feminist. 
Note. R/I: Representative but Logical; U/L: Unrepresentative but Logical; R&L: 
Representative and Logical; U&I: Unrepresentative and Illogical. 
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Figure 3. 1. Screen shot of the Lynn scenario in the CCPJ task as seen by the participants. 
The statement depicted is representative and logical (RL). This trial was in the unlimited time 
condition 
 
Each type of statement was presented four times in a random order using a total of 
sixteen different thumbnail descriptions and events. The experiment was programmed using 
E-Prime and participants completed it from a desktop computer. For each CCPJ task, all 
participants were first presented with a thumbnail description and instructed to click the left 
button on the mouse once they had finished reading it. This resulted in a probability statement 
appearing below the description. Participants then left clicked the mouse for “True” or right 
clicked the mouse for “False” indicating whether or not they agreed with the statement. The 
programme recorded the time taken to read the description, the time taken to make a 
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judgement, the total test time from start to finish, and the answers given. Following this, 
participants completed an electronic version of the Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI-40) 
questionnaire which was composed and executed in Qualtrics. 
The purpose of the REI-40 (Pacini & Epstein, 1999) was to assess preferences for 
information processing between the two thinking styles. The REI scale distinguishes between 
2 cognitive styles: A rational style, measured by an adapted NFC scale (Cacioppo & Petty, 
1982), emphasises a conscious, analytical approach; and an experiential style, measured by 
the FI scale (Epstein, et al., 1996), emphasises a pre-conscious, affective, holistic approach. 
The scale includes 40 items and uses a 5-point ratings (1 = definitely not true of myself to 5 = 
definitely true of myself). There are 4 sub-scales with 10 items each: Rational Ability (RA) is 
the ability to think logically and analytically; Rational Engagement (RE) is one’s reliance on 
and enjoyment of thinking in an analytical, logical manner; Experiential Ability (EA) is the 
ability with respect to one’s intuitive impressions and feelings; and Experiential Engagement 
(EE) is one’s reliance on and enjoyment of feelings and intuitions in making decisions. 
Sample items include: “I have a logical mind” (RA), “I enjoy intellectual challenges” (RE), “I 
believe in trusting my hunches” (EA), and “I like to rely on my intuitive impressions” (EE). 
For the complete REI-40 scale see Appendix 2.  
Design and Procedure. This study used a 2 x 2 x 4 mixed design with the time 
condition (unlimited time vs. time pressure) as a between-subject factor, and statement 
conflict (absent vs. present) and block (four trial blocks) as within-subject factors. The 16 
statements were comprised of 4 blocks, and each block had 4 statements (e.g., block 1 = RL1, 
RI1, UL1, UI1; block 2 = RL2, RI2, UL2, UI2, etc.) Two random orders of presentation of 
the trials were used to minimise confounding variables. The order of the trials in version 1 
was reversed for version 2 (e.g., an R&L trial in version 1 became a U&I trial in version 2). 
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In addition to this, the trials for both versions were programmed to be presented in a random 
order for each participant.  
Each vignette was presented on its own and participants had as much time as they 
needed to read it. They then pressed the spacebar to continue, which caused the statement to 
be presented. Participants were randomly allocated to one of two experimental conditions: the 
unlimited time or the time pressure condition. Those in the unlimited time condition were 
given as much time as they wished to answer the statements. They received instructions that 
stated: “Take all the time you need to read each description and consider the information 
carefully before reaching a decision” and were prompted throughout the experiment 
affirming that they may take as long as they wanted to reach their decision. Prompts included 
“please carefully consider all the information available before reaching a decision” and 
“please take all the time you need to read the following description”. Participants in the time 
pressure condition received the following instructions: “Read the description carefully BUT 
hurry to record the first snap answer that comes to your mind”. Additionally, they were 
incentivised to think quickly by beginning the test with £4 in “the bank” and every time they 
failed to answer within 8 seconds they lost 25p from the “bank” (25p x 16 CCPJ tasks = £4). 
They received feedback after each CCPJ task informing them how long they took in seconds 
to respond and what their remaining balance was. Throughout the experiment participants 
received prompts that stressed the urgency to make fast judgements and decisions, for 
example: “remember to respond as fast as you can!” and “please HURRY and record the first 
answer that comes to your mind!” (see Figure 3. 2 for a screenshot of a trial presented to 
participants in the time pressure condition). To ensure no data were missing there was no 
actual time limit, only the impression of one. No participants exceeded the time limit of 8 
seconds (Mlimited = 4.4 seconds, SD = 1.2, Min = 1.4, Max = 7.8). Regardless of their final 
money balance, all participants were paid £4 for their co-operation, but this was unknown to 
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them until after they had completed the task. The experiment took place in a psychology 
laboratory on the Kingston University campus. Participants gave their informed consent 
before anonymously completing the CCPJ task. Participants also completed an electronic 
version of the REI-40 questionnaire and gave self-report feedback as to how they solved the 
CCPJ tasks. Following this, they were debriefed and paid. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. 2. Screen shot of the Lynn scenario in the time pressure condition. The statement 
depicted is representative and logical (RL) 
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Results 
Demographics and outliers. A total of 101 Kingston University students participated in 
the experiment (N = 101, n_limited = 51, n_unlimited = 50). To examine the extent to which 
individual responses may be consistently aligned with the logical rule or the 
representativeness heuristic, the sample was screened for participants who always accepted 
R&L and U/L and rejected R/I and U&I statements (strictly logical), as well as participants, if 
any, who always rejected R&L and R/I statements and accepted U/L and U&L statements 
(strictly odd), to gauge the extent to which the overall results could be influenced by 
consistent responding. No reasoners exhibited choices which were always logical, nor always 
at odds with heuristic considerations, thus the sample size remained at N = 101. 
Robustness Check. Following the procedures outlined by Meade and Craig (2012), an 
overall “flag score” was computed to identify careless responders who were identified as 
outliers on a number of criteria. Three participants in total were removed from the sample. It 
was found that removing these three participants who were flagged more than once, made no 
difference to the results of the analyses. Thus, the results are robust even when the outliers 
are retained in the sample. For this reason, the detailed results for the entire sample (N = 101) 
will be reported. See Appendix C for a full version of the robustness check results. 
Manipulation Checks. On completion of the study each participant was asked to report 
how much time pressure they had experienced during the task. This was recorded on a 10-
point scale from 0 – 9 (0 = “no time pressure”, 9 = “extreme time pressure”). Manipulation 
checks revealed that participants in the limited time condition reported feeling under more 
pressure than those in the unlimited time condition (Munlimited = 1.72, SD = 2.33 vs. Mlimited = 
5.90, SD = 2.18; t(99) = -9.33, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.86). 
The total time spent completing the study was compared across the two time conditions. 
It was found that the participants in the limited time condition completed the study 
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significantly faster than those who had no time pressure (Munlimited = 471.75 seconds, SD = 
162.84 vs. Mlimited = 341.29 seconds, SD = 87.93; t(99) = 5.02, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.00). 
Following this the average reading time for the scenarios was calculated for each 
participant and compared across the two time conditions. There was no difference in reading 
times between the unlimited and limited time conditions (Munlimited = 11.84s, SD = 3.73 vs. 
Mlimited = 12.36s, SD = 4.23; t(99) = -.65, p = .517, Cohen’s d = .13). 
The final manipulation check examined whether there were any differences in judgement 
latencies across the two time conditions. In other words, the average time each participant 
took to read the statements and make their judgements. Results confirmed that participants 
who were put under time pressure did make their judgements significantly faster than those 
who had unlimited time to complete the study (Munlimited = 15.54s, SD = 7.64 vs. Mlimited = 
4.38s, SD = 1.21; t(99) = 10.30, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 2.05). 
Manipulation checks confirmed that participants in the limited time condition were under 
time pressure to respond quickly but were not pressured to read the task description faster 
than participants in the unlimited time condition. The fact that every participant spent the 
same amount of time reading the information before making their judgements means that any 
differences in reasoning cannot be attributed to differences in reading latencies. Participants 
in the limited time condition were not only faster in making their judgements, their overall 
time to complete the task was faster too and they reported feeling under more time pressure 
than those in the unlimited time pressure condition. This suggests that the time pressure 
manipulation was successful.  
Conflict Sensitivity. To examine conflict sensitivity, a heuristic score was computed for 
each trial to assess whether the participants were sensitive to the conflict between heuristic 
considerations (i.e., representativeness) and logical considerations when making their 
judgements in conflict trials. Responses were coded as heuristic when participants accepted 
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representative statements (R&L, R/I, see Table 2. 1, p. 74) or rejected unrepresentative 
statements (U&I, U/L). From these heuristic scores, I was able to calculate a total score for 
the conflict statements and for the congruent statements across each of the four blocks. The 
scores were maintained across the blocks to explore whether any order effects or learning 
effects were present in the data. Heuristic scores theoretically ranged from 0% (never 
accepted R&L or R/I statements nor ever rejected U/L or U&I statements) to 100% (always 
accepted R&L or R/I statements and always rejected U/L or U&I statements) and were 
analysed using a 2 (time condition) x 2 (conflict condition) x 4 (trial blocks) mixed analysis 
of variance (ANOVA) with repeated measures on the last two factors.  
The results revealed that the heuristic scores of the participants did not change across trial 
blocks (F(3, 297) = .82, p = .486, 𝜂7% = .008). In addition, neither the interaction between trial 
blocks and time pressure condition (F(3, 297) = 1.19, p = .315, 𝜂7%= .012) nor the interaction 
between block trials and conflict (F(3, 297) = 1.60, p = .191, 𝜂7%= .016) were significant. 
There was also no significant three-way interaction between block, conflict and time pressure 
conditions, F(3, 297) = .362, p = .780, 𝜂7%= .004. This suggests that the order of the trials 
presented in each block had no effect on the logicality of the judgements produced. In other 
words, there were no practice or learned effects. Participants did not become more sensitive 
to the conflict between logical and heuristic considerations as they completed more trials. 
Participants were more likely to respond heuristically in the absence of conflict between 
heuristic and logical considerations, Mno_conflict = 86.67, SD = 15.03, 95% CI [83.77, 89.56] 
vs. Mconflict = 78.67, SD = 21.38, 95% CI [74.77, 82.58], F(1,99) = 13.62, p < .001, 𝜂7%= .12. 
Heuristic thinking was also influenced by time; participants who were under time pressure to 
make a judgement were overall less likely to rely on heuristic considerations, Munlimited = 
88.63, SD = 11.41, 95% CI [84.81, 92.44] vs. Mlimited = 76.72, SD = 15.42, 95% CI [72.94, 
80.49], F(1,99) = 19.41, p < .001, 𝜂7%= .16. There was a significant interaction between 
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conflict and time pressure, F(1, 99) = 4.80, p = .031, 𝜂7%= .05. As shown in Figure 3. 3, 
participants were less heuristic in their judgements when conflict was present in the 
statements, but this effect was even more noticeable when they were put under time pressure. 
A simple main effects analysis showed that there was no difference in heuristic scores 
between the conflict and no conflict statements when time was unlimited (p = .294); 
however, when put under limited time pressure this difference became significant (p < .001). 
 
 
Figure 3. 3.  Rate of heuristic responding as a function of the conflict between heuristic and 
logical considerations and as a function of response time condition. Note. Error bars represent 
standard errors. The per-cell sample size was n = 50 for unlimited time, and n = 51 for 
limited time 
 
Judgement Latencies. Response latencies were analysed to assess which responses 
showed sensitivity to conflict between heuristic and logical considerations. Assuming that 
people who always respond with a heuristic judgement under conflict use a different strategy 
overall, I first screened and excluded them, so I could compare latencies for heuristic and 
logical answers under conflict (n = 35, 34.7%). In line with previous research (Pennycook, 
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Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2012; De Neys & Glumicic, 2008) three average latency scores were 
computed for each of the remaining participants: the average response latency for congruent 
statements (R&L and U&I statements), and for the conflict statements (R/I and U/L 
statements), we computed the average response latency for heuristic responses, as well as the 
average response latency for logical responses. To compute the three latency scores, we first 
selected latencies for logico-heuristic answers in non-conflict trials (i.e., latencies to either 
accept or reject R&L and U&I statements). Next we selected the latencies for participants 
who responded heuristically to conflict trials (i.e., latencies to either accept R/I statements or 
reject U/L statements). Finally, we selected the latencies for participants who responded 
logically to conflict trials (i.e., latencies to either reject R/I statements or accept U/L 
statements). Latencies were converted to log10 prior to analysis to normalize the distribution 
and subjected to a 3(judgment type: no-conflict vs. conflict-heuristic vs. conflict-logical) x 
2(time condition: unlimited vs. limited) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the first 
factor. 
As expected, there was a significant main effect for time pressure condition with 
latencies being faster in the limited time condition than the unlimited condition, Munlimited = 
19.00s, SD = 10.62, 95% CI [16.36, 21.63] vs. Mlimited = 4.38s, SD = 1.37, 95% CI [2.39, 
6.37], F(1, 64) = 171.04, p < .001, 𝜂7%= .728. There was also a main effect of judgement type 
with participants taking longer to make logical choices on conflict statements (i.e., rejecting 
R/I statements or accepting U/L statements; Mno_conflict = 9.97s, SD = 4.43, 95% CI [8.79, 
11.15] vs. Mconflict_heuristic = 10.90s, SD = 6.04, 95% CI [9.25, 12.54] vs. Mconflict_logical = 14.20s, 
SD = 9.47, 95% CI [11.56, 16.85], F(2, 128) = 8.99, p < .001, 𝜂7%= .123).  There was a 
significant interaction between time pressure condition and judgement type, F(2, 128) = 6.04, 
p = .003, 𝜂7%= .086. As Figure 3. 4 illustrates, when given unlimited time to respond, 
participants took longer to respond logically to conflict statements compared to heuristic 
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responses to conflict statements, or to no-conflict statements. Under severe time pressure, 
however, these differences in judgement latencies disappeared. 
 
 
Figure 3. 4. Judgement latencies as a function of judgement type and time condition. Note. 
Error bars represent standard errors. The per-cell sample size was n = 24 for unlimited time, 
and n = 42 for limited time 
 
A simple main effects analysis showed that when given unlimited time to make a 
judgement, participants took significantly longer to respond logically to conflict statements 
than to no conflict statements (p < .001), they also took significantly longer to respond 
logically to conflict statements than heuristically to conflict statements (p = .007). 
Interestingly, there was no difference in response times between no conflict statements and 
heuristic responses to conflict statements. (p > .439). Finally, when put under extreme time 
pressure, all these significant differences in judgement latencies disappeared. There was no 
difference in judgement times between the three response type conditions in the limited time 
condition (all p’s > .05). 
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Preferred Thinking Modes and Logical Sensitivity. To further understand the 
origin of the detection of conflict in R/I and U/L statements, individual differences in 
thinking mode were evaluated to see whether they would predict whether individuals would 
favour logical choices (i.e., rejecting R/I statements and accepting U/L statements). If, as 
suspected, sensitivity to logic is intuitive, people who score higher on the experiential 
measure should be logical in their judgements on the CCPJ task. Responses to the REI scale 
were analysed using the Two-Step Cluster procedure from IBM SPSS 23.0, with 4 inputs: 
Rational Ability (average score from items 1, 4, 8, 13, 14, 17, 25, 27, 30, 39), Rational 
Engagement (average score from items 2, 6, 10, 16, 20, 26, 28, 32, 33, 40), Experiential 
Ability (average score from items 3, 5, 18, 19, 21, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38), and Experiential 
Engagement (average score from items 7, 9, 11, 12, 5, 22, 23, 24, 29, 31). To minimise order 
effects, cases were randomly ordered and cluster solutions were replicated using cases sorted 
in different random order to confirm their stability. 
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Figure 3. 5. Mean REI-score profiles for the three types of thinking mode dispositions. 
 
The solution was stable and identified three clusters with an average silhouette 
measure of cohesion and separation of 0.40, suggesting a “fair” clustering solution. The ratio 
of sizes (largest cluster to smallest cluster) is 1.87. This number should be lower than 2 so 
this result is good. The first cluster profile is the largest (N = 43, 42.6%). As outlined in 
Figure 3. 5, it is characterised by participants who scored high on the RA and RE scales, but 
average on the EA and EE scales. Participants in this group view themselves as being far 
more rational than experiential. This cluster was labelled “highR-mediumE”. The second 
cluster profile was the smallest (N = 23, 22.8%). It is characterised by participants who 
scored average on the RA, RE, EA and EE scales. These participants did not rate themselves 
as being particularly rational or experiential. This cluster was labelled “mediumR-mediumE”. 
The third and final cluster profile (N = 35, 34.7%) is characterised by participants who scored 
high on the EA and EE scales, and high to average on the RA and RE scales. These 
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participants rate themselves as both highly rational and experiential. This cluster was labelled 
“highR-highE”. A logical score was computed for each person that showed the percentage of 
time they responded logically to the eight conflict trials. This logical score was subjected to a 
2(time pressure: unlimited time vs. time pressure) x 3(REI profile: highR-mediumE vs. 
mediumR-mediumE vs. highR-highE) between subjects factorial analysis of variance 
(ANOVA). There was a significant main effect of time pressure with participants making 
more logical judgements when put under severe time pressure, Munlimited_time = 11.09%, SD = 
13.83, 95% CI [5.86, 16.33], Mtime_pressure = 29.66%, SD = 22.23, 95% CI [24.34, 34.99], 
F(1,95) = 24.37, p < .001, 𝜂7%= .20. There was also a borderline significant main effect of 
cluster profile; the mediumR-mediumE cluster performed the most logically in their 
judgements, followed by the highR-mediumE, while the highR-highE cluster performed the 
least logically of the three groups (MmediumR-mediumE = 26.66%, SD = 23.81, 95% CI [19.11, 
34.21], MhighR-mediumE = 19.98%, SD = 20.72, 95% CI [14.43, 25.54], MhighR-highE = 14.49%, SD 
= 16.54, 95% CI [8.36, 20.63], F(2,95) =3.10, p = .05, 𝜂7%= .06. There was no significant 
interaction between time pressure and cluster profile, F(2, 95) = 0.93, p = .400, 𝜂7%= .012. In 
other words, being put under severe time pressure, or no time pressure at all, made no 
difference to how people perceived their own thinking styles to be. 
Post hoc comparisons using the Bonferroni correction indicated that the mean score 
for the mediumR-mediumE cluster (M = 26.66%, SD = 23.81) was significantly different 
than the highR-highE cluster (M = 14.49%, SD = 16.54). However, the highR-mediumE 
cluster (M = 19.98%, SD = 20.72) did not significantly differ from the mediumR-mediumE 
and highR-highE clusters. 
Taken together, these results suggest that preferred thinking modes and time pressure 
do have an effect on people’s logicality when making conjunction probability judgements. 
Specifically, these results suggest that when people are put under severe time pressure they 
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make more logical judgements than when given unlimited time to make their judgements. 
Additionally, people who rated themselves as medium on both the rational and experiential 
scales were more logical in their judgements than those people who rated themselves as high 
on both the scales. However, it should be noted that there was no interaction between 
preferred thinking style and time pressure. Thus, the effect of preferred thinking style on 
logicality was not exaggerated under time pressure.  
Discussion 
Support of Hypotheses and Interpretation of Results. The experiment reported 
here examined the impact of time pressure on the sensitivity to the conflict between heuristic 
and logical assessment in social judgements under uncertainty. The results support the 
hypotheses that 1) people are readily able to detect the conflict between heuristic and logical 
considerations, however there was not enough evidence to convincingly support the 
hypothesis that 2) people can have logical intuitions in conjunction probability problems, 
they are not simply applying the representativeness heuristic blindly. Finally, there was no 
support for the hypothesis that 3) people are able to have heuristic reflections, in other words 
that the heuristic bias enters reasoning during deliberation. 
Similarly to the research of De Neys and Glumicic (2008), the participants showed 
sensitivity to the conflict between representativeness and logic (i.e., they were sensitive to the 
differing answers produced by intuition and deliberation). Statements that contained conflict 
were associated with lower rates of heuristic judgements as well as longer judgement 
latencies, despite time pressure condition. This suggests that conflict detection happens 
readily and supports the ideas of Sloman (1996) and Epstein (1994) who claim that people 
experience a struggle between the two systems of thought and that human conflict monitoring 
is in fact very effective. Kahneman (2002) and Kahneman and Frederick (2005) state that 
conflict monitoring is quite lax and people make most decisions by relying on heuristic 
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beliefs without taking logical considerations into account. In other words, errors occur 
because of a failure to detect conflict. There is support for this default interventionist account 
in Experiment 1; however, only in the judgement latencies of the participants in the unlimited 
time condition. Participants answered statements containing no-conflict in the same amount 
of time as they responded heuristically to statements containing conflict. This finding 
suggests that the representative (i.e., heuristic) answer comes quickly and easily to people, in 
fact, it suggests a similarity between the manner in which people respond to no-conflict 
statements and when they respond heuristically to conflict statements. Thus, it would appear 
from their judgement latencies, that in the unlimited time condition people were not always 
able to detect the conflict between heuristic and deliberate considerations. Instead they were 
happy to trust their immediate, intuitive judgement. Although, the heuristic response rate was 
high, there were some participants who answered the conflict statements logically, but they 
also took significantly longer to respond logically compared to their faster no-conflict and 
conflict-heuristic responses. The way the participants responded to the CCPJ task in the 
unlimited time condition was textbook default interventionist account: there was no evidence 
of conflict detection in their judgement latencies, plus for a few participants who were willing 
or able to apply their cognitive resources they were able to reach a logical answer in line with 
the conjunction rule, but this took significantly longer to achieve. Suggesting that System 1 is 
fast and heuristic, while System 2 is slower and more logical. However, when put under 
severe time pressure this effect completely disappeared and there were no differences found 
in the judgement latencies between any of the three judgement types. Further support for the 
default interventionist account can be found in the analysis of the responses (e.g., the 
heuristic scores) as there was no evidence of conflict sensitivity in the unlimited time 
condition. The no-conflict and conflict statements were answered in a similar time to one 
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another, suggesting that the participants never noticed the difference between the two and 
employed similar strategies when answering them.  
However, this is where support for the default interventionist account ends. When the 
experimental manipulation of severe time pressure was introduced the results showed 
significant evidence of conflict detection. Participants were more likely to respond 
heuristically in the absence of conflict, and logically when conflict was present in the 
statements. This provides support for the parallel-competitive model which states that people 
are able to detect conflict but are not always able to inhibit the fast heuristic answer (Sloman, 
1996). The two systems of thought are believed to run in parallel to one another, thus alerting 
the reasoner when the they point towards different answers. The evidence from the limited 
time condition shows that people are sensitive to the conflict underlying heuristic and logical 
considerations and supports a widening body of evidence that conflict detection comes easily 
and naturally to people (De Neys, Cromheeke, & Osman, 2011; Bonner & Newell, 2010; De 
Neys, Moyens, & Vansteenwegen, 2010; De Neys et al., 2010; Villejoubert, 2009; De Neys 
& Glumicic, 2008; Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2012; Ball, Phillips, Wade, & Qualyle, 
2006; De Neys & Feremans, 2013). Overall, there was a high heuristic response to the task, 
which should not be attributed to a lax monitoring process. The high rate of heuristic 
responding was not due to reasoners not having acquired the relevant normative principles, or 
a failure to retrieve them (De Neys & Glumicic, 2008). If people were not taking the rule of 
conjunction probability into account, they would always respond heuristically to the conflict 
statements, which was not the case, as sometimes they responded logically. On some level, be 
it an active struggle or unconscious occurrence, it is clear that people under time pressure 
(i.e., despite being short of cognitive resources) are readily able to detect conflict, and this is 
evident due to their increased logicality when it comes to judging the conflict statements. If 
untrained participants are taking the rule of conjunction probability into account when 
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making their judgements, and this is evident from their ability to detect conflict, then the 
problem is not lack of statistical sophistication. The problem is more likely the struggle to 
override the enticing heuristic, as seen in the work by Houde and Moutier (2003). In other 
words, they just cannot ignore the fact that Linda seems like a feminist. “People might not 
always manage to adhere to the norm, but they are clearly not simply discarding it or treating 
it as irrelevant…Clearly, people are more normative than their answers show.” (De Neys & 
Glumicic, 2008, p. 1280).  
One point left to discuss is the evidence found that supports the newer logical 
interventionist account (De Neys, 2012). It is a more recent dual process theory that 
incorporates parallel processing to explain why people are so good at detecting conflict. 
However, instead of logical considerations emerging from slow, deliberate processing (e.g., 
traditional accounts of dual process theories); it proposes that people are able to arrive at a 
logical consideration by using intuitive reasoning. When put under severe time pressure to 
eliminate any differences in response times between the three judgement types, there was a 
significant increase in logical answers. In other words, participants relied less on heuristic 
considerations when making faster judgements. This finding lends support for the logical 
intuitionist account (De Neys, 2012; Villejoubert, 2009) as it shows that when people’s 
cognitive resources are limited by being put under severe time pressure (e.g., using System 1 
reasoing), they tend to be more logical in their judgements than when they are given 
unlimited time and access to all their cognitive resources to deliberate (e.g., using System 2 
reasoning). These findings support the idea that people can have an implicit and informal 
understanding of the law of conjunction probability (i.e., the first/fast response would also be 
the logical/correct one). The findings also showed that people were more likely to select the 
heuristic answer in the absence of time pressure, which could suggest that individuals who 
engage in effortful, deliberate thinking are also less prone to produce logical probability 
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judgements, as if it was the slower, more deliberative form of thinking that was more 
vulnerable to prior beliefs and non-logical heuristics. To a point, these findings suggest that 
logical considerations can be fast and automatic while heuristic considerations can be slow 
and deliberate. The findings attempt to reconcile the apparent contradiction between the 
logical intuitionist account (De Neys, 2012, 2014; Villejoubert, 2009) and the parallel-
competitive account (Sloman, 1996; Epstein, 1994), by suggesting that these two sources of 
logical responding might co-exist, depending on the time available to make the judgement 
and the cognitive resources available to the person making the judgement. Perhaps it is the 
logical judgement that comes first (i.e., an intuitive judgement) but when given more time to 
think this response is overridden by the compelling heuristic answer. Once the compelling 
heuristic has taken preference, logical responding requires more deliberative and effortful 
thinking to be reinstated. This speculation was supported by the fact that severe time pressure 
resulted in more logical responses (e.g., logical intuitions), whilst no time pressure resulted in 
higher representative answers (e.g., heuristic reflections). Additionally, the longer judgement 
latencies for logical responses to conflict statements in the unlimited time condition suggest 
that a huge amount of cognitive effort is required to reinstate the logical response after the 
persuasive heuristic response has taken hold. In a sense, putting participants under time 
pressure did not allow for the potent heuristic reflection to take hold of the reasoning process, 
as it removed the ability to reflect or deliberate. Thus, retaining the logical intuitive response. 
However, it is important to note the danger in assuming that a decrease in “heuristic” 
responding is a result of increased logical reasoning. The CCPJ task forced participants to 
make one of two responses, hence it is not clear that “logical” responding results from logical 
reasoning, or from a rejection of the heuristic response, or from participants simply giving up 
and guessing. These confounds in the data need to be addressed with future research to 
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improve our understanding of the cognitive underpinnings of human judgement and decision 
making. 
Despite there being some evidence that people high in analytical-rational style or low 
in intuitive-experiential style are less likely to commit reasoning errors and judgement 
fallacies (e.g., Pacini & Epstein, 1999; Shiloh, Salton, & Sharabi, 2002); the results of this 
study do not support this idea. Instead, they showed that people who rated themselves as 
medium on both the rational and experiential scales were actually less likely to commit the 
conjunction fallacy than those who rated themselves high on both scales. Also, it is important 
to note that this difference was only just significant (p = ,05). In fact, this data supports the 
findings of Lu (2015) who showed that rational and experiential cognitive styles did not 
influence the propensity for committing the conjunction fallacy. Some points to bear in mind 
when considering the REI is that it is a self-report measure, which brings certain problems 
along with it. Firstly, it relies on the honesty and introspective ability of the participants who 
might tailor their answers to fit a particular image, or perhaps they try to answer honestly but 
lack the introspective ability to provide an accurate response to a question. Participants may 
also vary according to their understanding or interpretation of a question. Additionally, there 
is the issue that intuitive thinking may not be accessible to conscious processing and; 
therefore, may be difficult to measure via self-report. It might be worth considering using a 
different task in future studies to determine which individual differences, if any, have an 
impact on people’s logicality when making conjunction probability judgements. A task, for 
example, such as the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Fredericks, 2005) which does not rely 
on self-report responses. Instead it measures through a series of three problems, people’s 
ability to inhibit a heuristic intuitive response and replace it with a logical deliberate one. 
Generalizabitily of Results. It is important to address a potential confound in the 
data. Kahneman (2003), Evans (2008) and Stanovich and West (2000), along with many 
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other default-interventionist theorists, never argued that everyone would be biased in their 
judgements. In fact, most of the research states that approximately 80% of participants 
commit the conjunction fallacy, which leaves 20% of participants answering in accordance 
with logical assessments. Thus, all the default-interventionist theorists need to account for the 
currently lower heuristic scores in the conflict condition is a small proportion of reasoners 
who do not commit the conjunction fallacy. It is for this reason that “unbiased reasoners” 
were filtered out of the analysis. Filtering out people with perfect logicality (i.e., a zero 
heuristic score) may not control for this completely, but it should help. One assumes that 
people who systematically answer logically to all eight conflict statements are applying the 
objective rule of probability consciously and purposefully. They are using a qualitatively 
different type of judgment when making their answers and thus should be removed from the 
analysis. However, people who answer fewer than eight conflict statements logically show 
that they are paying attention to the scenarios and statements and using different types of 
processes to complete the task compared with those who are always logical. This highlights 
an important differentiation between those people who are logical and those people who 
provide logical answers. Figure 3. 6 shows the distribution of answers as a score out of eight 
(N = 101). There were no perfectly logical people in this sample, thus they cannot be held 
responsible for the lower heuristic scores in the conflict condition. Unfortunately, however, 
due to the design of the methodology one cannot guarantee that a few participants were not 
guessing. A decrease in heuristic responses does not simply mean that people are reasoning 
more logically. Conflict in the statements causes a situation of uncertainty, and it might be 
that under this uncertainty some people respond differently. They might be reasoning in line 
with logical assumptions, but they might also be rejecting the representative choice (i.e., they 
have  no alternative other than to choose the logical answer), or they might be guessing. 
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Figure 3. 6. Distribution of participant’s logical judgements on the eight conflict statements 
(N = 101). 
 
Final remarks and Future Directions. To conclude, the present research set out to 
test the controversial assumption that logical judgments emerge from intuitive and implicit 
processes whereas heuristic judgments arise from explicit reflective processes. The results did 
not fully support the hypotheses; however, they did shed new light on our understanding of 
the cognitive processes and the interplay between these processes when making social 
judgements. What we traditionally believe and know about the dual process systems and the 
ways in which they function might not be entirely correct. There is data that suggests System 
1 might be able to produce both heuristic and logical responses. While the same can be said 
for System 2. However, these data are inconclusive and require further testing with a more 
robust methodology to eliminate any potential confounds. The results do however challenge 
the lax monitoring assumptions that people lack the ability, motivation, or resources to detect 
conflict between the two systems. In fact, there was solid evidence found for conflict 
sensitivity, lending support for a parallel model of reasoning as opposed to a serial one. The 
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parallel-competitive model states that both logical and intuitive processes are activated from 
the beginning of a reasoning task, which leads to “simultaneous contradictory belief” when 
people suspect that something is wrong with their answer, but continue to make it regardless 
because they lack the ability, or motivation, to inhibit the pervasive intuitive heuristic 
response (Epstein, 1994; Sloman, 1996; Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). Further research might 
include a measure of confidence ratings following the CCPJ response to assess whether 
people do in fact experience feelings of rightness/wrongness with their answers. 
In line with the logical intuitionist account (De Neys, 2012), the results suggest that people 
can intuit logical considerations, while it might be the more deliberative judgements that are 
susceptible to the representativeness heuristic (Handley & Trippas, 2015). However, these 
assumptions need further testing to rule out other explanations. One way of achieving this 
might be to redesign the CCPJ task. It was quite restrictive in the sense that it only offered 
two options to choose from. Participants were forced to choose one of those answers 
regardless of whether they agreed with them or not. A better option might be to include more 
choices in the test (see Travers, Rolison & Feeney, 2016). The authors presented the CRT test 
in a 4-option multiple choice format. For the conflict items, there was a correct logical option, 
the incorrect heuristic option, and two incorrect foil options. The no-conflict items presented 
the correct intuitive and logical option plus three incorrect foil options. A design such as this 
would assist with determining whether participants were in fact using logical or heuristic 
considerations when making their judgements, or whether they were simply confused and just 
making guesses, Future research might also further examine the factors, which may 
strengthen logical intuitions about conjunctive probabilities or lessen the impact of the 
heuristic processing on the individuating information. In line with the literature (Bago & De 
Neys, 2017; Pennycook & Thompson, 2012; Villejoubert, 2009), judgement latencies proved 
to be a successful method of encouraging intuitive thought while making judgements. 
  113 
However, Evans, Dillon and Rand (2015) caution researchers not to interpret judgement 
latencies as a substitution for thinking styles. Thus, the following experiment incorporated an 
eye-tracker as a more fine-grained method of tracing systems of thought during conjunction 
judgements.  
The importance of these findings leads to fostering better interventions to improve 
conjunction judgements. For example, biased social judgements may negatively impact a 
company’s recruitment and selection procedures, as well as legal and medical decisions. The 
present findings call for further exploration of the idea that that stereotypical heuristics can be 
deliberately used to override more implicit, logical assessments of conjunctive probabilities.  
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Experiment 2: Eye-tracking Evidence for Logical Intuitions in Conjunction Probability 
Judgements 
 
Using an adapted version of Villejoubert’s (2009) methodology designed to 
disentangle logical and heuristic considerations, Experiment 1 showed that people who were 
put under severe time pressure to provide a judgement about a conjunctive probability 
statement were almost six times more likely to provide a logical answer. This finding 
suggests that fast intuitive answers are not necessarily biased while heuristic and biased 
answers are not necessarily fast. Still, when logical and heuristic considerations were in 
conflict, but participants were not pressured to make fast judgements, those who provided 
logical answers also took longer to respond. What is not clear is whether those longer 
response latencies were cued by heuristic considerations or logical considerations. Using 
response times to attempt to answer this question might not be sufficient. Evans et al. (2015) 
provide evidence through the use of social dilemma experiments that response times should 
not be interpreted as a direct proxy for the use of intuitive or reflective processes. While 
Gaissmaier, Ficic and Rieskamp (2015) explain that it is impossible to distinguish between 
serial and parallel processing using only a mean response time analysis. For example, one 
would expect shorter response times from parallel processed information compared to serially 
processed information. However, it is also possible that parallel models can increase in 
response time depending on the number of items being compared. Krajbich, Bartling, Hare 
and Fehr (2015) caution against using reverse inferences (e.g., the use of behavioural or 
biological measures to infer mental function) in research as it does not consider sources of 
variability in the data, such as favourable choice options.  
Eye-tracking and judgement and decision making. Experiment 1 used judgement 
latencies and judgement responses as a proxy for measuring conflict detection, but this is an 
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indirect inference; a more direct test would require tracing information acquisition. Thus, 
instead of using response times one could explore other process-tracing methods such as eye-
tracking. Being able to retrieve information from our environment and memory is crucial for 
every decision we make. Our eyes are the foremost organs for acquiring information from our 
environment, and this acquisition is achieved when the eye fixates an object (Russo, 2011). 
Tracking the eye’s movements during decision making yields a fixation sequence, which 
provides a detailed trace of the information used. There are many advantages for using eye 
tracking methodology for tracing processes. Eye movements do not require much effort at all, 
in fact, they are so “metabolically cheap” that they are sometimes used to substitute working 
memory as a storage retrieval system (Spivey, Richardson & Dale, 2009, p. 237; Droll & 
Hayhoe, 2007). Eye fixations can be recorded unobtrusively and are difficult to censor due to 
their speed and automaticity. There are however also disadvantages including highly 
sophisticated and expensive equipment and the task of interpreting the data. Eye fixations tell 
researchers where participants are looking, not what they are thinking; which is tricky when 
one ultimately needs to know the latter to develop and test observed phenomena and theories 
(Russo, 2011). Perhaps the most common use of fixation locations is interpreting their 
frequency as an index of importance. In other words, the more a person fixates an object, the 
greater that object’s importance (van Raaij, 1977; Reisen, Hoffrage & Mast, 2008; Gidlof, 
Wallin, Dewhurst & Holmqvist, 2013). While the average fixation duration is commonly 
interpreted as an indicator of the processing depth or effort, with longer latencies assumed to 
indicate more complex cognitive processes than shorter ones (Ableson & Levi, 1985). Pieters 
and Warlop (1999) found that fixation durations on the selected item were always longer than 
the not selected alternatives, even under time pressure. Horstmann, Ahlgrimm and Glöckner 
(2009) used eye-tracking technology as a fine-grained method to analyse how the instruction 
to decide intuitively or deliberately affects information search and integration. They used 
  116 
fixation durations in an attempt to identify the difference between intuition and deliberation; 
however, they found no difference in durations between the two, leading to the assumption 
that intuition and deliberation share similar underlying process modes. 
Previous gaze and eye-tracking studies showed that longer latencies are associated 
with longer inspection of normatively critical problem information in syllogism tasks (Ball, 
Philips, Wade & Quayle, 2006). These researchers analysed eye-movements while 
participants were solving deductive syllogisms. These types of problems can be constructed 
to contain conflict, or no conflict. Conflict is present when the logical validity of an argument 
structure conflicts with the believability of its conclusion (e.g., All mammals can walk. 
Whales are mammals. Thus, whales can walk). When conflict is detected, it is believed that 
the analytic System 2 must intervene. The results of the eye-tracking study showed that 
people spent longer inspecting the syllogistic problems containing conflict than those without 
conflict. The source of conflict in conjunction fallacy tasks remains to be identified. 
The conjunction fallacy and working memory. Experiment 1 showed limited 
evidence that self-reported individual differences in thinking processes were related to 
conflict detection. Another approach would be to examine more objective individual 
differences such as working memory capacity. “The term working memory refers to a brain 
system that provides temporary storage and manipulation of the information necessary for 
such complex cognitive tasks as language comprehension, learning, and reasoning” 
(Baddeley, 1992, p. 556). A complex working memory task measures the number of items 
that can be recalled. These tasks have simultaneous storage and processing components: 
participants are expected to maintain information in an active state for later recall, whilst 
manipulating information for a current computation (Barrett, Tugade, & Engle, 2004). There 
are many models of working memory in existence; however, the one most often identified 
with is that of Baddeley (1992, 2007) who proposed three components: the central executive, 
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the phonological loop and the visuospatial sketchpad. The central executive acts as a control 
centre directing relevant information or suppressing irrelevant information from the 
phonological loop and visuospatial sketchpad. The phonological loop stores the sounds of 
language and prevents the information form decaying by continuously refreshing it in a 
rehearsal loop. For example, remembering a telephone number by constantly repeating it to 
yourself. The visuospatial sketchpad stores visual and spatial information, such as shapes, 
colours, textures and locations; all of which can be manipulated to construct mental maps. 
These two constructs – the phonological loop and the visuospatial sketchpad – can work 
simultaneously without affecting the ability of the other (Denis, Logie & Cornoldo, 2012). 
More recently, Baddeley (2000) added a fourth component to the model of working memory: 
the episodic buffer. It is believed to be a limited-capacity temporary storage system that 
integrates information from various sources. This passive system is dedicated to linking 
information across domains to form cohesive units of information (i.e., visual, spatial and 
verbal) with time sequencing, and it “serves as an interface between a range of systems, each 
involving a different set of codes” (Baddeley, 2000).  
As mentioned earlier, theorising in the heuristics and biases literature has emphasised 
dual-process models of cognition, which embody the assumption that there are two thinking 
systems: System 1, which operates intuitively and autonomously and System 2, which 
operates deliberatively and non-autonomously (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). The presence 
of thinking biases is extremely prevalent and common place; however, the ability to suppress 
an erroneous response and override it with a correct one varies from individual to individual. 
Evans and Stanovich (2013) believe that differences in working memory capacity and 
intelligence influence resistance to belief biases. They highlight how studies of individual 
differences in reasoning have shown for heuristics and biases tasks, that “the modal response 
displays negative correlations with cognitive sophistication” (p. 234). The common 
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assumption is that a person requires a certain amount of cognitive/computational power to 
override a heuristically primed response, and this ability to recognise the need to override (or 
detect the conflict between heuristic and logical considerations) might be related to 
intelligence. This would result in a negative relationship between biased responding and 
cognitive ability (Stanovich and West, 2008). However, these researchers also found that 
people with high SAT scores (an indicator of cognitive ability) were more susceptible to the 
conjunction fallacy. One can conceive that after detecting the conflict between an intuitive 
and logical assessment, people with strong cognitive abilities will have no problem in 
engaging deliberative thinking, and it is from this deliberation that they are arriving at their 
heuristic answers. This evidence suggests the possibility that the heuristic response comes 
from the deliberative system. While Chen and Sun (2011) found that people with reduced 
working memory capacity were more likely to use a satisficing heuristic when making 
financial decisions. However, this may not apply to the conjunction fallacy as results from 
Experiment 1 suggest that people make fewer errors when relying on intuitive System 1 
thinking (i.e., when they are put under severe time pressure). This implies that people can 
implicitly learn the logical rule through experience but overcome it when they start thinking 
about the Linda task. Weldon, Mushlin, Kim and Sohn (2013) point out that working memory 
capacity has been consistently correlated with performance in a variety of cognitive tasks. 
Such as higher working memory capacity reflects better ability to focus attention, filter out 
distractions, and maintain task goals, which according to the authors, implies that working 
memory capacity “may directly reflect the ability to exert cognitive control” (p. 6). Similarly, 
according to Stanovich (1998, see also, Evans & Over, 1996), the ability to resist belief-based 
responding is highly dependent on the cognitive resources of the explicit system, such as 
working memory. While Handley, Beveridge, Dennis and Evans (2004) found that children 
with higher working memory respond more rapidly and with greater accuracy to reasoning 
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tasks. If the classic account of the conjunction fallacy is true (i.e., the logical answer requires 
inhibiting the heuristic answer); and inhibition is a feature of working memory; so higher 
working memory capacity should be associated with less heuristic responding. On the other 
hand, the alternative account suggested by the data in Experiment 1 (i.e., less heuristic 
responding under time pressure, assuming time pressure means less opportunity for working 
memory-intensive deliberate processing), predicts that higher working memory capacity 
should be associated with more heuristic responding. 
The Present Experiment.  On the one hand, it is traditionally believed that time 
pressure promotes intuitive thinking (Capraro & Cococcioni, 2016; Sloman, 1996; 
Kahneman, 2011; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Stanovich & West, 1998), and Experiment 1 
found that people were more likely to provide a logical answer under time pressure, which 
lends support for the logical intuitions account, in other words, the logical answer comes first. 
However, on the other hand recent studies have warned against using time pressure to induce 
intuitive thinking because response speed interacts with decision conflict (Evans, Dillon & 
Rand, 2015), strength of preferences (Krajbich, Bartling, Hare & Fehr, 2015), and peoples’ 
probability to err when implementing a strategy (Recalde, Riedl & Vesterlunde, 2014). All of 
which could be problematic when exploring judgement under time pressure. However, the 
latter finding (i.e., the likelihood of making a wrong choice under time pressure) was not 
supported by Experiment 1, which showed that time pressure increased logical responses. A 
criticism of Experiment 1 is the fact that it only measured conflict through behaviours and 
response time (i.e., the reduced proportion of heuristic answers). However, there is evidence 
as mentioned earlier that people’s behaviour may not be a good measure of conflict detection. 
Thus, the experiment reported here used a more fined-grained measure of conflict processing 
than response latencies and time pressure, namely eye movements. Eye-tracking 
methodology can be used for tracing intuitive and deliberative processes (Glöckner & 
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Herbold, 2011; Rayner, 1998). Specifically, it is assumed that automatic, superficial levels of 
processing have shorter fixation latencies, while deeper processing and a deliberate 
consideration of information is related with longer fixations (Glöckner & Herbold, 2011; 
Velichkovsky, Rothert, Kopf, Dornhofer & Joos, 2002). Furthermore, eye tracking permits 
the detection of conflict in processing as eye movements are known to be disrupted when 
readers’ general knowledge conflicts with the text they are given to read (e.g., Duffy & Keir, 
2004; Featherstone & Sturt, 2010). 
Based on this information and in the hopes of shedding light on the processes 
involved in judging conjunctive probabilities, the aim of this experiment was to uncover 
whether individual differences in patterns of eye movements could account for differences in 
individuals’ propensity to generate logical probability judgements and focussed in particular 
on the question of conflict detection between heuristic and logical considerations. If the 
assumption is true that higher rates of fixations and longer durations of fixations equals 
higher importance/attention, then one could anticipate that people will fixate more and for 
longer durations on stimulus that they deem to be important when retrieving their answers.   
The main hypothesis of this experiment was therefore that eye movements would differ under 
conflict and non-conflict judgment settings. Thus, this study aimed to uncover whether 
individual differences in patterns of fixations for the different types of probability statements 
could account for differences in individuals’ propensity to generate a logical judgement. 
The question is whether conflict is only detected by people who have the cognitive 
means to do so (i.e., a high intelligence and strong working memory). If according to the 
default-interventionist view committing the conjunction fallacy is largely unconscious and in 
fact due to a lack of cognitive ability, then one would expect measures of effortful cognitive 
processing such as working memory capacity to be largely irrelevant in the process of solving 
conjunction judgements. However, if processing is based on a conscious analysis of the 
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constituent events of the problem and their relation to the description vignette, then one 
would expect working memory to be positively correlated with successful judgement 
performance. This research study is exploring the idea that intuition can reflect the laws of 
logic, in other words the logical answer comes first when making judgements, while 
deliberation might be more susceptible to heuristic biases. It assumes that people are readily 
able to detect the conflict underlying logical and heuristic considerations. If this assumption 
is indeed the case, then one could expect to see similar results to Chen and Sun (2011). To be 
more specific, people with lower working memory capacity will rely more heavily on 
intuitive processes when making their conjunction judgements, thus participants who exhibit 
lower working memory capacity will also exhibit higher logicality in their conjunction 
judgements. Stanovich and West (2008) found, people with higher SAT scores also 
committed the conjunction fallacy more regularly. If the classic account of the conjunction 
fallacy is true (i.e., the logical answer requires inhibiting the heuristic answer), higher 
working memory capacity should be associated with less heuristic responding. On the other 
hand, the alternative account (suggested by the data in Experiment 1), predicts that higher 
working memory capacity should be associated with more heuristic responding. Thus, 
participants who exhibited lower working memory capacity were expected to also exhibit 
higher logicality in their probability judgements. 
Method 
Participants. Forty-three psychology students from Kingston University were 
recruited for this study through the Sona-System – a Cloud-based Participant Management 
Software. Two students were already familiar with the Linda problem and therefore were 
removed from subsequent analysis. Of the remaining 41 participants (6 men and 35 women; 
mean age = 27.93, SD = 3.48), 29% were postgraduates and 71% were undergraduates. All 
the participants had background knowledge in psychology. The majority of the participants 
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were enrolled only in psychology modules (66%); however, some had dual majors which 
included criminology (7%), business (7%), human biology (5%), sociology (5%), journalism 
(2%), human rights (2%), English (2%), and creative writing (2%). The experiment was 
conducted in English, 61% of the participants were native English speakers. Participation was 
voluntary and anonymous, and the study took approximately 45 minutes to complete. 
Participants were either paid £6 or received course credits for their time and participation. 
Apparatus and Materials. Materials were adapted from those used in Experiment 1. 
Sixteen CCPJ tasks were programmed in Matlab and presented to each participant on a 21-
inch CRT display screen. Participants’ eye movements were recorded using a head mounted 
video-based Eyelink II eye tracker with a spatial resolution of 0.5 degrees and temporal 
resolution of 2ms while they were assessing the validity of the statements presented.  
Each CCPJ trial consisted of a thumbnail description and a statement sentence. The 
descriptions were short paragraphs that outlined the personality traits, hobbies and vocations 
of fictitious people according to recognised stereotypes (e.g., a feminist is single, outspoken, 
studied Philosophy at university and is deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and 
social justice). Each description was followed by a unique statement; one sentence that 
contained both a single clause and a conjunction clause. Within the single and conjunction 
clauses there was always a word that aligned with the stereotype (e.g., feminist) and a 
surprising word that contradicted the stereotype (e.g., bank cashier). Participants were 
required to either accept the statement as correct, or reject it as incorrect depending on 
whether they believed the single clause, or the conjunction clause, to be more likely to occur. 
The format of the statements could be manipulated by the arrangement of both the stereotype 
and surprise words within the single and conjunction clauses. There were four statement 
categories: Representative and Logical (R&L), Representative but Illogical (R/I), 
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Unrepresentative but Logical (U/L), and Unrepresentative and Illogical (U&I; see Table 2. 1, 
p. 74 for an illustration of the four types of statements for the CCPJ task).  
Manipulation checks were conducted on the CCPJ tasks to ensure that the 16 
problems were similar to one another. Thus, any differences found in reading latencies or 
eye-movements could be assumed the result of experimental manipulations and not lack of 
control in the experimental design. The number of words was counted for each thumbnail 
description and for each statement sentence, and an average word count was computed for 
each description and statement type (i.e., one value for each of: R&L, R/I, U/L, U&I). The 
means for the descriptions and statements were each subjected to a repeated-measures 
ANOVA with four levels (statement type). Results confirmed there was no significant 
difference in word count between the 4 types of description vignettes (MR&L = 37.50, SDR&L  
= 8.23, MR/I = 34.75, SDR/I  = 5.32, MU/L = 38.75, SDU/L  = 5.62, MU&I = 39.50, SDU&I  = 2.38), 
F < 1; nor the 16 statements (MR&L = 18.75, SDR&L  = .96, MR/I = 19.50, SDR/I  = 1.29, MU/L = 
19.00, SDU/L  = .82, MU&I = 19.00, SDU&I  = 1.41), F < 1. Accordingly, we can assume that 
any differences observed in the data are the result of individual differences in behaviour. The 
descriptions and statements remained unchanged between Experiment 1 and 2. However, 
some of the longer names of the fictitious characters were modified or simplified into shorter 
one syllable names. For example, Linda became Lynn and Samantha became Sam. This was 
done to ensure eye movements were as stable across the sixteen scenarios as possible.  
Design and procedure. This study used a 2 (Areas of Interest: Description AoI vs. 
Statement AoI) x 2 (Conflict: Present vs. Absent) repeated measures design. It examined the 
effect of conflict on the eye movement patterns across the following areas of interest (AoIs): 
description vs. statement and single clause vs. conjunction clause.  The experiment took place 
in a psychology laboratory on the Kingston University campus. Upon giving their informed 
consent, all participants completed both the CCPJ problem and the computation span.  
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CCPJ task. Participants were sat in front of a 21-inch CRT display screen while the 
experimenter set up the Eyelink II. The eye-tracker was placed and secured on the head of the 
participants, and the video cameras were positioned to get a clear and accurate reading of the 
pupils. The experimenter then performed the calibration and instructed the participants to 
keep their heads as still as possible for the remainder of the CCPJ task. The participants’ 
heads were rested on a chin rest to ensure as little movement as possible. The first slide of the 
CCPJ task presented the instructions to the participants: “In this experiment, you will be 
presented with a series of scenarios describing a person followed by a statement. Your task is 
to read these descriptions and then indicate if you think the accompanying statement is true or 
false”. At this point the experimenter explained that if they wanted to answer true, and accept 
the statement, they must click on the left mouse button, and if their answer was false, and 
they wanted to reject the statement, they must click on the right mouse button. The next 
screen explained to the participants they would be given three examples trials before 
beginning the experiment. This allowed them to become familiar with the task and 
understand what was expected of them before beginning the experimental problems. They 
were prompted to take as much as they needed to read the descriptions, and to consider the 
information carefully before reaching a decision. After completing three examples, they 
completed the 16 CCPJ problems in a random order while their behavioural responses and 
eye movements were recorded. More specifically, their responses and time latencies for each 
CCPJ problem, as well as percentage dwell time, total dwell time, first run dwell time, 
refixation number and refixation dwell time for six areas of interest (AoI). The first AoI was 
the description vignette, and the second was the statement sentence. The statement AoI was 
segmented into two additional AoIs, which allowed us to examine dwell times and refixations 
for the single and conjunction clauses. We safeguarded that no AoIs within the statement 
sentence were broken up or fragmented by falling over two lines. For example, you will see 
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in Figure 3. 7 that the conjunction clause, “cashier and feminist”, falls on the same line. The 3 
example trials and the 16 CCPJ problems were all presented in the same format.  
	
	
Figure 3. 7. Design and layout of a Comparative Conjunction Probability Judgment problem. 
The blue area defines the description Area of Interest (AoI), while the orange area defines the 
statement AoI. Note. The participants did not see the AoIs when they completed the task; 
they simply read the descriptions and statements in black text on a white background 
 
Computation span. This task was adapted from Ashcraft and Kirk (2001) and 
required participants to solve a series of arithmetic problems while also remembering the last 
digit from each problem. For example, participants were presented with simple arithmetic 
problems: “5 + 2 = ?, 9 – 6 = ?”, for which they were required to give the answers: “7, 3”. 
Following this they had to recall the last number of each problem for each of the several 
problems in that trial, in order: “2, 6”. The amount of problems per trial increased with the 
advancement of each trial. Thus, the span task required both on-line processing for arithmetic 
problem solutions, simultaneously combined with storage and maintenance of information in 
working memory for serial recall (Ashcraft & Kirk, 2001). The task was presented in video 
format using Windows Media Player software. Participants received instructions to the task 
both visually and verbally. They read the instructions off the computer screen whilst 
The$Comparative$Lynn$Task
Lynn$is$31$years$old,$single,$outspoken,$and$very$bright.$She$majored$in$philosophy.$As$a$student,$she$
was$deeply$concerned$about$issues$of$discrimination$and$social$justice,$and$she$also$participated$in$
anti@nuclear$demonstrations.
Lynn$is$more$likely$to$be$a$bank$teller$and$an$active$feminist$than$she$is$to$be$a$bank$teller.
TRUE$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$ FALSE
Description
Statement
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simultaneously listening to an audio recording (i.e., a voice over) of the same words 
incorporated into the video. This was done to ensure that all participants received the same 
introduction to the task, and also ensured they paid attention to the instructions and knew 
what was expected of them during the task. Participants were given two practice trails before 
the task began to ensure they felt familiar and comfortable with the task. The verbal voice 
recording stopped after the instructions and practice trials; it was not present during the task 
trials.  
Participants were instructed to read the simple arithmetic expression and told to 
announce their answers aloud. They were also asked to remember the second number for 
each equation presented as they would be required to recall these target digits after each 
series of arithmetic problems. The arithmetic problems were presented one at a time on the 
computer screen. Participants read the problems, processed the answers mentally and 
expressed their answers verbally. After each series of arithmetic problems, a blank page was 
displayed, and participants were asked to verbally recall the target digits in the exact order in 
which they were presented. Time allowed for recall was 4 seconds per target digit. 
Instructions emphasised the importance of answering the arithmetic problems correctly as 
accurate recall would only be recorded if they had given the correct answer to the arithmetic 
problem. The amount of arithmetic problems presented on each trial increased successively 
from one to seven, and participants completed two trials of each series length. In line with 
Salthouse and Babcock (1991), the arithmetic problems were all addition and subtraction 
equations of two digits between 1 and 9 each. Further restrictions prescribed that the answers 
to the problems could not equal negative amounts, the second digit could not be the same for 
two adjacent problems in a trial, and the answer to the problem could not equal the amount of 
the second digit. Participants had to process each equation as well as recall the relevant digit 
correctly to score a point. 
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Results 
Outliers. A total of 41 Kingston University students participated in the experiment (6 
men and 35 women; mean age = 27.93, SD = 3.48). The sample was screened for participants 
who were always logical (i.e., always chose the logical answer), as well as participants who 
always answered incongruently (e.g., rejected statements that were both representative and 
logical, instead of accepting them) on non-conflict trials. No reasoners were always logical, 
nor gave judgement responses that were always incongruent, thus the sample size remained at 
N = 41. 
Following the procedures outlined by Meade and Craig (2012), an overall “flag score” 
was computed to identify careless responders who were identified as outliers on three 
different criteria. First, a total duration score was computed by adding the total description 
dwell time to the total statement dwell time, then dividing by 1000 to create a score measured 
in seconds (M = 219.65 seconds, SD = 61.10, min = 103.96, max = 376.86). Total duration in 
seconds was then converted into a z-score. Outliers were identified as any cases with z-scores 
outside the (-3,3) range. No outliers were identified; thus, no flags were allocated for total 
duration. Secondly, participants were screened for multivariate outliers in their reading times 
of the two areas of interest: descriptions and statements. Mahalanobis scores showed that one 
participant was flagged as an outlier for their reading time of the descriptions, but there were 
no outliers flagged for statement reading times. In line with Meade and Craig (2012), a total 
flag score was computed for the participants (total duration in seconds flags + description 
AoI flag + statement AoI flag). There were no participants who achieved a total flag score of 
2 or higher, thus the sample remained at 41 participants. 
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Behavioural analysis 
Conflict sensitivity.  To examine conflict sensitivity, a heuristic score was computed 
for each trial to assess whether the participants were sensitive to the conflict between 
heuristic considerations (i.e., representativeness) and logical considerations when making 
their judgements. As in Experiment 1, responses were coded as heuristic when participants 
accepted representative statements (R&L, R/I, see Table 2. 1, p. 74) or rejected 
unrepresentative statements (U&I, U/L). A total heuristic score was computed for both the 
statements containing conflict and those without conflict. Heuristic scores ranged from 0% 
(never followed heuristic assessment) to 100% (always followed heuristic assessment) and 
were analysed using a paired samples t-test. Results showed that although participants 
answered more logically when conflict was present in the statements compared to when 
conflict was absent, this difference was not significant, M_noconflict = 86.59, SD = 16.39, 95% 
CI [81.41, 91.76], M_conflict = 83.23, SD = 22.12, 95% CI [76.25, 90.21], t(40) = 0.96, p 
= .343, Cohen’s d = 0.17. Thus, it was not possible to conclude that participants were 
sensitive to conflict between heuristic and logical considerations on the sole basis of the 
behavioural data in this experiment. 
Judgement latencies. Response latencies were analysed to assess which responses 
showed sensitivity to conflict between heuristic and logical considerations. Assuming that 
people who always respond with a heuristic judgement under conflict use a different strategy 
overall, we first screened and excluded them so we could compare latencies for heuristic and 
logical answers under conflict (n = 19, 46%). In line with previous research (Pennycook, 
Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2012; De Neys & Glumicic, 2008) and in accordance with Experiment 
1, three average response latency scores were computed for each participant: non-conflict 
(responses to R&L and U&I statements), conflict-heuristic (heuristic responses to R/I and 
U/L statements) and conflict-logical (logical responses to R/I and U/L statements). Latencies 
were converted to log10 prior to analysis to normalize the distribution and subjected to a 
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3(judgment type: non-conflict vs. conflict-heuristic vs. conflict-logical) repeated measures 
ANOVA. The results revealed no difference in latencies across judgement types, M_noconflict = 
12.31 seconds, SD = 3.35, 95% CI [10.79, 13.83], M_conflict_heuristic = 12.05 seconds, SD = 3.31, 
95% CI [10.55, 13.56], M_conflict_logic = 12.57, SD = 3.76, 95% CI [10.85, 14.28], F(2,40) = 
0.321, p = .727, 𝜂7% = .02. Once again, we found no evidence for conflict sensitivity between 
heuristic and logical considerations on the sole basis of the behavioural data in this study (i.e., 
responses and response times).  
Although no main effect was found for conflict sensitivity using the ANOVA 
calculation, the data in fact lends itself better to a correlation as both independent and 
dependent variables are continuous. Thus, a Pearson’s correlation was computed to assess the 
relationship between task duration and logicality when judging conjunction probability. A 
logical score was computed for each participant, which represented the amount of times they 
answered in line with logical considerations when answering the statements containing 
conflict. It ranged from 0 (never logical) – 8 (always logical). A weak, negative and 
marginally significant relationship was found between these two variables, r = -0.28, n = 41, 
p = .079. A scatterplot summarises the results (see Figure 3. 8). There appears to be a trend 
emerging in the data that the faster participants performed on the task, the higher their 
logicality scores were. This trend lends support for the idea that the fast judgements result in 
responses aligned with logical considerations, and not the slower judgements as previously 
assumed.  	
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Figure 3. 8. The relationship between mean duration latencies (in seconds) and logicality on 
conflict statements (score out of a possible 8). N = 41 
 
Individual differences 
Computation Span Task. The logical score was correlated against the participants’ 
computation span scores which ranged from 0 (zero recall) – 56 (perfect recall). A Pearson’s 
correlation was computed to assess the relationship between computation span and logicality 
when judging conjunction probability. Surprisingly, no relationship was found between these 
two variables, r = 0.21, n = 41, p = .196. A scatterplot summarises the results (see Figure 3. 
9). Overall, a strong or weak working memory could not predict logicality on the task. Next, I 
analysed the eye movement data. 
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Figure 3. 9. Relationship between logicality (logical score) versus working memory (C-span 
score). N = 41 
 
Eye-tracking analysis 
Eye movement patterns were examined to assess whether participants were sensitive to 
the conflict between heuristic considerations and logical considerations within the CCPJ task.  
The number of refixations (i.e., number of times participants revisited an AoI with at least one 
fixation outside that AoI) and the refixation dwell times (i.e., total amount of refixation time 
within an AoI) were examined across both of the conflict conditions (conflict absent vs. conflict 
present) and the AoIs (description vs. statement, and single clause vs. conjunction clause).  
Number of refixations.  Participants redirected their eyes more often towards the 
description in the absence of conflict; however, they redirected their eyes more often to the 
statement in the presence of conflict (see Table 3. 2 below for descriptive statistics).  
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Table 3. 2 
Means, Standard Deviations and 95% Confidence Intervals of number of refixations as a 
function of the AoIs and conflict conditions 
 
       
   M SD 95% CI 
  
      Lower Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
      
AoI Description 3.57 1.29 3.16 3.97 
 Statement 3.67 1.60 3.16 4.18 
      
Conflict Absent 3.46 1.23 3.07 3.85 
  Present 3.78 1.37 3.35 4.21 
      
 
A 2 (AoI: description vs. statement) x 2 (Conflict: absent vs. present) repeated 
measures ANOVA confirmed the overall difference in number of refixations between AoI’s 
was not statistically significant, F(1,40) = 0.18, p = .673,  ηp2 = .01. There was however, a 
significant main effect of conflict condition, F(1,40) = 6.13, p = .018, ηp2 = .13, showing that 
participants refixated more often when there was conflict present in the trials compared to 
when conflict was absent. There was also a significant interaction between AoI and conflict, 
F(1,40) = 34.40, p < .001, ηp2 = .46. Participants refixated more often on the description when 
conflict was absent, but more often on the statement when conflict was present (see Figure 3. 
10). Paired samples t-tests confirmed that participants refixated more often on the description 
when conflict was absent, t(40) = 3.01, p = .004, Cohen’s d = .24, and conversely on the 
statement when conflict was present, t(40) = -4.49, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .55.  
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Figure 3. 10. Mean number of refixations as a function of AoI (description vs. statement) and 
conflict (absent vs. present). Note. Error bars represent standard error of the mean 
 
When examining eye refixations and refixation dwell times it might be possible to 
notice patterns in people’s eye movements across the four different statement types. For 
example, in R&L statements, the representative single event (feminist) is more likely and 
more representative than the conjunction (bank teller and feminist) so we might expect less 
refixations on the conjunctive event (because it is easy to dismiss). By contrast, in R/I 
statements, the conjunction (bank teller and feminist) is more representative than the 
unrepresentative single event (bank teller), but bank teller is more probable. In this scenario, 
one should expect more refixations on the conjunctive event (because it is harder to dismiss). 
Similar findings would be expected from the U/L and U&I statements; however, this might 
not be the case as it might be harder to interpret unrepresentative events. For example, in U&I 
statements the conjunction is less likely and less representative than the single event, but the 
sentence says it is not, so the conflict in this statement might be the qualifier “more likely”. 
Thus, an exploratory examination of the patterns of eye movements across the different 
statement types was carried out. No inferential statistics were conducted because I did not 
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have a priori hypothesis. This was purely an exploratory exercise. The graphs below show no 
specific patterns across the four types of statements; however, they do show that participants 
refixated their eyes more often towards the conjunction clause in general, and they also 
refixated more often when conflict was present in the statements (see Figure 3. 11). 
Participants also refixated more on the conjunction clause in general, as well as the 
statements containing conflict compared to those without conflict (see Table 3. 3). 
 
 
Figure 3. 11. A descriptive analysis highlighting the number of refixations for each sentence 
component across each of the statement types 
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Table 3. 3 
Means, Standard Deviations and 95% Confidence Intervals of number of refixations for the AoIs 
and conflict conditions 
 
       
   M SD 95% CI 
  
      Lower Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
      
AoI Conjunction clause 1.19 0.51 1.03 1.35 
 Single clause 0.35 0.22 0.28 0.42 
      
Conflict Absent 0.62 0.31 0.52 0.72 
  Present 0.92 0.45 0.78 1.06 
      
 
Dwell times. In addition to refixating more often as outlined above, participants also 
gazed for longer on the description in the absence of conflict; however, they gazed for longer on 
the statement in the presence of conflict (see Table 3. 4 below for descriptive statistics).  
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Table 3. 4 
Means, Standard Deviations and 95% Confidence Intervals of refixation dwell times for the AoIs 
and conflict conditions. Note. Latencies are expressed in milliseconds 
 
       
   M SD 95% CI 
  
      Lower Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
      
AoI Description  4349.85 1799.21 3781.95 4917.76 
 Statement 2182.60 1032.74 1856.63 2508.57 
      
Conflict Absent 3274.25 1415.51 2827.46 3721.04 
  Present 3258.21 1244.79 2865.30 3651.11 
      
 
A 2 (AoI: description vs. statement) x 2 (Conflict: absent vs. present) repeated measures 
ANOVA confirmed a significant difference in refixation dwell time between AoI’s, F(1,40) = 
97.90, p < .001,  ηp2 = .71. Participants’ refixations lingered for longer periods of time on the 
descriptions versus the statements. There was no overall significant main effect of conflict 
condition, F(1,40) = 0.02, p = .881, ηp2 = .001. However, there was a significant interaction 
between AoI and conflict, F(1,40) = 21.98, p < .001, ηp2 = .36. Participants refixation dwell 
times were longer when looking at the description when conflict was absent, but when conflict 
was present their refixation dwell times were longer on the statements (see Figure 3. 12). Paired 
samples t-tests confirmed that participants refixated more often on the description when conflict 
was absent, t(40) = 3.12, p = .003, Cohen’s d = .25, and conversely on the statement when 
conflict was present, t(40) = -3.19, p = .003, Cohen’s d = .39. 
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Figure 3. 12. Mean refixation dwell times as a function of AoI (description vs. statement) and 
conflict (absent vs. present). Note. Error bars represent standard error of the mean 
 
A similar exploratory exercise to the one above was performed on the refixation dwell 
times to see whether any patterns in the eye movements latencies could be found across the four 
types of statements. Participants seemed to dwell for longer periods of time on the conjunctions 
in general, but no other stand out patterns were found. Conflict did not seem to make a difference 
to the refixation dwell times. See Figure 3. 13. 
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Figure 3. 13. A descriptive analysis highlighting the number of refixation dwell times for 
each sentence component across each of the statement types. Note. Dwell times are 
represented in milliseconds 
 
Finally, it was investigated whether patterns in people’s eye movements could predict 
logicality in their judgements. A Pearson’s correlation was computed to assess the 
relationship between refixation dwell times and logicality when judging conjunction 
probability. No relationship was found between statement refixation dwell time and 
logicality, r = -0.11, n = 41, p = .498; however, there was a moderately negative relationship 
found between description refixation dwell time and logicality, r = -0.36, n = 41, p = .020. A 
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scatterplot summarises the results (see Figure 3. 14). Overall, the amount of time spent 
refixating on the statements made no difference to the logicality of people’s conjunction 
judgements; however, it was found that the longer people refixated on the descriptions, the 
less logical their judgements were. This supports the deliberative heuristic idea. Perhaps 
when people reflect on their answers (e.g., search for the answer in the description) that is 
when the heuristic biases their judgements.  
 
 
Figure 3. 14. Relationship between logicality on the conflict statements, and refixation dwell 
times (in seconds) for statement and description AoIs 
Discussion 
Support of Hypotheses and Interpretation of Results. The aim of this experiment 
was to uncover whether individual differences in patterns of eye movements could account 
for differences in individuals’ propensity to generate logical probability judgements and 
focussed in particular on the question of conflict detection between heuristic and logical 
considerations. A secondary objective of this research was to determine how individual 
differences impact on the logicality of individuals’ probability judgements. Experiment 1 
tested the hypothesis that individuals who tend to engage more naturally in effortful thinking 
are also more prone to produce illogical probability judgements if they have time to 
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deliberate because their deliberation is biased by non-logical heuristics. Specifically, 
Experiment 1 examined the impact of time pressure on the sensitivity to the conflict between 
heuristic and logical assessment in social judgements under uncertainty. The results 
supported the hypothesis and revealed that in addition to people being able to detect conflict 
between heuristic and logical considerations, it appeared that they were also able to have 
logical intuitions. In other words, their intuitive responses were also portraying an 
understanding of logic; they were not simply applying the representativeness heuristic 
blindly. 
Experiment 2 was designed to replicate Experiment 1’s findings, but also to move 
away from time pressure as a manipulation and instead use a more fine-grained methodology. 
It employed the use of an eye-tracker to test the hypothesis that in situations of conflict 
between representativeness and logicality (R/I and U/L statements), individuals who provide 
logical answers will show different patterns of eye-movement disruption than individuals 
who provide heuristic answers. The aim of this experiment was to shed light on the processes 
involved in generating conjunction probability judgements. Specifically, it focussed on 
whether eye movements would differ as a function of judgment setting: conflict detection 
between heuristic and logical considerations; and provided empirical data to test the widely 
accepted assumption that heuristic thinking is fast and automatic while logical thinking is 
slower and more deliberate.  
In light of Experiment 1’s findings, it was unclear how the behavioural data in 
Experiment 2 would unfold as differences were found in the reaction time data, but not the 
heuristic scores data. In the first experiment, in the absence of time pressure, there was no 
evidence of conflict detection in the heuristic responses between no conflict and conflict 
statements; however, there was a difference found in the reaction times. Participants took 
longer to answer conflict statements logically compared to heuristically or when there was no 
conflict present. There was also no difference in reaction times between conflict-heuristic 
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judgements and no-conflict judgements. However, the heuristic scores data presented no 
evidence of conflict detection in the unlimited time condition in Experiment 1. Thus, the 
question remained whether this lack of difference in responses in fact meant that people were 
unable to perceive the conflict. Hence the collection of eye-tracking data to test this. In 
accordance with Experiment 1, there was no evidence found of conflict detection in the 
behavioural data in Experiment 2. The pattern of results is in fact very similar to the 
unlimited time condition in Experiment 1 (E1: M_noconflict = 90.25, M_conflict = 87.00 vs. E2: 
M_noconflict = 86.59, M_conflict = 83.23), which is unsurprising as both tested participants under 
similar conditions (i.e., unrestricted time to complete the task). In the absence of time 
pressure behavioural data indicates no sensitivity to conflict, but on examination of the eye 
movement data, this was in fact not the case. The eye-movement data revealed evidence for 
conflict sensitivity. Participants redirected their eyes more often towards the description in 
the absence of conflict; however, they redirected their eyes more often to the statement in the 
presence of conflict. Sympathetic to these findings, participants refixation dwell times were 
longer when looking at the description when conflict was absent, but when conflict was 
present their refixation dwell times were longer on the statements. These findings provide 
strong evidence for conflict detection as eye movement are difficult to censor due to their 
speed and automaticity (Glaholt & Reingold, 2011). Thus, they give reliable insight as to the 
cognitive processes of judgements and decisions. One caveat in using eye tracking as a 
process tracing measure is that it is assumes that the decision maker’s attention is focused at 
the point of fixation. But there is evidence that people are able to redirect their attention 
undetected to different areas of the visual field away from their point of gaze (Posner, 
Snyder, & Davison, 1980). However, according to Glaholt and Reingold (2011) during 
natural viewing, attention and eye movements are tightly coupled. The “focus of attention 
tends to shift to a new location just prior to a shift in gaze to that location and consequently 
the spatial distribution of eye fixations is a good indirect measure of the distribution of visual 
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attention” (Glaholt & Reingold, 2011, p. 127). If it is true that fixation gaze is a good 
measure of attention, and that automatic, superficial levels of processing have shorter fixation 
latencies, while deeper processing and a deliberate consideration of information have longer 
fixations (Glöckner & Herbold, 2011; Velichkovsky et al., 2002), one can speculate that the 
results from Experiment 2 show that when conflict was present in the trial the participants 
spent longer fixating on (i.e., their attention was directed towards) the statement; however, 
when conflict was absent this attention was focused on the description. These results show 
that people use different information search strategies depending on whether conflict is 
present or absent in the trials. This evidence of conflict detection provides support for the 
parallel processing model of the two processes. The two systems are activated from the 
beginning and work in parallel with one another, allowing a person to easily detect conflict 
when they each produce a different response. The fact that conflict detection can be 
witnessed in our eye movements (e.g., uncensored, extremely fast and automatic) suggests 
that people are extremely well adapted to detect conflict. This goes against the default 
interventionist account. A serial model of reasoning that states people are very bad at 
detecting conflict, and when they do they lack the motivation and resources to inhibit the 
intuitive response. 
The evidence presented for the logical intuitions and heuristic reflections accounts are 
unfortunately inconclusive in this study as judgement latencies yielded a not significant 
correlation (r = -0.28, p = .079). A major reason for this could be due to the study being 
underpowered. The study was originally powered for an eye tracking study and 41 
participants was enough to show differences in eye movements; however, it was 
unfortunately not high enough to show differences in the behavioural data.  A posthoc 
analysis revealed that the sample of 41 participants only generated 1 - b = 0.28 power. To 
reach a medium effect size (d = 0.5) and 1 - b = 0.80, I should have tested 68 participants. 
Although I found evidence for conflict detection in the eye movement data; there was no 
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evidence of logical intuitions in the behavioural data. However, there was a pattern emerging 
in the correlational results and perhaps with a larger sample this would have reached 
statistical significance. A negative relationship between logicality and total duration of the 
task was found. In other words, the longer participants took to complete the task, the less 
logical, or the more in line with heuristic considerations their answers were. This suggests 
that the faster judgments were more logical, which supports the assumption that logical 
answers come first and are intuitive but are overridden by the compelling heuristic answer 
when people take time to deliberate. When this happens, logical responding requires even 
more deliberation and effort to be reinstated. However, these findings were not significant, 
they were merely an emerging pattern in the data. Further testing should be done using an 
appropriately powered sample in future to consolidate these conjectures.  
Generalizability of Results. If people are able to detect conflict in conjunction 
probability judgments and they also have logical intuitions, the question remains as to why 
then do the majority of people still commit conjunction fallacies? A possible explanation for 
this could be that although people are able to generate fast logical intuitions about 
conjunctive probability judgments, when they detect conflict they employ deliberate thinking, 
and this is when the logical intuitions are overcome by slow heuristic deliberations. De Neys 
(2012) and Handley and Trippas (2015) offer explanations as to why this might be the case. 
When people fail to make normatively correct judgements, there are often implicit measures 
such as eye movements or response times that reveal a sensitivity to the normative 
information, even though this does not translate into correct answers. Additionally, when 
people make normatively correct judgements they often do not mention the critical aspects of 
the normative solution in their verbal protocols. These findings have led to the idea that 
logical judgements can be activated implicitly and thus perhaps outside of awareness, which 
is characteristic of intuitive rather than deliberative reasoning (Trippas, Handley, Verde, & 
Morsanyi, 2016). Nonetheless, despite the convincing evidence for conflict detection 
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presented in the eye movement data in this study, it remains true that the heuristic answer 
stayed prevalent even under conflict. Another possible explanation for the high heuristic 
responses in this study could be a methodological artefact. The Eyelink II eye tracker has a 
strict requirement for head-stabilization during recording (e.g., resting the chin on a chin-rest 
while the forehead is held up against a forehead-bar). The participants’ heads were strapped 
into an intimidating looking eye-tracking machine while their chins rested on a chin bar to 
reduce head movement, which could have induced a more thoughtful deliberative mindset. If 
indeed logical answers come first and are intuitive, but are overridden by the compelling 
heuristic answer when people take time to deliberate; then this restrictive posture might be 
causing people to deliberate and overthink their answers. No instructions were given to the 
participants as to how much time they should take to make their judgements; however, being 
strapped into such serious scientific equipment might have also unknowingly prompted them 
to think harder about their responses and in doing so increased their deliberative heuristic 
responses. One way to test this moving forward, might be to use a less intrusive eye-tracker 
for any future studies. Current video-based eye tracking technology allows for head-free eye 
movement monitoring, which is “idea for observing computer-based decision” (Glaholt & 
Reingold, 2011, p. 128). For example, screen-based eye-trackers are unobtrusive yet robust 
measurers of gaze and fixation data. The cameras are located on the computer screen; thus, 
they are far less intrusive than the Eyelink II eye tracker. There is no heavy camera 
contraption strapped to the participants heads and no stabilization bar to rest the chin on.  
Another piece of evidence that points to a disconnect between logicality and 
deliberative thinking in conjunction fallacies is the finding that working memory capacity did 
not correlate with logicality. Stanovich and West (2008) conducted seven different studies 
and observed that a large number of thinking biases were uncorrelated with cognitive ability. 
They state that “people of higher cognitive ability are no more likely to recognize the need 
for a normative principle than are individuals of lower cognitive ability” (p. 690). However, 
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when told what the bias is and when they needed to avoid it, people with higher cognitive 
ability displayed fewer reasoning biases than those with lower cognitive ability. The authors 
hypothesize that early in one’s developmental history the relevant mindware is not present, 
thus conflict detection is absent and the heuristic response is inevitable. As experience with 
statistics and probabilities grows, so does conflict detection because the relevant mindware is 
now available to engage the analytic system and override the heuristic response. Finally, they 
propose “that the mindware used in analytic simulation becomes so tightly compiled that it is 
triggered in the manner of a natural heuristic response” (p. 690). 
The evidence presented in this study goes against the default-interventionist 
interpretation since participants’ eye movements suggest they easily detected the conflict 
between logical and heuristic considerations. When conflict was present in the CCPJ task, 
participants refixated their eye movements more often and also had longer refixation dwell 
times on the statement AoIs; however, in the absence of conflict they refixated more often 
and for longer time periods on the descriptions. This result suggests that people are able to 
detect when conflict is present in the CCPJ task statements, and they are employing different 
strategies to solve the probability judgements dependent on whether conflict is present or 
absent in the trial. When conflict is present they are concentrating more of their attention 
searching for answers in the statement, whereas when conflict is absent they search for 
answers in the descriptions. This evidence of conflict sensitivity better suits a parallel-
competitive account of reasoning. This account believes that both systems of reasoning 
operate in tandem until conflict arises. Then it is possible for System 2 to override System 1; 
however, this does not always happen due to the heuristic response being so persuasive. The 
results showed a drop in heuristic responses for the conflict statements compared with the no 
conflict statements, but this difference was not significant. This suggests that the heuristic 
responses might have been too convincing to override. Or perhaps the participants lacked the 
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motivation to inhibit them due to task fatigue experienced by wearing the head mounted 
cameras as discussed previously. 
Final Remarks and Future Research. The eye movement data showed that 
individuals are able to detect the conflict between logical and intuitive considerations in 
conjunction judgements. However, the behavioural data in this study gave no indication as to 
the mode of thought used when making the judgements. A future consideration might involve 
combining eye tracking with a verbal protocol procedure to better understand the thought 
processes taking place while making judgements. Albertazzi (2006) suggests combining the 
use of eye fixations and concurrent verbal protocols to illuminate the processes behind 
observing and describing an object because drawing conclusions using both methods is far 
more succinct than only using either eye movements, or verbal protocols alone. Verbal 
protocol involves participants describing what they are doing or thinking (i.e., “think aloud”) 
either while they are making a judgement, or retrospectively after already having made the 
judgement. While this is very useful if you want to know the strategies used to make the 
judgement, there are also shortcomings. Concurrent verbalisation (e.g., simultaneous 
verbalisation while making a judgement) is effectively a secondary task that places burden on 
the cognitive resources and has been shown to affect decision accuracy (Russo, Johnson, & 
Stephens, 1989). While retrospective verbalisation relies on the participants’ having an 
accurate memory of how the decision or judgement unfolded and has been shown to reflect 
substantial forgetting and confabulation (Russo et al., 1989). Although, watching one’s eye 
movements while performing a retrospective verbalisation might work well, as the video of 
the eye movements may help to jog the participants memory.  
The average time taken to complete the CCPJ task was 219.65 seconds (SD = 61.10), 
which equates to 13.73 seconds per trial. Most adults read at a rate of approximately 300 
words per minute and this can increase up to 450 words per minute for college and university 
students. The average number of words across the 16 vignette descriptions was 37.63 words, 
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which means that between 5 and 7.5 seconds were spent reading the description, leaving 6.23 
to 8.73 seconds to make a judgement. These are quite long response times and more than 
enough time to inhibit a heuristic response. However, the average number of logical (i.e., 
correct) judgements made was less than 2 (M = 1.32, SD = 1.42) out of a possible eight. The 
participants must be assumed to have sufficient cognitive ability to perform academically as 
they all gained entrance to university. These results suggest that even with the cognitive 
capability and enough time to employ deliberation, the majority of participants are still 
inhibiting the logical response (e.g., assuming that intuitive and deliberate processes run in 
parallel) on conflict statements. In line with the original hypotheses of this experiment, and 
the assumption of logical intuitions and heuristic reflections, a possible explanation could be 
that logical answers come first and are intuitive but are overridden by the compelling 
heuristic answer when people take time to deliberate (which they did in this study, taking 
almost 9 seconds in some cases to make an answer). When this happens, logical responding 
requires even more deliberation and effort to be reinstated, which would explain the low 
number of logical judgements made for the conflict trials. If deliberation, or in this case 
heuristic thinking, is actually resource intensive then one might expect that loading cognitive 
resources will actually allow for more logical answers. This is exactly what was found in 
Experiment 1: the impact of time pressure increased logicality. It might sound 
counterintuitive, however overloading cognitive resources will also deplete one’s ability to 
deliberate, thus inducing intuitive thinking and increasing logic. However, this assumption 
needs further testing and it is important to note that the reason for most people making errors 
under conflict might simply be that people are uncertain about their answers under conflict, 
so they guess because they are forced to do so by the task. To further test the validity of the 
idea that heuristic answers are a result of deliberative processing and logical answers are 
derived from intuitive processing, I will next consider employing manipulations that decrease 
cognitive functioning as a means to increase intuitive processing. Evans, Dillon and Rand 
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(2015) warn researchers against the use of response latencies to infer reasoning type/process, 
hence the substitution of time pressure for alternative methods of encouraging intuition. To 
be more specific, I will test whether employing a task that either depletes or overloads 
working memory has any effect on people’s logicality when solving conjunction judgements. 
By removing access to cognitive functions such as working memory (System 2), one would 
supposedly increase reliance on System 1 processing.  
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Chapter 4: Inhibiting Deliberative Thinking to Increase the Logicality of Conjunction 
Probability Judgements 
The traditional dual-process theories of reasoning assume that humans have two 
distinct reasoning systems (e.g., Stanovich & West, 2000; Evans, 2003). System 1, also 
known as the intuitive system, is believed to be the default human reasoning system. It 
operates quickly and automatically by relying on prior knowledge and beliefs. System 2, also 
known as the analytic system, is slower, more deliberate, uses logical principles and is 
extremely taxing on executive resources (i.e., computational resources such as working 
memory). Assuming that System 2 reasoning is heavily demanding and draining on cognitive 
resources, then by depriving participants of these resources we potentially eradicate System 2 
during the initial response phase. Methods to do so, might include overloading cognitive 
resources with a dot memory task (e.g., Miyake, Friedman, Rettinger, Shah, & Hegarty, 
2001; De Neys & Schaeken, 2007), where individuals are required to keep a piece of 
information stored in their working memory while they simultaneously solve a conjunction 
judgement. This action of solving dual tasks places a burden on cognitive resources allowing 
for less available cognitive capacity for the secondary task. With less available resources, one 
assumes that the individuals will rely more heavily on intuitive processing to solve the 
conjunction judgement. Another option to test the model of “heuristic answers as deliberative 
processing” could involve depleting ego (i.e., self-control and cognitive energy) with an e-
task (Sripada, Kessler, & Jonides, 2014). The limited-strength theory assumes that people 
have a finite capacity for performing tasks of self-control, called ego. Once this storage of 
energy is depleted, it is assumed to adversely affect subsequent tasks of self-control because 
cognitive resources have been drained or depleted (Myers, et al., 2018). Thus, depleting 
individuals’ energy, or ego, before completing a conjunction judgement task would also 
induce the use of intuitive processing on that task as there are less available resources for 
deliberation.  
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Experiment 3: The Influence of Ego Depletion and Impulsivity on the Conjunction 
Fallacy 
People are able to exhibit self-control in their lives as witnessed through their 
behaviours. Some obvious ones include refraining from urges such as overeating, drinking 
too much alcohol, or acting violently against someone when provoked (Tice & Bratslavsky, 
2000; Vohs & Heatherton, 2000; Muraven, Collins, & Neinhaus, 2002).  However, not all 
human behaviour involves deliberate self-control. It has been shown that some behaviour is 
influenced by automatic processes. Goal oriented behaviour can indeed be activated out of 
awareness and function nonconsciously to guide self-regulation effectively (Bargh, Chen, & 
Burrows, 1996; Bargh, et al., 2001). Nevertheless, the portion of behaviour that requires 
volition is “important to the long-term health, happiness and success of the individual”, plus 
people have the ability to deliberate, think consciously about an issue and offer controlled 
responses of the self (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven & Tice, 1998, p. 1252). However, 
despite this remarkable capacity to regulate the self and overcome tempting desires, many 
behavioural and social problems arise from persistent lapses of self-control (Hagger, et al., 
2010). This suggests that people’s ability to exert self-control over their conscious behaviours 
is limited, and that without a store of energy for volition, people are not able to implement 
deliberate goal-oriented behaviour. The idea that volition expends a limited source of energy 
(i.e., ego) is not a new one. Indeed, Freud stated that “[Thought-processes] represent 
displacements of mental energy which are effected somewhere in the interior of the apparatus 
as this energy proceeds on its way towards action” (1923/1961, p. 19). He believed that the 
ego required some form of energy to accomplish its tasks and resist the energy depleting 
promptings of the id and superego (Baumeister, et al., 1998).  
Ego depletion. The limited-strength model of self-regulation states that “people’s 
ability to self-regulate is governed by a limited pool of resources; such that repeated acts of 
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self-regulation deplete this resource pool leaving the participant vulnerable to subsequent 
self-regulatory failure until this resource pool is replenished” (Myers, et al., 2018, p. 2). Self-
regulation, or self-control, entails “overriding or altering a predominant response tendency” 
(Schmeichel & Vohs, 2009, p. 770). This proposed depletion of self-regulatory energy with 
repeated acts of self-regulation is known as the ego-depletion effect. It can be likened to a 
muscle that tires after consistent use and is rendered useless until given time to rest and 
replenish (Baumeister, et al., 1998; Muraven, Tice & Baumeister, 1998). In 1998, two 
seminal articles emerged; the first by Baumeister and colleagues and the second by Muraven 
and colleagues, which provided empirical evidence supporting the limited-strength model. In 
addition to this, they also established the sequential-task paradigm as the preferred method 
for exploring the limited-strength model. This paradigm refers to the series of experimental 
manipulations that are presented to the participants. This usually entails two sequential tasks: 
an intervention task and an outcome task. The dependent variable is assessed by performance 
on the outcome task, which always involves some form of self-regulation, and is the same 
across both the experimental and control conditions. The intervention task varies across 
conditions; the control condition does not require any self-regulation but the experimental 
condition does. This task can vary vastly but must rely on a domain-general pool of 
resources. For example, having to resist the urge to eat chocolate and subsequently having to 
solve unsolvable puzzles (Baumeister, et al., 1998). The authors found that those who had to 
expend self-regulatory energy (e.g., resisting eating the chocolate) also gave up solving the 
puzzles faster than those who had not resisted the chocolate. This led the authors to conclude 
that an action such as self-regulated eating exhausted the general resource pool needed for 
persistence on the outcome task. A wide variety of tasks involving self-control have been 
utilised in the literature to induce ego-depletion. Ranging from eating inhibition, to inhibiting 
feelings while watching a disturbing clip, to letter crossing tasks. All of these result in a poor 
performance on a subsequent unrelated self-control task (Baumeister et al., 1998). This is due 
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to the fact that the depleted participant tends to rest in the subsequent task and are thus more 
likely to act on impulse (Baumeister et al., 1998). Feeney, Shafto & Dunning (2007) state that 
individuals who are depleted of System 2 resources are unlikely to suppress the incorrect 
response from System 1 in favour of System 2, thus giving an intuitive and incorrect 
response. 
In their seminal paper, Baumeister and colleagues (1998) questioned the toll that 
volition takes on the self. They suspected that acts such as judgement and decision making, 
responsibility taking, initiating and inhibiting behaviour, and making and executing plans, 
depleted a common inner resource called “ego”, and they conducted a series of experiments 
that tested this. They hypothesised that acts of volition and self-control would cause ego 
depletion. More specifically, following an initial act of volition, there would be less of this 
energy resource available for subsequent acts. They tested this hypothesis across a series of 
experiments examining a variety of seemingly unrelated acts: impulse control, attitudinal 
choices, affect regulation, and response regulation. The first experiment required hungry 
participants to resist the temptation of chocolate and perform a much less desirable action of 
eating radishes (i.e., impulse control) followed by persistence at a frustrating unsolvable 
puzzle task. It was found that participants who forced themselves to eat radishes rather than 
chocolate subsequently quit faster on the puzzle tasks than participants who had not had to 
exert self-control over eating. Thus, resisting temptation had produced a “psychic cost”, 
which resulted in less ability to persist when faced with frustration (Baumeister et al., 1998, 
p. 1255). The second experiment explored whether the same resource depletion was present 
in acts of choice. Participants were informed they had to read a speech. They were either told 
which speech they had to deliver (no choice) or they were given a choice of speeches (high 
choice). Speeches were either pro-tuition fee raise (counterattitudinal), or anti-tuition fee 
raise (proattitudinal). These choices were followed by persistence at the same unsolvable 
puzzle task as in the previous experiment. It was found that making a meaningful personal 
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choice to perform attitude-relevant behaviour caused a similar decrease in persistence as 
found in the first experiment. Hence, taking responsibility for a counterattitudinal behaviour 
depleted ego resources, which revealed that different types of volitional actions have the 
same depleting function on ego. These two experiments both showed that volition expended 
ego, which resulted in less persistence on unsolvable problems (Baumeister et al., 1998). 
Some believe that persisting in the face of frustration requires an act of self-control 
(overcoming the impulse to quit); however, others believe that it is adaptive to quit early on 
unsolvable problems. Persistence is only productive if it leads to success, thus squandering 
time and effort on an unsolvable problem is wasteful. Following on from this idea, the 
authors designed a third experiment using affect regulation (i.e., controlling one’s emotions) 
and solvable problems. This study instructed participants to either suppress or not to suppress 
their emotions, while watching either a funny or sad 10-minute video clip. Following this 
they completed an anagram task. Anagrams were chosen because they are solvable puzzles, 
which require people to keep breaking and reforming combinations of letters and persist 
through many initial failures; a task that requires self-control. Results showed that supressing 
emotions (both happy and sad) led to a decrease in performance of solvable anagrams, which 
indicates that acts of volition do in fact decrease persistence and performance on both 
solvable and unsolvable puzzles. Thus, the idea that people quit early on unsolvable puzzles 
because it is adaptive to do so cannot be accounted for. Instead these results support the idea 
that a valuable and limited resource of self is depleted by an initial act of volition. The fourth 
and final experiment was designed to complement experiment 2. Instead of showing how an 
act of responsible decision making undermined subsequent self-regulation, this experiment 
showed how an act of self-regulation undermined subsequent decision making. Participants 
initially completed a regulatory-depletion task (the letter-e task) in one of two conditions: 
control or depletion. The control condition required participants to read a page of 
meaningless text and simply cross off all instances of the letter e. The depletion condition 
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was more difficult and required them to conform to rules and withhold a prepotent response 
to the stimulus. They were told to cross off the letter e, but should withhold this response if 
the e was next to or one extra letter away from another vowel. For example, they would not 
cross off the e in the word vowel because it is one letter away from another vowel, o. After 
completing the letter-e task, participants were shown a boring movie clip. They were 
cautioned to watch as long as necessary to understand the content of the movie and answer a 
few questions afterwards, but they did not have to finish the movie and it was up to the 
participant when to stop. Half of the participants terminated the movie by pressing down on a 
button (active quit condition) while the other half lifted their hand off a button (passive quit 
condition). Results showed that high self-regulation (ego-depletion) caused people to be more 
passive (i.e., more prone to favour the passive-response option). Participants who had to do 
less work to quit (i.e., lift hand off a button) were more inclined to quit sooner when they 
were depleted than when they were not. Participants who had to initiate an action to quit (i.e., 
press a button down) tended to watch the movie longer when they were depleted than when 
they were not. In the absence of ego depletion there was no difference in time spent watching 
the movie. These findings provide further support for ego-depletion, such that ego depletion 
increased subsequent passivity. In other words, depleted people were less inclined to make 
active responses and were more inclined to choose the easier route, “as if carried along by 
inertia” (Baumeister et al., 1998, p. 1261). Overall, this investigation suggested that people 
do have a limited resource of energy, or ego, available to them, and that this resource is 
expended or depleted through the use of a wide range of different actions, such as self-
control, responsible decision making, and active choice. All four experiments provided 
support for the notion that volition causes ego-depletion. Specifically, following one initial 
act of volition there is less resource available for subsequent acts. 
Muraven, Tice and Baumeister (1998) also presented a series of experiments as 
empirical evidence for the limited-strength model of self-regulation. They conducted three 
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experiments in which participants engaged in self-regulation followed by a subsequent 
seemingly unrelated task also requiring self-regulation. The first experiment found that 
emotional regulation (i.e., overcoming a current emotional state and replacing it with a 
different one) to an upsetting movie resulted in a decrease of physical stamina, as measured 
by how long participants squeezed a handgrip. Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1 but 
used very different methods. The authors found that self-regulation by suppressing forbidden 
thoughts (i.e., told to NOT think about a white bear as much as possible) resulted in a 
subsequent tendency to give up more quickly on unsolvable anagrams. Both these 
experiments provided support for the notion that self-regulation involves a limited capacity of 
resources that can become temporarily depleted. Experiment 3 again sought to replicate 1 and 
2, but also rule out several alternative explanations. The authors found that supressing 
thoughts (using the same thought suppression manipulation as in Experiment 2) impaired 
subsequent efforts to control the expression of amusement and enjoyment in response to a 
humorous video. The authors again replicated the finding that self-regulatory performance 
drops off after a prior attempt at self-regulation. Participants who regulated their thoughts by 
not thinking about a white bear, were also less successful at controlling their emotions 
subsequently. Finally, a fourth study was conducted using autobiographical accounts that 
linked prior self-regulatory demands and indicators of regulatory capacity with poorer (or 
better, depending on the indicator) self-regulation of emotion. 
Gailliot and colleagues (2007) tested a biologically based intervention to restore the 
self-control resource. They discovered that acts of self-control not only depleted ego, but also 
depleted glucose levels (one of the body’s main sources of energy). And they found that low 
glucose levels correlated with poor performance on self-control tests. Remarkably, by getting 
their participants to drink sugary lemonade, they restored glucose levels to the bloodstream, 
which also restored the capacity for self-control. Interestingly, research conducted by 
Schmeichel, Vohs, and Baumeister (2003) suggested that ego-depletion led to poorer 
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intellectual performance, but only on higher order, complex tasks such as logical reasoning. 
They propose that the more complex forms of reasoning require active self-control and 
executive functioning, which consume ego (or energy) reserves, because these tasks were 
impaired following ego-depletion. While simpler information processing, such as general 
knowledge or a vocabulary test, were unaffected by ego-depletion. 
Hagger et al. (2010) provided strong empirical support for the limited-strength model 
through a meta-analysis of 83 studies. They authors concluded that “the strength model is a 
useful explanatory system with which to understand self-control, but further refinements may 
be necessary, particularly when it comes to the identification of mechanisms” (Hagger et al., 
2010, p. 520). This work proposed that the ego-depletion effect was reliable and represented 
a medium to large effect size. However, in 2014 Carter and McCullough reanalysed the data, 
but this time corrected for small-study effects and found strong signs of publication bias and 
an indication that the depletion effect is not meaningfully different from zero. The publication 
bias causes the sample to become unrepresentative and is prevalent in meta-analysis as the 
majority of studies chosen for the analysis are published studies, thus publication status is 
influenced by the study’s results. In other words, studies with significant and theory-
supporting results tend to be more likely to end up in meta-analytic samples (Carter & 
McCullough, 2014).  In addition to questions raised by Carter and McCullough (2014), 
recently there has been some conflicting evidence for ego-depletion including work that has 
questioned the strength of the ego-depletion effect and challenged whether it exists at all 
(Hagger et al., 2016). Some research suggests that applying self-control does not always 
reduce subsequent self-control (Moller, Deci, & Ryan, 2006; Tice, Baumeister, Shmueli, & 
Muraven, 2007; Job, Dweck & Walton, 2010). For example, in a study conducted by 
Muraven and Slessareva (2003), it was shown that participants who were motivated by 
incentives to apply self-control, did not exhibit any signs of ego-depletion on subsequent 
tasks. Across a series of three experiments, the researchers determined that the effect of ego-
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depletion is moderated by motivation (i.e., incentives).  In other words, a monetary incentive 
could compensate for lack of self-control resources. Indeed, when sufficiently motivated, 
ego-depleted participants performed as well on subsequent tasks as non-depleted participants. 
In a study conducted by Martijn, Tenbült, Merckelbach, Dreezens, & de Vries (2002) 
participants were told that performing a prior difficult task (i.e. controlling their emotions) 
would improve their performance on a subsequent task. They found that people’s 
expectancies about diminished self-control moderated ego-depletion. Participants who had 
been informed that their performance would improve following the ego-depleting task, 
actually showed no decrease in performance on a subsequent self-control task of squeezing a 
handgrip. Schmeichel and Vohs (2009) conducted a series of experiments that showed sound 
evidence that self-affirmation counteracted ego depletion by promoting high levels of mental 
construal, which contributed to successful self-control. Job, Dweck & Walton (2010) 
addressed the question whether people’s beliefs or implicit theories about self-control and 
willpower moderated the effects of ego-depletion. Their findings were similar to that above 
of Martijn et al. (2002), people who believed or were led to believe that they have a 
nonlimited resource of energy/ego, performed equally as well, or sometimes even better, on a 
subsequent demanding task. Indeed, a longitudinal study showed that the more people 
believed their energy/ego was limited, the poorer their self-regulation in the real world was 
when self-control demands were high. Finally, Xu et al. (2014) and Lurquin et al. (2016) both 
found non-significant results while testing for an ego-depletion effect, despite using reliable 
research methodologies and large sample sizes. These findings add to a growing body of 
evidence suggesting that ego-depletion is not a reliable phenomenon.  
Ego depletion tasks. There are many different types of depletion tasks – both 
emotional and cognitive, but the problem is that most of these interventions are not evaluated 
for performance. Performance on the intervention task needs to be independently evaluated in 
order to show “a decrement in performance that would be indicative of a resource depletion” 
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(Myers et al., 2018, p. 3). This lack is often due to the fact that many of these tasks are not 
amenable to measurement (e.g., not thinking of a white bear). However, without 
demonstrating that intervention tasks do in fact deplete resources, the theory underlying the 
strength model remains an assumption. One of the most popular and commonly used 
depletion intervention tasks, which can be measured, is the letter-crossing task (see Hagger et 
al., 2010; Carter et al., 2015). It is a search and identification task usually involving the letter 
e. This task requires participants to locate the letter e according to different sets of rules. The 
first part of the task is designed to instil a habit and requires participants to cross out every 
letter e on a page of text. The second part of the task is the experimental condition and is 
designed to force participants to inhibit this habituated response. They are given a second 
page of text and told to cross out all instances of the letter e except in specific cases. For 
example, not if the letter e is next to, or one letter away from a vowel. This action of having 
to override a newly acquired habitual response is said to be the cause of resource-depletion 
(Tice et al., 2007; Xu et al., 2014). 
The use of the letter e task requires that both the experimental and control conditions 
emit behavioural responses that can be tracked over time. “This is critical since the depletion 
of regulatory resources is a within subjects effect (occurs within participants over time) and 
the standard approach to observing it has been between-subjects using comparisons of 
experimental conditions” (Myers et al., 2018, p. 3). One of the only studies that has in fact 
measured changes across time is Arber et al. (2017) who presented participants with five 
different pages of text and asked them to mark off the letter e, except after certain rules. They 
found that across the five studies, participants’ ability to detect target vowel combinations 
(e.g., ie and ei) declined as a function of time on task. These same participants also showed a 
decline in performance on a secondary task – working memory span. Finding a time 
dependent decline on the experimental task followed by a similar decline on a subsequent 
task is wholly in keeping with the strength model predictions. However, there are some 
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limitations to the study. Rather than having an active control condition (e.g., crossing off 
instances of the letter e), the authors used a passive 10-min “chat” with the experimenter 
before completing the working memory span task. This study also did not have the habit 
forming first page. All five pages required the application of a rule. Indeed, some authors 
have argued that the habit-forming component of the letter e task is unnecessary, and that the 
immediate implantation of both rules is enough to cause ego-depletion (Arber et al., 2017; 
Baumeister et al., 1998; Sripada et al., 2014; Hagger et al., 2016). These researchers argued 
that identifying the letter e in one set of cases and not in another set of cases is a self-
regulatory action that in itself would require the use of limited resources; and this would be 
sufficient to cause resource depletion. The presence or absence of a habit-forming component 
in the letter e task has been up for debate recently. Baumeister and Vohs (2016) acknowledge 
that the Registered Replication Report (RRR) on ego depletion conducted by Hagger et al. 
(2016) had a methodological flaw, which was that the study did not start with a habit-forming 
stage prior to the instigation of a new set of rules. They see this as a reason to dismiss the null 
findings. “Without first instilling the habit, there is nothing to override. This may be a 
difficult cognitive judgment task, but no impulse is overridden, contrary to the nature of self-
control tasks” (Baumeister and Vohs, 2016, p. 574).  
Myers et al. (2018) offer two alternative explanation for the negative performance 
gradient found by Arber et al (2017). First, they suggest that by following the directions to 
inhibit an ie or ei response participants must override an automatic response to read as these 
vowel pairs are embedded in text. If this is indeed the case, then the depleting effect would be 
equal across the experimental and control conditions, as both these conditions require the 
overriding of the automatic reading response. Secondly, the authors suggest that simply 
following instruction to obey multiple rules could be the cause of depletion as by increasing 
the task difficulty, one also increases cognitive load. The fact that the subsequent task 
involves behavioural inhibition is incidental and might not contribute to the depletion effects. 
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If this is true, and the letter-e task manipulations are simply increasing the task complexity 
and difficulty, then the declining performance on the second task is warranted: “obviously, a 
more difficult task leads to poorer performance” (Myers et.al.,2018, p.4). However, task 
difficulty cannot account for the declining performance over time. A more difficult task 
would mean poorer results initially, but over time one would not expect to see greater deficits 
in performance. In fact, one might expect to see performance either remain constant or 
improve due to practice effects as one does in difficult skill-based tasks such as Stroop tasks. 
Practice effects are not observed in the letter e task because it is a fairly easy task in general. 
It might take some effort to complete, but it is not difficult and does not require much skill to 
complete. Myers et al. (2018) believe it is these characteristics that make the letter e task 
ideal for investigating ego depletion. 
Barratt Impulsiveness Scale. Impulsivity has been found to be a strong predictor of 
certain behaviours, for example gambling (Toplak, Liu, Macpherson, Toneatto, & Stanovich, 
2007), demonstrating intelligent professional conduct (Costa & Kallick, 2000), and exhibiting 
low conscientiousness but high neuroticism (Bamberger & Bacharach, 2006). Dickman 
(1990) defined impulsivity as the tendency to deliberate less than most people of equal ability 
before acting. This link to less deliberation prompted me to further explore impulsivity’s 
relationship to thinking dispositions by using the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale version 11 
(BIS-11; Patton, Stanford & Barratt, 1995). Impulsivity is a personality dimension described 
as “acting without thinking” (Moeller et al., 2001). While Martin and Potts (2009) believe 
impulsivity may be a multidimensional construct, where individuals lack the ability to inhibit 
certain behaviours and seek immediate rewards. In line with these definitions, one could 
assume that impulsive people tend to rely more on their intuition, while non-impulsive people 
prefer to deliberate their judgements. Patton and colleagues (1995) have proposed that 
impulsivity is comprised of three higher-order factors. The first, attentional impulsiveness, is 
the ability to focus on the tasks at hand and cognitive instability. An item example of 
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attentional impulsiveness is “I get easily bored when solving thought problems”. The second 
factor is motor impulsiveness, which involves acting on the spur of the moment and 
perseverance (e.g., I do things without thinking). The third and final factor is non-planning, 
which includes self-control and cognitive complexity (e.g., I am more interested in the 
present than the future). The authors report internal consistency coefficients for the BIS-11 
total score that range from 0.79 to 0.83 for separate populations of undergraduates, substance-
abuse patients, general psychiatric patients, and prison inmates. The results of this study 
(Patton et al., 1995) conclude that the total score of the BIS-11 is an internally consistent 
measure of impulsiveness.  
The current study. The objective of this study was to test the hypothesis that 
decreasing individuals’ capacity for effortful thinking will also have a positive impact on 
probability judgments because it will impede the inhibition of the rapid, logical response by 
conscious effortful deliberation. Using the Comparison Conjunction Probability Judgement 
(CCPJ) task methodology, this study aims to identify the impact of ego depletion of cognitive 
resources on the acceptance rates of both logical and illogical statements. It will provide the 
first assessment of the impact of cognitive depletion on the relative weight of heuristic and 
logical considerations in probability judgments. Additionally, this study will explore whether 
individual differences such as the propensity to be impulsive has any bearing on one’s 
logicality when judging conjunction probability judgements. In accordance with the 
assumption that impulsivity reflects fast, intuitive, System 1 thinking, I expect to find that the 
higher individuals score on the BIS-11 (i.e., the less impulsive they are), the more heuristic 
they will be in their judgements on the CCPJ task. Furthermore, and in line with the 
counterintuitive assumption that heuristic thinking in fact leads to more logical answers, I 
expect to find that individuals who assess themselves as being impulsive, also exhibit higher 
logicality in their conjunction judgements, as they are less prone to deliberating and being 
biased by the deliberative heuristic.  
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Method 
Participants. Guidelines suggest that for analysis of variance (ANOVA) designs in 
which factors have medium to large effects, a sample size in the range of 30 participants per 
cell yields approximately 80% power (Van Voorhis & Morgan, 2007). Ninety-eight 
psychology students from Kingston University were recruited for this experiment through the 
Sona-System – a shared participant scheme. Two students were already familiar with the task 
and another was completely unbiased in his/her answers, thus these three participants were 
removed from the sample. Of the remaining 95 participants (18 men and 77 women; mean 
age = 22 years, SD = 5.49), 23% were postgraduates and 77% were undergraduates. The 
majority of the participants were enrolled in psychology courses (85%); while the remainder 
were studying subjects including business (1%), chemistry (1%), creative writing (4%), dance 
(1%), film (2%), Law (2%), marketing (1%), property (1%), sustainability (1%) and theatre 
(1%). The experiment was conducted in English; 82% of the participants were fluent, native 
English speakers, 14% were proficient, 3% were intermediate and 1% had basic knowledge 
of the language. Participants were tested in isolation in a laboratory. Participation was 
voluntary and anonymous. The study took approximately 30 minutes to complete, and all 
participants were paid £4 and received 30 SONA credits for their time and participation. 
A control group of 50 participants was added to this sample from the unlimited 
condition in experiment 1. In this condition, participants simply completed the 16 CCPJ trials 
in their own time and capacity. They were not exposed to any time pressure nor were they put 
under any cognitive load. This brought the total sample size to 146 participants. In the control 
group, (8 men and 42 women; mean age = 24.84 years, SD = 9.47), 32% were postgraduates, 
66% were undergraduates, and one participant did not disclose. The majority of the 
participants were studying psychology (86%) and the experiment was conducted in English; 
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64% of the participants were fluent, native English speakers, while the remaining 36% were 
second or third language English speakers. 
Materials. The letter-e task used in this experiment was the same version used by 
Sripada and colleagues (2014). The Registered Replication Reports (RRR) in conjunction 
with the Open Science Framework (OSF) and in an ongoing effort to publish collections of 
replications based on a shared and vetted protocol has made available to the public the same 
letter-e task used in the Sripada et al. (2014) study. The letter-e task was selected for the 
function of ego depletion because it has yielded some of the highest effect sizes in inducing 
regulatory depletion (Hagger et al., 2010). It is a modified version of the letter-e task 
(Baumeister et al., 1998) lasting 7.5 minutes and consisting of 150 trials. Participants first 
completed a practise version (20 trials) of the letter-e task before they completed the main 
version. There were two conditions: control and experimental. Words appeared on the screen 
one at a time, for 1500 milliseconds each. In the experimental version of the task participants 
were required to suppress a prepotent tendency. They were instructed to press the “1” key 
when a word with the letter e was shown, but they had to withhold this response if the e was 
next to or one extra letter away from another vowel. Vowels included: “a, e, i, o, u, and y”. 
The control version was matched in all respects, except that participants pressed the “1” key 
whenever a word with the letter e was shown, regardless of where in the word the e appeared. 
Consequently, no suppression of prepotent tendencies was required. Both conditions of the 
letter-e task were administered using E-Prime 2 software, which recorded participants’ 
reaction times and errors for the tasks. 
The Comparative Conjunction Probability Judgement Task (CCPJ) was the same task 
administered to participants in the unlimited time pressure condition of experiment 1. It was 
programmed in E-Prime 2 software and presented 16 CCPJ trials to participants on a 
computer screen. Each CCPJ trial consisted of a thumbnail description and a statement 
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sentence. The descriptions were short paragraphs that outlined the personality traits, hobbies 
and vocations of fictitious people intended to be congruent with a stereotype. For example, 
Bill was presented as an intelligent yet unimaginative, compulsive, and generally lifeless 
man, whom at school was strong in mathematics but weak in social studies and humanities. 
Each description was followed by a unique statement; one sentence that contained both a 
single clause and a conjunction clause. Statements always featured a category that 
corresponded to the stereotype suggested in the thumbnail description (e.g., Bill is an 
accountant) and an atypical category chosen to be at odds with the stereotype (e.g., Bill plays 
in a rock band for a hobby). The single and conjunction clauses were used to manipulate the 
conflict within the statements (see Table 2. 1, p. 74 for an example of conflict and non-
conflict statements).  
The Barratt Impulsiveness Scale – version 11 (BIS-11; Patton et al., 1995) is a 
questionnaire designed to measure impulsiveness. It is composed of 30 items describing 
common impulsive or non-impulsive (for reverse scored items) behaviours and preferences. 
For example: “I plan tasks carefully” and “I do things without thinking”. Items were 
answered on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = “never” to 6 = “always”. The BIS-11 
was constructed in Qualtrics software and presented to participants electronically. See 
Appendix D for the complete BIS-11. This questionnaire was included to examine the 
relationship between impulsiveness and dual thought processes in conjunction judgements. A 
person who scores high in impulsiveness should in theory be more likely to use intuition 
when making conjunction judgements (Gerrard et al., 2008). If this is the case, then according 
to our hypothesis that intuitive considerations result in more logical conjunction judgements, 
those participants with higher BIS-11 scores should answer the CCPJ trials more logically 
than those with lower scores.  
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Design and procedure. The study used a 2 x 3 mixed design in which the dual-task 
paradigm was crossed with ego depletion manipulation using suppression of a prepotent 
tendency or no suppression. On arrival at the laboratory all participants were fully briefed on 
the study and gave their informed consent before starting the experiment. The first task to be 
administered was the BIS-11 questionnaire. This study was programmed in Qualtrics and 
completed on a computer screen. After reading the introduction, “People differ in the ways 
they act and think in different situations. This is a test to measure some of the ways in which 
you act and think”, the participants followed these instructions to complete the questionnaire, 
“Read each statement, then please indicate how often you act or feel that way. Do not spend 
too much time on any statement. Answer quickly and honestly”. The questionnaire items 
were presented in a matrix table and participants used a mouse to click their answers onto a 
6-point Likert scale (0 = “never”, 5 = “always”, see Figure 4. 1 below for an example of the 
BIS-11 as displayed to the participants in Qualtrics software). 
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Figure 4. 1. Screenshot of the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11; Patton et al., 1995) as 
displayed in Qualtrics Software 
 
On completion of the BIS-11 questionnaire, participants were randomly allocated into 
one of the two letter-e task conditions - either low depletion or high depletion. In both 
conditions of the task, participants were required to engage in a brief practice period before 
the commencement of the experiment. The researcher first loaded the practice letter-e task 
onto the testing computer and read through the instructions with the participants ensuring 
they understood precisely what was required of them before starting the practice test (Figure 
4. 2 demonstrates the instructions for both task conditions).  
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Figure 4. 2. Letter-e task instructions for the low depletion condition (left panel) and for the 
ego-depletion condition (right panel). Note, the control group was taken from E1 no time 
pressure condition 
 
During the task, the experimenter left the room so there were no distractions for the 
participants. Participants were told to call the experimenter back into the room when they 
arrived at a screen saying, “The Task is Done”. Each trial consisted of a white word presented 
on a black background. Each word was displayed for 1500 milliseconds in Arial font sized 
28. The words were preceded by a fixation cross, which was a white “+” sign on a black 
background, presented for 1500 milliseconds in Arial font sized 22. 
On re-entering the room, the experimenter asked: “Did you fully understand the 
task?” If the participants did not understand, the experimenter repeated the instructions given 
previously for the relevant condition and answered any further questions. Once the 
participants confirmed their understanding of the task, the experimenter launched the main 
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version of the letter-e task, reiterated the instructions and left the room. The main test was 
exactly the same as the practice test, only it contained more trials and as a result took longer 
to complete. On returning to the room, the experimenter asked the participants to complete a 
brief 4-item questionnaire on effort, difficulty, fatigue and frustration experienced during the 
letter-e task. Instructions read: “Please respond to the statements below describing your 
feelings about the task you have just completed. Circle one response (one number) under 
each item”. The four questions and their accompanying scales included: “How much effort 
did you put in to the task? (1 = “No effort”, 7 = “A lot of effort”), How difficult did you find 
the task? (1 = “Very easy”, 7 = “Very difficult”), How tired do you feel after doing the task? 
(1 = “Not at all”, 7 = “Very much”), Did you feel frustrated while you were doing the task?” 
(1 = “Not at all”, 7 = “Very much”)”. Participants were informed that there were no correct or 
incorrect answers to these questions, and as such should be honest in their responses. The 
questionnaire items were answered on a 7-point scale and this measure of self-report was 
used in the manipulation checks to assess the effectiveness of the letter-e tasks at depleting 
ego. 
The third and final test to complete was the 16 CCPJ trials. Two versions of the CCPJ 
task were created in E-Prime. They were identical, differing only in the order in which the 
descriptions and statements were presented. For example, in version 1, the Bill scenario was 
presented as a UL statement; however, in version 2 it was presented as an RI statement (see 
Appendix A for a full list of the scenarios and their corresponding statements). The two 
versions were counterbalanced between participants. This was done to control for any 
potential learning and order effects. The task introduction and instructions read: “People are 
not always given all the necessary information they need to make a good judgement. 
Sometimes we have to make the best possible judgement with the limited information we 
have. This study requires you to make 16 social judgements. You must first read a short 
personality description about a fictitious person, and then make a true/false judgement based 
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on the limited information you received in the description. Let’s begin by practicing a trial 
together.” After the practice trial, the participants completed the 16 CCPJ trials on their own; 
however, the experimenter remained in the room and was available to answer any questions 
that arose over the duration of the study.  
Each trial began with a fixation cross presented for 1 second followed immediately by 
the prime slide with instructions that read “Please read the following description carefully. 
You will not be able to return to this page.” The short personality description was presented 
below these instructions and the participants were given unlimited time to read it. To proceed 
to the target slide they were prompted to press the spacebar. The target slide presented the 
statement sentence and asked the participants to answer if they thought the statement was 
correct. Participants pressed “A” for yes or “L” for no. After every answer, the participants 
saw a slide asking them to state how confident they felt that the answer they made was 
correct. They rated their confidence levels between 0 (“not at all confident”) and 9 
(“extremely confident”), using the keyboard to enter their answers. After completing 16 
trials, participants saw a slide that signalled the end of the task, thanked them for 
participating and asked them to call the experimenter. The experimenter then paid the 
participants £4 each, issued them 30 sona credits if they had signed up to participate through 
the sona-system, and debriefed them before dismissing them. 
Results 
Careless responders and outliers.  One hundred and forty-five participants were 
recruited for this study. Participants were screened for careless responding (Meade and Craig, 
2012), where an overall “flag score” was computed to identify careless responders who were 
identified as outliers on a number of predetermined criteria. The first of which was the total 
duration spent completing the CCPJ task. A z-score was computed from each total duration 
time and any participants who fell outside of three standard deviations were flagged as 
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outliers. There were no participants flagged on this criterion. Next, I screened for multivariate 
outliers on judgement latencies. Mahalanobis distance scores were computed for the length of 
time it took participants to think about their answers and make their judgements. Twenty-nine 
participants were flagged on this criterion. Following this, I screened for multivariate outliers 
on reading latencies. Mahalanobis distance scores were computed for the length of time it 
took participants to read the scenarios (personality vignettes) in the task. Seventeen 
participants were flagged on this criterion. Finally, a total flag score was computed for each 
participant using these three criteria and all participants who were flagged more than once 
were removed from the sample. Five participants were removed from the sample based on 
these grounds (ncontrol = 1, nlow depletion = 2, nhigh depletion = 2), leaving the final sample at N = 140 
(ncontrol = 49, nlow depletion = 48, nhigh depletion = 43). 
Manipulation Checks. Assuming that heuristic deliberations impede logical 
intuitions, an e-task was administered to deplete participants’ cognitive resources resulting in 
the impairment of deliberative thinking and thus an increase of heuristic considerations. After 
completing either the high or low depletion version of the e-task, and in line with Sripada et 
al. (2014), all participants answered four self-report screening questions about their feelings 
regarding the task. Independent samples t-tests confirmed that participants who performed the 
high ego depletion task admitted putting more effort into the task than those who completed 
the low depletion version of the task, t(90) = -4.32, p < .001, Cohen's d = 0.91, see Table 4. 1 
for descriptive statistics. They also found the task more difficult, t(90) = -12.55, p < .001, 
Cohen's d = 2.62, and became more frustrated during the task than those in the low depletion 
condition, t(90) = -5.36, p < .001, Cohen's d = 1.12. Surprisingly however, there was no self-
reported difference in levels of tiredness after doing the two tasks, t(90) = -0.28, p = .782, 
Cohen's d = 0.06. 
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Table 4. 1 
Mean self-report scores measuring how much effort participants put into the task, how 
difficult they found the task, how frustrated they felt during the task, and how tired they felt 
after completing the task, as a function of ego depletion condition. Scores were measured on 
a 7-point likert scale ranging from 1 (lowest) to 7 (highest) 
        
  Low depletion (n = 49)   High depletion (n = 43) 
 M SD 95% CI  M SD 95% CI 
Effort 4.29 1.86 [3.75, 4.82]   5.67 1.06 [5.35, 6.00] 
Difficulty 1.76 0.95 [1.48, 2.03]  4.77 1.34 [4.34, 5.18] 
Frustration 1.98 1.39 [1.58, 2.38]  3.65 1.60 [3.16, 4.14] 
Tiredness 3.39 1.79 [2.87, 3.90]   3.49 1.67 [2.98, 4.00] 
        
 
On completion of each CCPJ trial, participants were asked to rate how confident they 
were that their judgement was correct. This was done on a 10-point Likert scale (0 = “not 
confident at all”, 9 = “extremely confident”). An average confidence score was computed for 
each participant across the sixteen CCPJ trials. An independent samples t-test revealed there 
was no difference in confidence ratings between the two depletion conditions, Mlow depletion = 
6.91, SD = 1.27 vs. Mhigh depletion = 6.74, SD = 1.00; t(90) = 0.69, p = .493, Cohen’s d = 0.15. 
Next I compared confidence latencies (i.e., how long participants took to rate their confidence 
levels) across the two groups, and again found no difference, Mlow depletion = 2.04 seconds, SD 
= 0.68 vs. Mhigh depletion = 1.95 seconds, SD = 0.72; t(90) = 0.61, p = .545, Cohen’s d = 0.13. 
These findings suggest that any significant differences in the data are due to the manipulation 
of cognitive depletion and not due to differences in confidence scores or confidence latencies. 
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Conflict Sensitivity. To examine conflict sensitivity, a heuristic score was computed for 
each trial to assess whether participants were sensitive to the conflict between heuristic (i.e., 
representativeness) and logical considerations when making their judgements. See 
Experiment 1 for a detailed explanation on how these scores were computed. Heuristic scores 
ranged from 0% (never followed heuristic assessment) to 100% (always followed heuristic 
assessment) and were analysed using a 3 (depletion: control vs. low depletion vs. high 
depletion) x 2 (conflict: absent vs. present) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the 
last factor. Results revealed no significant main effect for conflict, Mno_conflict = 85.24, SD = 
15.93, 95% CI [82.62, 87.86] vs. Mconflict = 83.31, SD = 18.92, 95% CI [80.16, 86.45], 
F(1,137) = 0.99, p = .323, 𝜂7%= .01. There was a significant main effect for cognitive 
depletion, Mcontrol = 88.52, SD = 11.51, 95% CI [84.87, 92.17] vs. Mlow depletion = 83.33, SD = 
13.42, 95% CI [79.65, 87.02] vs. Mhigh depletion = 80.96, SD = 13.84, 95% CI [77.07, 84.86], 
F(2,137) = 4.18, p = .017, 𝜂7%= .06. The pairwise comparison of the heuristic score across 
load conditions showed that people in the control condition were significantly more heuristic 
in their judgements compared to those in the high depletion condition (p < .05); whereas 
there was no difference in heuristic scores of those in the control condition and low depletion 
condition (p > .05), or the low depletion condition and the high depletion condition (p > .05). 
There was no interaction between conflict and cognitive depletion, F(2,137) = 0.60, p = .551, 𝜂7%= .01 (see Table 4. 2 for descriptive statistics). The effect of conflict was not larger under 
higher load; thus, I cannot conclude that load moderates the effect of conflict. 
Table 4. 2 
Means, Standard Deviations and 95% Confidence Intervals of Heuristic Scores for No 
Conflict and Conflict Statements across the Control, Low Depletion and High Depletion 
Conditions 
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    Control   Low depletion   Ego depletion 
  
M SD 95% CI 
 
M SD 95% CI 
 
M SD 95% CI 
No conflict   90.05 12.49 [85.63, 94.48]   82.81 16.83 [78.34, 87.29]   82.85 17.47 [78.12, 87.57] 
Conflict   86.99 17.30 [81.68, 92.30]   83.85 19.63 [78.49, 89.22]   79.07 19.43 [73.41, 84.73] 
             
 
The lack of conflict detection in this data is perplexing as there is compelling 
evidence for conflict detection in both experiments 1 and 2. For this reason, I revisited the 
confidence ratings and confidence latencies (from the manipulation checks) to test whether 
sensitivity to the conflict between heuristic and logical considerations could be found. As 
currently any sign of conflict sensitivity is being masked by the cognitive depletion tasks. If 
conflict sensitivity arises out of the substitution process (i.e., substituting an easier action for 
a more difficult one) then in addition to reduced self-report confidence judgements, we 
should also expect to see longer confidence response latencies for the conflict statements. In 
other words, if participants are questioning whether their answer is justified, this uncertainty 
should translate into increased processing time on the conflict statements, relative to the no 
conflict statements (for which the immediate heuristic response is also the logical response). 
Additionally, if participants feel uncertain about their responses, it may take more time to 
translate this uncertainty into a precise estimate of confidence compared to when one is fully 
confident. Hence, measuring the time participants take to provide a confidence judgement 
might provide an additional index of conflict sensitivity. 
Participants rated how confident they were that their judgement was correct on a 10-
point Likert scale (0 = “not confident at all”, 9 = “extremely confident”). These judgements 
were also timed to give the confidence latencies. A mean confidence rating score as well as a 
mean confidence latency score was computed for each participant across the conflict and no-
conflict trials. Paired samples t-tests confirmed that participants were more confident in their 
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judgments when conflict was absent from statements, Mno conflict = 6.97, SD = 1.24 vs. Mconflict 
= 6.69, SD = 1.23, t(91) = 3.01, p = .003, Cohen’s d = 0.23; and participants took longer to 
rate their confidence when conflict was present in the statements, Mno conflict = 1.93s, SD = 
0.74 vs. Mconflict = 2.02, SD = 0.78, t(91) = -2.20, p = .03, Cohen’s d = 0.19. Conflict detection 
was not present in the CCPJ responses; however, in the confidence ratings and confidence 
latencies there was evidence that people are sensitive to the conflict between heuristic and 
logical considerations. 
Judgement Latencies. Response latencies were analysed to assess which responses 
showed sensitivity to conflict between heuristic and logical considerations. Assuming that 
people who always respond with a heuristic judgement under conflict use a different strategy 
overall, we first screened and excluded them, so we could compare latencies for heuristic and 
logical answers under conflict (N = 97: ncontrol = 23, nlow depletion = 36, nhigh depletion = 38; 31% 
removed). In line with previous research (Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2012; De Neys 
& Glumicic, 2008) three average latency scores were computed for each participant: 1) the 
average response latency for congruent statements (R&L and U&I statements), 2) the average 
response latency for heuristic responses to conflict statements (R/I and U/L statements), 3) 
and the average response latency for logical responses to conflict statements. See Experiment 
1 for more details on how to compute these three latency scores. Latencies were converted to 
log10 prior to analysis to normalize the distribution and subjected to a 3(judgment type: no-
conflict vs. conflict-heuristic vs. conflict-logical) x 3(load: control vs. low depletion vs. high 
depletion) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the first factor. 
As expected, there was a significant main effect for ego-depletion condition with 
latencies being faster in the two ego-depletion conditions than the control condition, Mcontrol = 
4.34, SD = 0.20, 95% CI [4.25, 4.42] vs. Mlow depletion = 4.16, SD = 0.20, 95% CI [4.09, 4.23] 
vs. Mhigh depletion = 4.16, SD = 0.20, 95% CI [4.09, 4.23], F(2, 80) = 6.62, p = .002, 𝜂7%= .14 
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(see Table 4. 3 for descriptive statistics in seconds). The pairwise comparisons showed a 
difference in latencies between the control and low depletion conditions (p < .05), and a 
difference between the control and high depletion conditions (p < .05). There was no 
difference between the low and high depletion conditions (p > .05). There was also a main 
effect of judgement type with participants taking longer to make judgements when conflict 
was present in the statements, and even longer to make logical judgements with conflict 
statements, Mno_conflict = 4.02, SD = 0.19, 95% CI [3.97, 4.06] vs. Mconflict_heuristic = 4.07, SD = 
0.18, 95% CI [4.04, 4.11] vs. Mconflict_logical = 4.54, SD = 0.41, 95% CI [4.47, 4.64], F(2, 160) 
= 137.32, p < .001, 𝜂7%= .63 (see Table 4. 3 for descriptive statistics in seconds). The pairwise 
comparisons show a significant difference in judgement latencies between the no conflict and 
conflict-heuristic judgements (p < .05), the no conflict and conflict-logic judgements (p < 
.05), and the conflict-heuristic and conflict-logic judgements (p < .05). There was no 
interaction between load condition and judgement type, F(4, 160) = 0.18, p = .947, 𝜂7%= .01, 
thus load condition did not moderate judgement latencies. See Figure 4. 3 for descriptive 
statistics. 
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Table 4. 3 
Means, Standard Deviations and 95% Confidence Intervals as a function of Depletion 
Condition and Judgement Type. Data are expressed in seconds 
     
 
  M SD 95% CI 
Depletion Condition Control 31.60 18.78 [25.89, 37.30] 
 
Low depletion 22.04 10.42 [16.96, 27.12] 
 
High depletion 21.50 11.98 [16.59, 26.41] 
Judgement type No conflict 11.77 5.71 [10.67, 12.87] 
 
Conflict-heuristic 13.24 6.94 [11.84, 14.63] 
  Conflict-logical 50.13 36.19 [42.24, 58.02] 
 
     
  
  177 
     
 
Figure 4. 3. Judgement latencies as a function of response type across the experimental 
conditions. Note. Data is presented in seconds and error bars represent standard error 
Impulsivity and Logical Sensitivity. To further understand the origin of the conflict 
between heuristic and logical assessments, individual differences in impulsivity were 
evaluated to see whether they would predict logicality. BIS-11 scores were analysed to 
ascertain whether participants who were more impulsive were also more logical in their 
considerations when answering conjunction judgements. A person who scores high in 
impulsiveness should in theory be more likely to use heuristic thought processes when 
making conjunction judgements (Gerrard et al., 2008). If this is the case, then according to 
the hypothesis that heuristic considerations result in more logical conjunction judgements, 
those participants with higher BIS-11 scores should answer the CCPJ trials more logically 
than those with lower scores. 
A logical sensitivity score was computed for each participant, which showed how 
reliant they were on logical considerations when answering the 8 conflict trials. One 
participant who scored 100% logicality was removed from the sample. Consistent with the 
conflict sensitivity analysis, higher cognitive depletion resulted in more logical sensitivity; 
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however, this difference was not significant, Mlow depletion = 16.00, SD = 19.40, 95% CI [11.00, 
21.75], Mhigh depletion = 20.00, SD =19.47, 95% CI [14.44, 26.11], t(93) = -1.00, p = .319, 
Cohen’s d = 0.21. Responses to the BIS-11 ranged from 63 to 122 (low impulsivity – high 
impulsivity). To test whether logic sensitivity was predicted by impulsivity as a function of 
cognitive depletion, a regression model was run regressing a mean deviation form of BIS-11 
scores, the depletion condition with the contrast code -1 = high depletion, 1 = low depletion, 
and the interaction between the BIS-11 scores and the load condition. The model did not 
provide a significant fit to the data, F(3,91) = 1.28, p = .285, R2 = .041. Contrary to my 
expectations, the interaction term did not reach statistical significance (p = .328). Figure 4. 4 
presents the scatterplot for the model and Table 4. 4 shows the detailed results of the 
regression analysis. 
 
 
Figure 4. 4. Scatterplot of the interaction between BIS-11 scale and load condition on logical 
sensitivity 
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Table 4. 4 
Linear regression analysis predicting sensitivity to the conflict between logical and heuristic 
assessments from depletion condition (-1 = high depletion, 1 = low depletion), and 
impulsivity 
  B 95% CI b p 
Constant 17.78 [13.80, 21.75] 
 
< .001 
BIS-11 0.19 [-0.13, 0.50] 0.12    .241 
Load condition -2.28 [-6.26, 1.70] -0.12    .259 
BIS-11 x Load condition 0.16 [-0.16, 0.47] 0.10    .328 
Note. R2 = .041, F(3, 91) = 1.28, p = .285 
   
 
Discussion 
Support of Hypotheses and Interpretation of Results. The objective of this study 
was to test the hypothesis that decreasing individuals’ capacity for effortful thinking would 
also have a positive impact on probability judgments because it would obstruct the inhibition 
of the rapid, logical response by conscious effortful deliberation. As with the preceding 
experiments, it also hypothesised that individuals would show a sensitivity to the conflict 
underlying intuitive and logical considerations, and alongside this they would also 
demonstrate logical intuitions and heuristic reflections. To be more specific, it was expected 
that participants who were depleted cognitively would respond more logically as they were 
responding in line with intuitive processes. Whereas, those in the control condition, and 
possibly the low depletion condition would have access to their deliberative processing and 
thus commit more fallacies as the representativeness heuristic biases reflective thinking. It 
tested these hypotheses by identifying the impact of depletion of cognitive resources on the 
acceptance rates of both logical and illogical statements. The results found in this study 
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partially supported the hypotheses. Evidence of conflict sensitivity was found in the 
confidence ratings – both in their confidence responses and their confidence response 
latencies – and also in their judgement latencies across types of responses. Individuals were 
more confident in their judgments when conflict was absent from statements and took longer 
to rate their confidence when conflict was present in the statements. Evidence of conflict 
sensitivity was also present in the judgement latencies data. Participants took significantly 
longer to make judgements when conflict was present in the statements, particularly when 
they judged the conflict statements logically (i.e., correctly).  
Participants in the control condition were slower to complete the CCPJ task than those 
in the low depletion and high depletion conditions. There was however, no difference in time 
between the two depletion conditions (Mcontrol = 31.60 seconds vs. Mlow_depletion = 22.04 
seconds vs Mhigh_depletion = 21.50 seconds). This evidence ties in nicely with ego-depletion 
studies such as Baumeister et al. (1998) and Muraven et al. (1998) who found that volition 
expended ego, which resulted in less persistence on subsequent problems. In the case of this 
study, depleted participants might have given up quicker on the CCPJ task than the control 
group, thus resulting in their shorter judgement latencies. If this is in fact the case, then we 
might assume that in order to achieve these faster response times they relied more heavily on 
their faster, heuristic system of thought instead of their slower, more effortful deliberative 
thought. There was a significant effect of ego-depletion such that participants in the control 
group responded more heuristically (i.e., they answered more in line with heuristic 
considerations than logical considerations) than those in the high depletion group (Mcontrol = 
88.52 vs. Mhigh_depletion = 80.96). On average, participants in the high depletion group made 
their judgements 10 seconds faster than those in the control condition. These results show 
that ego-depleted participants who performed the letter-e task with conditions, also made the 
most correct judgements in the shortest time. This lends support for the idea that heuristic 
responses can reflect logical considerations; however, when people take time to deliberate 
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their judgement is biased by non-logical heuristics. However, the existence of logical 
intuitions and heuristic reflections should be researched further, as there is no way of being 
certain which system of thought the participants were using when they arrived at their 
answers. As mentioned in previous chapters, the methodology cannot predict if participants 
were guessing. It is possible that depleted participants were so cognitively drained that they 
just gave up and guessed their answers. Additionally, most of the significant differences 
found in the data of this experiment are due to the inclusion of the control condition from 
Experiment 1. The strength of the data presented here would have been higher if a new 
control had been collected for this experiment. 
Finally, this study explored whether the propensity to be impulsive had any bearing 
on one’s logicality when judging conjunction probability judgements. Due to the higher order 
factors of this scale, including self-control and perseverance, a positive correlation between 
those individuals who perceived themselves as non-impulsive and an increased propensity to 
think deliberatively was expected. In keeping with this study’s hypothesis that the logical 
answer comes first, but is overridden by a heuristic bias, it was also expected that individuals 
who assessed themselves as being impulsive, also exhibited higher logicality in their 
conjunction judgements. Unfortunately, there was no evidence found to support these 
theories. Despite previous work that shows impulsivity reflects a person’s propensity to 
deliberate less (Dickman, 1990), these findings suggest that a person’s propensity to be 
impulsive has no relationship to the considerations they use when making conjunction 
probability judgements. 
Generalizabitily of Results. Perhaps the most important question to arise from these 
results is if logical responses are in fact fast, then why did this not show in the judgement 
latencies data. These results showed that participants who answered the conflict statements 
logically did so in the slowest times. In fact, they were four times slower to answer conflict 
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statements in line with logical considerations compared to when answering conflict 
statements in line with heuristic considerations, or when answering the no conflict statements 
(see Table 4. 3 and Figure 4. 3). Indeed, these findings are more closely aligned with the 
traditional two-system model whereby the slower, more effortful System 2 thinking is 
necessary for reaching logical conclusions. In fact, the parallel-competitive account explains 
these findings perfectly. Intuition and deliberation work in parallel from the beginning of the 
reasoning process allowing people to detect when conflict arises between the two systems of 
thought. Conflict detection triggers a deeper processing of the task at hand, which can result 
in the slower, more deliberate process inhibiting the faster, more intuitive process, thus 
resulting in a logical response. However, this is not always the case and sometimes (in fact 
most of the time when it concerns the conjunction fallacy) the heuristic response is too 
enticing or convincing to be overridden.  
Looking closer at the judgement latencies across the response types, you will notice 
the enormous standard deviations for the conflict-logical judgements (SD = 36.19 seconds). 
This incongruity prompted me to explore the conflict-logical data in a bit more depth. A 
scatterplot of the data helps to illuminate the reasons for these conflicting findings (see Figure 
4. 5). When observing only the conflict statements, it is noticeable that those participants who 
answered the fastest also answered the most statements logically. The faster they responded 
to the conflict statements, the more correct answers they gave. Conversely, participants who 
only gave one or two correct answers out of a possible eight, also took the longest to respond. 
These findings support the logical intuitions account, that faster judgements lead to higher 
logicality. In other words, the fast heuristic response can indeed be logical, while the slower 
more deliberative response can be biased by prior beliefs and heuristics. The slow, but logical 
responses can be explained by the idea that it takes a great amount of cognitive energy and 
deliberation to reinstate the logical answer after it has been overridden by a potent heuristic 
reflection. Thus, it is difficult, and takes time but not impossible to reinstate the original 
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logical intuitive answer. This suggests that people can have both fast and slow reasoning 
processes that point towards the logical response. However, I also admit the necessity to 
research these ideas further, as it is always a possibility that the depleted participants were 
giving up quickly when conflict was present in the statements and guessing.  
 
 
Figure 4. 5. Scatterplot of the time taken in seconds to respond logically to conflict trials 
 
The manipulation between high and low depletion seemed to make no difference to 
the extent that participants were depleted. Why did the low depletion version of the letter e 
task not work in this study? This could be due to the actual task as described by Myers et al. 
(2018) who suggest that the letter e task with conditions is just a more difficult version of the 
letter e task without conditions. If this is the case, then both versions of the task might have 
had the same depleting effect on the participants, which might also explain the similarity in 
self-reported tiredness felt after completing the e-task in both the low and high ego-depletion 
conditions (Mlow depletion = 3.39, Mhigh depletion = 3.49, p = .782). The task manipulations (i.e., 
crossing out all examples of the letter e compared with crossing out the letter e according to a 
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set of rules) are designed to increase task difficulty, but this might not ultimately induce ego-
depletion. Increasing the complexity and difficulty of the task would obviously result in 
poorer performance; however, task difficulty alone cannot account for declined performance 
over time (Myers et al., 2018). “A more difficult task will mean poorer performance (a main 
effect in a sense) when compared to a less difficult task but it won’t necessarily produce 
greater deficits in performance over time” (Myers et al., 2018, p. 4). The fact that there was 
no difference in ego depletion between the low and high depletion condition, in a way makes 
total sense, as in line with the limited strength model people have a finite storage of energy 
that can become depleted when they undertake tasks requiring self-control. When this 
happens, people need to replenish these energy stores before continuing, as this will 
negatively affect performance on subsequent self-control tasks. In the manipulation checks, 
participants from each depletion condition completed a questionnaire pertaining the extent to 
which they felt, or experienced, depletion. These self-report answers did indeed differ 
between the two groups for all questions except how tired they felt after the task. Participants 
in the high depletion condition reported feeling more frustrated, putting more effort into the 
task and found the task more difficult than those in the low depletion condition. However, 
when it came to analysing their behavioural data there were no differences found between 
these two groups. What this might mean for our understanding of these energy stores is that 
once they are depleted, there is nothing left. There does not seem to be varying levels of 
depletion. In other words, one person cannot be more depleted than another. You either have 
energy reserves remaining or you do not. This would also have implications for ego-depleting 
tasks, such that a task is either depleting or it is not. You would not be able to find one task 
that is more depleting than another. However, this is purely speculative and would need to be 
tested with further research. 
A further explanation as to why the ego depletion conditions did not differ from each 
other could be a methodological one. One of the major assumptions of the limited-strength 
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model is that in order for ego depletion to occur, an act of self-control needs to be 
undertaken; in other words, a prepotent response needs to be overridden. “Self-control entails 
overriding or altering a predominant response tendency” (Schmeichel & Vohs, 2009, p. 770). 
Without a habit-forming section at the beginning of the task, there is no prepotent response to 
override. The experimental condition is supposed to consume more self-regulatory resources 
than the control, and the reason for this is straightforward. The instructions of the first task – 
to cross out every letter e – is designed to build and embed a habit. While the instructions of 
the second task – to NOT cross out the letter e in specific cases – forces the participants to 
inhibit the prepotent response. This inhibiting or overriding of the newly acquired habitual 
response is the cause of resource-depletion (Myers et al., 2018). Indeed, Baumeister and 
Vohs (2016) view the lack of a habit-forming stage prior to the instigation of a new set of 
rules as a methodological flaw. They believe that without the formation of a habit there is 
nothing to override, and this overriding of an impulse is essential to the nature of self-control 
tasks. 
The presence of conflict sensitivity was not found in the heuristic scores in this 
experiment. Thus, one could interpret that the participants were not aware of the conflicting 
assumptions between logical and intuitive thinking. According to the reinforcement 
sensitivity theory the behavioural inhibition system (BIS) resolves conflicts between the 
behavioural activation system and the fight-flight-freeze system. The BIS is a conflict 
detection system that helps to balance one impulse in favour of another (Schmeichel, 
Harmon-Jones & Harmon-Jones, 2010). BIS has also been identified as playing a role in the 
detection of response conflict in cognitive tasks (e.g., the go/no go task). Amodio, Master, 
Yee and Taylor (2007) found that higher BIS reflected greater conflict-related anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC) activity, and they concluded that BIS “corresponds to an attentional 
system for monitoring response conflicts” (p.16). Cognitive neuroscience believes that the 
ACC serves a conflict-monitoring function, whereby it monitors for conflict and recruits 
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additional mechanisms to resolve such conflicts. Inzlicht and Gutsell (2007) found that 
depleting cognitive resources had an impact on performance on the Stroop test. Participants 
were required to either inhibit or express their responses to a distressing film clip. They found 
that exercising self-control (i.e., inhibiting a distressing response) reduced activity in the 
brain’s conflict-detection centre, thus reducing BIS activation. This explanation might 
account for the reason why conflict detection was absent from the heuristic scores in the 
present study. If the letter e tasks (both the low and the high depletion conditions) caused 
ego-depletion in the participants, it is possible that this also resulted in the reduction of BIS 
activation, and henceforth a lack of conflict detection. This assumption; however, is not 
corroborated by the self-report confidence ratings and the response times taken to make these 
confidence ratings, as there was evidence found of conflict sensitivity in these. Participants 
were less confident in their judgements and took longer to rate their confidence when conflict 
was present in the statements. 
Finally, there is a potential confound in the data, such that it is unclear whether the 
ego depletion manipulations did in fact deplete cognitive resources and induce heuristic 
thinking, or whether ego depletion simply compelled participants to answer the task faster, 
thus causing higher levels of logicality (as explained by the logical intuitionist account). 
Participants in both the low and high depletion conditions completed the CCPJ task 
significantly faster than those in the control condition. These faster response times might in 
fact be the reason why the participants were answering more in line with System 1 thinking. 
Both time pressure and ego depletion are recognised as measures that encourage System 1 
thinking, thus the question remains, which one was responsible for the decrease in heuristic 
scores between the control and manipulation groups (M_control = 88.52, M_low depletion = 83.33, 
M_high depletion = 80.96). Although, when re-examining the judgement latencies across the three 
conditions (M_control = 31.60s, M_low depletion = 22.04s, M_high depletion = 21.50s) they do not 
appear to match the speed of those in the limited time pressure condition of Experiment 1 
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(M_limited = 4.38s), and neither do the heuristic scores (M_limited = 76.72). Thus, the reason for 
decreasing heuristic scores as ego depletion increases is most likely a result of the ego 
depletion task itself, and not faster response times. 
Final remarks and Future Directions. Although the ego depletion manipulation 
appeared to have been successful in this experiment, there are still doubts remaining. There is 
substantial evidence in the literature providing support for the fact that ego depletion and the 
limited strength model might not be as robust as previously believed (Moller et al., 2006; 
Tice et al., 2007; Job et al., 2010; Carter & McCullough, 2014; Hagger et al., 2016; Martijn et 
al., 2002). “Recent conceptual and empirical analyses have challenged the resource depletion 
explanation for the self-regulatory failures observed in ego-depletion experiments and 
questioned the strength of the ego depletion effect or whether it exists at all” (Hagger et al., 
2016, p. 547). However, there was significant drop in heuristic scores from the control to the 
high depletion condition, which suggests that the manipulation might in fact have made a 
difference to people’s logicality. The heuristic scores remained very high at 88.52% and 
80.96% respectively, but the high depleted participants made almost 10% fewer errors than 
those in the control condition. Another question to consider is why there was no difference 
between the two depletion condition. The manipulation checks showed significant differences 
in self-reported ratings of effort, frustration and difficulty but there was no difference 
between the heuristic scores. This might suggest that the low and high depletion conditions in 
fact did not differ from one another, which in turn questions the reliability of the ego 
depletion task.  
With this uncertainty in mind, future research might benefit from using a more 
developed methodology to collect the data. In other words, a task that incudes multiple 
answers to choose from instead of only two, which would eliminate any suspicions of 
guessing. It would also benefit from a more robust method of supressing cognitive resources 
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whilst performing the CCPJ task. This prompted the next experiment, which utilises a 
cognitive load task to overload cognitive resources as a method of encouraging System 1 
thinking. The task involves a secondary memory task to overload working memory while 
answering the CCPJ task. The thought behind this is that by overloading working memory 
during the task, one is encouraging intuitive thought as there will be less capacity to 
deliberate one’s judgements prior to answering. 
  
  189 
 
Experiment 4: The Influence of Spatial Storage Load and Cognitive Reflection on the 
Conjunction Fallacy 
Dual-Process Theories and the Conjunction Fallacy. Dual processes have been at 
the core of trying to explain the shortcomings of human judgements (i.e., the failure of logic 
and rational thinking). Most of the time these two reasoning systems coexist harmoniously. 
This happens when the heuristic default system provides a fast, automatic and correct 
response that aligns with the logical response of the analytic system. This is an example of 
congruency, when there is no conflict present between logical and heuristic considerations. 
However, this is not always the case; sometimes the intuitive response is at odds with the 
deliberative response. In other words, they are each pointing to a different answer. When this 
happens, the deliberative system must override the default heuristic response to replace the 
first intuitive response with a logical one (Stanovich & West, 2000). “Participants who are 
higher in System 2 resources (i.e., cognitive ability) are more likely to suppress the incorrect 
response from System 1 in favour of System 2, and give the correct response” (Feeney, 
Shafto & Dunning, 2007, p. 885). Indeed, the authors found that participants who performed 
poorly on the AH4 (a widely used group test of cognitive ability) were more susceptible to 
committing the conjunction fallacy. This lends support for the two-system notion that one 
needs to be able to deliberate effectively in order to override the prepotent heuristic response 
and replace it with a logical one. 
Working Memory and Judgement. There are studies consistent with the dual 
process framework which show that individual differences in cognitive capacity, such as 
working memory, can predict performance on conflict trials, but not on congruent trials (e.g., 
Stanovich & West, 2000; De Neys, 2006a). System 1 is assumed to operate automatically; 
hence it should not overburden limited executive resources. People with poorer working 
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memory should be able to arrive at the correct answer for trials that do not contain conflict, as 
the default heuristic response aligns with the logical response. However, on trials containing 
conflict, only people with higher cognitive abilities will be able to override the heuristic 
response and replace it with a logically correct one. Crisp and Feeney (2009) found that a 
secondary memory task increased conjunction errors for strongly related events but had no 
effect on the weakly related scenarios. They suggest that under memory load, most 
participants lack the cognitive resources necessary to inhibit the compelling heuristic output 
activated by a strong causal link. However, when the causal link is weaker, the heuristic 
response is less compelling, thus participants can overcome it even under memory load. 
Finally, the authors suggest that “causal knowledge has a crucial influence on probabilistic 
reasoning” (Crisp & Feeney, 2009, p. 2331).  
The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005) is a brief, three-item task that 
is designed to measure a person’s ability to override an incorrect prepotent heuristic response 
and replace it with a logical and correct response through engaging in further reflection. The 
bat-and-ball problem is the best-known CRT item. In this problem, participants are asked: 
“A bat and a ball together cost £1.10. 
A bat costs £1 more than a ball. 
How much does the ball cost?”  
The appealing but incorrect answer is “10p”. This answer is believed to be generated 
effortlessly and automatically by intuitive processes. The correct answer to this problem is in 
fact “5p” and requires that effortful deliberation be employed to inhibit and override the 
prepotent intuitive response. The CRT has become a popular measure of individual 
differences (see Appendix E for the full version of the CRT). A few reasons for this being 
that the CRT is a performance measure rather than a self-report measure, and neither 
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intelligence tests nor measures of executive functioning assess the tendency toward miserly 
processing in the way that the CRT does (Toplak, West & Stanovich, 2011). It is also very 
short and easy to conduct both as a pen and paper test or electronically. Additionally, it has 
been shown to be able to discriminate well between impulsive and reflective decision makers 
(Oechssler, Roider, & Schmitz, 2009; Travers, Rolison & Feeney, 2016).  
Although the CRT is a convincing predictor of intelligence and cognitive aptitude 
(Frederick, 2005; Obrecht, Chapman, and Gelman, 2009), it is also a unique and potent 
predictor of performance on heuristics-and-biases tasks (Toplak, West & Stanovich, 2011), 
and more pertinently on conjunction fallacies (Oechssler, Roider, & Schmitz, 2009). In this 
study, participants were presented with the classic “Linda task” by Kahneman and Tversky 
(1983) and asked to indicate which of these two statements was more likely to be true: 1) 
“Linda is a bank teller” or 2) “Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement”. 
The authors found that higher test scores on the CRT (i.e., scoring 2 or more correctly out of 
3) were correlated with lower incidences of the conjunction fallacy. However, even in the 
higher CRT group, committing the conjunction fallacy remained fairly established at 38.3% 
(compared to 62.2% for the low CRT group). Hoppe and Kusterer (2011) found that CRT test 
scores were able to predict performance on certain heuristics and biases tests. More 
specifically, they found that individuals with lower cognitive abilities, as measured by the 
CRT, are significantly more likely to exhibit both the base rate fallacy and the conservatism 
fallacy. Interestingly however, they found no link between CRT test scores and the 
endowment effect, which was striking in both low and high CRT groups. Toplak et al. (2011) 
argue that low CRT scores indicate a tendency to behave as a “cognitive miser”, giving the 
first response which comes to mind. In other words, these decision makers “act on impulse” 
and neglect to employ deliberation to override the prepotent heuristic response (Alós-Ferrer 
& Hügelschäfer, 2012, p. 183). 
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The CRT and Dual Process Theories. Dual process theories differ in their account 
of CRT performance. The default-interventionist models (Evans, 2006; Kahneman & 
Frederick, 2002) propose that intuition is the default mode of processing and that deliberative 
processing needs to be actively engaged to override and inhibit the initial, fast intuitive 
response. However, this does not always happen and often, even after engaging deliberation, 
people fail to adequately replace the intuitive response with a logical one (Stanovich & West, 
2008). Failure to engage deliberative processing has been used to explain incorrect 
responding (i.e., heuristic responding) on the CRT (Travers, Rolison, & Feeney, 2016). More 
specifically, when a heuristic answer is given, deliberative processing has likely failed to 
engage. However, when a correct answer is given, it is believed that the initial heuristic 
response has been inhibited and replaced by a logical one. In other words, system 1 
processing is overridden by system 2 processing. Travers, Rolison and Feeney (2016) used a 
novel methodology incorporating mouse tracking to capture time-course of reasoning on the 
CRT. They found that participants were initially drawn towards the intuitive (i.e., incorrect) 
option even if they proceeded to choose the deliberative (i.e., correct) answer. Furthermore, 
participants who chose the incorrect answer, were not attracted to the correct option prior to 
this. They concluded that intuitive processes are automatically activated and must be 
inhibited to answer correctly. They add that when participants responded intuitively, there 
was no evidence that deliberation had taken place. These findings lend support for the 
default-interventionist models of thinking and performance on the CRT. 
Parallel-competitive dual process theories posit that both heuristic and deliberate 
processing are activated simultaneously resulting sometimes in conflict that needs to be 
resolved. When this conflict happens, both systems compete for control of behaviour (Evans, 
2007; Sloman, 1996). Similarly to default-interventionist models, these accounts predict that 
system 1 processing needs to be inhibited by system 2 processing in order to reason correctly. 
Distinctively though, parallel-competitive models predict that system 2 processing is 
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persistently attempting to signal the correct response, even when failing to override the output 
of system 1 processing. 
The Current Study. Dual process theories have come under heavy criticism due to 
the fact that the framework has focussed primarily on people’s responses while ignoring the 
mechanisms underlying the cognitive processes (De Neys, 2006b; Reyna, Lloyd & Brainerd, 
2003; Stanovich & West, 2000; Gigerenzer & Reiger, 1996). The tasks that are commonly 
used to assess the conjunction fallacy offer a narrow window on the mechanisms that may 
underpin judgments. This may result in confounds as studies that include and explore 
individual differences are purely correlational and thus showed no causality (De Neys, 
2006a). 
Using a new methodology adapted from Evans & Curtis-Holmes (2005) that 
disentangled logic from intuition, Villejoubert (2009) found that individuals were more likely 
to accept representative statements, but they were also significantly less likely to accept 
illogical ones. Moreover, they consistently took longer before accepting a statement when 
heuristic and logical considerations were in conflict, even when they were pressured to 
provide an answer under time pressure. The current and widely accepted understanding is that 
when the slow deliberative system is not given enough time to process information, thinking 
will be more heuristic and less logical. However, Villejoubert’s (2009) findings suggest that 
quick thinking can be logical while effortful thinking can be biased by non-logical heuristics. 
The present research aims to build on these ideas and explore more systematically the 
circumstances under which accurate logical considerations may be fast and intuitive in 
judgements of probability. The objective is to test original and theoretically-driven ways to 
improve individuals’ probability judgements, and this will be addressed by testing the 
hypothesis that decreasing individuals’ capacity for effortful thinking will also have a 
positive impact on probability judgments because it will impede the inhibition of the rapid, 
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logical response by conscious effortful deliberation.  
Using the Comparative Conjunction Probability Judgement (CCPJ) task methodology, 
this study aims to identify the impact of increased cognitive load on the acceptance rates of 
both logical and illogical statements. Increasing cognitive load has produced conflicting 
findings with standard conjunction tasks (Crisp & Feeney, 2009; De Neys, 2006a; 
Villejoubert, 2009). This research will provide an assessment of the impact of cognitive load 
on the relative weight of heuristic and logical considerations in probability judgments. 
Oechssler, et al. (2009) raised an interesting question in their research: are people who exhibit 
the conservation bias less susceptible to the base rate fallacy? In the same train of thought, 
one might also ask the question: are people who exhibit examples of System 1 thinking, also 
less susceptible to committing the conjunction fallacy in conjunction probability judgements? 
This study also aims to investigate whether a relationship exists between cognitive reflection 
and logicality on conjunction judgements. The hypothesis is that people who exhibit lower 
CRT scores will also commit fewer conjunction fallacies, as they will be less likely to inhibit 
the logical intuitive answer. People with higher CRT scores are more able to inhibit intuition 
and employ deliberation and thus will commit more conjunction fallacies as their deliberation 
will be biased by heuristic assessments. 
Method 
Participants. Power analysis performed in GPower (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang & 
Buchner, 2007) indicated that a total sample size of 159 students would be sufficient to detect 
effects of a medium size effect (d = .5), as reported in Villejoubert (2009), with 1 - b = .80 
and a = .05.  One hundred participants were recruited for this study. A control group of 50 
participants was added to this study from the unlimited condition in Experiment 1. In this 
condition, participants simply completed the 16 CCPJ trials in their own time and capacity. 
They were not exposed to any time pressure nor were they put under any cognitive load. This 
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brought the total sample size to 150 participants. There were two participants who responded 
logically to all of the eight conflict trials, in other words, these participants were unbiased in 
their answers, thus were removed from the sample to avoid a possible confound in the data 
leaving the final sample size at 148 students. Following screening for careless responding 
(details outlined in results section), a further 7 participants were ruled out leaving the sample 
at 141 students (ncontrol = 48, nlow load = 46, nhigh load = 47). Participants ranged in age from 18-
56 years (M = 23.70, SD = 7.19). One hundred and eighteen were females (83.7%) and 23 
males (16.3%). Most of the students were undergraduates (n = 84, 59.6%) and the remaining 
57 students were postgraduates (40.4%). One hundred and five of the students were native 
English speakers (74.5%), while 24 rated themselves as intermediate English speakers (17%), 
and the remaining 12 as proficient in English (8.5%). 
Materials 
The Comparative Conjunction Probability Judgement (CCPJ) task. This is a 
series of 16 CCPJ trials presented on a computer screen. Each trial presented a short 
personality vignette describing an imaginary person’s hobbies and characteristics, followed 
by one of four types of probability statements: representative and logical (RL), representative 
but illogical (RI), unrepresentative but logical (UL) and unrepresentative and illogical (UI). 
Participants saw four of each type of statement presented in a random order, they then had to 
judge whether they believed the statement to be true or false, and entered their answers using 
the keyboard of the computer. See Chapter 2 for full details of the CCPJ task. 
Dot memory task.  This classic spatial storage task can originally be seen in the work 
presented by Bethell-Fox and Shepard (1988) and Miyake and colleagues (2001). It is well-
established that it successfully burdens participant’s executive resources (De Neys & 
Schaeken, 2007; Franssens & De Neys, 2009; Johnson, Tubau, & De Neys, 2016; Miyake et 
al., 2001). For this study, a 3x3 matrix filled with three or four dots (depending on which load 
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condition: low or high) was briefly presented to each participant for 850 ms (see Figure 4. 6). 
Participants memorized a new pattern before reading each social judgement vignette and 
were asked to reproduce it after each judgement they made. In the recall phase, an empty 
matrix was presented on the screen, and participants used the mouse to indicate the location 
of the dots. Hovering over an empty square and left clicking the mouse would cause a dot to 
appear in the corresponding location. If the participant decided to change his/her mind, 
hovering over the dot and left clicking the mouse a second time would clear the square. 
 
Figure 4. 6. Examples of the dot patterns in the low-load (a) and high-load (b) conditions  
In the high load trials, the matrix was filled with a complex four-dot pattern (i.e., a 
“two- or three-piece” pattern based on the work of Bethell-Fox & Shepard, 1988, and 
Verschueren, Schaeken, & d’Ydewalle, 2004). Miyake et al. (2001) established that 
memorising complex dot patterns such as these depleted executive resources. In the low load 
trials the pattern consisted of three dots on a horizontal, vertical or diagonal line (i.e., a “one- 
piece” pattern in Bethell-Fox & Shepard’s terms). This simple and systematic pattern should 
only minimally burden the executive resources (e.g., De Neys, 2006a; Miyake et al., 2001).  
Cognitive Reflection Task (CRT).  Taken from Frederick (2005), this test is 
composed of three questions, all of which are designed to produce an intuitive response. In 
other words, they all hint towards a fast heuristic response in the first instance. This fast 
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response is also the incorrect response, and in order to replace it with the correct answer one 
must override or suppress this first response and employ reflective analytical thinking 
(Frederick, 2005). See Appendix E for the full CRT. Frederick (2005) accompanied his CRT 
with the following prior instructions: “Below are several problems that vary in difficulty. Try 
to answer as many as you can.” For this experiment I replaced these instructions with the 
simple heading of “Brain teaser”. A combined measure of performance on these three items 
was the dependent variable (i.e., a score out of 3).  
Procedure. In this experiment, participants made conjunction probability judgements 
while they simultaneously tried to remember a briefly presented visual dot pattern (e.g., 
Miyake, Friedman, Rettinger, Shah, & Hegarty, 2001; De Neys, 2006a). The difficulty of the 
dot pattern was manipulated so that remembering the pattern in a control condition would be 
easier and less demanding on executive resources. As a measure of individual differences, 
they also completed the CRT (Frederick, 2005). On arrival the participants received an 
information sheet and consent form. After being briefed on the study and giving their 
informed consent, they commenced with two tasks: the CRT and the CCPJ trials. The order 
in which they completed these tasks was counterbalanced. The CRT was presented as a pen 
and paper task, while the CCPJ task was programmed in E-Prime 2 and presented digitally on 
a computer screen. The sequence of events to complete the CCPJ trials consisted of first 
reading a personality vignette about a fictitious person. Once they had finished reading this 
description, they pushed the spacebar and a dot matrix pattern flashed up on the screen for 
850ms. After 850ms, the matrix disappeared from the screen and they had to read and answer 
the judgement statement. After making their judgement by entering their answer (“A” for 
True and “L” for False) on the keyboard, an empty matrix appeared on the screen and they 
had to recall the locations of the dots they had seen directly previously. The participants all 
completed three practice trials on the CCPJ task before they commenced with the full 16 
experimental trials. They were instructed to focus predominantly on remembering the dot 
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sequences. They were told that recalling the dots correctly was the most important part of the 
study and that their answers to the social judgements came secondary. This was to encourage 
participants to take the dot task seriously and ensure the experimental manipulation (i.e., 
overloading cognitive resources) succeeded. On completion of both the CCPJ task and the 
CRT, they were debriefed and paid in their choice of either course credits (30 credits) or 
money (£4). The study took less than 30 minutes to complete.  
Results 
Careless responders and outliers. Participants were screened for carless responding 
(Meade and Craig, 2012), where an overall “flag score” was computed to identify careless 
responders who were identified as outliers on a number of predetermined criteria. The first of 
which was the total duration spent completing the CCPJ task. A z-score was computed from 
each total duration time and any participants who fell outside of three standard deviations 
were flagged as outliers. There were no participants flagged on this criterion. Next, I screened 
for multivariate outliers on judgement latencies. Mahalanobis distance scores were computed 
for the length of time it took participants to think about their answers and make their 
judgements. Twenty-one participants were flagged on this criterion. Following this, I 
screened for multivariate outliers on reading latencies. Mahalanobis distance scores were 
computed for the length of time it took participants to read the scenarios (personality 
vignettes) in the task. Twenty-two participants were flagged on this criterion. A total flag 
score was computed for each participant using these three criteria (total duration, judgement 
duration and reading duration) and all participants who were flagged more than once were 
removed from the sample. Seven participants were removed from the sample based on these 
grounds (ncontrol = 2, nlow load = 3, nhigh load = 2). Thus, 9 participants in total were removed from 
the sample as 2 responded 100% logically, leaving the final sample size at N = 141.  
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Manipulation Checks. Following De Neys and Schaeken (2007) and Johnson, Tubau 
and De Neys (2016), recall performance was assessed to ensure the dot memory task was 
properly performed. Largely, recall performance was high with the mean number of correctly 
recalled dots for the complex four-dot patterns reaching 3.48 (SD = 0.35) and 2.78 (SD = 
0.22) for the simple three-dot patterns. In other words, 87% of a complex and 92.7% of a 
simple pattern was reproduced correctly, showing that the dot memory task was taken 
seriously by the participants and performed correctly.  
Manipulation checks showed that there was a significant difference in total duration 
latencies (i.e., how long each participants took to complete the entire task from beginning to 
end) between load groups (Mcontrol = 478.19 seconds, SD = 163.05 vs. Mlow load = 718.96 
seconds, SD = 263.88 vs. Mhigh load = 732.72 seconds, SD = 305.33; F(2,138) = 15.50, p < 
.001). Pairwise comparisons revealed that total duration latencies differed between the 
control and low load condition (p < .001), and between the control and high load condition (p 
< .001), and there was no difference between the low load and high load conditions (p = 
1.00). This was expected as the control condition did not fill out the dot pattern on a grid, nor 
were they required to rate their confidence after each trial, and thus were significantly faster 
than the other two conditions. The fact that there was no difference between the low and high 
load conditions is encouraging, as it means any differences in judgements between the two 
conditions can be attributed to the manipulation of cognitive load and not extra thinking time. 
In the low load and high load conditions, on completion of each trial, participants 
were asked to rate how confident they were that their judgement was correct. This was done 
on a 10-point Likert scale (0 = “not confident at all”, 9 = “extremely confident”). An average 
confidence score was computed for each participant across the conflict conditions of the 
CCPJ task. In other words, one score for trials containing conflict and another score for trials 
without conflict. These scores were subjected to a 2 (load: low vs. high) x 2 (conflict: absent 
  200 
vs. present) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor. Results revealed a 
significant main effect of conflict. Participants reported feeling less confident in their answers 
when conflict was present in the statements (Mno-conflict = 7.13, SD = 1.44, 95% CI [6.84, 7.43] 
vs. Mconflict = 6.85, SD = 1.35, 95% CI [6.58, 7.13], F(1,94) = 8.56, p = .004, 𝜂7%= .08). There 
was no main effect of load condition. Participants reported the same level of confidence in 
their answers across both load conditions (Mlow load = 7.01, SD = 1.26, 95% CI [6.63, 7.39] vs. 
Mhigh load = 6.98, SD = 1.37, 95% CI [6.60, 7.35], F(1,94) = 0.01, p = .909, 𝜂7%= .00). Finally, 
there was no interaction between conflict and load conditions (F(1,94) = 0.76, p = .387, 𝜂7%= 
.01, see Table 4. 5 for descriptive statistics). 
 
Table 4. 5 
Means, Standard Deviations, and 95% Confidence Intervals across the load (low vs. high) 
and conflict (absent vs. present) conditions for confidence ratings (score out of 10) 
      
        95% Confidence Interval 
Condition Conflict M SD 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Low Load Absent 7.19 1.34 6.77 7.61 
 
Present 6.82 1.31 6.43 7.22 
High Load Absent 7.08 1.53 6.67 7.49 
  Present 6.88 1.40 6.49 7.26 
      
 
In addition to recording the confidence judgements, so were the latencies of how long 
it took each participant to make these judgements of confidence. These confidence latencies 
were subjected to a 2 (load: low vs. high) x 2 (conflict: absent vs. present) mixed ANOVA 
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with repeated measures on the last factor. Results revealed a significant main effect of 
conflict. Participants took longer to rate their confidence when conflict was present in the 
statements (Mno-conflict = 2758.76 ms, SD = 1127.70, 95% CI [2530.27, 2987.25] vs. Mconflict = 
2947.88 ms, SD = 1351.67, 95% CI [2674.00, 3221.75], F(1,94) = 3.96, p = .049, 𝜂7%= .04). 
There was no effect of load condition. Participants took the same length of time to report 
their confidence across the two load conditions (Mlow load = 2713.96 ms, SD = 985.61, 95% CI 
[2379.72, 3048.20] vs. Mhigh load = 2986.99 ms, SD = 1295.10, 95% CI [2659.65, 3314.34], 
F(1,94) = 1.34, p = .249, 𝜂7%= .01). There was no interaction between the conflict and load 
conditions (F(1,94) = 0.22, p = .639, 𝜂7%= .00, see Table 4. 6 for descriptive statistics). 
 
Table 4. 6 
Means, Standard Deviations, and 95% Confidence Intervals across the load (low vs. high) 
and conflict (absent vs. present) conditions for confidence latencies (in milliseconds) 
      
        95% Confidence Interval 
Condition Conflict M SD 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Low Load Absent 2642.09 1099.75 2315.46 2968.72 
 
Present 2785.82 1015.33 2395.03 3176.62 
High Load Absent 2870.67 1154.01 2550.77 3190.56 
  Present 3103.32 1605.50 2720.58 3486.05 
      
 
Conflict Sensitivity. To examine conflict sensitivity, a heuristic score was computed for 
each trial to assess whether participants were sensitive to the conflict between heuristic (i.e., 
representativeness) and logical considerations when making their judgements. See 
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Experiment 1 for a detailed description on how these scores were computed. Heuristic scores 
ranged from 0% (never followed heuristic assessment) to 100% (always followed heuristic 
assessment) and were analysed using a 3 (load: control vs. low vs. high) x 2 (conflict: absent 
vs. present) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor. 
The results revealed that participants were more likely to respond heuristically in the 
absence of conflict between heuristic and logical considerations, Mno_conflict = 86.68, SD = 
14.50, 95% CI [84.29, 89.07] vs. Mconflict = 80.99, SD = 18.87, 95% CI [77.94, 84.04], 
F(1,138) = 11.51, p = .001, 𝜂7%= .08. Heuristic thinking was also influenced by load 
condition; participants who were under a high cognitive load while making a judgement were 
least likely to rely on heuristic considerations, while participants under no cognitive load 
were most likely to rely on heuristic considerations, Mcontrol = 88.28, SD = 11.50, 95% CI 
[84.54, 92.02] vs. Mlow load = 84.38, SD = 12.69, 95% CI [80.56, 88.19] vs. Mhigh load =78.86, 
SD = 14.89, 95% CI [75.08, 82.63], F(2,138) =6.20, p = .003, 𝜂7%= .08). Pairwise comparisons 
revealed that heuristic scores differed between the control and high load condition only (p = 
.002). There was no difference in scores between the control and low load condition (p = 
452), nor between the low load and high load conditions (p = .132). I expected the low load 
condition to be similar to the control condition as it was designed to be very relaxed on the 
use of cognitive resources. However, the fact that there was no difference between the low 
and high load conditions is unexpected. Finally, there was no interaction between conflict and 
cognitive load, F(2,138) = 0.98, p = .378, 𝜂7%= .01 (see Table 4. 7 for descriptive statistics).  
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Table 4. 7 
Means, Standard Deviations and 95% Confidence Intervals of heuristic scores for the 
absence or presence of conflict as a function of load condition 
      
Load Conflict M SD 95% Confidence Interval 
    Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Control Absent 89.84 12.54 85.75 93.94 
 
Present 86.72 17.38 81.49 91.95 
Low Absent 86.96 13.93 82.77 91.14 
 
Present 81.79 16.18 76.46 87.13 
High Absent 83.25 16.33 79.11 87.38 
  Present 74.47 21.01 69.19 79.75 
      
 
This result was surprising as an interaction was expected, assuming that cognitive 
load would not affect judgements in the absence of conflict between heuristic and logical 
considerations. However, it appears that cognitive load reduced both the proportion of 
heuristico-logical answers in the absence of conflict and the proportion of heuristic answers 
in the presence of conflict. The reasons for the impact of cognitive load on non-conflict 
scenarios are unclear. A possible reason might be that under load, people find it harder to 
process the unrepresentative statements (U&I, U/L). To test this idea, I ran a 3 (load: control 
vs. low vs high) x 2 (conflict absent vs. present) x 2 (statement: representative vs. 
unrepresentative) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the last two factors.  
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The results for the main effects of load, conflict and the interaction between load and 
conflict remained the same as outlined in the analysis above. In addition to this, there was a 
significant main effect of statement. Participants responded more heuristically to 
unrepresentative statements, Mrepresentative = 79.65, SD = 19.96, 95% CI [76.36, 82.95] vs. 
Munrepresentative = 88.02, SD = 14.70, 95% CI [85.69, 90.36], F(1,138) = 20.20, p < .001, 𝜂7%= 
.13. Finally, there was no interaction between statement and load (F(2,138) = 1.50, p = .228, 𝜂7%= .02), no interaction between statement and conflict (F(1,138) = 0.02, p = .904, 𝜂7%= .00), 
and no three-way interaction between statement and conflict and load (F(2,138) = 0.58, p = 
.561, 𝜂7%= .01). Thus, load did not moderate how difficult participants found the 
representative and unrepresentative statements. In general, and regardless of load, 
participants answered the representative statements more logically, while relying more 
heavily on heuristic considerations when making unrepresentative judgements. In line with 
Tversky and Kahneman’s (1983) belief that cognitive misers rely on heuristics to make 
difficult judgements, one could assume that people find it more difficult in general to process 
the unrepresentative statements, regardless of cognitive load. 
Judgement Latencies. Response latencies were analysed to assess which responses 
showed sensitivity to conflict between heuristic and logical considerations. Assuming that 
people who always respond with a heuristic judgement under conflict use a different strategy 
overall, they were screened for and excluded in order to compare latencies for heuristic and 
logical answers under conflict. The remaining sample was as follows: N = 83; n_control = 23, 
n_low load = 29, n_high load = 31 (41% removed from sample). In line with previous research 
(Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2012; De Neys & Glumicic, 2008) three average latency 
scores were computed for each participant: 1) the average response latency for congruent 
statements (R&L and U&I statements), 2) the average response latency for heuristic 
responses to conflict statements (R/I and U/L statements), 3) and the average response 
latency for logical responses to conflict statements. See Experiment 1 for a more 
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comprehensive explanation on how to compute these three latency scores. Latencies were 
converted to log10 prior to analysis to normalize the distribution and subjected to a 3 
(judgment type: no-conflict vs. conflict-heuristic vs. conflict-logical) x 3 (load condition: 
control vs. low vs. high) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the first factor.  
There was a significant main effect for judgement type. Participants were fastest at 
making judgements that contained no conflict, but took the longest amount of time to make 
logical judgements when conflict was present in the statements (Mno_conflict = 4.11, SD = 0.22, 
95% CI [4.06, 4.15] vs. Mconflict_heuristic = 4.16, SD = 0.19, 95% CI [4.12, 4.20] vs. 
Mconflict_logical = 4.63, SD = 0.42, 95% CI [4.55, 4.72], F(2, 188) = 154.47, p < .001, 𝜂7%= .62). 
There was also a significant main effect of load condition. Participants were overall fastest at 
making judgements when put under high load (Mcontrol = 4.34, SD = 0.20, 95% CI [4.24, 4.43] 
vs. Mlow load = 4.35, SD = 0.15, 95% CI [4.28, 4.43] vs. Mhigh load = 4.21, SD = 0.29, 95% CI 
[4.14, 4.28], F(2, 94) = 4.27, p = .017, 𝜂7%= .08). There was a significant interaction between 
load condition and judgement type. Participants were fastest at making judgements under 
high cognitive load, especially when conflict was absent from the statements, F(4, 188) = 
2.37, p = .054, 𝜂7%= .05 (see Figure 4. 7). 
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Figure 4. 7. Judgement latencies as a function of judgement type and load condition. Note. 
Error bars represent standard errors. The per-cell sample size was n = 23 for control, n = 36 
for low load, and n = 38 for high load 
 
Planned paired samples t-tests revealed that no-conflict statements were answered 
significantly faster than conflict-heuristic statements, Mno_conflict = 4.10, SD = 0.22, 
Mconflict_heuristic = 4.15, SD = 0.19, t(96) = -3.55, p = .001, Cohen’s d = 0.24. No-conflict 
statements were also answered significantly faster than conflict-logical statements, Mno_conflict 
= 4.10, SD = 0.22, Mconflict_logical = 4.63, SD = 0.42, t(96) = -13.42, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.58. 
Finally, conflict-heuristic statements were answered significantly faster than conflict-logical 
statements, Mconflict_heuristic = 4.15, SD = 0.19, Mconflict_logical = 4.63, SD = 0.42, t(96) = -12.47, p 
< .001, Cohen’s d = 1.47. Please note, these descriptive statistics and paired samples t-tests 
are expressed in log10. 
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Cognitive Reflection and Logical Sensitivity. To further understand the origin of the 
conflict between heuristic and logical assessments, individual differences in cognitive 
reflection (i.e., the ability to override a heuristic response and replace it with a logical one) 
were evaluated to see whether they would predict logicality. If, as suspected, sensitivity to 
logic is fast and intuitive, people who are less cognitively reflective should be more logical in 
their judgements on the CCPJ task. A logical sensitivity score was computed for each 
participant. More specifically, one score that showed what percentage of time they judged 
conflict statements logically (0% = “never logical”, 100% = “always logical”). The sample 
was screened for perfect logicality and participants who always answered logically on the 
conflict trials were excluded from the analysis. Consistent with the conflict sensitivity 
analysis, higher cognitive load led to an increase in logical sensitivity and this difference was 
marginally significant, Mlow load = 17.82%, SD = 16.22, 95% CI [13.56, 22.34], Mhigh load = 
24.74%, SD =20.96, 95% CI [19.14, 30.61], t(94) = 1.81, p = .074, Cohen’s d = 0.37. 
Responses to the CRT ranged from 0 (never answered a trial logically) to 3 (answered all 3 
trials logically), Mlow load = 0.45, SD = 0.88, 95% CI [0.21, 0.70], Mhigh load = 0.37, SD = 0.67, 
95% CI [0.20, 0.57]. To test whether logic sensitivity was predicted by cognitive reflection as 
a function of cognitive load, a regression model was run regressing a mean deviation form of 
CRT scores, the load condition with the contrast code -1 = high load, 1 = low load, and the 
interaction between the CRT scores and the load condition. The model did not provide a 
significant fit to the data, F(3,92) = 1.45, p = .233, R2 = .045. Contrary to my expectations, 
the interaction term did not reach statistical significance (p = .372). Figure 4. 8 presents the 
scatterplot for the model and Table 4. 8 shows the detailed results of the regression analysis.  
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Figure 4. 8. Scatterplot of the interaction between CRT scores and cognitive load condition 
on logical sensitivity 
 
Table 4. 8 
Linear regression analysis predicting sensitivity to the conflict between logical and heuristic 
assessments from load condition (-1 = high load, 1 = low load), and cognitive reflection 
     
  B 95% CI ß p 
Constant 21.37 
[17.54, 
25.21] 
 
< .001 
CRT 1.99 [-3.14, 7.19] 0.08    .443 
Load condition -3.54 [-7.37, 0.29] -0.19    .070 
CRT x Load condition -2.32 [-7.45, 2.81] -0.09    .372 
Note. R2 = .045, F(3, 92) = 1.45, p = .233 
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Discussion 
Support of Hypotheses and Interpretation of Results. This experiment examined 
the impact of cognitive load on the sensitivity to the conflict between heuristic and logical 
assessment in social judgements under uncertainty. The aim of this study was to test original 
and theoretically-driven ways to improve individuals’ probability judgements. The results 
supported the hypothesis that people are able to detect the underlying conflict between the 
two systems of thought. The results also appeared to support the hypothesis that decreased 
capacity for effortful thinking would have a positive impact on probability judgments; 
however, the reason for this is still debatable. One explanation for the higher logicality 
observed in the depleted and high-load conditions could be that people might have access to 
logical intuitions. Indeed, this can be seen in the data as decreasing cognitive resources would 
have increased intuitive responses, which in turn resulted in higher levels of logical 
responses. The control conditions did not impose restrictions on the participants reasoning 
and allowed them to use conscious effortful deliberation. However, deliberation did not 
appear to equate with higher logicality (i.e., as predicted by the default interventionist and 
parallel competitive accounts) as these participants responded more in line with heuristic 
considerations; which seems to lend support for the heuristic reflections account. In other 
words, belief-based responses (i.e., responses derived from heuristics) are available as a 
System 2 response and depend on the inhibition of a competing intuitive-logical response 
(Howarth, Handley & Walsh, 2016). However, one must not ignore the fact that participants 
could also be guessing when confronted with the conflict trials as this conflict brings along 
uncertainty and the task requires a forced response. Due to the rate of heuristic responding 
being so high overall, it would only take a small amount of correct, or logical, guesses to 
sway the data. 
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The hypothesis that people who exhibited lower CRT scores would also commit fewer 
conjunction fallacies, as they are less likely to inhibit the logical intuitive answer was not 
supported. There was no significant relationship found between CRT sores and logicality. 
Oechssler et al. (2009) found that biases were significantly more pronounced for individuals 
with low cognitive abilities, as rated on the CRT. However, these results do not support this 
evidence. A reason for this could be that like making judgements in line with logical 
considerations, answering the CRT trials correctly is difficult and infrequent. Seventy-four 
percent of the participants never managed to get any CRT questions correct (see Table 4. 9 
for the frequencies and percentages of the CRT scores). This could be due to a limitation in 
the procedure. The CRT was counterbalanced when being administered to the participants. 
Half answered it before completing the CCPJ task and half answered it afterwards. Those 
participants who answered it after the CCPJ task would have been submitted to cognitive load 
in the form of a dot test (either low load or high load), which might have fatigued them and 
affected their ability to solve the difficult CRT questions. 
 
Table 4. 9 
Frequency and percentages of CRT scores as a function of load condition 
      
CRT score Low load (n = 47)   High load (n = 49) 
  Frequency %   Frequency % 
0 35 74.5  36 73.5 
1 6 12.8  8 16.3 
2 3 6.4  5 10.2 
3 3 6.4   0 0 
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Generalizability of Results. It was apparent from both the heuristic scores and 
judgement latencies that the participants were able to detect the conflict underlying logical 
and heuristic considerations. Individuals answered more in line with heuristic considerations 
when conflict was absent from statements, especially in the control condition. In other words, 
the presence of conflict coupled with an increase in cognitive load saw an increase in 
logicality in individuals’ answers. Participants also responded the fastest when conflict was 
absent from the statements, and there were significant differences in judgement latencies 
between the no-conflict, conflict-heuristic and conflict-logical judgement types. Such that the 
time taken to respond increased significantly between the judgement types in that order. This 
provides support for the notion that people are sensitive to conflict between logical and 
heuristic considerations (De Neys, 2012, 2014; De Neys & Schaeken, 2007; Villejoubert, 
2009).  
There was additional support for conflict detection found in the self-reported 
confidence ratings (e.g., how confident they were in their judgements) as well as the time it 
took participants to make these ratings (e.g., how long it took to assess their confidence 
levels). They were less confident, and also took longer to judge their confidence when 
conflict was present in the statements. When conflict was absent; however, they were more 
confident they had answered correctly and arrived at these confidence judgements faster. This 
suggests that people use a parallel processing model of reasoning as these models propose 
people are very good at detecting conflict.  
There was no difference in load condition for both the confidence judgements and 
confidence judgement latencies. In other words, being exposed to higher or lower cognitive 
loads did not affect the participants belief in how accurately they had answered, nor did it 
affect the length of time they spent considering their accuracy. This result was surprising as 
the more complex 4-dot pattern was far more difficult to memorise and recall than the easier 
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3-dot pattern and I was expecting this to influence the confidence judgements. However, load 
condition had no effect on either the confidence ratings nor the confidence latencies. Indeed, 
the difference in load can be seen in the participant’s heuristic scores: as the load increased, 
so did their logicality. There is evidence that people exhibit lower confidence when their 
response conflicts with the normative response (De Neys & Franssens, 2009; De Neys, 
Cromheeke & Osman, 2011). This literature has shown that even though individuals are 
unable to resist giving the intuitive response, they are also more sensitive to normative 
standards than is originally assumed as portrayed in their confidence scores. This goes against 
the default interventionist account and aligns itself more with a parallel model of dual 
processes. Stupple, Ball & Ellis (2013) found that the harder the problem, the lower the 
confidence levels. This was not supported in the current experiment as the high load task was 
far more difficult than the low load task but there was no difference in confidence scores. 
Thompson, Prowse, Turner and Pennycook (2011) found reduced ‘feelings of rightness’, 
which is closely associated with confidence, when participants rejected belief bias 
conclusions compared to when they accepted conclusions. Thus, it may be the case that 
people feel more confident when responding ‘yes’ to a statement, than responding ‘no’. 
Indeed, Stupple et al. (2013) found that accepting, or agreeing with, a statement resulted in 
greater confidence than rejecting, or disagreeing with, a statement.  
To investigate this idea further I computed two mean confidence scores for each 
participant for the conflict statements only. One for when they accepted statements and the 
other for when they rejected statements. A 2 (accept confidence vs. reject confidence) x 2 
(low load vs high load) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the first factor was 
conducted on the data. There was a significant effect of type of response (i.e., accept / reject) 
such that individuals who rejected statements, actually reported feeling more confident than 
when they accepted statements (Maccept = 3.17, SD  = 1.23, 95% CI [2.91, 3.43] vs. Mreject = 
3.67, SD = 1.28, 95% CI [3.40, 3.93], F(1,91) = 4.87, p = .03, 𝜂7% = .05). There was no 
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difference in confidence levels between conditions (Mlow load = 3.37, SD  = 0.64, 95% CI 
[3.17, 3.57] vs. Mhigh load = 3.47, SD = 0.68, 95% CI [3.28, 3.64], F(1,91) = 0.49, p = .488, 𝜂7% 
= .01) and there was no interaction between type of response and condition (F(1,91) = .29, p 
= .592, 𝜂7% = .00). These findings do not support those found by Stupple et al. (2013), in fact 
they suggest that people feel more confidence in their answers when they reject or disagree 
with a statement.  
Evidence for logical intuitions was also found in this experiment. Participants in the 
high load condition would also have had the least access to cognitive resources for 
deliberation, as their working memory was put under high load conditions (i.e., remembering 
a complex 4-dot pattern). The task was taken seriously by the participants with an accuracy 
score of 87% achieved, thus, we can assume participants in the high load condition were 
relying more heavily on their intuition while making their conjunction judgements. These 
participants responded significantly more logically (i.e., committed fewer conjunction 
fallacies) than those in the control condition. This evidence provides support that intuitive 
thought might point to the logical answer, even when there is conflict in the statements. The 
fact that the control condition had full cognitive ability, but still made more errors lends 
support for the heuristic reflections account. While it appears to be true that people can intuit 
logic, it might also be true that the bias is found in deliberative reflections, and it corrupts 
people’s judgements when they analyse, or think hard about, their answers. The parallel-
competitive account could explain the overall high levels of heuristic judgements despite the 
experimental manipulations. Whereby conflict is readily detected by people, but this does not 
necessarily translate into logical judgements due to the difficulty of inhibiting the potent 
heuristic response. Although, the data shows that participants with reduced cognitive capacity 
were in fact doing just this. How is it possible that people with less working memory capacity 
are able to perform a task that requires a lot of cognitive effort (e.g., inhibiting a potent 
response), while people who have ample cognitive capacity were not able to do so? One 
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answer would be that the logical answer in fact comes first, and those people under cognitive 
load were in fact answering in accordance with their fast, automatic, intuitive – yet logical – 
reasoning process. However, it is important to note that the methodology employed to collect 
this data was a forced-choice task containing only two choices, which does not allow for the 
detection of guessing. It is true that people find judgements under uncertainty (e.g., trials 
containing conflict) difficult, thus they might resort to guessing under these conditions. 
Alternatively, they might simply be rejecting the heuristic response, thus choosing the only 
other alternative answer available to them. Or, they may in fact be reasoning logically. 
However, the methodology employed does not allow a differentiation between these 
possibilities, thus it is difficult to ascertain the reasons behind the increase of logical 
responses on the conflict trials and in the experimental manipulation conditions such as ego 
depletion and cognitive load.  
Final remarks and Future Directions. To readdress the question raised at the 
beginning of this experiment: are people who exhibit examples of System 1 thinking, also 
less susceptible to committing the conjunction fallacy in conjunction probability judgements? 
From an initial examination of these data it would appear the answer is yes, although one 
must seriously consider how valid the data is given the methodology employed to collect it. 
Across this program of research there has been substantial evidence supporting the idea that 
people can detect conflict between the different systems of reasoning. There also appears to 
be evidence that people can intuit logic in conjunction judgement problems, and that 
heuristics can bias their analytical processing. However, these assumptions would need to be 
tested further using an expanded methodology that was better suited for pin pointing the 
reasons why people respond more logically when faced with conflict or when forced to 
respond intuitively. The question that is raised now, is how transferable this information is. 
Can it be applied to different heuristics and biases tasks? This question prompted the 
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following and final experiment in this thesis, which explored whether the findings across the 
previous four experiments were transferable across different tasks and fallacies.  
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Chapter 5: Analysing Response Times to Further Understand Base Rate Neglect 
 
Human judgement is not perfect especially under circumstances of uncertainty. A 
classic example of the unescapable impact that intuitive reasoning has on people’s judgement 
and decision making is base rate neglect (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). A typical base rate 
problem includes two different types of information. First, it includes base rate information in 
the form of background data that always includes numerical information about the 
composition of a sample. Second, it includes indicant or diagnostic information. This 
information is purely descriptive and evokes a stereotypical response. The base rate fallacy is 
when individuals tend to ignore base rates in favour of individuating information (when such 
is available) instead of integrating the two (Bar-Hillel, 1980). One exhibits the base rate 
fallacy when one allows indicators to dominate base rates when making probability 
judgements. Similar to the conjunction fallacy, people respond to these problems 
inappropriately because of the salient stereotypical response that is cued by the 
representativeness heuristic. Indeed, Kahneman and Tversky (1973) observed that the vast 
majority of educated university students and even university professors failed to answer the 
problem correctly. Their subjects applied their knowledge of the prior (i.e., base rate 
information) only when they were given no specific evidence (e.g., null description). “As 
entailed by the representativeness hypothesis, prior probabilities were largely ignored when 
individuating information was made available” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973, p. 242).  
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Experiment 5: The Effects of Time Pressure and Cognitive Reflection on Base Rate 
Neglect. 
 
Although it is clear that human judgement is often biased, the nature of the bias is 
unclear and misunderstood. It is commonly accepted that base rate neglect occurs because of 
the deliberative and effortful thinking of System 2 required to process base rate information, 
while fast and intuitive System 1 processing is required for diagnostic information 
(Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). These biased judgements are presumed to occur because the 
representativeness heuristic cues an intuitive response that is difficult to override (Kahneman 
& Frederick, 2002; Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). Additionally, some dual process theorists 
agree that a certain amount of deliberative System 2 processing is required for prior 
probabilities to enter into judgement, thus the difference of ease that base rates and 
stereotypes are processed is the source of base rate neglect (Bonner & Newell, 2010; De Neys 
& Glumicic, 2008; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). This perspective is firmly grounded in the 
dual-process theoretical framework, which claims that human reasoning relies on two distinct 
systems of thought. System 1 is a fast, autonomous, intuitive system, while System 2 is 
slower, effortful and working memory dependent (Evans, 2008; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; 
Kahneman, 2003; Kahneman, 2011; Sloman, 1996).  
Dual-process theory and base rate neglect. 
The default-interventionist view suggests that people reason heuristically by default 
and that for the majority of the time they are unaware that these intuitions might be wrong 
(Kahneman, 2002; Evans, 2003). It is believed that due to lax monitoring people fail to detect 
that their intuitive response in fact conflicts with the laws of probability, thus “the dominance 
of intuitive thinking is attributed to a failure to monitor the output of the heuristic reasoning 
process” (De Neys, Vartanian & Goel, 2008, p.483). According to the parallel-competitive 
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view, people always engage in probabilistic thinking and are thus able to detect when their 
intuitive responses are incorrect (Epstein, 1994; Sloman, 1996). Both systems of thought are 
engaged simultaneously from the beginning and operate in parallel. This enables people to 
detect a conflict between their stereotypical intuition and the appropriate response. However, 
the presence of conflict detection does not always translate into their responses. People are 
not always able to inhibit the prepotent intuitive response and thus “behave against their 
better judgement” (Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994, p. 819). Thus, base rate neglect is attributed 
to an inhibition failure rather than to a lack of conflict detection.  
According to the serial view (default-interventionist) a reasoner initially relies on the 
intuitive system and the deliberate system will only be cued if there is a conflict between the 
intuitive and deliberate outputs. There is a fundamental conceptual problem; however, as how 
will the reasoner ever detect the conflict between these two outputs if the deliberate system is 
not engaged yet? The parallel view resolves this problem as both systems are simultaneously 
activated; however, this view is also problematic as the deliberative system is engaged from 
the beginning, thus basically throwing away any benefit of an intuitive route (De Neys, 
2012). When there is no conflict present (i.e., congruent trials), it is conducive to rely on the 
intuitive route. Engaging in demanding deliberation is superfluous in this situation and would 
be a complete waste of limited cognitive resources (De Neys & Glumicic, 2008). “What dual 
process models need is a way to detect whether deliberate thinking is required without having 
to engage in deliberate thinking” (De Neys, 2012, p. 34). The logical intuitionist account (De 
Neys, 2012) aims to solve this conceptual puzzle. It suggests that people have logical 
intuitions. In other words, they have an implicit knowledge of logical principles that is 
activated automatically. Thus, when faced with a reasoning problem people have two cued 
intuitive responses: one heuristic and one logical. When these responses conflict with one 
another, a noticeable arousal is created, which results in a questioning of the heuristic 
response. This experience will not be purely explicit, but more of an awareness that there is 
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something wrong with the heuristic response; hence, conflict detection as a “gut feeling” (De 
Neys et al., 2010). The idea of a logical intuition has implications for dual process theories as 
it resolves the short comings of the serial and parallel views. “If the intuitive System 1 cues 
both a logical and heuristic response, potential conflict can be detected without prior 
engagement of System 2” (De Neys, 2013, p.8). If logical intuition is consistent with heuristic 
intuition, then people will select the cued response without any further deliberation. 
However, conflict between the two intuitive responses would signal the need to engage the 
deliberative system. It is important to note that even if deliberation is engaged, this does not 
imply a logical response as the heuristic intuition is very compelling. However, this theory 
does supply a switch rule that determines whether deliberation is required without engaging 
the deliberative system. 
 
Conflict Detection in Base Rate problems.  
The heuristics and biases paradigm has introduced many classic examples of 
erroneous human judgement and decision-making, including base rate neglect, also known as 
base rate fallacy or base rate bias. A classic example of the prevalent impact that intuitive 
heuristics have on human judgement and decision-making can be found in base rate neglect 
studies conducted by Kahneman and Tversky (1973). These studies required people to read a 
stereotypical description and respond to problems that cued a salient but inappropriate 
response. Participants first read a description about the composition of a sample of fictitious 
people (e.g., a sample of 70 lawyers and 30 engineers), they then read a short personality 
description of a randomly selected individual from that sample and had to indicate which 
group they thought the individual belonged to. Statistically, a randomly drawn individual 
would be drawn from the larger group, rather than the smaller group. However, due to the 
stereotypical beliefs cued by the personality description, people may be inclined to answer in 
line with the representativeness heuristic. For example: “Jack is a 45-year-old man. He is 
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married and has four children. He is generally conservative, careful, and ambitious. He shows 
no interest in political and social issues and spends most of his free time on his many hobbies 
which include home carpentry, sailing, and mathematical puzzles”. Kahneman and Tversky 
(1973) found that the majority of their participants committed errors in judgement due to 
neglecting the prior base rate information and focusing on the stereotypical information at 
hand. To be more specific, most participants rated Jack as an engineer because of his 
personality description and ignored the fact that there were more than twice the number of 
lawyers than engineers present in the sample. “The failure to appreciate the relevance of prior 
probability in the presence of specific evidence is perhaps one of the most significant 
departures of intuition from the normative theory of prediction” (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1973, p. 243).  
An adaptation of the classical base rate task can be found in the following study. 
Consider the following problem taken from De Neys and Glumicic (2008):  
In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 995 nurses and 5 
doctors. Paul is a randomly chosen participant of this study. 
Paul is 34 years old. He lives in a beautiful home in a posh suburb. He is well spoken and 
very interested in politics. He invests a lot of time in his career.  
What is most likely? 
(a) Paul is a nurse. 
(b) Paul is a doctor. 
This problem is an example of an incongruent problem type. The personality 
description suggests that the answer is doctor, while the base rate information suggests it is 
nurse. When faced with this conflict, many studies have shown that people prefer to base 
their judgements on the individuating information found in the personality description and 
neglect or underweight the base rate information resulting in a base rate fallacy (for a review, 
see Barbey & Sloman, 2007).  
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In the last decade, there has been an increasing accumulation of evidence supporting 
conflict detection (De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; Thompson & Johnson, 2014; Pennycook, 
Fugelsang & Koehler, 2015; Villejoubert, 2009). In other words, it has become accepted that 
people who offer an intuitive response that conflicts with the principles of logic can often 
detect that their response is incorrect. To test for this sensitivity to conflict, researchers 
usually compare individuals’ processing of the control and conflict versions of various 
judgement and decision-making tasks. Where control tasks (also known as congruent tasks) 
contain no conflict, but conflict tasks contain conflict between the cued heuristic response 
and the logical answer in line with statistical laws of probability. There is an assumption that 
if an individual is able to detect the conflict underlying the logical and heuristic 
considerations, this will also be evident in their processing. Indeed, these processing effects 
have been shown across a wide variety of tasks: biased reasoners who solve conflict versions 
typically need more time to reach their answers (Bonner & Newell, 2010; De Neys & 
Glumicic, 2008; Villejoubert, 2009; Pennycook, Trippas, Handley, & Thompson, 2014), they 
express less confidence about the correctness of their answers (Bago & De Neys, 2017; De 
Neys, Cromheeke, & Osman, 2011; Thompson & Johnson, 2014), and they show increased 
activation in their Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC) known to mediate conflict and monitor 
error (Ne Neys et al., 2008; Vartanian et al., 2018), compared to when they solve control or 
congruent versions. 
In 2008, De Neys and Glumicic designed two experiments to establish how precisely 
people experience conflict between logical and heuristic considerations. The first experiment 
used a think aloud protocol alongside base rate neglect problems modelled after Kahneman 
and Tversky’s (1973) classic problems. The second used problem processing times as an 
attempt to highlight the processes underlying these base rate neglect problems. Findings 
showed almost no evidence for conflict detection in the think aloud results; however, there 
was evidence of conflict detection in the recall data (i.e., a recall test completed after the base 
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rate neglect problems to ascertain how deep the information was processed). This suggests 
that people might not be explicitly reporting an active struggle between the logical and 
heuristic considerations, but their cognitive system does seem to be detecting it on some 
level. Experiment 2 reinforced the results of Experiment 1 by showing superior recall on 
conflict and neutral trials. It also showed that better recall was accompanied by longer 
decision-making times and a tendency to review the base rate information more extensively. 
These results lend support the idea that a flawless conflict monitoring process exists, as 
whenever the base rates conflict with the description people are able to detect this and 
“consequently redirect attention towards a deeper processing of the base rate information” 
(De Neys & Glumicic, p. 1274). 
With this in mind, Franssens and De Neys (2009) designed an experiment to test the 
automaticity of conflict detection. They hypothesized that the conflict monitoring process 
used minimal cognitive resources and operated quite automatically. The researchers had half 
their participants solve base rate neglect tasks under cognitive load (i.e., a difficult 4-dot 
memory test), while the remainder of the sample performed the task under no load. 
Afterwards they had to recall information regarding the base rates to highlight the depth at 
which this information was processed. Results replicated those of De Neys and Glumicic 
(2008) by showing the successful nature of the conflict-monitoring process. Recall was 
higher for those base rate problems that contained conflict than for those without conflict. 
More interestingly however, was the recall performance of those participants who had to 
make judgements under load. Cognitive load had no effect on the conflict monitoring process 
under load, which suggests that it requires only minimal resources to operate. In the load 
condition, base rate recall remained better for conflict trials than for no-conflict trials. 
Additionally, recall performance on conflict trials were equally high in the load condition as 
in the no load condition. In other words, the load condition impeded the deliberative thinking 
needed to solve the base rate problem, but it did not prevent conflict detection from 
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occurring. This evidence supports the notion that the conflict monitoring process is both 
successful and effortless. Research has shown that people do in fact detect conflict between 
heuristic and logical considerations even though this does not always translate into their 
answers. De Neys, Vartanian and Goel (2008) found that the inhibition area of the brain 
(lateral prefrontal cortex) was activated when stereotypical responses were avoided, but more 
importantly they also found that the conflict-detection area (anterior cingulate) was activated 
even when people reasoned stereotypically. These findings suggest that people are detecting 
their bias even when they respond intuitively.  
Aims and rationale 
Understanding and clarifying the exact nature of the heuristic bias is important for the 
development of judgement and decision-making theories. However, it is difficult to decide 
between these existing views as the majority of the studies focus on the accuracy of the 
output (i.e., whether or not people give the correct response to the problem), and not on the 
underlying processes (De Neys et al., 2008). The current and widely accepted understanding 
is that people are “cognitive misers”, thus when the slow deliberative system is not given 
enough time to process information (e.g., forced to answer quickly, or intuitively), thinking 
will be more heuristic and less logical (Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002). However, 
recently there have been a number of studies suggesting that intuitive thinking can be logical 
(De Neys, 2012; Villejoubert, 2009; Handley & Trippas, 2015; Villejoubert, 2009). Indeed, 
fast thinking can in fact be logical while slow thinking can be biased (Howarth, Handley & 
Walsh, 2016; 2018).  The previous four experiments in this program of research attempt to 
demonstrate logical intuitions. They also attempt to offer an explanation as to why there are 
such high rates of probability errors in the control conditions (i.e., even when people are 
allowed to think hard about their answers). The default interventionist model has been ruled 
out due to the fact that people are very capable of detecting the conflict underlying intuitive 
and deliberative processes, providing support instead for a parallel model of thinking. 
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Recently a new theory has emerged by Howarth, Handley and Walsh (2016, 2018). It 
supports the notion that human reasoning operates as two parallel process competing with 
each other. The authors agree with the idea of logical intuitions and propose that the logical 
response is present from the beginning of the reasoning process, but it is often inhibited by 
heuristic reflections. In other words, effortful thinking (e.g., deliberation or reflection) can be 
biased by heuristics (e.g., prior beliefs or heuristics). If this is in fact true, then it might help 
to explain the high rates of heuristic responding across the program of research thus far. As 
discovered across the previous four experiments, people are not mere cognitive misers. They 
are sensitive to the conflict between competing responses, and they actually wanted to 
deliberate and think hard about their answers as can be seen in their response times from the 
control condition (e.g., they spent 19 seconds on average per trial). However, this observation 
also lends support for the parallel-competitive account that states the representative answer is 
very potent and difficult to suppress, but this account believes that the representative response 
results from fast System 1 thought. So these two different accounts need to be addressed and 
tested further. 
The purpose of this study is to build on the novel idea of logical intuitions by 
confirming that individuals are sensitive to logical principles when using System 1, intuitive 
reasoning. The study will use base rate and time pressure manipulations in an attempt to 
identify the cognitive underpinnings of probability judgements and will test the hypothesis 
that “individuals will judge conflict statements (i.e., inconsistent with base rate 
considerations) as more logical than congruent statements (i.e., consistent with base rate 
considerations), and that under time pressure individuals’ will answer more problems 
correctly, or logically”. This is because people have an unlearned, inherent understanding of 
the logical principals that underlie probability judgements, which is represented in their 
intuitive answers. It will also test the heuristic reflections account that proposes when people 
are given time to think about their answers, their deliberation can be biased by non-logical 
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heuristics. 
Using an adaptation of the Comparison Conjunction Probability Judgement (CCPJ) 
task used in the previous experiments, this study aims to investigate the effect that conflict 
(between logical and heuristic considerations) and time pressure have on the use of the 
representativeness heuristic in base rate judgements. This study aims to replicate the findings 
of Experiment 1 by assessing the effect of conflict on heuristic and logical answers, plus it 
will use severe time pressure as a method of inducing System 1 reasoning to investigate 
whether individuals are sensitive to conflict between the two systems of reasoning, as well as 
to assess what effect increased System 1 reasoning has on base rate errors. Furthermore, the 
study aims to assess if cognitive reflection has any impact on an individuals’ logicality when 
making base rate judgements. Following the results in Villejoubert (2009), as well as the 
results from Experiment 1, I hypothesize that both conflict and time pressure will increase 
logicality in base rate judgements. There should be convincing evidence, in both rate of 
heuristic responding as well as response latencies, for the fact that people are able to detect 
the conflict underlying logical and heuristic statements, as well as the observation that people 
under time pressure make fewer base rate errors, as they should be relying on their intuition 
to make these judgements. Finally, I expect to see that individuals who showed little or no 
cognitive reflection on the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Fredericks, 2005), to also have 
answered more logically. Cognitive reflection is the ability to override an intuitive response 
and replace it with a deliberative one. If my assumption is correct, and our intuition can 
reflect logical principles, but deliberation causes prior beliefs to bias our answers, then being 
able to respond intuitively should produce more logical judgements. In other words, people 
who are unable to inhibit the intuitive response should also show more logicality in their 
responses to the base rate task. 
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Method 
Participants. Power analysis indicated that a sample of 34 participants per group (i.e., 
68 participants in total as there were two groups) would be sufficient to detect effects of a 
medium size effect (d = .5), as reported in Villejoubert (2009), with 1 - b = .80 and a = .05. 
The final sample consisted of 76 Kingston University students ranging in age from 18 – 57 
years (M = 21.60, SD = 6.32). Sixty-four were females (84.2%) and 12 males (15.8%). Most 
of the students were undergraduates (n = 71, 93%) while the remaining five were 
postgraduates (7%). All the participants were psychology students. The majority were 
majoring in Psychology (n = 64, 84%); however, there were some who had second majors 
including Biology (2%), Creative Writing (2%), Criminology (4%), Drama (2%), English 
(2%), French (2%), and Sociology (2%). 
Procedure and Materials. Participants were tested individually in a laboratory room 
on the Kingston University campus. They all completed the base rate task electronically on 
the laboratory computer as well as the Cognitive Reflection Task (CRT; Frederick, 2005), 
which was completed as a pen and paper test. The base rate task and the CRT were 
administered in a random order. The CRT was printed on a single page under the heading 
“Brainteaser”. The participants were instructed verbally to complete as many of the questions 
as possible. See Appendix E for an example of the three-item CRT. The CCPJ task from the 
previous experiments was adapted for this study. It contained the same 16 vignettes; 
however, instead of being a conjunction fallacy task it was tailored to be a base rate neglect 
task. This was done by adding base rate information to each scenario. To be more specific, 
the base rate information was displayed before the personality description (see Figure 5.1). 
For example, “Imagine a sample of 150 people consisting of 5 accountants and 145 rock 
musicians. The description below was chosen at random from the 150 available.” This was 
then followed by a description of Bill (e.g., an accountant as described in the original task by 
Tversky and Kahneman, 1983). Participants were then instructed to press the space bar 
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following which the statement appeared for them to either accept as true or reject as false 
(e.g., “Bill is more likely to be an accountant than a rock musician”). This statement was 
answered either under time pressure, or no time pressure, depending on the experimental 
condition the participants were allocated to. They logged their answers by pressing “A” for 
YES, or “L” for NO on the keyboard. Finally, they logged their confidence in their response 
on a 10-point scale ranging from “0” = not at all confident to “9” = extremely confident. 
Conflict versus no conflict was operationalised by the wording of the statements 
combined with the information provided by the base rates. The statements were either 
congruent with the base rate information provided at the start of the trial (i.e., the statement 
contained no conflict), or they were incongruent with the base rate information (i.e., the 
statement contained conflict). The trial type (e.g., R&L, R/I, U/L, and U&I) was designed by 
manipulating the large vs. small populations in the base rate information with the statements. 
For example, in a situation where rock musicians outnumbered accountants (as worded 
above), judging the following statement as true (e.g., “Bill is more likely to be an accountant 
than he is to be a rock musician”) would be making a representative but illogical (e.g., R/I) 
judgement because the participant answered in accordance with the personality description 
and ignored the base rate information. If the participant had judged the statement as false, 
they would have made an unrepresentative and logical (e.g., U/L) judgement because they 
used the base rate information and disregarded the personality description. 
On arrival at the experiment, all participants were first given the information sheet to 
read, any questions they had were answered by the researcher, and finally when they were 
satisfied, they signed the consent form. The researcher read through the instructions with the 
participant before starting the base rate task, and there was one practice example to complete 
in each time condition before the 8 trials began (participants completed 8 trials under time 
pressure and 8 trials without time pressure). The participants had opportunities to ask 
questions during the example trials and when they felt ready they could begin the task. The 
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order of time conditions was randomised and counterbalanced. Half of the participants 
completed the first 8 trials without any time pressure followed by the second 8 trials under 
time pressure. The other half completed the first 8 trials under time pressure, followed by 8 
trials with no time pressure.  
No time pressure instructions included the following instructions, “Please take all the 
time you need to read the following description” and “Please carefully consider all the 
information available before reaching a decision”. Whereas time pressure instructions 
included “You must give your first ‘gut’ response as you will not have long to think about 
your answers. Each time you take too long to answer you will lose credits, so remember – 
answer fast!” and “Please HURRY and record the first answer that comes to your mind!” 
Time pressure was encouraged through the loss of credits. Each participant began the test 
with 8 credits (each credit was worth 50p, which equated to £4), and each time they took too 
long to provide a judgement they would lose a credit, thus losing money. They were allocated 
7500ms to read the statement and make their judgement. This amount of time allowed the 
participants approximately 2.5 seconds to read the statement and 5 seconds to make a 
judgement. This was calculated on an average reading speed of 350 words per minute. Adults 
read at a speed of 300 wpm but this can rise to as much as 400 wpm for university students, 
and each statement was between 12 – 16 words in length. Taking longer than 7.5 seconds 
resulted in the loss of a credit accompanied by a message displayed in red text on the screen 
that read, “Careful! You took too long to respond. Remember to respond as fast as you can to 
retain your credits. You currently have [number] credits remaining. You have lost a total of 
[loss] credits.” If the participants answered faster than 7500ms, they received a message in 
green text that read, “Good! You responded fast enough. Continue to respond as fast as 
possible to retain your credits. You have [number] credits remaining.” See Figure 5. 1 for 
examples of a trial containing no time pressure and a trial containing time pressure. 
Following every judgement they made, participants had to rate how confident they felt about 
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their judgement being correct. They rated this on a scale from 0-9, “0” = not at all confident, 
and “9” = extremely confident.  
 
 
 
Figure 5. 1.  Screenshots of the trials in both the unlimited time (A) and time pressured 
conditions (B). Note. A represents a U&I trial, while B represents a R/I trial 
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Results 
 
Outliers. Following the procedures outlined by Meade and Craig (2012) I screened 
the sample for careless responders. An overall “flag score” was computed to identify careless 
responders who were identified as outliers on four different criteria. First, the total duration 
latency was converted in to a z-score. Outliers were identified as any cases with z-scores 
outside the (-3,3) range. Two participants were flagged as outliers in the no time pressure 
condition, and none in the time pressure condition. Second, average trial durations were 
computed for the time pressure and no time pressure conditions, these were then analysed for 
outliers. There was one participant flagged in the no time pressure condition, and one in the 
time pressure condition. Third, the data was screened for multivariate outliers in the 
judgement latencies. Mahalanobis scores showed that ten participants were flagged in the no 
time pressure condition for taking too long to make a judgement, while only one was flagged 
in the time pressure condition. Fourth, the data was screened for multivariate outliers in the 
reading times of the base rate and descriptive information. Mahalanobis scores showed that 
one participant was flagged in each of the time pressure conditions for taking too long to read 
the descriptive information. Next, a total flag score was computed for each participant. Two 
individuals who scored more than two flags were eliminated from the sample, leaving the 
sample size at N = 77. Finally, the sample was also screened for unbiased reasoners (i.e., 
participants who always chose the logical answer). One participant responded 100% logically 
to all 16 trials, thus was removed from the analysis. The final sample size, excluding all 
outliers, was N = 76 participants. 
Manipulation checks. To check whether the manipulation of time pressure worked in 
this study I compared total durations across the two time conditions, and also compared 
confidence ratings and confidence latencies across these time conditions. Due to the design of 
the study, and every participant doing both the time pressured trials as well as the non-time 
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pressured trials, I was expecting to see no difference in total time taken to complete the study 
regardless of the order they completed the conditions in. Indeed, this was the case. 
Participants who were put in the non-time pressure condition first completed the study in a 
similar time to those put into the time pressure condition first, MNTPfirst = 533.26s, SD = 
147.39, 95% CI [484.12, 582.41] vs. MTPfirst = 509.01s, SD = 129.24, 95% CI [467.12, 
550.91], t(74) = 0.76, p = .447, Cohen’s d = 0.18. Judgement latencies were compared across 
time pressure conditions and the difference was significant. Participants judgements were 
faster for the time pressure trials than the non-time pressure trials, MNTP = 5.19s, SD = 2.76, 
95% CI [4.56, 5.82] vs. MTP = 3.14s, SD = 1.40, 95% CI [2.82, 3.46], t(75) = -6.86, p < .001, 
Cohen’s d = 0.94.  
Participants were asked to rate their confidence in their judgements after each trial. 
Their answers as well as their judgement latencies were recorded. The idea behind this being 
that participants when put under time pressure would feel less confident in their judgements 
and would hesitate for longer when making these judgements, compared to when completing 
the non-time pressure trials. Indeed, there was a significant difference in confidence scores 
between the time conditions; however, surprisingly there was no difference in the time that 
they took to make these judgements. Paired samples t-tests revealed that participants were 
more confident in their answers when not under time pressure compared to when under time 
pressure, MNTP = 7.41, SD = 1.17, 95% CI [7.15, 7.68] vs. MTP = 7.13, SD = 1.37, 95% CI 
[6.82, 7.45], t(75) = 2.38, p = .020, Cohen’s d = 0.22; however, there was no difference in 
latencies when making these judgements, MNTP = 2.08s, SD = 0.80, 95% CI [1.90, 2.26] vs. 
MTP = 1.99s, SD = 0.79, 95% CI [1.81, 2.17], t(75) = 0.95, p = .344, Cohen’s d = 0.11. 
Conflict Sensitivity. To examine patterns of heuristic responding, a heuristic score 
was computed for each statement type by calculating the proportion of time participants 
either accepted statements that were congruent with heuristic considerations (R&L and R/I 
statements; see Table 2. 1, p. 74) or rejected statements that were incongruent with such 
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considerations (U/L and U&I statements). In this context, U/L means the participant 
answered in accordance with the base rate information (ignoring the personality description), 
thus making a logical judgement. R/I judgements are made in line with the representative 
personality description (ignoring the base rate information), thus making an illogical 
judgement. R&L and U&I statements contain no conflict between the base rates and the 
personality stereotypes. The heuristic score ranged from 0 (never followed the heuristic 
consideration) to 100% (always followed the heuristic consideration). Heuristic scores were 
compared across statement conflict to assess whether the presence or absence of conflict in 
the statements affected the level of heuristic considerations used by participants’ when 
making base rate judgements. Heuristic scores were also compared across time conditions to 
assess whether the presence or absence of time pressure affected the level of heuristic 
responding. Finally, the order in which the participants completed the statements was 
included as a repeated measures factor (i.e., time pressure first, or unlimited time first). 
Although the task was separated into two distinct parts (time pressure or unlimited time), 
there might still be an order effect apparent, hence the inclusion of order as a repeated 
measures factor. By starting the task off under severe time pressure, one might be 
unknowingly setting the scene for the rest of the trials despite instructions to slow down and 
think hard about the answers. Likewise, by beginning the task with no time pressure, one 
might be lessening the urgency of the time pressure condition that follows. Thus, a 2 
(conflict: absent vs present) x 2 (time pressure: unlimited vs limited) x 2 (order: limited-
unlimited vs unlimited-limited) mixed ANOVA was conducted with repeated measures on 
the first two factors and independent measures on the last factor. 
There was a significant main effect for conflict. Results showed that statements for 
which heuristic considerations conflicted with logical ones led to lower rates of heuristic 
responding than non-conflict statements, Mnoconflict = 92.78%, SD = 11.95, 95% CI [90.04, 
95.53], Mconflict = 85.39%, SD = 17.84, 95% CI [81.29, 89.49], F(1, 74) = 13.44, p < .001, ɳp2 
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= .15. Surprisingly, there was no effect of time pressure. Heuristic scores did not differ 
between those trials completed under unlimited time and those completed under time 
pressure, Munlimited = 88.80%, SD = 15.62, 95% CI [85.21, 92.39], Mlimited = 89.38%, SD = 
14.25, 95% CI [86.15, 92.60], F(1, 74) = 0.09, p = .761, ɳp2 = .001. There was no significant 
interaction between conflict and time pressure condition, F(1, 74) = 0.48, p = .491, ɳp2 = .01 
(see Figure 5. 2 for descriptive statistics). Furthermore, the order in which participants 
completed the trials (i.e., whether they performed the time pressure trials first, or the 
unlimited time trials first) made no difference to their heuristic scores, MNTPfirst = 90.03%, SD 
= 9.37, 95% CI [85.95, 94.12], MTPfirst = 88.14%, SD = 14.82, 95% CI [84.16, 92.12], F(1, 
74) = 0.44, p = .510, ɳp2 = .01. Finally, there were no other significant interactions found in 
the data: conflict x order (p = .883), time pressure x order (p = .100), and conflict x time 
pressure x order (p = .629). 
 
 
Figure 5. 2.  Rate of heuristic responding as a function of the conflict between heuristic and 
logical considerations and the time pressure condition. Note. Error bars represent standard 
errors 
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There was also evidence for conflict sensitivity in the self-reported confidence scores. 
Following every judgement they made, participants had to rate how confident they were that 
their answer was correct. Their confidence ratings as well as their confidence rating latencies 
were recorded. Paired samples t-tests confirmed that confidence ratings were higher when 
conflict was absent from the statements, Mno conflict = 7.49, SD = 1.14, 95% CI [7.23, 7.75] vs. 
Mconflict = 7.06, SD = 1.40, 95% CI [6.74, 7.38], t(75) = 3.64, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.34. 
There was no difference in confidence rating latencies between conflict and no-conflict 
statements, Mno conflict = 2.01s, SD = 0.73, 95% CI [1.85, 2.18] vs. Mconflict = 2.05s, SD = 0.76, 
95% CI [1.88, 2.23], t(75) = -0.54, p = .594, Cohen’s d = 0.05. 
Judgement Latencies. Response latencies were anlaysed to assess which responses 
showed sensitivity to conflict between heuristic and logical considerations. Assuming that 
people who always respond with a heuristic judgement under conflict use a different strategy 
overall, I first screened and excluded these participants, so I could compare latencies for 
heuristic and logical answers under conflict (n = 36, 45%). In line with previous research 
(Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2012; De Neys & Glumicic, 2008) three average latency 
scores were computed for each participant: the logico-heuristic answers on non-conflict trials 
(i.e., only the latencies for accepting R&L or rejecting U&I were selected), the heuristic 
answers on conflict trials (i.e., they either accepted R/I statements or rejected U/L 
statements), and finally the logical answers on conflict trials (i.e., they either rejected R/I 
statements or accepted U/L statements). Latencies were converted to log10 prior to analysis to 
normalize the distribution and subjected to a 3(judgment type: no-conflict vs. conflict-
heuristic vs. conflict-logical) x 2(time condition: unlimited vs. limited) repeated measures 
ANOVA. 
As expected, there was a significant main effect for time pressure condition with 
latencies being faster in the limited time condition than the unlimited condition, Munlimited = 
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3.70, SD = 0.57, 95% CI [3.59, 3.81] vs. Mlimited = 3.50, SD = 058, 95% CI [3.40, 3.59], 
F(1,15) = 13.42, p = .002, 𝜂7%= .47; see Table 5. 1 for descriptive statistics in seconds.  
 
Table 5. 1 
Means, Standard Deviations and 95% Confidence Intervals of judgement latencies as a 
function of time pressure condition. Note Means and Standard Deviations reported in 
seconds 
     
Time condition M SD 95% Confidence Interval 
   Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Unlimited 6.21 3.55 4.45 7.98 
Time Pressure 3.60 1.56 2.62 4.59 
 
There was no significant difference in the latencies between types of responses, Mno-
conflict = 3.59, SD = 0.18, 95% CI [3.51, 3.67] vs. Mconflict-heuristic = 3.61, SD = 0.34, 95% CI 
[3.49, 3.74] vs. Mconflict-logical = 3.59, SD = 0.86, 95% CI [3.48, 3.69], F(2,30) = 0.15, p = .860, 𝜂7% = .01; see Table 5. 2 for descriptive statistics in seconds. Finally, there was no interaction 
between time pressure and type of response, F(2,30) = 1.20, p = .154, 𝜂7%= .12, see Figure 5. 3 
for descriptive statistics. 
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Table 5. 2 
Means, Standard Deviations and 95% Confidence Intervals of judgement latencies as a 
function of response type. Note, latencies are reported in seconds 
     
Type of Response M SD 95% Confidence Interval 
   Lower Bound Upper Bound 
No conflict 4.35 2.40 3.39 5.30 
Conflict-Heuristic 5.51 3.04 3.14 7.87 
Conflict-Logic 4.87 3.89 3.48 6.26 
 
 
 
Figure 5. 3. Response latencies as a function of time pressure condition and type of response. 
Note. Error bars represent standard errors 
 
Cognitive Reflection and Logical Sensitivity. To further understand the origin of the 
conflict between heuristic and logical assessments, individual differences in cognitive 
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reflection (i.e., the ability to override a heuristic response and replace it with a logical one) 
were evaluated to see whether they would predict logicality. If, as suspected, sensitivity to 
logic is fast and intuitive, but subsequently overridden by biases when given time to 
deliberate; then people who present low CRT scores (i.e., they do not override the prepotent 
heuristic response) should also be more logical in their base rate judgements. A logical 
sensitivity score was computed for each participant. More specifically, one score that showed 
what percentage of time they judged conflict statements logically (0% = “never logical”, 
100% = “always logical”). The sample was screened for perfect logicality and participants 
who always answered logically on the conflict trials were excluded from the analysis. A 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient was computed to assess the relationship between logical 
sensitivity and cognitive reflection. No significant relationship was found between these two 
variables, r = 0.22, p = .053. A scatterplot summarises the results (Figure 5. 4). Increases in 
logical sensitivity did not correlate with increases in cognitive reflection scores. Additionally, 
only one participant scored 3 on the CRT. If this participant is removed as an outlier, then the 
result remains not significant; r = 0.22, p = .063. 
 
 
Figure 5. 4.  Scatterplot of the relationship between CRT scores and logical sensitivity 
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Discussion 
Support of Hypotheses and Interpretation of Results. The experiment reported 
here examined the impact of conflict and time pressure on the logicality of people’s 
probability judgements. The results supported the hypothesis that people easily detect conflict 
between intuitive and deliberative considerations on base rate tasks, but there was no support 
found for logical intuitions. This was evident in the rates of heuristic responding, such that 
participants answered more in line with heuristic considerations when conflict was absent 
from the statements, but they were more logical in their judgements when conflict was 
present. This suggests that the presence of conflict in the base rate statements produced 
higher rates of logicality in the judgements, which is supported by findings in Villejoubert 
(2009) and Franssens and De Neys (2009). However, it is important to note that there is 
unfortunately no way to tell for certain why conflict spikes levels of logical responses in this 
study due to the methodology of the task. It could simply be that conflict causes a situation of 
uncertainty for the participants, which in turn causes the participants to make more guesses. 
The task forces a response between only two options; thus, a logical response could be the 
result of a) a logical consideration, b) the rejection of the heuristic response, or c) a guess. 
There was; however, evidence found for conflict sensitivity in the participants self-reported 
confidence ratings. They were more confident in their answers being correct when conflict 
was absent from the statements, than when conflict was present. Unfortunately, there was no 
support found for conflict sensitivity in the judgement latency data. Contradictory to 
Experiment 1, the three different types of responses given by participants (e.g., no-conflict, 
conflict-heuristic and conflict-logical) were all made in similar judgement times to one 
another. These findings do not support the idea of conflict detection, as the no-conflict 
statements were answered just as quickly as those containing conflict, suggesting that perhaps 
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the participants did not detect the difference between the two, or perhaps they did but were 
too “miserly” to spend any extra time or cognitive energy on these trials.  
Perhaps the biggest surprise in this study was the fact that time pressure had no 
impact on the participant’s logicality. Participants judged eight statements under time 
pressure, and an additional eight statements without any time pressure, and there were no 
differences found in rates of heuristic responding between these two conditions. Although the 
manipulation was successful, and participants judged statements significantly faster when 
under time pressure, there was no evidence that this translated into the types of reasoning 
they used when making these judgements. As seen in Villejoubert (2009) and Kahneman 
(2011), time pressure was employed to encourage System 1 thinking resulting in higher 
intuitive responses, while unlimited time would allow System 2 thinking resulting in more 
deliberative responses (e.g., as was the case in Experiment 1). However, in this study there 
was no evidence for different thinking styles across the two time conditions. Participants 
were equally heuristic in their responses (Munlimited = 88.80% vs. Mlimited = 89.38%) across 
both the time conditions. It is always possible that one or the other specific task or method 
feature is driving the effects in each specific task. For example, the role that conflict plays in 
logicality. Conflict between heuristic and logical considerations on ratio bias tasks was found 
to result in fewer correct responses (Bonner & Newell, 2010), while conflict on base rate 
neglect tasks, and conjunction fallacy tasks resulted in more correct responses (Franssens & 
De Neys, 2009; Villejoubert, 2009). However, as convergent evidence across different tasks 
and methods increases, the possibility that the effect is being driven by a specific task or 
method becomes more unlikely (De Neys, 2013). The results from this experiment lend no 
support for logical intuitions. Time pressure had no impact on the logicality of the responses, 
in fact, the rate of heuristic responding remained higher than any found across this body of 
research. Either the time pressure manipulation failed to induce System 1 thought, which 
might be due to the nature of the task (for example, base rate tasks might require less time to 
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answer than conjunction fallacy tasks, thus even a time limit of 7.5 seconds was too long for 
System 1 reasoning. However, this is unlikely as researchers have presented response times 
much slower than these in their results concerning base rate tasks, which will be discussed in 
more detail in the following section). Or, the participants were too miserly with their 
cognitive resources to deliberate their answers, hence the surprisingly fast responses across 
both of the time conditions. The same way that there is no support found for logical 
intuitions, there is no support for heuristic reflections, due to the failure of the time pressure 
manipulations to encourage System 1, or System 2 reasoning. There is no difference in 
responses between the two time conditions suggesting that the participants employed a 
similar reasoning style across both the conditions instead of switching between intuitive and 
deliberative.  
Finally, there was no support for the hypothesis that people with little or no cognitive 
reflection also show more logicality in their judgements. In fact, if anything, the data seemed 
to show a trend moving in the opposite direction: an increase in cognitive reflection resulted 
in an increase in logicality. However, this finding was not significant revealing no 
relationship between cognitive reflection (i.e., the ability to inhibit an intuitive response and 
replace it with a deliberate one). It is also important to note how uneven the groups were with 
only one participant answering all three CRT questions correctly. Below is a  breakdown of 
the responses, which shows how few participants were able to answer any of the difficult 
CRT questions correctly. The majority of participants never got any answers correct (n = 57, 
75%), and only one participant managed to answer all three questions correctly (see Figure 5. 
5).  
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Figure 5. 5. Distribution of participant’s CRT scores (N = 76) 
 
Toplak, West and Stanovich (2011) demonstrated that the CRT was a powerful 
predictor of heuristics and biases tasks. In fact, they suggest that cognitive miserliness is the 
primary factor in predicting how well people perform on the task. However, Stupple, Gale 
and Richmond (2013) found that while cognitive miserliness was implicated in CRT 
performance, it was in fact working memory capacity that was the strongest predictor. There 
is a recent stream of thought that believes the CRT is actually a test of numeric ability 
(compared to general intelligence) as one requires numeric ability to solve the problems 
correctly (Sinayev & Peters, 2015; Welsh, Burns & Delfabbro, 2013). These researchers have 
found that the CRT positively correlates with numeracy and that it’s predictive power is 
limited to biases with a numerical basis, such as framing and discount delay tasks. Base rate 
tasks also have a calculable correct response; however, Welsh et al. (2013) found no 
significant relationship between base rate tasks and the CRT. Indeed, numeric ability is a 
robust predictor of superior decision making and seems to be the key mechanism (compared 
to cognitive reflection) when solving the CRT problems (Sinayev & Peters, 2015). If 
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cognitive reflection (i.e., the ability to override a prepotent intuitive response) is not actually 
being measured by the CRT, then it is not surprising that the hypothesis was not supported. 
Instead, what the results might be showing is a weak, non-significant relationship between 
numeracy and logicality. However, the relationship between numeracy and good judgement 
making would need to be tested further. Taken together, these findings highlight the fact that 
the psychological and psychometric properties of the CRT require further research. 
Generalizabitily of Results. Problems with extreme base rates? De Neys and 
Glumicic (2008) used extreme base rates (e.g., 995/5) and found evidence of conflict 
detection. Using less extreme base rates (e.g., 95/5 or 9/1) in other studies (De Neys & 
Franssens, 2009; De Neys & Feremans, 2013) still resulted in successful conflict detection. 
Thus, extreme base rates do not appear to affect conflict detection (De Neys, 2014). 
However, Pennycook et al. (2012) performed an extensive set of experiments and found that 
conflict detection, as represented by latencies, is more pronounced when more extreme base 
rates are being used. Indeed, even the biased reasoners took longer to make a judgement 
when conflict was present in the trials. However, when they tested with the classic 70/30 base 
rate the effect disappeared. The researchers suggested that the more extreme base rates help 
to focus attention on the base rate information and thereby facilitate conflict detection. The 
current study used a mix of base rates; however, they all erred on the side of extreme and the 
difference in the ratio was always fairly large. In fact, the least extreme base rate used was 
175/25 (e.g., 88:12), while the most extreme was 985/15 (e.g., 99:1).  
The question remains: why did the participants not show conflict detection in their 
judgement latencies in this study? They made no-conflict, conflict-heuristic and conflict-
logical judgements in a similar time to one another, even when coerced to answer quickly or 
leisurely, which is extremely unusual considering the fact that the differences in latencies 
were significant in all of the other experiments across this program of research (except for 
Experiment 2 which was underpowered). The answer to this might have something to do with 
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the design of this study (e.g., repeated measures) or the task itself (e.g., base rates) that has 
made the participants answer the unlimited time condition very quickly. Compared to 
Experiment 1, where participants in the unlimited time condition took on average 19 seconds 
to make a judgement (while the limited time condition took 4.38 seconds); participants in the 
current study took 6.21 seconds (and 3.60 seconds in the limited time condition). Although 
this difference is significant which indicates they were indeed faster when under time 
pressure, they were not exactly slow when given unlimited time. In fact, if you deduct 1.65 
seconds for the initial reading time of the 11-word statement, they judged their “slow and 
deliberative” answers in a mere 4.56 seconds. The task was randomized and counterbalanced 
and there were no order effects found in the data analysis, which leads me to speculate that 
the speed at which they completed the judgements had to do with the type of task being 
administered (e.g., base rates instead of conjunctions) and not the study’s design (e.g., 
repeated measures). On closer examination of the latency data, it became apparent that 
perhaps the independent grouping condition did in fact alter the latencies, as latencies for the 
time pressured judgements appeared faster if participants were in the no-time-pressure-first 
group. However, a 2(time pressure: unlimited vs. limited) x 2(group: NTPfirst vs. TPfirst) 
one way ANOVA revealed a non-significant difference in latencies between the no time 
pressure and limited time pressure conditions as a function of grouping condition. Firstly, 
there was no significant difference in judgement latencies for the time pressured trials as a 
function of group, MNTPfirst = 2.83s, SD = 1.64, 95% CI [2.29, 3.38] vs. MTPfirst = 3.43s, SD = 
1.07, 95% CI [3.08, 3.78], F(1,74) = 3.53, p = .064. Nor was there a difference in judgement 
latencies for no time pressure trials as a function of group, MNTPfirst = 5.59s, SD = 2.47, 95% 
CI [4.76, 6.41] vs. MTPfirst = 4.81s, SD = 3.00, 95% CI [3.84, 5.78], F(1,74) = 1.51, p = .223. 
See Figure 5. 6. Thus, the group (e.g., time pressure first, or unlimited time first) was not 
responsible for the fast response latencies as there were no differences found between the 
two.  
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Figure 5. 6. Judgement latencies as a function of time pressure and group. Note. Error bars 
represent standard errors 
 
De Neys and Glumicic (2008) conducted two experiments using base rate tasks. They 
reported their participant’s response times as ranging from fastest at 14 seconds (when 
responding correctly to congruent trials) to slowest at 24 seconds (when responding correctly 
to incongruent trials). Pennycook, Trippas, Handley, and Thompson (2013) also conducted a 
series of experiments using base rate neglect tasks. In experiment one, they found a main 
effect for instruction prompts (e.g., belief vs. statistics) such that statistics instructions (M = 
12.73s) led to faster judgement latencies than belief instructions (M = 14.05s). In experiment 
two, they found that participants responded faster to no conflict (M =3.69s) than to conflict 
(M = 3.80s) trials. In experiment three, they do not disclose latency data. Experiment two was 
under time pressure while experiment one was not. The judgement latencies from these two 
research articles appear ‘normal’ in the sense that unlimited time judgements took a long time 
to make (over 12 seconds), while time pressured judgements were significantly shorter in 
under 4 seconds. Which is indeed was found in Experiment 1, which compared conjunction 
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judgements made under time pressure to those made under no time pressure (note, this study 
was an independent measures design). Participants took around 19 seconds to make no time 
pressure judgements, and they were much faster (4.38 seconds) when making time pressured 
judgements. Then why were participants in the current study so fast to make their unlimited 
time judgements (Munlimited = 5.20s vs. Mlimited = 3.13s)? The instructions were the same as 
Experiment 1, there were blue colour prompts as well as wording that requested participants 
to think hard about their answers in the unlimited time condition (e.g., “please carefully 
consider all the information available before making a decision”), while the red colour 
prompts and urgent wording in the time pressure condition (e.g., “please HURRY and record 
the first answer that comes to your mind”), as well as the risk of losing credits, ensured 
participants answered quickly in the limited time condition. A possible reason for this latency 
discrepancy might be a result of the briefing that participants were given before commencing 
with the task. Before they began, they were informed that they would be participating in both 
time conditions: 8 trials under time pressure and 8 under no time pressure, but the order of 
these would be randomized. They were also informed that they would lose credits if they took 
too long to make a judgement in the time pressure condition. Providing this information 
before the study might have somehow compelled the participants to make fast judgements in 
both conditions. Future studies might also include a short break between the time conditions, 
as a way to “reset” the participants of any learned behaviour from the first condition.  
Final remarks and Future Directions. This study was a conundrum. On the one 
hand it showed a perfect example of how conflict effects logicality in probability judgements. 
Participants were sensitive to the conflict underlying intuitive and deliberative assessments, 
and the presence of conflict caused them to be more logical in their judgements. This 
supports the findings in Villejoubert (2009) and Franssens and De Neys (2009). While on the 
other hand it showed that time pressure made no difference to individuals’ logicality. In 
Experiment 1, the presence of time pressure significantly increased individuals’ logicality, 
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and this was expected to be replicated in the current study; however, it was not. In the current 
study all participants answered with high levels of base rate neglect regardless of whether 
they were under time pressure or not. The evidence of conflict detection combined with high 
base rate neglect rates provides support for the parallel-competitive account. The two systems 
of thought run concurrently allowing participants to detect when their answers conflict with 
one another. When this happens, it allows the participants the opportunity to employ further 
deductive reasoning which might result in System 2 inhibiting System 1. However, this is not 
always the case, as the heuristic response can be very compelling, hence the high rates of 
fallacies committed. 
A further strange finding was that participants in this study completed the task 
extremely quickly, independent of time pressure condition. In order to deduce whether this 
was due to the design of the study being within subjects, or due to the task itself, it would be 
beneficial to conduct a few replication studies in the future. The first could be to conduct the 
study as a between subjects design (i.e., participants are allocated to either the time pressure 
or the unlimited time condition, and not both) to see whether this makes a difference to the 
logicality scores. Additionally, the within subjects design could be replicated but this time 
should include less transparent instructions before the task commences. Instead of briefing 
the participants in full before the task begins, perhaps the instructions could unfold only at the 
beginning of each section of the task. I would also suggest making it explicitly clear that 
credits are only lost due to slow responses in the time pressured condition, and that the 
unlimited time condition is completely separate from this. I suspect that participants were 
probably quite anxious at the prospect of losing credits (e.g., money) and as a result 
responded quickly to all items in the task (i.e., both time pressure conditions). I would also 
recommend taking a short break, or introducing a filler task, between the two conditions as a 
way to eliminate passing any learned behaviour from one condition to the next. However, 
these suggestions are purely speculation will need to be tested with further research. 
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Chapter 6: General Discussion 
 
The conjunction fallacy has historically been explained through dual process theories, 
such that the reliance on heuristics – specifically representativeness – produces a bias in 
people’s judgements. In other words, System 1 processes, or intuition, leads people astray. 
However, if people were only able to inhibit the pervasive intuitive response and employ 
system 2 deliberation, they would arrive at a correct, logical answer (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1983; Evans, 2008; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich & West, 2000). This is due to the fact that 
traditionally System 1 processes are viewed as rapid, autonomous processes and are assumed 
to yield default biased responses unless intervened on by distinctive higher order reasoning 
processes (System 2). What defines the difference between the systems of thought, is that 
System 2 processing supports hypothetical thinking and load heavily on working memory 
(Evans & Stanovich, 2013). At the heart of the dual process model of the Linda problem lies 
a “corrective” view on sound reasoning, such that accurate or logical responding is assumed 
to require the correction of an intuitive System 1 response by slower, more demanding 
System 2 processing (Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman & Frederick, 2005). This view leads to a 
somewhat unattractive characterization of System 1 as a source of error that requires 
supervision from the deliberate System 22.  
While the existence of two systems of thought (i.e., intuition vs. deliberation) is 
plausible, the emergence of recent work on conflict detection and logical intuitions calls into 
question the role played by intuition in conjunctive probability judgment. It is apparent that 
                                                             
 
 
2 It should be clarified that dual process models do not simply claim that intuitions are always incorrect. It is not 
disputed that intuitive responses can be appropriate and helpful in some cases (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; 
Kahneman, 2011; Sloman, 1996). It is also not claimed that deliberation will necessarily lead to a correct answer 
(Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman, 2011). The point is that intuitive responses have the potential to be 
incorrect, thus require monitoring and sometimes correction. It is this corrective view that leads to a rather 
negative view of System 1. 
  249 
people’s intuition does not always lead them astray, indeed in certain instances it leads them 
to the correct logical response (De Neys, 2012; Villejoubert, 2009; Pennycook, Trippas, 
Handley, & Thompson, 2013). People are also readily able to detect the conflict between 
intuitive and deliberate processes, even when they are biased. In other words, they can detect 
when the heuristic System 1 response is at odds with the logical System 2 response, even if 
they are not able to suppress it (Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2012; Franssens & De 
Neys, 2009, Villejoubert, 2009). These results pave the way for an alternative explanation, 
where logical judgements result from the absence of overriding the logical intuitive 
assessment. This view is closest to the logical intuitionist account as it assumes logical 
assessments arise from intuitive processing; however, it also proposes that heuristic 
judgements result from overriding logical intuitive assessments through engaging in 
reflective thinking. Consequently, heuristic judgements (unlike heuristic assessments) require 
the involvement of reflective thinking. This idea was tested across a series of five 
experimental studies using an adapted methodology from Villejoubert (2009). 
Overview of Hypotheses and Results 
This thesis had two objectives. Using the dual-process theoretical framework, the first 
explored the impact of individual differences on the logicality of peoples’ probability 
judgements. Experiment 1 attempted to clarify whether people have access to logical 
intuitions (e.g., the logical answer originates from intuitive processing), but these are 
subsequently overridden by heuristic deliberations when they think hard about their answer. 
Additionally, it was investigated whether individuals who engaged more naturally in effortful 
thinking (i.e., achieved a high score on the rational ability, and a low score on the experiential 
ability) were also more prone to produce illogical probability judgements (i.e., a high 
heuristic score) if they had time to deliberate because their deliberation was biased by non-
logical heuristics (e.g., prior beliefs). Experiment 2 tested whether in situations of conflict 
between representativeness and logicality (e.g., R/I and U/L statements), individuals who 
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provided logical answers would show different eye-movement patterns to individuals who 
provided heuristic answers. This tested for evidence of conflict sensitivity and explored 
whether certain strategies in obtaining information from the task (i.e., as interpreted from the 
eye movement patterns), resulted in higher or lower logicality in the participants answers.  
The second objective attempted to test original and theoretically driven ways to 
improve individuals’ probability judgements and explored whether these were transferable 
across heuristics and biases tasks. Experiments 3 and 4 tested the hypothesis whether 
decreasing individuals’ capacity for effortful thinking also had a positive impact on 
probability judgements because it impeded the inhibition of the rapid, logical response by 
conscious effortful deliberation. While Experiment 5 tested the transferability of the findings 
from Experiment 1 to a different heuristics and biases task (e.g., base rate neglect). It 
attempted to replicate findings from Experiment 1, by testing the assumption that both the 
presence of conflict and severe time pressure would increase logicality in base rate 
judgements in a within-subject design.  
Experiment 1. The first experiment examined the impact of time pressure on the 
sensitivity to the conflict between heuristic and logical assessments in social judgements 
under uncertainty. It also explored whether a natural propensity to think rationally, or 
experientially made a difference to people’s logicality when they made conjunction 
judgements. The hypothesis proposed that people could readily detect conflict between the 
two systems of thought. This was supported by results that showed conflict-statements were 
associated with lower rates of heuristic judgements and longer judgement latencies. 
Importantly, time pressure had an impact on logical judgements, such that people made more 
logical judgements when conflict was present in statements, and this effect increased under 
time pressure. These findings do not provide support for the default interventionist account. 
The fact that people exhibited sensitivity to conflict in their response latencies, plus this 
translated to higher logicality in their judgements, instead suggests support for the parallel 
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competitive account of reasoning. In other words, the two systems of thought run 
concurrently thus being able to alert people to conflicting answers between them. This 
conflict detection results in system 2 overriding the intuitive response in some cases; hence 
the higher rate of logical/correct answers when conflict was present. However, the results 
might also point towards the more recent logical intuitions account. Participants made more 
logical judgements when conflict was present and this effect was increased when put under 
severe time pressure, suggesting that fast System 1 thinking might in fact reflect logical 
considerations. When given unlimited time to think about their answers (as exhibited by their 
response latencies), participants seemed to respond more in line with heuristic considerations, 
suggesting that slower deliberation does not result in more logical judgements, and can be 
influenced by non-logical biases, such as prior beliefs. However, this hypothesis was 
debunked during the analysis of the REI data. There was still support for the logical intuitions 
account as participants under severe time pressure responded significantly more logically 
compared to those in the unlimited time condition, but there was no evidence that pointed to 
the heuristic bias originating in System 2 reasoning. Instead, the marginally significant 
evidence suggested that individuals who rated themselves as medium on both rational and 
experiential scales actually outperformed those who rated themselves as high on both scales. 
This finding does not support the heuristic reflections hypothesis, which states that people 
who exhibit a natural propensity to deliberate (e.g., a high rational score) will also display 
more heuristic errors, because biases such as prior beliefs corrupt people’s deliberation.  
Experiment 2. This experiment examined the hypothesis whether in situations of 
conflict between representativeness and logicality, individuals who provided logical answers 
would show different eye-movement patterns to individuals who provided heuristic answers. 
It also explored the relationship between working memory capacity and logicality. To be 
more specific, participants who exhibited lower working memory capacity were expected to 
also exhibit higher logicality in their probability judgements because they would rely more 
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heavily on their intuitive processing (i.e., produce logical intuitions). The behavioural results 
for this experiment did not yield much in the line of proof for the hypotheses, probably due to 
the fact that the study was severely underpowered. However, the eye-tracking data showed a 
natural ability to detect conflict, thus supporting the parallel-competitive account. Participants 
refixated more often (i.e., they looked back more often) when there was conflict present 
compared to when conflict was absent. There was also a significant interaction between 
conflict and AoIs for both number of refixations and dwell times. Participants searched for 
answers in the description when conflict was absent from statements; however, when conflict 
was present they searched for answers in the statements. This is very interesting as it shows 
that on some level, probably outside of their awareness as eye movements are unconscious, 
people realise that the answer to the no-conflict statements can be found in the personality 
descriptions; however, the answer to the conflict statements lies beyond the personality 
vignette and instead concerns the conjunction rule, hence they search the statements for their 
answer. There was also evidence found that the longer people refixated on the descriptions, 
the less logical their judgement were. This was not surprising as the description was designed 
to introduce a highly convincing stereotype. The more time a person spent contemplating the 
stereotype, the more likely they would be to answer in line with the representativeness 
heuristic. The results for experiment 2 provide no evidence of logical intuitions nor of 
heuristic reflections. There was a pattern found in the correlation between logicality and task 
duration that showed fast participants made more logical judgement; however, this 
relationship was not significant (p = 079). Perhaps with more power and a larger sample size 
this would reach significance, but further testing is needed. Finally, the hypothesis that a high 
working memory capacity would result in lower rates of the conjunction fallacy was not 
supported. It was found that having a strong, or weak, working memory capacity made no 
difference to the logicality of probability judgements. 
  253 
Experiments 3 and 4. The third and fourth experiments explored ways of improving 
individuals’ probability judgements. In line with the logical intuitions account, they examined 
whether depleting and overburdening cognitive capacity (i.e., discouraging effortful, 
deliberative thinking) had a positive impact on conjunction probability judgements because it 
encouraged fast, intuitive and logical assessments. Additionally, the experiments investigated 
the relationship between impulsivity and logicality, as well as cognitive reflection and 
logicality on social judgements. In accordance with the heuristic reflections account, it was 
hypothesised that low impulsivity, but high cognitive reflection would result in more 
conjunction fallacies because people displaying these traits would also be more inclined to 
deliberate, which is when the heuristic biases reasoning. The hypothesis was supported by the 
data that showed both cognitively depleted and overburdened participants were able to detect 
the conflict underlying the statements. This finding was confirmed by both the judgement 
latency as well as the heuristic scores data. Participants were faster on the no-conflict trials 
compared to the conflict trials. They were also responded heuristically (i.e., in line with 
heuristic considerations) in the absence of conflict. In line with the logical intuitionist 
account, both the depleted and overburdened participants responded with higher logicality in 
their probability judgements; suggesting that logical assessments might originate from 
intuitive processes, while the slower, more deliberative processes might be susceptible to 
heuristic biases. However, the methodology used in this experiment has some flaws and 
requires further testing to be conducted in this regard. Finally, there was no relationship 
found between impulsivity and logical sensitivity, neither was there a relationship between 
cognitive reflection and logical sensitivity.  
Experiment 5. The final experiment tested whether the findings from the first 
experiment were robust across a within-subjects design as well as a different cognitive 
fallacy, namely base rate neglect. Based on the findings from Experiment 1, the hypothesis 
predicted that both conflict and time pressure would increase logicality in base rate 
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judgements. Additionally, the relationship between cognitive reflection and logical sensitivity 
was explored. It was expected that participants who scored high on cognitive reflection also 
committed more conjunction fallacies, as their ability to inhibit intuition and employ 
deliberation would result in more biased answers (e.g., the heuristic reflections account). The 
data supported the hypothesis that participants were readily able to detect conflict between 
heuristic and logical considerations.  They displayed higher logicality in their judgements for 
statements containing conflict, they were also less confident in their answers when conflict 
was present. However, there was no evidence found for conflict sensitivity when analysing 
the judgement latencies for the three different response types. This was an unusual result as 
latencies were significantly faster when put under severe time pressure (i.e., the time pressure 
manipulation appeared to work, but made no difference to the participant’s answers in this 
experiment). Finally, there was no support for the hypothesis that a high cognitive reflection 
score would lead to more conjunction fallacies. In fact, an opposite pattern to this was 
emerging in the data, although it was not significant. Thus, having  high or low cognitive 
reflection (e.g., the ability to inhibit intuitive responses), makes no difference to the 
considerations you rely on when making social judgements. 
Contribution to Knowledge 
Evidence for Logical Intuitions and Heuristic Reflections. The findings in 
Experiment 1 did lend support for the idea of logical intuitions and heuristic reflections; 
however, these need to be interpreted with caution due to certain methodological flaws found 
in this study. Participants displayed significantly more logic in their judgements when put 
under severe time pressure compared to when given unlimited time to reflect on their 
answers. When allowed enough time to deliberate, participants made more conjunction errors 
than when they were forced to respond with their intuitive answer. These findings suggest 
that the logical answer might come first, but when allowed to deliberate the heuristic bias 
then corrupts reasoning. However, the CCPJ task needs to be redesigned and modified to 
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include multiple choices, which will eliminate the possibility of guessing or being forced to 
choose one of only two options.  
Experiment 2 showed that eye movement patterns could predict logicality on 
conjunction judgements, and that people were sensitive to the conflict underlying intuitive 
and logical considerations. The longer participants spent looking at the descriptions (as 
measured by their refixation dwell times), the more conjunction errors they committed. While 
the amount of time spent looking at the statements made no difference to their judgements. If 
automatic and superficial levels of processing have shorter fixation latencies, while deeper 
processing and a deliberate consideration of information is related with longer fixations 
(Glöckner & Herbold, 2011; Velichkovsky, Rothert, Kopf, Dornhofer & Joos, 2002), then we 
can presume that longer refixation dwell times on the description also meant a deeper 
processing of that information. Hence, a deep processing of the information on the 
description also led to more biased judgements. This finding is both common sense and 
profound. The Linda problem was designed to illicit the conjunction fallacy. It exacerbates 
the fallacy by priming people with information that leads them to choose the conjunction as 
the more probable option. The point is that there is always a stereotypical response and a 
surprising response, and the representativeness heuristic is used to manipulate these responses 
in the description vignette. Thus, it is not that surprising that when people pay more attention 
to the description, they are also more influenced by the heuristic response. According to the 
traditional parallel-competitive model of dual process theories, people can detect conflict but 
are not always able to override the potent intuitive response. However, sometimes the 
presence of conflict can cause them to employ deliberation which can lead to a correct and 
logical answer. This was not the case according to the data in this experiment. In this case 
slow, deliberative reasoning (i.e., the lengthy refixations that suggested deliberate 
considerations) resulted in more heuristic responses (i.e., more conjunction fallacies). This 
evidence lends support for the heuristic reflections account that proposes the bias corrupts our 
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reasoning when we reflect or deliberate. However, it could also support the lax monitoring 
and cognitive miser accounts as the participants might have been simply using their intuition 
to solve these problems, and not employing deliberation at all. Although, this could be 
disputed by the long reaction times recorded, which were arguably too long for supposedly 
fast, automatic responses.  
Experiment 3 used the letter-e task to deplete participants’ ego, or cognitive resources. 
The high ego depletion manipulation resulted in significantly fewer conjunction fallacies 
compared to the control condition. People who are cognitively depleted theoretically do not 
have access to the resources needed for demanding deliberative processing, thus they would 
tend to rely more heavily on their intuitive processing. This indicates that a higher reliance on 
intuition also resulted in fewer conjunction errors, which provides evidence for logical 
intuitions. Participants in the control condition would have had full access to the cognitive 
resources needed to conduct deliberative reasoning. However, despite this, they ended up 
committing more conjunction fallacies than those in the high depletion condition. This does 
not support the traditional default interventionist account, or parallel-competitive accounts. 
Instead, this result provides support for the heuristic reflections account, as it demonstrates 
that people who have the means and ability to think hard about their answers, are influenced 
by biased reasoning such as prior beliefs, and make more errors. It also lends support for the 
idea of logical intuitions, as the more depleted the participants were, the more logical their 
answers were. This result was replicated in experiment 4. Cognitive resources were limited in 
this study by overburdening the working memory. This yielded similar results, showing that 
the participants who’s working memory was overburdened the most also committed 
significantly fewer conjunction fallacies compared to the control condition. These findings 
again support the logical intuitions and the heuristic reflections account, as participants who 
were forced to answer intuitively showed more logicality in their judgements, while those 
who deliberated their answers showed higher levels of error. This suggests that the logical 
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answer comes first and can be intuitive, while the biased heuristic answer comes second 
when people deliberate. The results form Experiments 3 and 4 need to be interpreted with 
caution for two reasons. First, the CCPJ task does not allow the researcher to assess whether a 
logical judgement resulted from logical considerations, or the rejection of the alternative 
answer, or from simply guessing. The second, is that there was no new control group data 
collected for these experiments. They both used the unlimited time condition from 
Experiment 1 as their control group. This did not allow the control group data from 
Experiment 1 to be replicated, which would have greatly strengthened the evidence here. 
Finally, experiment 5 did not yield any support for logical intuitions or heuristic 
reflections. The participants answered the base rate problems extremely quickly in general 
compared to the conjunction judgement problems, and although there was a significant 
difference in time between the trials answered under time pressure and those under no time 
pressure, this had no effect on the logicality of the base rate judgements. These results 
suggest that the participants might have been answering with one particular strategy in mind. 
For example, in line with the parallel-competitive account, they might have noticed the 
conflict between the two opposing responses as represented by the significant differences 
found in their heuristic scores and confidence scores; however, found the intuitive response 
too persuasive. Thus, the fault would be an inhibition one, which ties in with the cognitive 
miser account. This finding was indeed a surprise as the time pressure manipulation had 
worked so effectively to increase intuitive responses in Experiment 1, as well as other 
published studies (Villejoubert, 2009; Pennycook & Thompson, 2012; Bago & De Neys, 
2017).  
Evidence for conflict sensitivity. Across the program of research there was strong 
evidence to show that people are sensitive to the conflict underlying heuristic and logical 
considerations. In fact, conflict sensitivity was evident in all five of the experiments as 
represented by significant differences in heuristic scores, patterns in eye movements, or 
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confidence judgements. Across the five experiments, conflict caused higher rates in logical 
reasoning, although this pattern was always visible these differences did not always reach 
statistical significance. In experiments 1, 4 and 5; however, a significant difference was found 
between conflict and heuristic scores, such that the presence of conflict caused lower rates of 
heuristic responses. In other words, the presence of conflict in the statements caused 
participants to make fewer probability errors, But it is important to note that across all five 
experiments the rates of heuristic responses remained very high (see Table 6. 1 for an 
overview). Experiments 2 and 3 did not show significant evidence for conflict sensitivity in 
the heuristic scores, however they did show evidence of conflict sensitivity in the eye 
movements in Experiment 2, such that participants refixated more on the description when 
conflict was absent from the statements, but refixated more on the statements when conflict 
was present. To be more precise, when conflict was present in the statements, the participants 
employed different eye movement patterns to when conflict was absent from the statements. 
They looked back more often and for longer at the statement when conflict was present, but 
they looked back and for longer at the description when conflict was absent. These results are 
fascinating as they show that people are very good at detecting conflict. In fact, conflict 
sensitivity might even occur involuntarily, as eye movements are uncensored, extremely fast 
and automatic. These findings also suggest that on some level people might have an idea or 
feeling as to the correct and incorrect answer because they appear to have an inkling of where 
to search for the correct answers. When there is no conflict, both systems of thought point to 
the same answer, hence the correct answer can be found in the description. However, when 
conflict is present the law of conjunction probability needs to be followed, thus looking at the 
statement is more likely to provide correct answers as it removes the compelling stereotype. 
Experiment 3 provided evidence of conflict detection in the self-reported confidence ratings 
provided by the participants after each trial they completed. Participants felt more confident 
in their answers when conflict was absent from the statements. Thus, again they were able to 
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sense when their competing systems of thought were in conflict with one another and this 
translated into the amount of confidence they felt in their answers.  
The fact that participants showed a sensitivity to the conflict underlying logical and 
heuristic considerations in all five of the experiments, supports the idea that conflict is easily 
and readily detected by people even if this is on an implicit and automatic level (e.g., as 
shown in uncensored eye movements in Experiment 2). These findings do not support the 
default interventionist account, which states that conflict detection is available only when a 
person engages in deeper System 2 processing.  
 
Table 6. 1 
Means, Standard Deviations, p-values and Effect Sizes of heuristic scores as a function of 
conflict across the program of research. Note, Means and Standard Deviations are expressed 
as percentages 
Experiment M (SD) p Effect size 
 No conflict Conflict   
1 86.67 (15.03) 78.76 (21.38) < .001 𝜂7% = .12 
2 86.59 (16.39) 83.23 (22.12) .343 d = .17 
3 85.24 (15.93) 83.31 (18.92) .323 𝜂7% = .01 
4 86.68 (14.50) 80.99 (18.87) .001 𝜂7% = .08 
5 92.78 (11.95) 85.39 (17.84) <.001 𝜂7% = .15 
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Emerging Themes 
Two interesting findings to come from this research program were that people want to 
think hard about their answers, and they are readily able to detect conflict between heuristic 
and logical considerations. The data across the program of research showed that people are 
effortless deliberators and not the “cognitive misers” who fail to reason in line with the tenets 
of logic because they either lack the cognitive ability or the motivation to do so (Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1973). To elaborate, the people who participated across these five experiments all 
showed a natural propensity to deliberate. They seemed to naturally, without coercion, 
engage in System 2 reasoning and think hard about their answers. In fact, it was increasingly 
difficult to get people to respond intuitively to the CCPJ task. This was particularly evident 
when designing and implementing the first experiment, which manipulated time pressure. All 
the participants, even those who were put under severe time pressure, appeared to want to 
think hard about their answers. It took many pilot versions of the experiment, including strict 
instructions to respond quickly, a countdown clock showing time running out, a stern vocal 
instruction to “answer now” to eventually arrive at the current design that uses the loss of 
money as an incentive to answer quickly. The lengths that the researcher had to go to get 
participants to answer as quickly as possible suggests that people tend to want to think hard 
about their answers. That perhaps deliberation comes effortlessly to them, which debunks the 
cognitive miser account. There was also an increase in judgement latencies under conflicting 
scenarios, which supports this idea. When faced with uncertainty, instead of simply 
responding with a fast, easy heuristic answer, they chose instead to spend longer thinking 
about their response, which would imply they are not cognitive misers at all. If people were 
simply cognitive misers, or they were not able to detect conflict, then they would respond to 
all statements (i.e., both those containing conflict and those without) in the same way and in 
the same amount of time. However, this was not the case. In fact, instead of people being 
“cognitive misers’ they appeared to be “effortless deliberators”. This interpretation of the 
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data lends support for the heuristic reflections account, as it shows that people want to think 
hard about their answers, but at the same time also show high rates of reasoning errors 
because the bias enters human processing in System 2 (not System 1 as previously believed). 
If this is indeed the case, then System 2 reasoning might not be as cognitively taxing as 
previously believed, but this should be explored further in future research.  See Table 6. 2 for 
an overview of the judgement latencies across the five experiments.  
 
Table 6. 2 
Overview of the Means, Standard Deviations, p-values and Effect Sizes of judgement 
latencies as a function of response type across the program of research. Note, Means and 
Standard Deviations are expressed in seconds 
Experiment M (SD) p Effect size 
 No conflict Conflict-Heuristic Conflict-Logical   
1 9.97 (4.43) 10.90 (6.04) 14.20 (9.47) < .001 𝜂7% = .12 
2 12.31 (3.35) 12.05 (3.31) 12.57 (3.76) .321 𝜂7% = .02 
3 11.77 (5.71) 13.24 (6.94) 50.13 (36.19) < .001 𝜂7% = .63 
4 14.37 (7.01) 15.93 (8.10) 61.58 (49.25) < .001 𝜂7% = .50 
5 4.35 (2.40) 5.51 (3.04) 4.87 (3.89) .860 𝜂7% = .01 
 
When viewing the judgement latency data in entirety across all five studies, it 
becomes clear in three out of five studies that it took significantly longer to respond logically 
to conflict statements compared to the other types of responses. How does one explain this 
finding with regards to the logical intuitions account, which proposes that logical responses 
originate from intuitive thinking, thus they come first and are fast? Indeed, this result seems 
to support the original, dominant two-systems view as it suggests that System 2 overrides and 
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corrects System 1. In situations of conflict, correct responding is assumed to require 
correction of an intuitive System 1 response by slower and more deliberate System 2 
processing (Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman & Frederick, 2005). Thus, one needs to employ the 
slower deliberative thinking to reach the logical answer, which explains the long judgement 
latencies (Stanovich & West, 2000; Evans, 2008; Kahneman, 2011). In three of the 
experiments (excluding Experiment 2 and 5), when judgements latencies were grouped into 
type of response (e.g., No-Conflict, Conflict-Heuristic and Conflict-Logical), the logical 
judgements made when conflict was present in the statements took significantly longer to 
make compared to the heuristic judgements when conflict was present, or the judgements 
when conflict was absent from the statements. These results support the parallel-competitive 
account of reasoning, as they show that conflict is detected by participants. They took longer 
to respond heuristically to conflict statements compared to no conflict statements. Plus, the 
heuristic answer was given quickly compared to the logical answer when conflict was 
present, which suggests that logical judgements require the intervention of slower, more 
conscious deliberation to override the potent, fast heuristic response.  
This is convincing evidence for the original parallel-competitive model of reasoning; 
however, realising that these judgement latencies are grouped together across manipulation 
conditions I decided to investigate them further as many of the experiments yielded 
significant interactions between the experimental manipulation and the judgement type. In 
doing so, I wanted to establish whether there were both fast and slow logical judgements 
being made on the conflict trials. A simple examination of the participants’ judgement 
latencies when they answered conflict statements in line with logical considerations revealed 
that there were in fact both fast as well as slow logical judgements being made (see Figure 6. 
1). This observation brings the parallel-competitive account into question, as it appears that 
sometimes logical responses can be arrived at very quickly, while other times they do take 
much longer. These incredibly fast logical answers (e.g., given in a matter of seconds) 
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provides support for the logical intuitions account as these logical answers must be available 
first (i.e., as a System 1 response and before any influence from System 2), but also suggests 
that perhaps people have access to both fast and intuitive as well as slow and deliberate 
logical reasoning. This counteracts the traditional parallel-competitive account, which states 
that logical reasoning stems from slower, more effortful deliberation; however, it does not 
rule out a parallel model completely. Due to people’s undeniable ability to detect conflict 
underlying logical and heuristic considerations, it is highly probable that they do rely on a 
parallel processing model of reasoning. The same way that people could have access to both 
logical intuitions and heuristic intuitions (e.g., logical intuitionist account), they may also 
have access to logical deliberations and heuristic deliberations (e.g., heuristic reflections 
account). Consider this possibility: the first response points towards a logical answer, but 
people being the opposite of cognitive misers in fact do want to think hard about their 
answers, thus they employ deliberation in a natural and effortless manner. At this point, the 
heuristic influences reasoning and biases the judgement. It is possible for a person to override 
this heuristic response and replace it with the original logical response, but this takes serious 
cognitive effort. This would explain the high rates of heuristic responding across the tasks, 
and also the presence of both very short and very long logical response latencies.  
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Figure 6. 1. Judgement latencies for the Logical-Conflict response type across the five 
experiments. Note. Latencies are expressed in seconds 
 
In Experiments 2 and 5 there was little difference in response latencies between types 
of responses (see Table 6. 2). This did not necessarily mean that participants were unable to 
detect the conflict, as this was evident from their eye movement patterns and self-reported 
confidence scores. However, this conflict sensitivity did not materialise into their judgement 
latencies. In experiment 2, as previously mentioned, the choice in eye tracker may be the 
reason why. The Eyelink II is a serious looking piece of equipment with head mounted 
cameras and a chin and forehead bar. It might have been intimidating having this equipment 
strapped to one’s head and as a result promoted deliberative thinking, which would explain 
the long judgement latencies across the three judgement types (e.g., 12 seconds). The results 
of experiment 5 were very unexpected and have been challenging to interpret because it was 
the only within-subjects study and also the only one to use a base rate neglect task, thus 
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comparatively there is not much to work with. Time pressure, which had worked so 
effectively in previous studies, had no effect on participants’ heuristic scores. While there 
was a significant difference between the unlimited time and time pressured conditions, such 
that trials answered under time pressure were also answered significantly faster; compared 
with the other four experiments this task was completed very rapidly. This might be due to 
the study’s within-subjects design and also due to the difference in task (i.e., base rate neglect 
compared to conjunction fallacy). Hertwig and Gigerenzer (1999) discovered that the use of 
between-subjects groups or within-subjects groups made a difference to the rate of 
conjunction violations on the seven-letter word problem. Indeed, the between-subjects group 
violated the conjunction rule by estimating that more words end in ‘ing’ than in ‘_n_’. 
However, the within-subjects group, who saw both alternatives, answered the questions 
correctly and only 26% committed the conjunction fallacy. A similar discovery was made by 
Birnbaum and Mellers (1983) who found that the base rate fallacy also led to different 
conclusions depending on whether a within-subjects or between-subjects design was used. 
They found that in between-subjects comparisons the base rates were not given attention, thus 
base rate neglect was prevalent. However, in within-subjects comparisons participants used 
the base rates and the fallacy disappeared (Varey, Mellers, & Birnbaum, 1990). These authors 
cautioned against drawing inferences from between-subjects comparisons of judgement 
because these comparisons lead to paradoxical conclusions. In other words, there is a 
confound formed between the stimulus and the context by allowing the stimulus to evoke its 
own context. However, Tversky and Kahneman (1983) used both within- and between-
subjects designs to test the Linda problem. In the between-subjects design participants either 
judged the constituent events (i.e., T, F) or their conjunction (i.e., T&F), not both, as in the 
within-subjects design. In both designs, the probability of T&F was ranked higher than the 
probability of T. The within-subjects design of Experiment 5 seems to have sped up the 
overall time taken to complete the trials. Although half of the trials were answered under time 
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pressure and the other half answered with unlimited time; both of these conditions were 
completed very hastily compared to the CCPJ task across the first four experiments. 
Compared to the results of Experiment 1, the limited time conditions seem to be on a par with 
one another (M_E1_limited = 4.38s, M_E5_limited = 3.60s); however, the time pressured conditions 
vary greatly (M_E1_unlimited = 19.00s, M_E5_unlimited = 6.12s). Perhaps, informing participants 
before the study that they would be making judgements both under time pressure and without 
time pressure somehow urged them to answer faster than they would normally have. 
However, the base rate neglect task does differ to the conjunction fallacy task, and it might be 
plausible that participants interpreted the statements and made their judgements faster for the 
base rates compared to the conjunctions. However, these are simply speculations that need to 
be tested further through replication studies. 
Methodological Observations  
This research project was a learning experience from start to finish and is by no 
means a perfect piece of work. There are many potential limitations that will be discussed in 
more detail in this section; however, perhaps the most obvious and serious of the limitations 
in this body of research lies within the methodology. To be more precise, the CCPJ task used 
across the five experiments. This task was designed to be a forced-response task that 
contained only two choices, or responses. Participants were expected to either accept a 
statement as being true, or reject it as being false, based on reading a previous piece of 
information. Following the work of Evans and Curtis-Holmes (2005), this design attempted 
to disentangle the cognitive underpinnings of social judgements by allowing the researcher to 
assess whether the response came from heuristic or logical considerations. However, what 
this design did not allow for was the identification of guessing or ruling out the possibility 
that a participant was simply choosing the only other alternative available. In other words, a 
participant might reject a statement as false, but that does not mean he believes it to be true. 
Yet he has to choose true as it is the only other remaining option. Future research should 
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develop and utilise a methodology better suited to the purpose of the study. This might 
include more responses to choose from. For example, Travers, Rolison and Feeney (2016) 
designed a task where each problem was presented in a 4-option multiple choice format. For 
the conflict items, the possible responses were the correct option, the incorrect option, and 
two incorrect foil options. For the no-conflict problems the correct intuitive option was 
presented with three incorrect foils. 
An additional limitation to the current methodology is the way that the statements are 
answered (i.e., accept/reject). Both the CCPJ and the base rate neglect task use ‘true or false’ 
as a means of responding. Throughout this research program it has been assumed that 
accepting a statement as true is the equivalent of rejecting a statement as false. Both types of 
responses (e.g., true and false) were used to control for answer type. However, they may not 
simply mean the opposite of each other and might be interpreted differently from one 
another. To test for this potential confound, I calculated whether there was an interaction 
between conflict and response type using the control group from Experiment 1 (i.e., unlimited 
time condition). The amount of times each person accepted or rejected a statement when 
conflict was present and when conflict was absent in the statements was calculated. There 
was a significant main effect for type of response; participants rejected more statements 
overall than they accepted (M_accept = 3.71, SD = 0.77, 95% CI [3.49, 3.93], M_reject = 4.29, SD 
= 0.77, 95% CI [4.07, 4.51], F(1, 49) = 7.09, p = .01, 𝜂7% = .13), but there was no interaction 
between conflict and type of response, F(1, 49) = 0.32, p = .574, 𝜂7% = .01. This suggests that 
there is no difference between accepting a statement as true or rejecting a statement as false. 
Consequently, one can assume that participants were able to accept statements just as easily 
as they were to reject statements.  
Another potential limitation to this body of research is the fact that it relies heavily on 
judgement latencies. Krajbich et al. (2015) show that using the reverse inference can be 
dangerous. The reverse inference is the use of behavioural or biological measures to infer 
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mental function. It can be problematic as it does not consider other sources of variability in 
the data, for example discriminability of the choice options. Many researchers have used the 
assumption that decisions derived at through intuitive processes should tend to have shorter 
reaction times than those derived from deliberative processes (Kahneman, 2011; Evans & 
Stanovich, 2013). More recently, certain researchers have worked backwards from this to 
reason that fast decisions are intuitive (Stupple, Ball, Evans & Kamal-Smith, 2011; De Neys 
& Glumicic, 2008). However, there are many pitfalls associated with making reverse 
inferences, and this argument can also be applied to reaction time durations. There is “a key 
distinction between the prediction that an automatic process will occur faster than more 
deliberative computations, and the classification of a choice as intuitive or automatic because 
it happens more quickly” (Krajbich, et al., 2015, p. 2). These authors caution strongly against 
using reaction time differences as evidence favouring dual-process accounts as reaction time 
in a choice task depends critically on how different the decision maker finds the options 
available. For example, suppose a researcher designs a study on preferences between beer 
and wine, where subjects are required to make multiple decisions between different beer-
wine pairings. The experimenter has to decide which beers and wines to include in her 
experiment. Depending on which brands she chooses, she might find that beers are generally 
preferred to the wines. While another experimenter running an identical experiment on the 
same population, might find that the wines he selected are preferred by his participants. The 
problem arises when these two researchers compare their reaction time results. The first 
researcher might find that the preference for beer amongst her subjects led to faster beer 
choices, while the second researcher found faster wine choices. Based on their results from 
these two seemingly identical studies they would reach opposite conclusions about whether 
people intuitively favour beer or wine in a fast, automatic way. This logic can be applied to 
any choice task. While the programme of research in this thesis does rely on reaction times, it 
does not use the reverse inference. What it does instead is compares latencies between 
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judgements made under conflict and those without conflict and compares latencies between 
intuitive and logical assessments while under conflict. Although this body of work does state 
that logical intuitions are faster and come before heuristic deliberations, it does not put a 
timestamp on the ’fast’ or ‘slow’ judgements. What it attempts to do is to assess the timeline 
of judgement making by observing the order in which different types of responses are given 
(i.e., logical intuitions come first, followed by heuristic deliberations, and then possibly 
followed by logical deliberations). Additionally, this task might not be as vulnerable to mixed 
interpretations as the beer-wine study mentioned above. The Linda problem was designed to 
entice a heuristic response through the use of the representativeness heuristic. It was designed 
to do this by combining a highly likely scenario with a highly unlikely scenario, which makes 
the task easy to interpret as well as easy to commit the conjunction fallacy. Thus, when 
adapting Villejoubert’s (2009) study into the CCPJ task used in this thesis I first piloted the 
descriptions to ensure that people were surprised or shocked at one of the constituent events, 
while the other one seemed perfectly normal. The pilot study ensured that most people felt 
the same way about the fictitious characters used in the task. This would have standardised 
their answers to some extent and avoided individual preferences such as experienced in the 
beer-wine experiment. The design of the CCPJ task also illuminated the difference between a 
heuristic and logical assessment, such that it was possible to see which assessment had been 
used to judge the conflict statements. As previously mentioned, it is problematic to classify a 
choice as intuitive or automatic because it happens more quickly (Krajbich, et al., 2015). 
However, the CCPJ design now allows one to measure and compare the latencies between 
heuristic and logical judgements made under conflict (e.g., R/I and U/L statements); thus, 
allowing one to assess which comes first, or is more automatic. 
Another major limitation to the study is the fact that for three out of a possible four 
conjunction fallacy experiments, the same control data was used. This is problematic because 
those control results have not been replicated and yet much of the evidence depends on 
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comparisons with this data. The strength of the evidence in this body of research would have 
been much higher if new control data had been collected for at least one of Experiment 3 or 
4.  
A final limitation to this program of research would be to question whether or not I 
was in fact recording the first intuitive response. As with simple tasks such as Modus Ponens 
(e.g., if A then B; A; Therefore, B), the processing needed to arrive at the correct response is 
so basic that it is in fact automatized and assimilated as a System 1 response. With this in 
mind, could the correct intuitive answer possibly be attributed to the easiness of the task and 
not to logical intuitions (i.e., the automatization of laws of logic). I would suggest that the 
answer here is no. This is not an easy task. The task was designed to create stereotypes that 
contrasted greatly across categories. Each description was designed so that the person 
presented appeared both as a highly representative member of a stereotypical category and 
highly unrepresentative of an atypical category, without openly mentioning that this 
individual belonged to either category. The point of designing the descriptions in this fashion 
was to increase the conflict between intuitive and deliberative assessments, thus increasing 
the difficulty of the task. I would suggest that this CCPJ task, along with the base-rate neglect 
task, are difficult enough to warrant deliberation, which is why there is such a high rate of 
fallacies committed because the logical intuition is overridden by the heuristic deliberation. 
As I have discovered across this research program, people are effortless deliberators. They 
want to think hard about their answers. Perhaps if the task was simpler, they would be able to 
answer using more automatic responses, and thus we would see fewer fallacies committed. 
However, this is an assumption that would need to be tested further. Critics might also query 
whether the procedures used to guarantee a first intuitive response were stringent enough. A 
variety of methods were employed across the five experiments to encourage intuitive first 
responses, including extreme time pressure, cognitive load, and cognitive depletion. If as 
assumed, System 2 is heavily demanding and draining on cognitive resources, then by 
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depriving participants of these resources we eradicate System 2 as much as possible during 
the initial response phase. Across the four experiments that used manipulations to decrease 
conjunction fallacies (i.e., increase logical judgements) three of them proved successful in 
significantly lowering the rates of conjunction fallacies committed by participants. See Table 
6. 3 for more detail. Extreme time pressure, cognitive depletion and cognitive load (as 
between subjects designs) all significantly increased the logicality of people’s conjunction 
probability judgements. Unfortunately, time pressure as a within subjects design and 
implemented on a base rate task had no effect on lowering base rate neglect. The purpose of 
the manipulations was to encourage System 1 thinking and eradicate System 2 thinking as 
much as possible. The pattern in the data suggests that these manipulations were stringent 
enough because they produced responses significantly different to the control conditions. The 
fact that these manipulations resulted in responses that were higher in logicality supports the 
notion of logical intuitions. 
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Table 6. 3 
Means, Standard Deviations, p-values and Effect Sizes of heuristic scores as a function of 
task manipulation across the program of research. Note, Means and Standard Deviations are 
expressed as percentages 
Experiment Manipulation 
conditions 
M (SD) p 𝜂7% 
1 Unlimited time 
Time pressure 
88.63 (11.41) 
76.72 (15.42) 
< .001 .16 
3 No depletion 
Low depletion 
High depletion 
88.52 (11.51) 
83.33 (13.42) 
80.96 (13.84) 
.017 .06 
4 No load 
Low load 
High load 
88.28 (11.50) 
84.38 (12.69) 
78.86 (14.89) 
.003 .08 
5 Unlimited time 
Time pressure 
88.80 (15.62) 
89.38 (14.25) 
.761 .001 
 
 
Conflict being present in the statements as well as promoting intuitive thinking through 
various manipulations both resulted in more logical probability judgements. However, some 
might argue that these findings are simply due to a practice or learned effect. Experiment 1 
took this into account by analysing the data across blocks. The task was designed so that the 
sixteen trials were presented over four blocks with four trials in each block. The trials within 
each block were randomised, and the order in which the blocks were presented was also 
randomised. Two different ordered versions of the task were used to minimise confounding 
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variables. The order of the trials in version 1 was reversed for version 2 (e.g., an R&L trial in 
version 1 became a U&I trial in version 2). The results showed that there was no effect of 
blocks on either conflict sensitivity, or time pressure conditions, and there were no 
interactions found between these variables, which suggests that the order of the trials 
presented in each block had no effect on the logicality of the judgements produced. In other 
words, participants did not become more sensitive to the conflict between logical and 
heuristic considerations as they completed more trials. Thus, there was no evidence of 
practice or learned effects. The same CCPJ task was administered across the five 
experiments, which suggests there are no learned or practice effects in any of the studies 
within this program of research. 
Concluding Remarks  
This thesis contributes to the ever-expanding support for the existence of logical 
intuitions (De Neys, 2012; Villejoubert, 2009; Handley & Trippas, 2015; Trippas, Handley, 
Verde, & Morsanyi, 2016; Franssens & De Neys, 2009; Morsanyi & Handley, 2012; 
Pennycook, Trippas, Handley, & Thompson, 2013). It also contributes to the body of 
evidence that supports conflict detection. Recently, there is a burgeoning movement away 
from the lax monitoring perspective of the dominant two-system view, towards a belief that 
people are readily able to detect when deliberative and intuitive considerations are in conflict 
with one another (De Neys, Cromheeke & Osman, 2011; Pennycook, Fugelsang & Koehler, 
2012; De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; De Neys, Vartanian, & Goel, 2008). However, the most 
important contribution to knowledge that this thesis provides is to propose a new explanation 
for the role that intuition plays in probability judgements, and in doing so, provides a 
different perspective on how dual processes of reasoning operate. Traditional dual process 
theories state that the intuitive heuristic response comes first but must be overridden by 
logical deliberation in order to avoid making an error. However, this program of research has 
provided evidence to support the idea that it is in fact the logical-intuitive answer that comes 
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first, and this is followed by a heuristic-reflective answer when a person deliberates. It is 
entirely possible that people have learned the laws of probability through simply existing in 
the world. We might not have been formally taught these laws of statistics but have learned 
them implicitly by interacting with our environments (e.g., Saxe, 1988). This explains how 
these tenets of logic are possible as our first, intuitive response. However, it is when we start 
to deliberate and overthink our first response that the heuristic bias corrupts our judgement 
(i.e., prior beliefs and experiences taint our initial logical response). This program of research 
shows in fact that people are fond of deliberating. They want to think hard about their answer 
before making a judgement. In fact, it was extremely difficult to encourage people to respond 
using their intuitive System 1 thinking, especially under time pressure in Experiment 1. 
Increasingly strict measures had to be put in place to ensure participants would respond 
within 8 seconds. I piloted several methods, including a countdown clock, and a vocal 
command to answer immediately; however, these did not seem to portray the urgency that 
was necessary. Eventually, I discovered that by instructing participants that they would lose 
money each time they took too long to respond was quite motivating to the participants and 
this procedure was implemented in the final task design. The conjunction fallacy is extremely 
potent and once it has overridden the logical intuitive response it seems to take a great 
amount of cognitive energy to inhibit it and revert back to the initial logical answer. This is 
evidently difficult to do (as observed by the extended judgement latencies in the conflict-
logical responses), but not entirely impossible as some participants were able to give the 
correct, logical responses to the conflict statements. The majority of participants; however, 
did still commit errors. Across this program of research, it was circa 80% which is in line 
with the original Linda problem (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). This high rate of biased 
responding could be attributed to the fact that people are “effortless deliberators”, in other 
words, they want to think hard about their answers and tend to employ this more effortful 
style of thinking very naturally (i.e., the opposite of a cognitive miser). People naturally want 
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to think hard about their answers before making a judgement. Hence, the high rate of errors 
because the bias resides in deliberative System 2 thinking. It is invoked by reflecting on 
previously acquired knowledge and experiences. This is supported by the findings in 
Experiments 1, 3 and 4. Individuals who spent longer thinking about their answers also made 
more judgements in line with heuristic considerations. While individuals who were severely 
cognitively depleted, or cognitively overloaded (i.e., System 2 was suppressed) answered 
more in line with logical considerations compared to those in a control group. The findings 
across this research program have implications for dual process theories. They question the 
original two-systems accounts, both the serial and the parallel models (Evans, 2008; 
Stanovich & West, 2000; Sloman, 1996; Kahneman, 2003, 2011), which state that intuition 
will most often lead to heuristic, biased reasoning, but deliberation will most often lead to 
logical reasoning; offering instead an alternative explanation as to the role that intuition and 
deliberation plays in probability judgements. The findings are still aligned with a parallel 
account of reasoning as there was considerable evidence found for conflict sensitivity, hence 
the two systems ought to be running alongside one another in order for people to detect that 
they are producing differing responses. However, instead of the two systems running in 
parallel from the start (i.e., the traditional parallel-competitive model), System 2 might only 
activate at some point after System 1. System 2 is easily activated, as people are “effortless 
deliberators”, so the trick is in fact finding ways to delay the activation of System 2 so that 
people respond in line with their initial logical answer. Some of the findings from this body 
of research are also aligned with the logical intuition account (De Neys, 2012), as far as 
supporting the idea that there are logical intuitions that come first; however, they differ in the 
detail of where the heuristic bias comes into play. The logical intuitionist account suggests 
that there are logical intuitions activated in parallel with heuristic intuitions right from the 
start; thus, System 1 thinking can produce biased or logical answers. While the heuristic 
reflective account suggests that the logical answer comes first. Logic is embedded in System 
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1 thinking, but when people switch to System 2 deliberation, that is where the bias is found, 
and that is when they make errors. The theory resulting from this programme of research, 
however, may propose that the logical answer comes first. It is a fast, automatic System 1 
response derived from the implicit learning of logical laws by existing in and interacting with 
our environment. However, System 2 deliberation is easily employed by people, thus happens 
very naturally and is probably very difficult to avoid. It contains biased heuristics from 
previous knowledge and prior beliefs which easily override or inhibit the initial logical 
response. From this point on, the two Systems are running in parallel with each other, which 
can result in feelings of conflict between the intuitive and deliberate considerations. The 
heuristic-reflective response presents convincing evidence, which could explain the high rates 
of heuristic responding seen in the CCPJ task. Those participants who solved the problems 
correctly (e.g., logically) after spending considerable time on each problem probably needed 
an immense amount of cognitive resources and deliberation to inhibit the deliberate-heuristic 
response and replace it with a deliberate-logical one. In other words, it might be possible that 
people have access to both intuitive-logical and deliberate-logical judgements. Thus the 
sequence of events would unfold as such: logical intutions come first, but are overridden by 
heuristic reflections, which might in turn be overridden by logical deliberations. There is the 
possibility that logical deliberations run parallel to heuristic deliberations, which allows or 
conflict detection between the two, and also means that if enough cognitive energy is 
invested in the judgement, people would be able to override the heuristic reflective response 
and replace it with the original logical response, thus making a logical-deliberative 
judgement. See Figure 6. 2 for an overview of the different dual process models displaying 
the relations between the intuitive and deliberative system. However, it is very important to 
state that at this point it is purely a theoretical claim that attempts to explain the roles that 
intuition and deliberation play when people make social judgements. In fact, this theory 
cannot be applied beyond the scope of conjunction and base rate judgements at the present 
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time. This theory was derived by attempting to consolidate the data found across these five 
experiments with the existing dual process theories of reasoning. It is crucial that further 
research is conducted, using valid and reliable methodologies, to test these theoretical claims. 
The dominant two-system view has been applied to many forms of complex cognitive 
activities (Darlow & Sloman, 2010; Reyna & Brainerd, 1995), thus the findings from this 
research program promise to have wide ranging implications for our understanding of how 
intuition and deliberation interact when we engage in such activities.  
 
 
Figure 6. 2. Four different theoretical models of the relation between the intuitive and 
deliberative systems. Deliberate processing is represented by grey bars and intuitive 
processing by white bars. The horizontal axis represents the flow of time. Dashed lines 
represent the optional nature of the triggered deliberative processing (adapted from De Neys, 
2012). The heuristic reflective model is originally proposed here (but see also Handley & 
Trippas, 2015) 
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Future research 
This thesis examined the effect of limiting people’s deliberation through the use of 
time pressure, ego depletion and cognitive load, and in doing so encouraged intuitive 
responding. Future research might consider ways to increase the potency of people’s logical 
intuitions. In other words, instead of constraining deliberation, one might explore ways to 
increase people’s trust in their logical intuitions. One example could be to prime intuitive 
responding before completing the CCPJ task. Bakhti (2018) used the scrambled sentence task 
to prime individuals before completing conjunction fallacy tasks and found that individuals 
who had been religiously primed committed more fallacies than those who had been 
reflectively primed. Additionally, one might look at adapting or developing a new task to test 
the interplay between intuition and logical assessments when they are on equal playing fields. 
It is important to improve on the current CCPJ task, and this new task should use non-binary 
response options to allow the researcher to gain more insight as to the mechanisms of 
reasoning when making these types of judgements. Dual process theorists suggest that 
heuristic processes are associative (e.g., Sloman, 1996). “One very important characteristic of 
outputs from associative processes is that they vary in strength. Thus, the output of heuristic 
processes should vary in strength, and the ability of analytic processes to control such outputs 
should, in turn, vary with the strength of the heuristic process” (Crisp & Feeney, 2009, p. 
2323). Indeed, the authors found that the rate of conjunction fallacies was higher for strongly 
related conjunctions than for weakly related ones, thus replicating the findings of Tversky 
and Kahneman (1983). However, they also found that strongly related conjunctions cued a 
much stronger heuristic output than the weak conjunctions, and the strength of this output 
determined the ease with which the analytical system inhibited the heuristic response. The 
authors suggest that “causal knowledge has a crucial influence on probabilistic reasoning” 
(Crisp & Feeney, 2009, p. 2331). The original Linda problem was designed to produce high 
rates of the conjunction fallacy, which is exactly what it does (e.g., circa 80% of all 
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participants commit the fallacy; Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). It has strong causal links 
between the events and was developed to compare a highly likely category with a highly 
unlikely one. The representativeness heuristic, which is evoked through the description, is 
what makes the conjunction so compelling in conflict scenarios. It would however, be 
interesting to see what happens in a task where intuition and logic are “pulled at” with equal 
strength. Something similar perhaps to the unrelated scenarios as described in Crisp and 
Feeney (2009; see Experiment 1). In all likelihood, people would probably still naturally 
want to deliberate as this has been evidenced throughout this research program. People 
engage unprompted and easily in deliberation, and it proved difficult at times to get them to 
respond using their intuitive thought only. Thus, one might expect lower rates of fallacies 
rather than a complete elimination. Another future research avenue might involve examining 
more closely the time it takes for the logical intuition to be overridden by the deliberative 
heuristic. There might be a “sweet spot”, or a range in time, when people are able to apply 
normative laws to their judgements (whether they are aware of doing so or not). This time 
frame may well differ across tasks. It did in this research program as seen between the 
conjunction fallacy and base rate neglect tasks, although this may be also due to the strength 
of the heuristic response. Identifying the moment at which heuristic deliberation 
“contaminates” logical intuition may provide an effective mean to minimise people’s 
propensity to commit the conjunction fallacy. 
  
  281 
References 
 
Abelson, R.P., & Levi, A. (1985). Decision making and decision theory. In G. Lindzey & E. 
Aronson (Eds.), Handbook of social psychology (Volume 1): Theory and method (pp. 
231– 309). New York: Random House.  
Albertazzi, L. (2006). Visual thought. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. 
Alos-Ferrer, C., & Hugelschafer, S. (2012). Faith in intuition and behavioural biases. Journal 
of Economic Behaviour & Organisation, 84, 182-192. doi: 
10.1016/j.jebo.2012.08.004  
Amodio, D. M., Master, S. L., Yee, C. M., & Taylor, S. E. (2008). Neurocognitive 
components of the behavioral inhibition and activation systems: Implications for 
theories of self-regulation. Psychophysiology, 45, 11-19. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-8986.2007.00609.x 
Arber, M. M., Ireland, M. J., Feger, R., Marrington, J., Tehan, J., and Tehan, G. (2017). Ego 
depletion in real-time: an examination of the sequential-task paradigm. Frontiers in 
Psychology, 8, 1-12. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01672 
Ashcraft, M. H., & Kirk, E. P. (2001). The relationship among working memory, math 
anxiety, and performance. Journal of Experiemntal Psychology: General, 130, 224-
237. doi: 10.1037/0096-3445.130.2.224 
Baddeley, A. (1992). Working Memory. Science, 225, 556-559. doi: 
10.1126/science.1736359 
Baddeley, A. (2000). The episodic buffer: A new component of working memory? Trends in 
Cognitive Science, 4, 417-423.  
Baddeley, A. D. (2007). Working memory, thought and action. Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press. Retrieved from 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198528012.001.0001 
  282 
Bago, B., & De Neys, W. (2017). Fast logic? Examining the time course assumption of dual 
process theory. Cognition, 158, 90-109. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2016.10.014 
Bago, B., & De Neys, W. (in press). The smart System 1: Evidence for the intuitive nature of 
correct responding on the bat-and-ball problem. Thinking & Reasoning. doi: 
10.1080/13546783.2018.1507949 
Bakhti, R. (2018). Religious versus reflective priming and susceptibility to the conjunction 
fallacy. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 32, 186-191. doi: 10.1002/acp.3394 
Ball, L. J., Philips, P., Wade, C. N., & Quayle, J. D. (2006). Effects of belief and logic on 
syllo- gistic reasoning: Eye-movement evidence for selective processing models. 
Experimental Psychology, 53, 77–86. 
Bamberger, P. A. & Bacharach, S. B. (2006). Abusive supervision and subordinate problem 
drinking: Taking resistance, stress and subordinate personality into account. Human 
Relations, 59, 723-752. doi: 10.1177/0018726706066852 
Bar-Hillel, M. (1980). The base rate fallacy in probability judgements. Acta Psychologica, 
44, 211-233. 
Bar-Hillel, M., & Neter, E. (1993). How alike is it versus how likely is it: A disjunction 
fallacy in probability judgements. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65, 
1119-1131. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514. 
Barbey, A. K., & Sloman, S. A. (2007). Base-rate respect: From ecological rationality to dual 
processes. Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 30, 241-256. 
Bargh, J. A., Chen, M., & Burrows, L. (1996). Automaticity of social behaviour: Direct 
effects of trait construct and stereotype activation on action. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 71, 230-244. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.71.2.230 
Bargh, J. A., Lee-Chai, A., Barndollar, K., Gollwitzer, P. M., & Trötschel, R. (2001). The 
automated will: Nonconscious activation and pursuit of behavioural Goals. Journal of 
Social Psychology, 81, 1014-1027. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.81.6.1014 
  283 
Barrett, L. F., Tugade, M. M., & Engle, R. W. (2004). Individual differences in working 
memory capacity and dual-process theories of the mind. Psychological Bulletin, 130, 
553-573. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.130.4.553 
Baumeister, R. F., and Vohs, K. D. (2016). Misguided effort with elusive implications. 
Perspectives on Psychological Science, 11, 574–575. doi: 
10.1177/1745691616652878 
Baumeister, R.F., Bratslavsky, E., Muraven, M., & Tice, D.M. (1998). Ego-depletion: Is the 
active self a limited resource? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 
1252-1265. 
Bethell-Fox, C. E., & Shepard, R. N. (1988). Mental rotation: Effects of stimulus complexity 
and familiarity. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and 
Performance, 14, 12-23. Doi: 10.1037/0096-1523.14.1.12 
Birnbaum, M. H. & Mellers, B. A. (1983). Bayesian inference: Combining base rates with 
opinions of sources who vary in credibility. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 45, 792-804. 
Böckenholt, U. (2012). The coginitve-miser response model: Testing for intuitive and 
deliberative reasoning. Psychometrika 77,388-399. doi: 10.1007/S11336-012-9251-Y 
Bonini, N., Tentori, K., & Osherson, D. (2004). A different conjunction fallacy. Mind & 
Language, 19, 199–210. doi: 10.111/j.1468-0017.2004.00254.x 
Bonner, C., & Newell, B. R. (2010). In conflict with ourselves? An investigation of heuristic 
and analytic processes in decision making. Memory & Cognition, 38, 186–196. 
Brotherton, R. & French, C. C. (2014). Belief in conspiracy theories and susceptibility to the 
conjunction fallacy. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 28, 238-248. doi: 
10.1002/acp.2995 
Cacioppo, J. T., & Petty, R. E. (1982). The need for cognition. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 42, 116-131.  
  284 
Camerer, C. (1995) “Individual Decision-making,” The Handbook of Experimental 
Economics, Eds. John Kagel and Alvin Roth. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Campos, F., Lincoln, D., Neves, M., Correia, W., & Soares, M. (2013). The conjunction 
fallacy and its impact in user’s data acquisition process. In: Marcus A. (eds) Design, 
User Experience, and Usability. Design Philosophy, Methods, and Tools. DUXU 
2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 8012. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. 
doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-39229-0_23 
Carter, E. C., Kofler, L. M., Forster, D. E., and McCullough, M. E. (2015). A series of meta-
analytic tests of the depletion effect: self-control does not seem to rely on a limited 
resource. Journal of Experimental Psychology General. 144, 796–815. doi: 
10.1037/xge0000083 
Carter, E. C., & McCullough, M. E. (2014). Publication bias and the limited strength model 
of self-control: has the evidence for ego depletion been overestimated? Frontiers in 
Psychology, 5, 1-11. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00823 
Charness, G., Karni, E., & Levin, D. (2010). On the conjunction fallacy in probability 
judgement: New experimental evidence regarding Linda. Games and Economic 
Behavior, 68, 551-556. doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2009.09.003 
Chen, Y, & Sun, Y. (2011). Age differences in financial decision-making: Using simple 
heuristics. Educational Gerontology, 29, 627-635. Doi: 10.1080/713844418 
Costa, A., & Kallick, B. (2000). Discovering and exploring habits of mind. Alexandria, VA: 
Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development. 
Costello, F.J. (2009). How probability theory explains the conjunction fallacy. Journal of 
Behavioural Decision Making, 22, 213-234. doi: 10/1037/a0037010 
Costello, F. & Watts, P. (2017). Explaining high conjunction fallacy rates: The probability 
theory plus noise account.  Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 30, 304-321. doi: 
10.1002/bdm.1936 
  285 
Crisp, A. K., & Feeney, A. (2009). Causal conjunction fallacies: the roles of causal strength 
and mental resources. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 62, 2320-37. 
doi: 10.1080/17470210902783638 
Darlow, A. L., & Sloman, S. A. (2010). Two systems of reasoning: architecture and relation 
to emotion. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science, 1, 382-392. doi: 
10.1002/wcs.34 
Dearden, T. E. (2018). The conjunction fallacy in profiles of victims of homicide. Journal of 
Investigative Psychology and Offender Profiling, 15, 187-199. doi: 10.1002/jip.1502 
Delazer, M., Domahs, F., Bartha, L., Brenneis, C., Lochy, A., Trieb, T., & Benke, T. (2003). 
Learning complex arithmetic – an fMRI study. Cognitive Brain Research, 18, 76-88. 
doi: 10.1016/j.cogbrainres.2003.09.005 
Denes-Raj, V., & Epstein, S. (1994). Conflict between intuitive and rational processing: 
When people behave against their better judgement. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 66, 819–829. 
De Neys, W. (2006a). Dual processing in reasoning: Two systems but one reasoner. 
Psychological Science, 17, 428-433. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01723.x 
De Neys, W. (2006b). Automatic-heuristic and executive-analytic processing during 
reasoning: Chronometric and dual-task considerations. The Quarterly Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 59, 1070-1100. doi: 10.1080/02724980543000123 
De Neys, W. (2009). Beyond response output: More logical than we think. Behavioral and 
Brain Sciences, 32, 87-88. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X09000326 
De Neys, W. (2012). Bias and Conflict: A Case for Logical Intuitions. Perspectives on 
Psychological Science, 7, 28 – 38.  
De Neys, W. (2013). Conflict detection, dual processes, and logical intuitions: Some 
clarifications. Thinking and Reasoning, 20, 169–187. doi:10.1080/13546783. 
2013.854725 
  286 
De Neys, W. (2015). Heuristic bias and conflict detection during thinking. Psychology of 
Learning and Motivation, 62, 1-32. doi: 10.1016/bs.plm.2014.09.001 
De Neys, W., & Bonnefon, J. F. (2013). The whys and whens of individual differences in 
thinking biases. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 17, 172-178. doi: 
10.1016/j.tics.2013.02.001 
De Neys, W., Cromheeke, S., & Osman, M. (2011). Biased but in doubt: Conflict and 
decision confidence. PLoS ONE, 6, 1-10. doi: 10.1371/ journal.pone.0015954  
De Neys, W., & Glumicic, T. (2008). Conflict monitoring in dual process theories of 
thinking. Cognition, 106, 1248-1299. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2007.06.002 
De Neys, W., & Feremans, V. (2013). Development of heuristic bias detection in elementary 
school. Developmental Psychology, 49, 258–69. 
De Neys, W., & Franssens, S. (2009). Belief inhibition during thinking: Not always winning 
but at least taking part. Cognition, 113, 45–61. 
De Neys, W., Moyens, E., & Vansteenwegen, D. (2010). Feeling we’re biased: Autonomic 
arousal and reasoning conflict. Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience, 10, 
208–216. doi: 10.3758/CABN.10.2.208 
De Neys, W., & Schaeken, W. (2007). When people are more logical under cognitive load: 
Dual task impact on scalar implicature. Experimental Psychology, 54, 128-133. 
https://doi.org/10.1027/1618-3169.54.2.128 
De Neys, W., Vartanian, O., & Goel, V. (2008). Smarter than we think: When our brains 
detect that we are biased. Psychological Science, 19, 483-489. 
Denis, M., Logie, R., & Cornoldo, C. (2012). The processing of visuo-spatial information: 
Neuropsychological and neuroimaging investigations. In Imagery, Language and 
Visuo-Spatial Thinking (pp. 81-102). Hove, US: Psychology Press.  
  287 
Devine, P.G. & Moneith, M.J. (1999). Automaticity and Control in Stereotyping. In S. 
Chaiken & Y. Trope (Eds.), Dual Process Theories in Social Psychology (pp. 339-
360). New York: The Guilford Press. 
Dickman, S. J. (1990). Functional and dysfunctional impulsivity: Personality and cognitive 
correlate. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 58, 95-102. 
Droll, J.A., & Hayhoe, M.M. (2007). Trade-offs between gaze and working memory use. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 33, 1352-
1365. Doi: 10.1037/0096-1523.33.6.1352. 
Duffy, S. A, & Keir, J. A. (2004). Violating stereotypes: Eye movements and comprehension 
processes when text conflicts with world knowledge. Memory & Cognition, 32, 551-
559. 
Epstein, S. (1994). Intergration of the Cognitive and the Psychodynamic Unconscious. 
American Psychologist, 49, 709-724. doi: 10.1037//0003-066X.49.8.709. 
Epstein, S., Pacini, R., Denes-Raj, V., & Heiser, H. (1996). Individual differences in intuitive 
– Experiential and analytical – Rational thinking styles. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 2, 390–405. Available from: 
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Seymour_Epstein/publication/14436248_Individ
ual_Differences_in_Intuitive-Experiential_and_Analytical-
Rational_Thinking_Styles/links/5588bd7308aeb2994444a7bb/Individual-Differences-
in-Intuitive-Experiential-and-Analytical-Rational-Thinking-Styles.pdf 
Erceg, N. & Galić, Z. (2014). Overconfidence bias and conjunction fallacy in predicting 
outcomes of football matches. Journal of Economic Psychology, 42, 52-62. doi: 
10.1016/j.joep.2013.12.003 
Evans, A. M., Dillon, K. D., & Rand, D. G. (2015). Fast but not intuitive, slow but not 
reflective: Decsion conflict drives reaction times in social dilemmas. Journal of 
Exerimental Psychology: General, 144, 951-966. Doi: 10.1037/xge0000107 
  288 
Evans, J. St. B. T. (1984). Heuristic and analytic processes in reasoning. British Journal of 
Psychology, 75, 451–468. 
Evans, J.St.B.T. (2003). In two minds: Dual-process accounts of reasoning. Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences, 7, 454–459. Doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2003.08.012. 
Evans, J. S. B. T. (2006). The heuristic-analytic theory of reasoning: Extension and 
evaluation. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 13, 378–395. Doi:10.3758/BF03193858. 
Evans, J. St. B. T. (2007). On the resolution of conflict in dual- process theories of reasoning. 
Thinking & Reasoning, 13, 321–329. doi: 10.1080/13546780601008825 
Evans, J. St. B. T. (2008). Dual-processing accounts of reasoning, judgement, and social 
cognition. Annual Review of Psychology, 59, 255-278. 
Evans, J. St. B. T. (2009). How many dual process theories do we need: One, two or many? 
In J. St. B. T. Evans & K. Frankish (Eds.), In two minds: Dual processes and beyond 
(pp. 33–54). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Evans, J. St. B. T. (2010). Intuition and reasoning: A dual process perspective. Psychological 
Inquiry, 21, 313–326. 
Evans, J. St. B. T., & Curtis-Holmes, J. (2005). Rapid responding increases belief bias: 
Evidence for the dual-process theory of reasoning. Thinking & Reasoning, 11, 382-
389. doi: 10.1080/13546780542000005 
Evans, J. St. B. T., & Over, D. E. (1996). Rationality and reasoning. Hove, UK: Psychology 
Press. 
Evans, J. S. B. T., & Stanovich, K. E. (2013). Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition: 
Advancing the debate. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 8, 223-241. doi: 
10.1177/1745691612460685. 
Featherstone, C. R., & Sturt, P. (2010). Because there was a cause for concern: An 
investigation into a word specific prediction account of the implicit-causality effect. 
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 63, 3-15.  
  289 
Feeney, A., Shafto, P., & Dunning, D. (2007). Who is susceptible to conjunction fallacies in 
category-based induction? Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 14, 884-889.  
Fiedler, K. (1988). The dependence of the conjunction fallacy on subtle linguistic factors. 
Psychological Research, 50, 123-129. doi: 10.1007/BF00309212 
Fisk, J. E. (2002). Judgements under uncertainty: Representativeness or potential surprise? 
British Journal of Psychology, 93, 431-449.  
Fisk, J. E., & Pidgeon, N. (1996). Component probabilities and the conjunction fallacy: 
Resolving signed summation and the low component model in a contingent approach. 
Acta Psychologica, 94, 1-20. 
Fiske, S. T., & Taylor, S. E. (1991). McGraw-Hill series in social psychology. Social 
cognition (2nd ed.). New York, NY, England: Mcgraw-Hill Book Company. 
Franssens, S., & De Neys, W. (2009). The effortless nature of conflict detection during 
thinking.  Thinking & Reasoning, 15, 105-128. doi: 10.1080/13546780802711185f 
Frederick, S. (2005). Cognitive reflection and decision making. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 19, 25–42. 
Freud, S. (1961). The ego and the id. In J. Strachey (Ed. and Trans.), The standard edition of 
the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol 19, pp. 12-66). London: 
Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1923). 
Friedman, R. S., & Förster, J. (2000). The effects of approach and avoidance motor actions 
on the elements of creative insight. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79, 
477-492. 
Gaissmaier, W., Fific, M. & Rieskamp, J. (2011). Analyzing response times to understand 
decision processes. In M. Schulte-Mecklenbeck, A. Kühberger & R. Ranyard (Eds.), 
A handbook of process tracing methods for decision research: A critical review and 
user’s guide (pp. 141-162). New York and Hove: Psychology Press. 
  290 
Gailliot, M. T., Baumeister, R. F., DeWall, C. N., Maner, J. K., Plant, E. A., Tice, D. M., et 
al. (2007). Self-control relies on glucose as a limited energy source: Willpower is 
more than a metaphor. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92, 325–336. 
Gerrard, M., Gibbons, F. X., Houlihan, A. E., Stock, M. L., & Pomery, E. A. (2008). A dual-
process approach to health risk decision making: The prototype willingness model. 
Developmental Review, 28, 29-61. Doi: 10.1016/j.dr.2007.10.001.  
Gidlof, K., Wallin, A., Dewhurst, R. & Holmqvist, K. (2013). Gaze behaviour during 
decision making in a natural environment. Journal of Eye Movement Research, 6, 1-
14. Doi: 10.16910/jemr.6.1.3. 
Gigerenzer, G. (1994). Why the distinction between single-event probabilities and 
frequencies is relevant for psychology (and vice versa). In G. Wright & P. Ayton 
(Eds.), Subjective probability (pp. 129- 161). New York: Wiley. 
Gigerenzer, G. (1996). On narrow norms and vague heuristics: A reply to Kahneman and 
Tversky (1996). Psychological Review, 103, 592–596. 
Gigerenzer, G. & Gaissmaier, W. (2011). Heuristic Decision Making. Annual Review of 
Psychology, 62, 451-482. doi: 10.1146/annurev-psych-120709-145346 
Gigerenzer, G., & Regier, T. (1996). How do we tell an association from a rule?: Comment 
on Sloman (1996). Psychological Bulletin, 119, 23–26. 
Glaholt, M. G., & Reingold, E. M. (2011). Eye movement monitoring as a process tracing 
methodology in decision making research. Journal of Neuroscience, Psychology, and 
Ecomonics, 4, 125-146. doi: 10.1037/a0020692 
Glöckner, A., & Herbold, A. K. (2011). An eye-tracking study on information processing in 
risky decisions: Evidence for compensatory strategies based on automatic processes. 
Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 24, 71-98. 
  291 
Glöckner, A., & Witteman, C. (2010). Beyond dual-process models: A categorisation of 
processes underlying intuitive judgment and decision making. Thinking & Reasoning, 
16, 1-25. 
Hagger, M. S., Chatzisarantis, N. L. D., Alberts, H., Anggono, C. O., Batailler, C., Birt, A. 
R., . . . Zwienenberg, M. (2016). A multilab preregistered replication of the ego-
depletion effect. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 11, 546–573. Doi: 
10.1177/1745691616652873. 
Hagger, M. S., Wood, C., Stiff, C., & Chatzisarantis, N. L. D. (2010). Ego depletion and the 
strength model of self-control: A meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 136, 495-525. 
Doi: 10.1037/a0019486 
Handley, S. J., Newstead, S. E., & Trippas, D. (2011). Logic, beliefs, and instruction: A test 
of the default interventionist account of belief bias. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 37, 28-43. doi: 10.1037/a0021098 
Handley, S. J., & Trippas, D. (2015). Dual processes, knowledge, and structure: A critical 
evaluation of the default interventionist account of biases in reasoning and judgement. 
Psychology of Learning and Motivation, 62, 33–56. doi: 10.1016/bs.plm.2014.09.002 
Hertwig, R., Benz, B., & Krauss, S. (2008). The conjunction fallacy and the many meanings 
of and. Cognition, 108, 740-753. 
Hertwig, R. & Gigerenzer, G. (1999). The “conjunction fallacy” revised: How intelligent 
inferences look like reasoning errors. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 12, 
275-305 
Heuristic. (2019). Online Etymology Dictionary. Retrieved from 
https://www.etymonline.com/columns/post/links?utm_source=etymonline_footer&ut
m_medium=link_exchange 
Hoppe, E.I., Kusterer, D.J. (2011). Behavioral biases and cognitive reflection. Economics 
Letters 110, 97–100. 
  292 
Horstmann, N., Ahlgrimm, A., & Glöckner, A. (2009). How distinct are intuition and 
deliberation? An eye-tracking analysis of instruction-induced decision modes. 
Judgement and Decision Making, 4, 335-354. 
Houdé, O., & Moutier, S. (2003). Judgement under uncertainty and conjunction fallacy 
inhibition training. Thinking and Reasoning, 9, 185-201. doi: 
10.1080/13546780343000213. 
Houdé, O., Zago, L., Mellet, E., Moutier, S., Pineau, A., Mazoyer, B., & Tzourio-Mazoyer, 
N. (2000). Shifting from the perceptual brain to the logical brain: The neural impact 
of cognitive inhibition training. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 12, 721-728. 
Howarth, S., Handley, S., & Walsh, C. (2018). The logic sense: Exploring the role of 
executive functioning in belief and logic-based judgements. Thinking and Reasoning, 
1-33. doi: 10.1080/13546783.2018.1523808 
Howarth, S., Handley, S., & Walsh, C. (2016). The logic-bias effect: The role of effortful 
processing in the resolution of belief-logic conflict. Memory and Cognition, 44, 330-
349. doi: 10.3758/s1342  
Inzlicht, M., & Gutsell, J. N. (2007). Running on empty: Neural signals for self-control 
failure. Psychological Science, 18, 933–937. 
Job, V., Dweck, C. S., & Walton, G. M. (2010). Ego depletion – Is it all in your head? 
Implicit theories about willpower affect self-regulation. Psychological Science, 21, 
1686-1693. Doi: 10.1177/0956797610384745. 
Johnson, E.D., Tubau, E., & De Neys, W. (2016). The doubting system 1: Evidence for 
automatic substitution sensitivity. Acta Psychologica, 164, 56-64. doi: 
10.1016/j.actpsy.2015.12.008  
Kahneman, D. (1991). Judgment and decision making: A personal view. Psychological 
Science, 2, 142-145. 
Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. London, UK: Penguin Group. 
  293 
Kahneman, D. (2003). A perspective on judgement and choice: mapping bounded rationality. 
The American Psychologist, 58, 697-720. 
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002). Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in 
intuitive judgment. In T. Gilovich, D. Griffin, & D. Kahneman (Eds.), Heuristics and 
biases: The psychology of intuitive judgment (p. 49-81). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Kahneman D., & Tversky A. (1972). Subjective Probability: A Judgment of 
Representativeness. Cognitive Psychology, 3, 430-454. doi: 10.1007/978-94-010-
2288-0_3 
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1973). On the psychology of prediction. Psychological 
Review, 80, 237–251. doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.90.4.293 
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. 
Econometrica, 47, 263-291. 
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1996). On the reality of cognitive illusions. Psychological 
Review, 103, 582-591. 
Koriat, A. (1993). How do we know that we know? The accessibility model of the feeling of 
knowing. Psychological Review, 100, 609–639. 
Krajbich, I., Bartling, B., Hare, T., & Fehr, E. (2015). Rethinking fast and slow based on a 
critique of reaction-time reverse inference. Nature Communications, 6, 1-9. doi: 
10.1038/ncomms8455 
Lu, Y. (2015). Is experiential-intuitive cognitive style more inclined to err on conjunction 
fallacy than analytical-rational cognitive style? Frontiers in Psychology, 6, 1-8. doi: 
10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00085. 
Lurquin, J. H., Michaelson, L. E., Barker, J. E., Gustavson, D. E., von Bastian, C. C., 
Carruth, N. P., & Miyake, A. (2016). No evidence of the ego-depletion effect across 
  294 
task characteristics and individual differences: a pre-registered study. PLoS One, 11, 
1-20. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0147770 
Martijn, C., Tenbült, P., Merckelbach, H., Dreezens, E., & de Vries, N.K. (2002). Getting a 
grip on ourselves: Challenging expectations about loss of energy after self-control. 
Social Cognition, 20, 441–460. Doi: 10.1521/soco.20.6.441.22978 
Martin, L. E. & Potts, G. F. (2009). Impulsivity in decision-making: An event-related 
potential investigation. Personality and Individual Differences, 46, 303-308. doi: 
10.1016/j.paid.2008.10.019 
Masicampo, E. J., & Baumeister, R. F. (2008). Toward a physiology of dual-process 
reasoning and judgment: lemonade, willpower, and expensive rule-based analysis. 
Psychological Science, 19, 255-60. 
Meade, A. W., & Craig, S. B. (2012). Identifying careless responses in survey data. 
Psychological Methods, 17, 437-455. doi: 10.1037/a0028085  
Medin, D., Coley, J. D., Storms, G., & Hayes, B. (2003). A relevance theory of induction. 
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 10, 517-532. 
Mellers, B., Hertwig, R., & Kahneman, D. (2001). DO frequency representations eliminate 
conjunction effects? An exercise in adversarial collaboration. Psychological Science, 
12, 269-275. 
Mevel, K,, Poirel, N., Rossi, S., Cassotti, M., Simon, G., Houdé, O., &De Neys, W. (2015). 
Bias detection: Response confidence evidence for conflict detection sensitivity in the 
ratio bias task. Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 27, 227-237. doi: 
10.1080/20445911.2014.986487 
Miles, J., & Shevlin, M. (2001). Applying regression and correlation: A guide for students 
and researchers. London: Sage. 
Miyake, A., Friedman, N.P., Rettinger, D.A., Shah, P., & Hegarty, M. (2001). How are 
visuospatial working memory, executive functioning, and spatial abilities related? A 
  295 
latent-variable analysis. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 130, 621–640. 
Doi. 10.1037/0096-3445.130.4.621. 
Moeller, F. G., Barratt, E. S., Dougherty, D. M., Schmitz, J. M., Swann, A. C. (2001). 
Psychiatric aspects of impulsivity. American Journal of Psychiatry, 158, 1783–1793. 
Moller, A.C., Deci, E.L., & Ryan, R.M. (2006). Choice and ego- depletion: The moderating 
role of autonomy. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 32, 1024–1036. 
Moors, A., & de Houwer, J. (2006). Automaticity: A theoretical and conceptual analysis. 
Psychological Bulletin, 132, 297–326. 
Moro, R. (2009). On the nature of the conjunction fallacy. Synthese, 71, 1-24. doi: 
10.1007/s11229-008-9377-8 
Morsanyi, K., & Handley, S. J. (2012). Logic feels so good—I like it! Evidence for intuitive 
detection of logicality in syllogistic reasoning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 38, 596-616. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0026099 
Moutier, S., & Houdé, O. (2003). Judgement under uncertainty and conjunction fallacy 
inhibition training. Thinking & Reasoning, 9, 185-201. doi: 
10.1080/13546780343000213 
Muraven, M., Collins, R. L., & Nienhaus, K. (2002). Self-control and alcohol restraint. An 
initial application of the self-control strength model. Psychology of Addictive 
Behaviors, 16, 113–120. 
Muraven, M., Tice, D. M., & Baumeister, R. F. (1998). Self-control as a limited resource: 
regulatory depletion patterns. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 774–
789. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.74.3.774. 
Muraven, M., & Slessareva, E. (2003). Mechanism of self-control failure: Motivation and 
limited resource. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29, 894–906. Doi: 
10.1177/0146167203253209. 
  296 
Myers, L., Downiw, S., Taylor, G., Marrington, J., Tehan, G., & Irelands, M. J. (2018). 
Understanding performance decrements in a letter-cancelling task: Overcoming habits 
or inhibition of reading. Frontiers in Psychology, 9, 1-15. Doi: 
10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00711. 
Obrecht, N. A., Chapman, G. B., & Gelman, R. (2009). An encounter frequency account of 
how experience affects likelihood estimation. Memory & Cognition, 37, 632–643. 
Oechssler, J., Roider, A., & Schmitz, P. W. (2009). Cognitive abilities and behavioural 
biases. Journal of Economic Behaviour & Organization, 72, 147-152. doi: 
10.1016/j.jebo.2009.04.018 
O’Hagan, A., Buck, C. E., Daneshkhan, A., Eliser, J. R., Garthwaite, P. H., Jenkinson, D. 
J.,…Rakow, T. (2006). Uncertain Judgements: Eliciting experts’ probabilities. West 
Sussex, UK: Wiley. 
Pacini, R., & Epstein, S. (1999). The relation of rational and experiential information 
processing styles to personality, basic beliefs and the ratio-bias phenomenon. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 76, 972–987. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.76.6.972 
Patton, J.H., Stanford, M.S., & Barratt, E.S. (1995). Factor structure of the Barratt 
Impulsiveness Scale. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 6, 768-774. 
Pennycook, Fugelsang and Koehler (2012). Are we good at detecting conflict during 
reasoning? Cognition, 124, 101-106. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2012.04.004 
Pennycook, G. & Thompson, V. A. (2012). Reasoning with base rates is routine, relatively 
effortless, and context dependent. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 19, 528-534. Doi: 
10.3758/s13423-012-0249-3. 
Pennycook, G., Trippas, D., Handley, S. J., & Thompson, V. A. (2013). Base rates: Both 
neglected and intuitive. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and 
Cognition, 40, 544-554. doi: 10.1037/a0034887 
  297 
Pieters, R., & Warlop, L. (1999). Visual attention during brand choice: The impact of time 
pressure and task motivation. International Journal of Research Marketing, 16, 1-16. 
Pogue, A., Kurumada, C., & Tanenhaus, M. K. (2015). Talker-Specific Generalization of 
Pragmatic Inferences based on Under- and Over-Informative Prenominal Adjective 
Use. Frontiers in Psychology, 6, 1-18. http://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.02035 
Posner, M. I., Snyder, C. R. R., & Davidson, B. J. (1980). Attention and the detection of 
signals. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 109, 160–174. 
Recalde, M. P., Riedl, A. & Vesterlunde, L. (2014). Error prone inference from response 
time: The case of intuitive generosity. CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4987. 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2507723 (Date of access: 17/01/2019) 
Reeves, T. & Lockhart, R. S. (1993). Distributional versus singular approaches to probability 
and errors in probabilistic reasoning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 
122, 207-226. 
Reisen, N., Hoffrage, U., & Mast, F.W. (2008). Identifying decision strategies in consumer 
choice situation. Judgement and Decision Making, 3, 641-658.  
Reverberi, C., Pischedda, D., Burigo, M., & Cherubini, P. (2012). Deduction without 
awareness. Acta Psychologica, 139, 244-253.doi:10.1016/j.actpsy.2011.09.011 
Reyna, V. F. (1991). Class inclusion, the conjunction fallacy, and other cognitive illusions. 
Developmental Review, 11, 317-336. 
Reyna, V. F. (2012). A new intuitionism: Meaning, memory, and development in Fuzzy-trace 
theory. Judgment and Decision Making, 7, 332-359.  
Reyna, V. F., & Brainerd, C. J. (1995). Fuzzy-trace theory: An interim synthesis. Learning 
and Individual Differences, 7, 1-75. doi: 10.1016/1041-6080(95)90031-4 
Reyna, V. F., & Brainerd, C. J. (2008). Numeracy, ratio bias, and denominator neglect in 
judgments of risk and probability. Learning and Individual Differences, 18, 89–107. 
doi:10.1016/j.lindif.2007.03.011 
  298 
Reyna, V.F., Lloyd, F.J., & Brainerd, C.J. (2003). Memory, development, and rationality: An 
integrative theory of judgement and decision- making. In S. Schneider & J. Shanteau 
(Eds.), Emerging perspectives on judgment and decision research (pp. 201–245). New 
York: Cambridge University Press.  
Rieger, M. O. (2012). Why do investors buy bad financial products? Probability 
misestimation and preferences in financial investment decision.  Journal of 
Behavioral Finance, 13, 108-118. doi: 10.1080/15427560.2012.680991 
Riis, J. & Schwarz, N. (2003). Approaching and avoiding Linda: Motor signals influence the 
conjunction fallacy. Social Cognition, 21, 247-262.  
Russo, J.E. (2011). Eye fixations as a process trace. In M. Schulte-Mecklenbeck, A. 
Kühberger & R. Ranyard (Eds.), A handbook of process tracing methods for decision 
research: A critical review and user’s guide (pp. 43-64). New York and Hove: 
Psychology Press. 
Russo, J. E., Johnson, E. J., & Stephens, D. L. (1989). The validity of verbal protocols. 
Memory & Cognition, 17, 759–769. 
Salthouse, T. A., & Babcock, R. L. (1991). Decomposing adult age differences in working 
memory. Developmental Psychology, 27, 763-776. doi: 10.1037/0012-1649.27.5.763 
Saxe, G. (1988). The mathematics of child street vendors. Child Development, 59, 1415-
1425. 
Schmeichel, B. J., Harmon-Jones, C. & Harmon-Jones, E. (2010). Exercising self-control 
increases approach motivation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 99, 
162-173. doi: 10.1037/a0019797 
Schmeichel, B. J., & Vos, K. (2009). Self-affirmation and self-control: Affirming core values 
counteracts ego depletion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 96, 770-
782. doi: 10.1037/a0014635 
  299 
Shiloh, S., Salton, E., & Sharabi, D. (2002). Individual differences in rational and intuitive 
thinking styles as predictors of heuristic responses and framing effects. Personality 
and Individual Differences, 32, 415-429. 
Sides, A., Osherson, D., Bonini, N. & Viale, R. (2002). On the reality of the conjunction 
fallacy. Memory and Cognition, 30, 191–198. doi: 10.3758/BF03195280 
Sinayev, A., & Peters, E. (2015). Cognitive reflection vs. calculation in decision making. 
Frontiers in Psychology, 6, 1-16. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00532 
Sloman, S. A. (1996). The empirical case for two systems of reasoning. Psychological 
Bulletin, 119, 3–22. 
Sloman, S. A., Over, D., Slovak, L., & Stibel, J. M. (2003). Frequency illusions and other 
fallacies. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 91, 296-309. 
doi:10.1016/S0749-5978(03)00021-9 
Spivey, M., Richardson, D.C., & Dale, R. (2009). Movements of eye and hand in language 
and cognition. In E. Morsella, J. Bargh, & P.M. Gollwitzer (Eds.), The psychology of 
action (Vol. 2, pp. 225-249). New York: Oxford University Press. 
Sripada, C., Kessler, D., & Jonides, J. (2014). Methylphenidate blocks effort-induced 
depletion of regulatory control in healthy volunteers. Psychological Science, 25, 
1227-1234.  
Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (1998). Individual differences in rational thought. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General, 127, 161-188. 
Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (2000). Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for 
the rationality debate [Target article and commentaries]. Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences, 23, 645–726. 
Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (2008). On the relative independence of thinking biases and 
cognitive ability. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 94, 672-695. Doi: 
0.1037/0022-3514.94.4.672 
  300 
Stanovich, K. E., West, R. F., & Toplak, M. E. (2011). The complexity of developmental 
predictions from dual process models. Developmental Review, 31, 103-118. doi: 
10.1016/j.dr.2011.07.003 
Stupple, E. J. N., & Ball, L. J. (2008). Belief-logic conflict resolution in syllogistic reasoning: 
Inspection-time evidence for a parallel-process model. Thinking and Reasoning, 14, 
168-181. doi: 10.1080/13546780701739782 
Stupple, E. J. N., Ball, L. J., Ellis, D. (2013). Matching bias in syllogistic reasoning: 
Evidence for a dual process account from response times and confidence ratings. 
Thinking & Reasoning, 19, 54-77. doi: 10.1080/13546783.2012.735622 
Stupple, E. J. N., Gale, M., & Richmond, C. R. (2013). Working memory, cognitive 
miserliness and logic as predictors of performance on the Cognitive Reflection Test. 
Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science society, 35, 1396-1401. 
Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society. Retrieved from 
https://escholarship.org/content/qt36989187/qt36989187.pdf 
Teigen, K. H. (2004). Judgement by representativeness. In R. Pohl (Ed.), Cognitive illusions: 
Handbook on fallacies and biases in thinking, judgement, and memory (pp. 165-182). 
Hove, UK: Psychology Press. 
Tentori, K., Bonini, N., & Osherson, D. (2004). The conjunction fallacy: a misunderstanding 
about conjunction? Cognitive Science, 28, 467-477. 
Thompson, V. A., & Johnson, S. C. (2014). Conflict, metacognition, and analytic thinking. 
Thinking & Reasoning, 20, 215-244. doi: 10.1080/13546783.2013.869763 
Thompson, V. A., Prowse Turner, J. A., & Pennycook, G. (2011). Intuition, reason, and 
metacognition. Cognitive Psychology, 63, 107-140. doi: 
0.1016/j.cogpsych.2011.06.001 
Thurstone, L.L. (1927). The nature of intelligence. New York: Harcourt. 
  301 
Tice, D.M., Baumeister, R.F., Shmueli, D., & Muraven, M. (2007). Restoring the self: 
Positive affect helps improve self-regulation following ego depletion. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 43, 379–384. 
Tice, D. M., & Bratslavsky, E. (2000). Giving in to feel good: The place of emotion 
regulation in the context of general self-control. Psychological Inquiry, 11, 149-159. 
doi: 10.1207/S15327965PLI1103_03 
Toplak, M. E., Liu, E., Macpherson, R., Toneatto, T., & Stanovich, K. E. (2007). The 
reasoning skills and thinking dispositions of problem gamblers: A dual-process 
taxonomy. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 20, 103-124. doi: 
10.1002/bdm.544 
Toplak, M. E., West, R.F., & Stanovich, K. E. (2011). The Cognitive Reflection Test as a 
predictor of performance on heuristics-and-biases tasks. Memory and Cognition, 39, 
1275-1289. Doi: 10.3758/s13421-011-0104-1. 
Toyosawa, J., & Karasawa, K. (2004). Individual differences on judgment using the ratio-bias 
and the Linda problem: Adopting CEST and Japanese version of REI. The Japanese 
Journal of Social Psychology 20, 85–92. 
Travers, E., Rolison, J. J., & Feeney, A. (2016). The time course of conflict on the Cognitive 
Reflection Test. Cognition, 150, 109-118. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2016.01.015 
Tremoliere, B. & De Neys, W. (2014). When intuitions are helpful: Prior beliefs can support 
reasoning in the bat-and-ball problem. Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 26, 486-490. 
doi:10.1080/20445911.2014.899238 
Trippas, D., Handley, S. J., Verde, M. F., & Morsanyi, K. (2016). Logic brightens my day: 
Evidence for implicit sensitivity to logical validity. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 42, 1448-1457. doi: 
10.1037/xlm0000248 
  302 
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1971). The belief in the law of small numbers. Psychological 
Bulletin, 76, 105-110. 
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. 
Science, 185, 1124–1131. 
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1982). Judgement under uncertainty: heuristics and biases. In 
D. Kahneman, P. Slovic, & A. Tversky, Judgement under uncertainty: Heuristics and 
biases (pp. 3-20). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1983). Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The 
conjunction fallacy in probability judgment. Psychological Review, 90, 293-315. 
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1992). Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative 
Representation of Uncertainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5, 297-323. 
Varey, C. A., Mellers, B. A., & Birnbaum, M. H. (1990). Judgments of proportions. Journal 
of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 16, 613-625. 
Vartanian, O., Beatty, E. L., Smith, I., Blackler, K., Lam, Q., Forbes, S., & De Neys, W. 
(2018). The reflective mind: Examining individual differences in susceptibility to 
base rate neglect with fmri. Journal od Cognitive Neuroscience, 30, 1011-1022. doi: 
10.1162/jocn_a_01264 
van Raaij, F. W. (1977). Consumer information processing for different information 
structures and formats. Advances in Consumer Research, 4, 176–184. 
Velichkovsky, B., Dornhoefer, S., Kopf, M., Helmert, J., & Joos, M. (2002). Change 
detection and occlusion modes in road-traffic scenarios. Transportation Research 
Part F: Traffic Psychology and Behaviour, 5, 99-109.  
Villejoubert, G. (2009). Are representativeness judgments automatic and rapid? The effect of 
time pressure on the conjunction fallacy. Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the 
Cognitive Science society, 30, 2980–2985. Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society. 
Retrieved from http://141.14.165.6/CogSci09/papers/655/paper655.pdf 
  303 
Villejoubert, G. (2011). Rethinking the Role of Intuition in the Conjunction Fallacy. In W. 
Brun, G. Keren, G. Kirkebøen, & H. Montgomery (Eds.). Perspectives on Thinking, 
Judging, and Decision Making (pp. 109–119). Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. 
Vohs, K. D., & Heatherton, T. F. (2000). Self-regulatory failure: A resource-depletion 
approach. Psychological Science, 11, 249–254. 
Welsh, M. B., Burns, N. R., & Delfabbro, P. H. (2013). The Cognitive Reflection Test: how 
much more than numerical ability? Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive 
Science society, 35, 1587-1592. Retrieved from 
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/68n012fh 
Whiteside, S. P. & Lynam, D. R. (2001). The Five Factor Model and impulsivity: using a 
structural model of personality to understand impulsivity. Personality and Individual 
Differences, 30, 669-689. doi:10.1016/S0191-8869(00)00064-7 
Wilson Van Voorhis, C.R., & Morgan, B.L. (2007). Understanding power and rules of thumb 
for determining sample sizes. Tutorial in Quantitative Methods for Psychology, 3, 43-
50. 
Wojciechowski, B. W., & Pothos, E. M. (2018). Is there a conjunction fallacy in legal 
probabilistic decision making? Frontiers in Psychology, 9, 1-11. doi: 
10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00391 
Xu, X., Demos, K. E., Leahey, T. M., Hart, C. N., Trautvetter, J., Coward, P.,…Wing, R. R. 
(2014). Failure to replicate depletion of self-control. PLoS One, 9, 1-5. doi: 
10.1371/journal.pone.0109950 
 
 
 
  
  304 
Appendix A: Comparative Conjunction Probability Judgement Task 
 
 Description Statement Statement 
Type 
Example 1 Henry is 44 years old. He 
lives in Africa and he is 
passionate about wild 
animals. He drives a jeep. 
He loves documentaries and 
adventure books. During his 
free time, he helps the 
inhabitants of a neighboring 
village build a well. 
 
Henry is more likely to be a 
photographer and work in an 
animal testing lab than he is 
to be a photographer. 
U&I 
Example 2 Jesse is 28 years old. She 
enjoys meeting new people 
and traveling to unusual 
countries.  She has excellent 
team building skills and is 
very athletic. In her spare 
time she likes to go hiking 
and play paintball. 
Jesse is more likely to be a 
soldier than a beauty salon 
owner and a soldier. 
R&L 
Example 3 Julia is 35 years old.  She 
plays kick-boxing. She is a 
member of the 
neighbourhood watch. She 
drives a truck. She has 
excellent problem-solving 
skills. She is confident and 
copes well with difficult 
situations. 
Julia is more likely to be a 
florist and a firefighter than 
she is to be a florist. 
R/I 
Trial 1 Linda is 31 years old. She is 
single, outspoken, and very 
bright. She has a Degree in 
philosophy. As a student, 
she was deeply concerned 
with issues of 
discrimination and social 
justice, and also 
participated in anti-nuclear 
demonstrations. 
 
Linda is more likely to be a 
feminist than she is to be a 
feminist and a cashier. 
R&L 
Trial 2 Johnny is 29 years old. He 
is a fan of punk and hard 
rock music. He likes to 
wear leather. He owns a 
Harley-Davidson and takes 
part in biker rallies every 
year. He has a Rottweiler 
named Rex. 
Johnny is more likely to 
work as a bouncer and give 
ballet lessons than he is to 
give ballet lessons. 
R/I 
  305 
 
Trial 3 Ronald is 31 years old. He 
likes candlelight dinners 
and watching the sunset. He 
collects antique books and 
is particularly fond of 
medieval poetry. On 
Sundays, he enjoys taking 
his poodle for a walk in the 
countryside. 
 
Ronald is more likely to be a 
war General than he is to 
write romantic novels and be 
a war general. 
U/L 
Trial 4 Sarah is 43 years old. Since 
her childhood, she has 
always been passionate 
about mystery stories. She 
has an intuitive mind and is 
very sensitive. She wears 
colourful clothes and many 
jewels. She likes to read 
romance novels. 
 
Sarah is more likely to work 
as a foreman and be a 
fortune-teller than she is to 
be a fortune teller. 
 
U&I 
Trial 5 Bill is 34 years old. He is 
intelligent, but 
unimaginative, compulsive, 
and generally lifeless. In 
school, he was strong in 
mathematics but weak in 
social studies and 
humanities. 
 
Bill is more likely to work 
as an accountant than he is 
to play in a rock band during 
his free time and work as an 
accountant.  
 
R&L 
Trial 6 Thomas is 10 years old. He 
gets along very well with 
his brothers and sisters. At 
school, he is very shy. His 
favourite pastimes are 
reading, drawing and 
solving puzzles. He dreams 
that he will become a doctor 
later on in life. 
 
Thomas is more likely to be 
unruly and studious than he 
is to be unruly.  
R/I 
Trial 7 Christine is 25 years old. 
She likes to be alone and 
has few friends. She wears 
black, listens to metal 
music, and is fascinated by 
death. She likes to read 
vampire stories. 
 
Christine is more likely to be 
a ballerina than she is to be a 
Goth and a ballerina. 
 
U/L 
Trial 8 Mike is 23 years old. He 
studied economics for his 
A-levels. He is bilingual 
Mike is more likely to give 
chemistry lessons and work 
U&I 
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and likes to travel. He 
follows the news closely 
and is attuned to the latest 
happenings around him. 
 
as a journalist than he is to 
work as a journalist.  
Trial 9 Chris is 19 years old. He 
has long hair and several 
piercings on his face. He 
has a tattoo on his right 
forearm. He participated in 
protests against genetically-
modified crops. He works 
as a volunteer for a charity 
helping the homeless during 
winter. 
 
Chris is more likely to be an 
anti-globalization activist 
than he is to work as a 
salesman and be an anti-
globalization activist.  
 
R&L 
Trial 10 Susan is 35 years old. She is 
single, shy and rather 
unassuming. She owns her 
flat, which she has 
redecorated herself. She 
likes sewing, and is taking 
gardening classes. She 
owns four cats and 
volunteers for the RSPCA 
every Saturday.  
 
Susan is more likely to be a 
librarian and enjoy bungee 
jumping than she is to enjoy 
bungee jumping.  
 
 
R/I 
Trial 11 Simon is 32 years. He 
works hard, loves money 
and speculates in stocks. He 
is often stressed, rarely has 
time to eat a full meal and 
sleeps little. He is single 
and lives in a loft 
apartment. 
 
Simon is more likely to be a 
graffiti artist than he is to be 
a businessman and a graffiti 
artist.  
 
 
U/L 
Trial 12 Rachel is 25 years old. She 
is engaged. She wears the 
most fashionable, most 
expensive designer clothes. 
She is passionate about 
everything that relates to 
interior decorating. She 
works at a publishing house 
in Paris city centre. 
 
Rachel is more likely to 
attend fashion shows and 
enjoy camping in the 
wilderness for her holidays 
than she is to attend fashion 
shows. 
 
U&I 
Trial 13 Karen is 40 years old. She 
is passionate about the 
environment and recycles 
all her waste. She lives a 
healthy lifestyle and is a 
Karen is more likely to be an 
ecologist than she is to be an 
ecologist and enjoy 
taxidermy.  
R&L 
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vegetarian. She enjoys 
hiking and being 
surrounded by nature, and 
she is an active member of 
Green Peace. 
 
Trial 14 Samantha is 24 years old. 
She is a caring person who 
is always polite to others. 
She likes to help people and 
is very good at multi-
tasking.  She is clean, 
hygienic and remains calm 
in a crisis. She is energetic 
and has a great work ethos. 
 
Samantha is more likely to 
be a nurse and a robotics 
engineer than she is to be a 
robotics engineer. 
R/I 
Trial 15 Nathan is 47 years old.  He 
is lazy and slightly 
overweight.  He enjoys DIY 
and is handy around the 
house. He likes to have a 
pint with the lads after 
work. 
 
Nathan is more likely to be a 
personal trainer than he is to 
be a builder and a personal 
trainer. 
 
U/L 
Trial 16 Peter is 32 years old. He is 
a sports enthusiast who 
often travels with his 
friends to go and watch live 
sporting events.  He likes to 
keep fit by jogging and has 
completed several long-
distance races. He coaches 
little league football on the 
weekends. 
 
Peter is more likely to be a 
rugby referee and interested 
in philosophy than he is to 
be a rugby referee. 
 
U&I 
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Appendix B: Rational Experiential Inventory (Pacini & Epstein, 1999) 
 
  
Rational-Experiential Inventory
Please use the following scale (1-5) to answer these questions:
1 = Definitely not true of myself; 5 = Definitely true of myself
1.     I have a logical mind.
2.     I prefer complex problems to simple problems.
3.     I believe in trusting my hunches.
4.     I am not a very analytical thinker.
5.     I trust my initial feelings about people. 
6.     I try to avoid situations that require thinking in depth about something. 
7.     I like to rely on my intuitive impressions.
8.     I don’t reason well under pressure.
9.     I don’t like situations in which I have to rely on intuition. 
10.  Thinking hard and for a long time about something gives me little satisfaction.
11.  Intuition can be a very useful way to solve problems.
12.  I would not want to depend on anyone who described himself or herself as intuitive.
13.  I am much better at figuring things out logically than most people.
14.  I usually have clear, explainable reasons for my decisions.
15.  I don’t think it is a good idea to rely on one’s intuition for important decisions.
16.  Thinking is not my idea of an enjoyable activity.
17.  I have no problem thinking things through carefully.
18.  When it comes to trusting people, I can usually rely on my gut feelings.
19.  I can usually feel when a person is right or wrong, even if I can’t explain how I know.
20.  Learning new ways to think would be very appealing to me. 
21.  I hardly ever go wrong when I listen to my deepest gut feelings to find an answer.
22.  I think it is foolish to make important decisions based on feelings.
23.  I tend to use my heart as a guide for my actions. 
24.  I often go by my instincts when deciding on a course of action. 
25.  I’m not that good at figuring out complicated problems. 
26.  I enjoy intellectual challenges.
27.  Reasoning things out carefully is not one of my strong points.
28.  I enjoy thinking in abstract terms.
29.  I generally don’t depend on my feelings to help me make decisions.
30.  Using logic usually works well for me in figuring out problems in my life. 
31.  I think there are times when one should rely on one’s intuition.
32.  I don’t like to have to do a lot of thinking.
33.  Knowing the answer without having to understand the reasoning behind it is good enough for me.
34.  Using my gut feelings usually works well for me in figuring out problems in my life.
35.  I don’t have a very good sense of intuition. 
36.  If I were to rely on my gut feelings, I would often make mistakes.
37.  I suspect my hunches are inaccurate as often as they are accurate.
38.  My snap judgements are probably not as good as most people’s.
39.  I am not very good at solving problems that require careful logical analysis.
40.  I enjoy solving problems that require hard thinking. 
Data scheme
Recode: 4, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 15, 16, 22, 25, 27, 29, 32, 33, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39 
Rational Ability:=(1 + 4 + 8 + 13 + 14 + 17 + 25 + 27 + 30 + 39)/10
Rational Engagement:=(2 + 6 + 10 + 16 + 20 + 26 + 28 + 32 + 33 + 40)/10 
Experiential Ability:=(3 + 5 + 18 + 19 + 21 + 34 + 35 + 36 + 37 + 38)/10 
Experiential Engagement:=(7 + 9 + 11 + 12 + 15 + 22 + 23 + 24 + 29 + 31)/10 
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Appendix C: Experiment 1 Robustness test 
Participants who failed to meet certain outlined parameters were flagged as outliers. This 
entailed examining the judgement responses, the judgement latencies and the reading 
durations for carelessness. Outliers were flagged for a number of reasons, which will be 
explained in more detail below, and following the number of flags received they were either 
retained in the sample, or excluded. 
Following this, the total time taken to complete the task was screened for outliers in the 
unlimited time condition. A z-score was computed for each participant for the total time taken 
to complete all 16 trials in the study. Participants who performed slower or faster than 3 
standard deviations from the mean total time were considered outliers. One participant in the 
unlimited time condition was identified as an outlier and flagged.  
Next, the trial duration latencies were screened for outliers. In the limited time condition, 
participants were instructed to make their judgements in 8 seconds or faster. An average trial 
duration score was computed for each participant in this condition, and they received a flag if 
this was greater than 8 seconds. No participant spent over 8 seconds per trial under time 
pressure. In the unlimited time condition a z-score was computed for each average trial 
duration score. Participants who performed slower or faster than 3 standard deviations from 
the mean total time were considered outliers. One participant in the unlimited time condition 
was identified as an outlier and flagged.  
Following this, the trial durations were analysed for multivariate outliers. Unlimited and 
limited time conditions were analysed separately. An examination of the Mahalanobis 
distance scores flagged two participants as outliers in the unlimited time condition and 
another two in the limited time condition. The same analysis was performed to identify 
multivariate outliers on trial reading durations (i.e., the length of time taken to read the 
scenario). However, this time the entire sample was analysed together because the time 
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pressure manipulation did not affect the time allocated for reading the scenarios. The 
Mahalanobis distance scores indicated a total of nine participants flagged for giving answers 
considered as multivariate outliers on the reading durations. 
Finally, an overall flag score was computed for careless responding. This entailed 
summing the flags accumulated across (a) incongruent answers to non-conflict trials, (b) 
taking too long or not long enough to complete the study, (c) taking too long or not long 
enough to read the scenarios, (d) taking too long or not long enough to read the statement and 
make a judgement, and (e) responding to the trials in under 8 seconds in the limited time 
condition. In the limited time condition, five participants each scored one flag, while one 
participant scored two flags. In the unlimited time condition, four participants each scored 
one flag, while two participants scored two flags. Participants who received two flags or more 
were removed from the sample. Thus, three participants in total were removed from the 
sample leaving the total amount of participants at 98 (nunlimited = 48; nlimited = 50). 
When heuristic scores were analysed using a 2 (time condition) x 2 (conflict condition) x 
4 (trial blocks) mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) with repeated measures on the last two 
factors, results were no different to those outlined above in chapter 3 (see Table 1).  
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Table 1 
Mixed Analysis of Variance Summary Table for the Effects of Time Pressure and Block on 
Conflict Sensitivity 
 
 
Judgement latencies were converted to log10 prior to analysis to normalize the 
distribution and subjected to a 3(judgment type: no-conflict vs. conflict-heuristic vs. conflict-
logical) x 2(time condition: unlimited vs. limited) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on 
the first factor. Results do not differ from those reported above which include the full sample 
(see Table 2). 
 
Table 2 
Mixed Analysis of Variance Summary Table for the Effects of Time Pressure on Response 
Type 
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Appendix D: Barratt Impulsiveness Scale Version 11 
 
Reverse scored items: 1, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 20, 29, 30. 
  
Patton, Stanford, Barratt (1995). J Clin Psy, vol. 51, pp. 768-774 
DIRECTIONS: People differ in the ways they act and think in different situations.  This is a test 
to measure some of the ways in which you act and think.  Read each statement and put an X on 
the appropriate circle on the right side of this page.  Do not spend too much time on any 
statement.  Answer quickly and honestly. 
 
 c d e f 
 Rarely/Never     Occasionally   Often  Almost Always/Always 
1    I plan tasks carefully.     c     d     e   f 
2    I do things without thinking.     c     d     e   f 
3    I make-up my mind quickly.     c     d     e   f 
4    I am happy-go-lucky.     c     d     e   f 
5    I don’t “pay attention.”     c     d     e   f 
6    I have “racing” thoughts.     c     d     e   f 
7    I plan trips well ahead of time.     c     d     e   f 
8    I am self controlled.     c     d     e   f 
9    I concentrate easily.     c     d     e   f 
10  I save regularly.     c     d     e   f 
11  I “squirm” at plays or lectures.     c     d     e   f 
12  I am a careful thinker.     c     d     e   f 
13  I plan for job security.     c     d     e   f 
14  I say things without thinking.     c     d     e   f 
15  I like to think about complex problems.     c     d     e   f 
16  I change jobs.     c     d     e   f 
17  I act “on impulse.”     c     d     e   f 
18  I get easily bored when solving thought problems.     c     d     e   f 
19  I act on the spur of the moment.     c     d     e   f 
20  I am a steady thinker.     c     d     e   f 
21  I change residences.     c     d     e   f 
22  I buy things on impulse.     c     d     e   f 
23  I can only think about one thing at a time.     c     d     e   f 
24  I change hobbies.     c     d     e   f 
25  I spend or charge more than I earn.     c     d     e   f 
26  I often have extraneous thoughts when thinking.     c     d     e   f 
27  I am more interested in the present than the future.     c     d     e   f 
28  I am restless at the theater or lectures.     c     d     e   f 
29  I like puzzles.     c     d     e   f 
30  I am future oriented.     c     d     e   f 
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Appendix E: Cognitive Reflection Task (CRT; Frederick, 2005) 
 
1. A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs a dollar more than the ball. How 
much does the ball cost? ____ cents  
[Correct answer 5 cents; intuitive answer 10 cents] 
2. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 
machines to make 100 widgets? ____ minutes  
[Correct answer 5 minutes; intuitive answer 100 minutes] 
3. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 
48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to 
cover half of the lake? ____ days  
[Correct answer 47 days; intuitive answer 24 days] 
 
